WI: The Back up plan to counter Yamato

Ming777

Monthly Donor
As we all know, the battleship Yamato was sunk on the way to Okinawa for her suicide mission. However, what if the battleship did survive the carrier onslaught?

Task force 58 had a back-up plan just in case. The had a fleet of destroyers, cruisers, and 2 Alaska class battlecruisers, all led by six modern battleships, three South Dakotas and three Iowa class. Clearly, the Ten-Go task force would be destroyed, however Yamato was still a potent vessel. How much damage do you think could Yamato could dish out before her inevitable demise?
 
Hmmm. Good question.

The Yamato was designed to counter the numerical superiority of the Americans by being able to fight more than one ship at one time. But against the Iowas (which were far faster and far more maneuverable than the giant Yamato), with the tendency for Japanese vessels to have poor fire control, Iowa, New Jersey and Missouri woulda dropped Yamato before the Japanese ship could sink any of the American battleships. If Yamato gets into it with any of the others, either the South Dakotas, or worse the Alaskas (which were probably not able to sink something as big as Yamato anyways), its bad for the Americans.

Now, Ten-Go's ultimate idea was to have Yamato beach itself off Okinawa and act as a inmmovable gun battery. That's kinda a waste of a battleship, but the Japanese were rather desperate at that point.
 

CalBear

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Almost none.

She had a grossly inadequate screen (1 CL, 8 DD), very poor gunnery control and a even worse record in combat (an Iowa would have sunk every ship in Taffy three in about two hours), seriously deficient and variable quality armor (the turret face armor for her main battery was the heaviest armor ever put to sea, while most of her armor, while heavier than U.S. ships in thickness was of poorer quality, similar to the immediate post WW-I RN plate), and even her AP 18.1" shells would have had great difficulty with the American STS plate and its decapping design. Worst of all she would be faced with more enemies than she had main turrets.

The U.S. ships, both the Iowas & South Dakotas, had exceptionally good gun laying and aiming radars, with the Iowa's 16"/50 direction being the best ever attached to a heavy gun. American armor was superior to the IJN, had the ability decap AP shells, and U.S. ships were the only ones ever made with an INTERNAL STS vertical armor plating box protecting the magazines from splinter damage, American armor scheme made U.S. ships much more "survivable" than Yamato. Both American classes had exceptional armor and in virtually the same thickness and effectiveness, with the BB-61 weight difference being due to the larger 16"/50 gun (just the barrels themselves, not including the larger breeches and much larger turrets, added close to 200 tons to the design), greater overall length (+200'), additional secondary armaments, and larger power plants.

Lastly, and perhaps most critically, the U.S. escort would have been far larger, more than capable of holding the small IJN screen at bay and allowing the heavies to deal with Yamato (this specific engagement is just about the only one that would actually justify the money wasted on the CB design since it would be useful for demolishing the enemy light unit at long range). The American ships would also, thanks to both their radar aiming and escorts, be able to fight at close to max range and, if necessary or desired, from behind heavy smoke screening from their escorts.. American AAA and available fighter cover would also mean the Japanese would be denied use of airborne spotting to track fall of shot.

As an aside: The Americans didn't require a back-up plan. Mitscher had ELEVEN carriers (7 CV & 4 CVL) carrying right around 1,000 aircraft, the U.S. send the equivalent of four deck-loads after the Yamato, leaving the remaining aircraft to continue to conduct regular operations in support of the Okinawa invasion. Four hours after the first aircraft took off (and the flight time to the Yamato from the carriers was just about two hours) Yamato went dead in the water; 23 minutes later she capsized and exploded. In other words, it took the aircraft about two hours to send her to the bottom. She sank at 14:23, meaning the Americans could have done it all over again with four fresh deck-loads before the day watch changed.

Mitscher actually asked his screen commander, Willis Lee, if he wanted to take his heavies and deal with her and her escort. Lee declined, more or less telling Mitscher he didn't want to waste the time and effort on Yamato.
 
CalBear:

Ever played Fighting Steel the amped up version?
http://forums.navalwarfare.org/showthread.php?t=6

They extend beyond '42, better radars, new ship classes:
Iowas, Montanas, Alaskas - even Salems, Ludendorf/Hindenburg.

