WI: the Allies launched D-Day Earlier?
- Thread starter SpicyJuan
- Start date
The Allies can't launch D-Day successfully before 1944. The American Army isn't ready, there aren't enough landing craft, the Luftwaffe hasn't been almost completely destroyed, the Heer isn't being steadily smashed by the Red Army, etc.
Most likely a 1943 D-Day is a bloodbath and ultimately a failure. The Allies might have recovered enough to try again in 1944, but the damage might be too severe.
Edit: Also, correct me if I'm wrong but aren't the Mulberry's still in development at this time?
Most likely a 1943 D-Day is a bloodbath and ultimately a failure. The Allies might have recovered enough to try again in 1944, but the damage might be too severe.
Edit: Also, correct me if I'm wrong but aren't the Mulberry's still in development at this time?
1942?
Operation Sledgehammer is ok'ed, large numbers of British and Commonwealth troops are taken from the fight in North Africa for one great thrust on France with a smattering of American troops.
The stage is set.... and the invasion happens.
Hitler pulls back from the Leningrad and Stalingrad fronts in the East and goes defensive pulling a certain amount of troops to the West.
The invasion force is pulverized. Churchill loses the PM seat in favor of someone like Lord Halifax. Republicans make massive gains in the November election demanding we focus on the people who attacked us.
Okay I can see Churchill losing his seat, and the Republicans making gains. I don't see a renewed demand for focus on Japan though. After a complete failure to invade Europe, resulting in the death or capture of tens of thousands of American soldiers I think it would be more likely for the focus of people to zero in on Germany. Yes Japan backstabbed the country, but their attack didn't result in casualties on the scale that this would. There would be attacks on the administration and his appointments as incompetent of course but if anything this would probably cut down on pushing for Japan to be dealt with first IMO.
You do know Europe first wasn't popular OTL.
A massive defeat this early in the game would increase the public pressure big time to deal with Japan first regardless of what kind of strategic sense or not it makes.
I know, and I was acknowledging that. My point was that after the Nazis have been responsible for the death, capture, or wounding of tens of thousands of Americans there will be a lot more anger pointed at Germany, and possibly fewer calls for focusing primarily on Japan early on..
There is a huge difference between how the public views a military action you start that fails and a sneak attack that kills your service men.
If you when at a clearly declared state of war start a huge attack and it utterly fails the public will be calling for heads to roll, but the big target will be politicians and generals on your side.
Why Pearl Harbor was so hated by Americans and why Yamamoto would have likely swung after the war if he lived was that the U.S. and Imperial Japan were not at an official state of war when Japan attacked. Hence it was viewed as an utterly dishonorable sneak attack on the United States. Things would be viewed very differently if Japan and the U.S. exchanged declarations of war and then the U.S. attacked first and Japan in 1941 managed a major naval victory in the Pacific. It certainly might not be enough for Americans back then to turn against the war, but Americans would have been pissed off at their own leadership.
Last edited:
Anaxagoras
Banned
D-Day required two major strategic achievements: 1) the U-Boat menace had to be dealt with in order to allow for a sufficient logistical buildup in Britain, and 2) the power of the Luftwaffe had to be smashed. Attempting to invade before these had been achieved is a recipe for disaster.
Such a thing upends the war from my vantage point three core ways, one it guarantees the fighting in North Africa will be going on well into 1944, because a 1942 invasion requires a pull out of forces for that attack on the Panzer Army Africa in Egypt as well as a long delay for Torch.
Second, it could cause a collapse in the Churchill government (I suspect likely would), but perhaps more important then any of that is it could cause Hitler to retrench and go defense in the East something his generals couldn't convince him to do. Obviously Germany ends up with alot more troops to spare if the pullout from Stalingrad is allowed which might happen in time.
Then the question is how well does FDR take the stress of such a loss and what happens by the 1944 election.
1942 definitely wouldn't work. 1943 might, although it would require ditching Sicily and a number of landings in the South Pacific to get the requisite shipping. We had a pro-longed thread on that one recently here.
1944? 1943 I can see, but 1944? No way, not with the amount of power the British had behind them after El-Alamein.
Because none of them were trying. In 1942, pretty much all of Hitler's generals were onboard with renewing the offensive against the USSR because they recognized that they couldn't allow the Red Army to build-up into a overwhelming sledgehammer. That the Germans didn't have the strength to defeat the USSR before this occurred was not apparent to them.
