WI: The BoB with no Dowding and Park

[Ian Hathaway]

The Headquarters of Fighter Command was situated on the North West outskirts of London. The leader of Fighter Command, Hugh Dowding was obviously there most of the time and he was visited fairly regularly by Keith Park who was in charge of the defence of the skies above the south east of England with 11 Group.

Bentley Priory was not an obvious target for the Germans however it was on the low priority list due to the radio traffic that left the buildng. On more than one occasion raiders attacked Fighter Commands HQ but caused little or no damage.

However, what would have happened if, in late July, Dowding and Park had been out for a stroll when a lone raider had straffed the grounds of Bentley Priory, killing or injuring both?

The BoB had already started by this time so some of the defence tactics used were already forming and some of the deficiencies of the system were already being recognised. So how do you think Dowding and Parks absence would affect the BoB?

And finally, who would take over from them?

 

[ivanotter]

Leigh-Mallory was surely i the running for Dowding's job.

Bader might have taken over 11 Group.

Douglas Sotho could have been a contender insofar as he had Brooke's ear.

... all of it would havbe been rather bad.

Leigh-Mallory believed in hitting the bombers on their way home, after they had dropped their bombs and after he had formed up his big wing stuff.

Parker did not really believe in that strategy.

Interesting as Parker said that he believed that 11 Group should just scramble and get in the air as fast as possible as they had very limited time from sigthing of bombers to engagement.

He pointed out that 12 Group had more time to get in the air, wherefor big wing was fine for 12 Group.

... except there were not many bombers getting to 12 Group's area.

Ivan

 

[MattII]

I thought Park mostly stayed at RAF Uxbridge.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I thought Park mostly stayed at RAF Uxbridge.

Well he did, after all that is where 11 Group headquarters were, however he did make regular visits to his boss at Bently Priory to discuss the situation and talk tactics.

For example on the 7th September, just when you would think he was needed most at 11 Group HQ he actually spent most of the day with Dowding. Park had a very able team of control staff who he trusted to follow his directives ... he didn't need to be their all the time.

 

[Riain]

I think talk of tactics shows how little would change in such a scenario. The most important thing was that the radar and fighter control system, the best in the world, was set up an running.

Just a word on big wings, losses over about 6% are unsustainable. A few big wing inflicted massacres in a short space of time might drastically curtail Luftwaffe activities, like it did for Luftflotte 5 on August 15th 1940.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I think talk of tactics shows how little would change in such a scenario. The most important thing was that the radar and fighter control system, the best in the world, was set up an running.

Just a word on big wings, losses over about 6% are unsustainable. A few big wing inflicted massacres in a short space of time might drastically curtail Luftwaffe activities, like it did for Luftflotte 5 on August 15th 1940.

The most important thing was not the radar and fighter control system but what you did with it. Park was a master of the system and knew exactly what he had to do, where he had to send his squadrons and what targets he had to protect. If he sent his fighters up too soon there was a chance they would be sent to the wrong targets or worse still, they would be caught refuelling when the bombers arrived. If he sent the fighters up too late they would not be able to stop the bombers from hitting their targets, with a possibility of catching the fighters on the ground.

The big wing was not used on 15th August, the raids were at their closest 130 miles from Duxford. Also the big wing was attempted 32 times during the BoB and only intercepted on 7 occassions, most if not all of those occassions was after the use of German mass formations that gave, fighter command a much longer preparation time. Use of the Big Wing in July and August would have seen far more British casualties. On the subject of casualties, Douglas Bader was very liberal with his combat claims, quite often his Squadrons would post claims up to four times those of actual aircraft shot down or damaged.

 

[Riain]

Park wasn't born with the ability to master the radar/control system, he was a long serving officer who learned how to use it. Other men of his rank and of similar background should have been able to use it to similar if somewhat different effect. Certainly there were other ideas on how, not to detract from Park, whom I like.

I didn't say the big wing was used against Luftflotte 5, I said that it suffered major casualties and therefore ceased operations. The lure of the big wing was that it could bring major forces to bear on enemy formations and overwhelm them causing major casualties. I struggle to see the difference in live saved by use of Park's methods and lives saved because the Luftwaffe limiting operations because it had been mauled by big wings a couple of times.

 

[MattII]

Park wasn't born with the ability to master the radar/control system, he was a long serving officer who learned how to use it. Other men of his rank and of similar background should have been able to use it to similar if somewhat different effect.

Note the bolded part. Park may not have been born with the ability, but he sure had something more than most, for he had an acute ability to pick off fighter-sweeps from actual bomber formations, and didn't waste his forces trying to engage them.

I struggle to see the difference in live saved by use of Park's methods and lives saved because the Luftwaffe limiting operations because it had been mauled by big wings a couple of times.

Well, except for the fact that big wings don't work unless you can see the enemy coming in time, which wasn't possible in the BoB given both the shortness of the approach, and more importantly the time delays in trying to organise squadrons. Now Big Wings might have worked had Leigh Mallory not been such an ass in allowing Bader to run the organisation of such. Bader's glory-hound desire to lead the 12-group big wing, and his tendency to mix spitfires and hurricanes meant that it was never going to work.

 

[Riain]

When the RAF started fighter sweeps into France they were puzzled as to why the Luftwaffe never bothered to come up, but never failed to come up for bombers. The answer was that pure fighter sweeps flew at speeds and altitudes best suited to fighters whereas bombers flew at speeds and altitudes best suited to bombers. On a radar screen the difference is as plain as day, when the RAF learned this all offensive flights took place at bomber speeds and altitudes. Maybe Park picked this up when the shoe was on the other foot.

BTW I'm not denigrating Park or Dowding, they were both talented and got shafted. But there is always more than one way to skin a cat and perhaps if given the opportunity the big wing idea might have come together on occasion to create a massacre of bombers that may rock the Luftwaffe back for a bit, saving lives in the process.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

When the RAF started fighter sweeps into France they were puzzled as to why the Luftwaffe never bothered to come up, but never failed to come up for bombers. The answer was that pure fighter sweeps flew at speeds and altitudes best suited to fighters whereas bombers flew at speeds and altitudes best suited to bombers. On a radar screen the difference is as plain as day, when the RAF learned this all offensive flights took place at bomber speeds and altitudes. Maybe Park picked this up when the shoe was on the other foot.

BTW I'm not denigrating Park or Dowding, they were both talented and got shafted. But there is always more than one way to skin a cat and perhaps if given the opportunity the big wing idea might have come together on occasion to create a massacre of bombers that may rock the Luftwaffe back for a bit, saving lives in the process.

Unfortunately this was not always the case, on 18th September a raid was spotted moving rapidly across the Channel, Park put up 15 squadrons to intercept and found it was just a fighter sweep. Unfortunately the RAF lost five aircraft because of it.

Two hours later the same tactics were used by the Luftwaffe, a high speed raid only this time the fighters had a scattering of Ju88s amongst them, Park held back his fighters on this occasion, again the wrong move.

Later that afternoon the Luftwaffe tried again, and again mixed in with the fighters were the fast Ju88s. This time Park got it right and on one of the rare occasions the Big Wing intercepted in a timely fashion claiming 30 kills ... the figure was actually nearer to 4.

On 18th September Fighter Command lost 12 aircraft and the Luftwaffe 15.