Alaskas in this are scary accurate at very long range - hits out at 28-30K yards - but fragile compared to say a Scharnhorst.

Options include shell's eye camera view on the way to the target.

To the thread point - my impression is Yamatos-Iowas might have been a little like T72's - M1's Desert Storm, but not with 125mm just dropping on the ground short, just the accuracy and training part. Iowas hitting hard at very long range and Yamatos just not connecting. That and bad damage control verses very good US damage control - - I give you the Franklin. Not just better equipment, but more proficiency and experience - all that shore bombardment firing the guns, at least for the older ones.

Nihon Kaigun - ever been here?
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm

Furatakas Fleet is fun - Tamiya box covers and photo shop - the 12x18" Montana-ized Yamato.

Has the action log for Yamatos - very boring - a lot of sailing around without fighting, meaning the crew wouldn't be as proficient with the ship. A Hangar queen ship in effect. Japanese handling their capital ships like WW1 A-H - more valuable as a fleet-in-being.
 

Tellus

Banned
I tried it in the last scenario of P.T.O, where the Japanese are theoretically doomed; I managed to slip her past the carrier wings in heavy rain, and then sunk most of the US fleet before it took serious damage. Even then I pushed the Americans back to the Mariannas.

Henceforth it is established that the clear weather that day was the last line of defense of the U.S. Navy, and the real reason why we won the war. :D
 

CalBear

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Monthly Donor
I tried it in the last scenario of P.T.O, where the Japanese are theoretically doomed; I managed to slip her past the carrier wings in heavy rain, and then sunk most of the US fleet before it took serious damage. Even then I pushed the Americans back to the Mariannas.

Henceforth it is established that the clear weather that day was the last line of defense of the U.S. Navy, and the real reason why we won the war. :D


Well, there you have it.

Proof positive that Yamato was the first stealth warship, completely invisible to radar.

:p
 
The Commander in charge during the Okinawa Campaign was Clifton Spruance, who orderd his subcommander Mitcher to attack only with the vastly superior carrierstrikegroups, as there were plenty of aircraft available, who all could hit much harder than any of the gun armed ships in the fleet.

In theory, Mitcher could have called for Rear Admiral Lee's battleline to form up, but only as a last ditch defense, as Spruance appearently had his reasons for not allowing batlteships to slug it out together. (Most likely he expected a higher loss in personel, when engaging with ships, endagering his objective, the invasion of Okinawa. Aircraft were a much more flexible and cheaper option, both in personel and material coasts.)

By the way, Mitcher had a more powerfull force at hand, in the form of fast destroyer groups, escorting his carriers, rather than the less manouvrable and relatively vulnerable cruisers and battleships. As with Taffy 3 at Samar, a few destroyers could in fact force a much more powerfull fleet to make evasive action, and thereby protecting the carriers. Simmialrly the Invbasionforce of Okinawa could be succesfully defended by the convoy escorts, as the Yamato Force was much smaller than the Kurita Force at Samar. Battleships were a waist of resources in any scenario, as more potent weapons were cheaper and more flexible. Anyway, the battleship was a dinosaur, a waist of both men and resources, resulting in their decommissioning directly after the war.
 
Lastly, and perhaps most critically, the U.S. escort would have been far larger, more than capable of holding the small IJN screen at bay and allowing the heavies to deal with Yamato (this specific engagement is just about the only one that would actually justify the money wasted on the CB design since it would be useful for demolishing the enemy light unit at long range). The American ships would also, thanks to both their radar aiming and escorts, be able to fight at close to max range and, if necessary or desired, from behind heavy smoke screening from their escorts.. American AAA and available fighter cover would also mean the Japanese would be denied use of airborne spotting to track fall of shot.

