WI: The boer wars as an early vietnam

Well, as it was the British were only too willing to scorch the earth and lock tens of thousands of noncombatants away to die under conditions of deliberate, graduated starvation, lack of sanitation, and disease (roughly 10% of the total Boer population died in the concentration camps). And they only ameliorated their policy, and started making reasonable efforts to administer the camps responsibly, due to public pressure following the government's failure to keep word from getting out.

I reckon the British government would've been quite happy to kill up to 30% of all Boers if necessary -- and much more than that if they could keep it hush-hush. I can't imagine the Boers sustaining the war effort in the face of demonstrable the British government's extraordinary willingness to see so many (non-British) women and children die.

The British were going to get the gold and territory.
 
I agree with Tallil2long. What we might call the 'Vietnam Effect'—which I'll define as a militarily superior power withdrawing its effort to crush a guerrilla movement because of public pressure within itself rather than because of military defeat—depends on there being the necessary public pressure. Are the British people, at the height of the Age of Imperialism, going to decide to pull their country out of the war to gain valuable resources because of the suffering of (to borrow a phrase) a faraway people of whom they know nothing?

If you think the answer is 'yes', I have some swampland in Florida to sell you.

As for the guerrillas successfully forcing out the British without it being a Vietnam-esque matter of British public opinion… no, that's not realistic. Guerrilla warfare is far less effective, historically speaking, than modern public opinion holds. They're only so effective nowadays because occupying powers tie their own hands behind their back by conforming to ideals of human rights and suchlike. Here's an example of history: the British Empire faced a potentially Vietnam-esque situation in Malaysia in its waning years, and reacted by conducting a strategy of torturing people suspected of sheltering the communist rebels/freedom fighters/terrorists (delete as appropriate—the terms are synonymous anyway), of population transfers/ethnic cleansing to get rid of mixed areas full of ethnic discontent, and of group reprisals: if your village shelters a communist rebel, say goodbye to your village and your homes. It worked perfectly and communism in Malaysia was put down for good. Modern western interventionist great powers aren't willing to be so brutal, which is why they can be defeated by groups so much weaker than them.

(Lest I be misinterpreted, I should add that I'm not saying that the strategy British imperialists used in Malaysia was morally right; I'm just saying that as a matter of fact it's much more effective at putting down an insurgency than the more human-rights-ish, restricted-ROE strategies of modern interventionists.)
 
say the war went on for at least a decade and seemed unwinnable, would Britain simply give up?

1) This belongs in post-1900. Just barely, but after 1900.

2) The Boer War can't replicate Vietnam for two obvious reasons.

a) There is no sanctuary area for the Boers to operate from.
b) There is no Great Power supplying the Boers lavishly with arms.
 
2) The Boer War can't replicate Vietnam for two obvious reasons.

a) There is no sanctuary area for the Boers to operate from.
b) There is no Great Power supplying the Boers lavishly with arms.
That's also why Perfidious Albion's comparison of Malaya to Vietnam falls down - the Communists in Malaya had neither, those in Vietnam had both.
 
Possible if Germany supports the Boers through their colony in Namibia, and the Boers are able to use the Namibian deserts as refuge/staging area.

Why Germany would go through any trouble on behalf of the Boers is another matter. Not only is pissing in Britain's cornflakes over some African backwater at this point a Very Bad Idea, but the Boers themselves want independence, not an exchange of colonial masters, and are about as German as they are British.
 
1) This belongs in post-1900. Just barely, but after 1900.

2) The Boer War can't replicate Vietnam for two obvious reasons.

a) There is no sanctuary area for the Boers to operate from.
b) There is no Great Power supplying the Boers lavishly with arms.

the boers used german weapons and kaiser wilhelm 2 explicitly promised to aid them militarily though he later reneged
 
Yeah I think the British government would see every last Boer dead befpre pulling out and importantly, the population at home don't care.

The Boer Wars should be a point of national shame for us Brits, it may have been the worst thing our country ever did.
 
Yeah I think the British government would see every last Boer dead befpre pulling out and importantly, the population at home don't care.

I don't think so. IOTL public pressure made the government improve conditions in the concentration camps, so I can't imagine people being fine with a mass genocide. (Or at least not with a mass genocide of white people.) Nor for that matter can I imagine the government successfully keeping such a thing secret.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Given the size of the Boer population

say the war went on for at least a decade and seemed unwinnable, would Britain simply give up?

Given the size of the Boer population - the total number of men mobilized amounted to ~90,000, whereas the British pulled together an expeditionary force of ultimately 450,000, one would expect they would pursue the strategy they did in actuality - isolate the Boer forces from the civilian population, cut them off from any foreign sanctuaries, and lay waste to anything that could be used by the Boer guerillas.

Which is ultimately why they were able to force the Boers to the table.

