WI: The B.E.F. only defends Belgian Neutrality in 1914.

Agreed, but it requires the Germans to declare War or attack them.

Britain can't send troops to Belgium without an invitation and that invitation wasn't forthcoming until after German troops entered Belgium, so Britain would be sending troops to the territory of a combatant to defend parts of that territory against another combatant. By going to Belgium Britain will be at war with Germany, declaration or not.

Also, before it is bought up, Germany only had a single campaign plan for 1914; attack France through Belgium. Sending British troops will not alter that plan, indeed that plan was developed with the assumption that Germany would be fighting Britain.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
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Crucially, there wasn’t a grouping in the Cabinet that was interested in protecting Britain’s self interest.
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As I am in the process of rereading Politicians at War by Cameron Hazlehurst I can only subscibe to the above.

In the deliberations of the british cabinet - as far as they are recorded, reported, remembered and reconstructed - the 'british interest' in
  • a possible renewed naval race (that the race was 'won' by Britain was clear to and accepted by even Tirpitz in 1912)
  • keeping a 'balance of power(s)' on the continent or
  • global colonial 'Great Game' extended to every region of the world
did not play any role at all.

The said source shows astonishingly how important actually inner-party relations and affair were for each of the cabinet members in finding their way towards participation in the war.
Of which 'excusing' from the Irish Affair was not the least reason for some members including most prominently the PM Asquith but also not the most important.

What in the end actually brought the majority of the cabinet the often so-called "waveres" or anti-interventionalists to turn to intervention WAS the thread of some continental power being in allover-control of not only the belgian channelcoast.

Unfortunatly (???) 'Real-Politics' didn't play much if any role in the decisions of the british politicians in late July/August 1914.


And I am still convinced, that with another man at the helm of british foreign affairs instead of Gray some kind of redux of the 'Gladstone Treaties' (to be found here in 'Appendix B and C), maybe offered at 1st or 2nd August, reinforced by the 'promise' of placing troops in Belgium, an announcement maybe backed by a somewhat laaarge group of british ... travelers reaching Ostend, could be in the cards.

This would/could keep the germans at the southern part or - givin' the german politicians including Kaiser Bills attitude at this time (trying desperatly to avoid any conflict with Britain) - even cancel any german invasion of Belgium.
...
despite Moltke not having a plan for that.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
Britain can't send troops to Belgium without an invitation and that invitation wasn't forthcoming until after German troops entered Belgium, so Britain would be sending troops to the territory of a combatant to defend parts of that territory against another combatant. By going to Belgium Britain will be at war with Germany, declaration or not.
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Sry, but .-.. such 'official' stuff like a proper declaration eventually after some kind of ultimatum to at least keep a fig-leaf of leaving the possibility to change course to the 'ultimated' was in the view of the contemporary public (journalist) and politicians veery important.
Otherwise neither the germans nor the brits had put so much attention to their declarations.

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Also, before it is bought up, Germany only had a single campaign plan for 1914; attack France through Belgium. Sending British troops will not alter that plan, indeed that plan was developed with the assumption that Germany would be fighting Britain.
True enough.
Moltke - or whoever - would have to ... 'improvise' something completly different. ... Most likely along some lines of former staff rides, plans and war games of esp. Schlieffen and Moltke the Elder.


The events on 1st August with the Kaisers order to stop the planned deployment and campaign in the west IMHO clearly shows that at the political head of goverment Germany was well willingly< to avoid a western campaign.
 
Not in the OP as posted

The OP failed to explain why the German Army, vastly outnumbering the BEF, would not take the chance to finish the job.

Now looking back on it with 20/20 eyesite I am not sure it WAS in England’s best interests to go to war. That war screwed England 6 ways from Sunday and set up WW2 with ultimately put the last nail in the Empires coffin. So I contend that in reality leaving Germany to dominate Europe would have been no worse. England would still have had (at least short term) its empire and the most powerful navy in the world. And no one can truly know what a dominate Germany would have done, Germany had been stuck in the middle between powerful countries that opposed it from its creation and acted accordingly (being worried about getting attacked grim multiple directions) so we truly can’t say what a Germany that felt safe on its boarders would do.

So based on the OP and the Stated Goals of Protecting Belgium it is possible that it MAY have been able to. And based on the eventual results to England of fighting it may have been better to not fight. But based on the real objectives of 1914 England it was never going to happen.

The problem is a Germany dominated Europe would allow Germany to have the capacity to build up both a powerful Navy and a powerful Army to challenge the British Empire. Why take chance when UK can try to preserve the balance of power in Europe? It

It's the capacity, not intention, of future Germany that matters.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
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It's the capacity, not intention, of future Germany that matters.
As said :
up to now I couldn't find any evidence for this being on any british politicians mind, especially not of one of the cabinet members during the July-crisis in 1914​

Do you have any source for I would be pleased to know of.
 
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