So, if this happens, maybe the US, seeing the Alaska's as useful, keep them into the Cold War?
 

burmafrd

Banned
Aircraft at that time had virtually no night flight capability. And carrier operations were dependent on at least decent weather. Battleships showed their value in the Solomons, on both sides (even if the IJN handled them badly). To say they were a waste is to be blatantly oblivious to what transpired. And there was a reason that in the North Atlantic carriers did not do much- the weather was terrible most of the time. The RN had to keep a heavy force there to keep an eye on the german heavy ships. And they could not rely on air power to stop them. It was only due to a very lucky hit on her rudders that doomed the Bismark- if not for that she would have made it to the French ports. IF that had happened, remember that the Tirpitz was ready for combat less then a year later. The RN would have had a real headache worrying about both of them, and also adding the Scharnhost and Gneisnau. THose four ships would have made a very formidable force-especially to a RN already badly stretched due to the Pacific War.

The Yamato had poor gunnery aiming capability, the 18.1 was a ballastically poor gun, her shells were not of great quality. I think that an Iowa would have been able to take her one on one. The SD class actually in some respects were tougher since being shorter she presented a smaller target. Even a couple of the OLD BBs would have had a good chance at taking her down, despite their slow speed. THey probably would have been heavily damaged, though.
 
Aircraft at that time had virtually no night flight capability. And carrier operations were dependent on at least decent weather. Battleships showed their value in the Solomons, on both sides (even if the IJN handled them badly). To say they were a waste is to be blatantly oblivious to what transpired. And there was a reason that in the North Atlantic carriers did not do much- the weather was terrible most of the time. The RN had to keep a heavy force there to keep an eye on the german heavy ships. And they could not rely on air power to stop them. It was only due to a very lucky hit on her rudders that doomed the Bismark- if not for that she would have made it to the French ports. IF that had happened, remember that the Tirpitz was ready for combat less then a year later. The RN would have had a real headache worrying about both of them, and also adding the Scharnhost and Gneisnau. THose four ships would have made a very formidable force-especially to a RN already badly stretched due to the Pacific War.

The Yamato had poor gunnery aiming capability, the 18.1 was a ballastically poor gun, her shells were not of great quality. I think that an Iowa would have been able to take her one on one. The SD class actually in some respects were tougher since being shorter she presented a smaller target. Even a couple of the OLD BBs would have had a good chance at taking her down, despite their slow speed. THey probably would have been heavily damaged, though.


Some might still think that the only way to deal with an opponent is to destroy it completely, but that is not the case normally. The mission is to deny your opponent to do its job, no matter how. A much cheaper solution is to use the already plenty escorts of destroyers and destroyer escorts to face any IJN surfaceforce, when airpower is not available. Battleships are always at a disadvantage against a numerical strong destroyerforce, as the capital ship cannot allow damage, while the cheap destroyers are expendable, if necessary.

So forget the battleships of the USN and use what is available at the scene already. The Invasionfleet had these numbers of escorts, so could put up a strong defense, threatening the Yamato with their torpedoes, while laying protective smokescreens, to hide their flogg of transports. By the time, Yamato and her taskforce are able to defeat the USN escorts, if capable to do this altogether, they are almost out of ammunition, as this is what warfare is all about.

The period is also an important thing to mention. Surfaceships had had their period decades earlier and were now already reduced to subsidiary roles, such as support of landings and escorting convoys. The primary Naval Warfare was now executed by the submarine and aircraft, who both had come to age and were fully mature. Any surface actiongroup was doomed, as long as it lacked firepower and long ranging weapons. The big gun was finished as an effective weapon at sea, being replaced by the torpedo and long ranged missile, as well as airpower.

In theory the USN could have had a different fleet, when designing the Two Ocean Plan. By not building the four South Dakota's and six Iowa's, ten more slipway's were available for more urgently needed carriers.
 
The USN would never have not built the SoDaks - at the time they were laid down, the battleship was still viable. It wasnt really obsolete until 1944, and even then it had uses in bad weather. The Iowas were maybe unnecessary, but the US could afford to build them AND carriers, to cover its bets
 
I have also read that Mitcher disobeyed orders by launching the airstrike against the Yamato task force. There was a plan to counter Yamato with surface ships. I don't know if it was the 3rd Fleet or the 7th Fleet given the job. The 7th Fleet's cruisers, DDs, and old battlewagons had the firepower to do the job. Given the slow speed of the old BBs, it also makes for a fun wargame; I'll have to try it sometime.