Best,
 

Redhand

Banned
The thing to consider here is that the British took the gloves off early and did not put them back on. The US in Vietnam had to prop up a pretty crappy failed state in South Vietnam, try to avoid atrocities that the British found very effective to use, and deal with the fact that military successes were offset by developments occurring outside the borders of South Vietnam.

The British had to simply subdue states in the interior of Africa who were massively outnumbered and outgunned, and they could use atrocities to get it done. The US was outnumbered, certainly not outgunned, but was basically playing an eternal game of wackamole that they could not continue forever. It probably stopped all of the dominoes from falling, but it couldn't save South Vietnam.
 
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That's also why Perfidious Albion's comparison of Malaya to Vietnam falls down - the Communists in Malaya had neither, those in Vietnam had both.

Does the analogy fall down? Certainly, because we're talking about real-life scenarios, they're not identical-except-for-one-difference as would be ideal for analysis; of course there are multiple differences between the two scenarios. Ultimately it's up to us to work out which of the differences were decisive in causing the different outcome.

Since not only were the Malaysian communists working with much less than the Vietnamese communists but the British Empire and its cohorts were working with much less than the United States, I'm not inclined to think that it was a matter of the Malayans lacking the necessary supplies. That leaves the matter of safe havens and the matter of British strategy vs American strategy. I'm inclined to favour the latter, but I understand that it can be reasonable to draw different conclusions; I'm not claiming that it is as clear-cut a case as the old "Could Hitler have won WW2?"
 
For stronger Boer states (which leads to a rougher war for the British) you need several things.

- Avoid the Anglo-German agreement (1886) on the their influence spheres on the Portuguese colonies. If the Germans can be convinced to push for at least Delgoa bay to be under German influence it would give the Boers an effectively secure harbor. This would also strengthen German public support for the Boers. Which was rather large anyway but the German government didn't want to risk a war with the UK. (Support for the Boers was rather large in Europe anyway after the Jameson raid.)

- After the Jameson raid British military control over Kimberley and ''Noordkaap'' was rather weak. Incidentally a local African tribe I can't properly recall attacked the British settlements in the area. But they didn't do much more then raiding and killing a few smaller settlements. They could have easily raised Kimberley to the ground if they realized how weak the British defense was at that point.

- There already was a railroad between Pretoria and Lourenco Marques (Maputo) which was in the hands of the NZASM (Dutch-South African Railroad Society) and nationalized at the start of the war, this would become a crucial supply line for the Boers.

- The Boers already purchased about 30.000 Mausers from the Germans and various guns from both the French and the Germans, their military was equipped with the best weaponry gold could buy. And the Boers had a lot of gold. A stronger Boers-German relation would lead to even more material.

- Earlier military succeses for the Boers. While the Boers were superb in defending themselves from the superior British numbers. Mostly due to conservative British generals not adapting their strategies and tactics against the Boers their unconventional warfare. The Boers never really managed to take over several key areas when they actually were on the offensive in Natal. Taking Ladysmith early on would have been possible if General Jourdain had been a bit less cautious. Or you could have Louis Botha leading the charge into Natal.

- These early military successes which would not be limited to repelling British attacks would give the Boers a much stronger position to continue the war from. There could be the possibility of the Boers still in the British Cape Colony taking up the banner of revolt and making live hell for the British forces in their own backyard.

This would lead to either an interference from other European powers, such as France and Germany who would smell the British weakness in the area like a shark swimming towards a wounded seal. Hell the Russians could even decide its time to continue their push into Afghanistan... Which would lead to a victorious Transvaal and Oranje Vrijstaat.

That or the British manage to wrangle themselves out of this disaster diplomatically and have to use a lot more resources to take down the Boers. Which at this point would no longer be a possibility. So they pull back after a Vietnam-esque war trauma.

Ironically this would make the British troops perform a lot better in a hypothetical WWI.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Don't forget, the "CTs" in Malaya were largely ethnically Chinese...

Does the analogy fall down? Certainly, because we're talking about real-life scenarios, they're not identical-except-for-one-difference as would be ideal for analysis; of course there are multiple differences between the two scenarios. Ultimately it's up to us to work out which of the differences were decisive in causing the different outcome.

Since not only were the Malaysian communists working with much less than the Vietnamese communists but the British Empire and its cohorts were working with much less than the United States, I'm not inclined to think that it was a matter of the Malayans lacking the necessary supplies. That leaves the matter of safe havens and the matter of British strategy vs American strategy. I'm inclined to favour the latter, but I understand that it can be reasonable to draw different conclusions; I'm not claiming that it is as clear-cut a case as the old "Could Hitler have won WW2?"

Don't forget, the "CTs" in Malaya were largely ethnically Chinese... they sort of stood out from the average Malayan "crowd."

Add that to Malaya being a peninsula whose land borders were with friendly countries, fairly limited, or both, and yep, it was a very different situation.

Best.
 
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