The Commander in charge during the Okinawa Campaign was Clifton Spruance, who orderd his subcommander Mitcher to attack only with the vastly superior carrierstrikegroups, as there were plenty of aircraft available, who all could hit much harder than any of the gun armed ships in the fleet.

In theory, Mitcher could have called for Rear Admiral Lee's battleline to form up, but only as a last ditch defense, as Spruance appearently had his reasons for not allowing batlteships to slug it out together. (Most likely he expected a higher loss in personel, when engaging with ships, endagering his objective, the invasion of Okinawa. Aircraft were a much more flexible and cheaper option, both in personel and material coasts.)

By the way, Mitcher had a more powerfull force at hand, in the form of fast destroyer groups, escorting his carriers, rather than the less manouvrable and relatively vulnerable cruisers and battleships. As with Taffy 3 at Samar, a few destroyers could in fact force a much more powerfull fleet to make evasive action, and thereby protecting the carriers. Simmialrly the Invbasionforce of Okinawa could be succesfully defended by the convoy escorts, as the Yamato Force was much smaller than the Kurita Force at Samar. Battleships were a waist of resources in any scenario, as more potent weapons were cheaper and more flexible. Anyway, the battleship was a dinosaur, a waist of both men and resources, resulting in their decommissioning directly after the war.
 

burmafrd

Banned
ITs not about speed when its ship vs ship- maneuverability is more important.Yamato was slow to turn.

Fire control: the US Ships had a huge advantage there-especially with the late war improvements to radar.

Shells: the US shells were the best in the world at that time. The 18.1 shells had poor quality control and the gun itself had poor ballistics despite its size; IJN propellant was not the best.

One BB vs several; bad news any way you look at it.

The Yamato had a lot of armor and would have taken a fair amount of punishment but its fate was certain.
 
A more and even better option would have been to possition a submarine on Yamato's route, with orders to scout for her and, if possibly, attack it. A wolfpack was even better. So no losses on Allied side, given the poor ASW capabilities of the far too few IJN destroyers, escorting the big ships, while Yamato herself could do nothing against a submerged submarine. The Carriers would be used only as a second way to stop her, but this might mean the loss of a few aircrews in the attack, given the vast amount of AA guns on especially Yamato.

Yamato already had proven to be vulnerable to underwater damage, when a single torpedo of USS Skate had hit her in 1943. This torpedo ruptured the torpedobulkhead foreward in the ship, just foreward of A turret, resulting in the flooding of some 3000 tons of water inside the Citadel, which was designed just to withstand torpedohits. The designflaw in this part of the vessel was serious, as it could mean the loss of her fightingpower (flooding the foreward magazines) with just a single hit. Although still afloat, the vessel would be quite useless in such a case.
 
A more and even better option would have been to possition a submarine on Yamato's route, with orders to scout for her and, if possibly, attack it. A wolfpack was even better. So no losses on Allied side, given the poor ASW capabilities of the far too few IJN destroyers, escorting the big ships, while Yamato herself could do nothing against a submerged submarine. The Carriers would be used only as a second way to stop her, but this might mean the loss of a few aircrews in the attack, given the vast amount of AA guns on especially Yamato.

Yamato already had proven to be vulnerable to underwater damage, when a single torpedo of USS Skate had hit her in 1943. This torpedo ruptured the torpedobulkhead foreward in the ship, just foreward of A turret, resulting in the flooding of some 3000 tons of water inside the Citadel, which was designed just to withstand torpedohits. The designflaw in this part of the vessel was serious, as it could mean the loss of her fightingpower (flooding the foreward magazines) with just a single hit. Although still afloat, the vessel would be quite useless in such a case.

In the old Microprose WW2 sub simulator game, Silent Service 2, there was a sink the Yamato scenario. Even at the highest difficulty, I was able to sink the ship, by basically disabling her then creep over to hide udner her while the escorts tried to find me. When they got bored, they would steam off, leaving me to finish the Yamato off at my leisure. :D

Torqumada
 

DISSIDENT

Banned
If it doesn't get sunk, humanity is up shit creek when the forces of the hostile planet Gamilon under War Leader Desslok bombard Earth in two hundred years.
 

DISSIDENT

Banned
To those who that last comment seemed completely non sensical to, google the Anime series "Space Battleship Yamato".
 
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