Last edited:
Fearless Leader
Donor
I think it's important to note that Operation Sledgehammer (The planned 1942 invasion of Northern France) most certainly did not have the same objectives as Operation Overlord.
The goal of Sledgehammer rather was to take the Cotentin/Cherbourg peninsula , dig in, and distract the Germans from the Eastern front while luring a good chunk of the Luftwaffe into a battle they could not win.
The goal of Sledgehammer rather was to take the Cotentin/Cherbourg peninsula , dig in, and distract the Germans from the Eastern front while luring a good chunk of the Luftwaffe into a battle they could not win.
Would the Allies be able to supply an invasion in 1943? Without a harbour and without Mulberries their massive advantages can't be brought fully to bear. I wonder, what was the status of German defences in Northern France? How well fortified were the ports in 1943 compared to a year later, and ditto for the beaches? Would the Allies try for Pas de Calais?
A 1942 invasion would force Britian to take a lot of that firepower and place it in Europe for the attack and leave behind enough to hold the position.
No heavy air support, no hundreds of U.S. tanks coming in, it would be reduced to a secondary theater for the British and a non theater for some time to the U.S.
OTL Africa fell mid-1943 with it being the main theater of the British and the U.S. in late 42 and early 43. That wouldn't be the case here for either the British or US.
Last edited:
1943?
If Operation Torch went sufficiently better than the original timeline that North Africa was clear of the Axis by the end of 1942, I could see a *lot* of pressure for landings in the summer of 1943 in France.
Mind you, such landings might very well come at the cost of the Germans still being sufficiently strong to be able to concentrate enough force in France to pin the Western Allies down in Normandy, and to contain them. Also, it would likely come at the cost of a slower or no Sicily campaign in 1943, and possibly leaving Italy fully committed to the Axis side for some time longer...
If Operation Torch went sufficiently better than the original timeline that North Africa was clear of the Axis by the end of 1942, I could see a *lot* of pressure for landings in the summer of 1943 in France.
Mind you, such landings might very well come at the cost of the Germans still being sufficiently strong to be able to concentrate enough force in France to pin the Western Allies down in Normandy, and to contain them. Also, it would likely come at the cost of a slower or no Sicily campaign in 1943, and possibly leaving Italy fully committed to the Axis side for some time longer...
Last edited:
Even then, though, that means a WAllied breakthrough is inevitable. The resulting war of attrition is one Germany can't win. Also, just pulling in the forces required to keep the WAllies bottled up is practically guaranteed to see the Soviets achieve even greater victories in '43 then they managed IOTL.
Three of the 24+ Threads I've Read on the Subject
I'd recommend reading these before wasting time posting opinions. Not recommended is Dunns 'Lost Victory'. Recommended is Griggs '1943' on the subject, Atkinsons chapter on the Symbol Confrence in 'Day of Battle', WGF Jacksons chapter frpm 'The Battle for Italy', There are a dozen others with chapters worth reading as well
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=285956
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=275883&highlight=Operation+Sledgehammer
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=322575&page=2
According to John Ellis 'Brute Force' the German AF had about 10% more operational aircraft in mid 1943 vs June 1944. Alfred Price in his 'Luftwaffe' provides similar numbers. In either case the number is between 5,000 & 6,000 depending on how its counted. Including the Red AF the Allies were flying over 15,000 combat aircraft over Europe in mid 1943.
They still managed to assault Sicily with a seven division landing force. How much experience is required to land on the less defended beaches of France in 1943? The Axis had stronger beach defenses and reserves in sicily than were available in France in the same month.
I'd recommend Holts 'The Deceivers' for a extensive 600+ page cataloge and analysis of the Allied deception operations. The British Deception Committee was fully operational before the end of 1942 & had over a year of experience then. The deception operations covering Op Torch were quite sucessfull & the German leaders placed the actual target of French North Africa last in their estimates.
Specialist hardware like the funnies were uneeded vs the thinly defended beaches of France in mid 1943. The better defended Sicillian coast was taken without those, so was the beach head at Salerno & Anzio
First off pwerful forces were sent against the Allies in Africa & failed to "pulverize" them. With shorter supply lines, larger and better airbases much closer, larger air forces at hand why would the Germans do any better?
This is a important point. Many of the negative views about Operation Sledgehammer, or the Round Up plans, result from a ignorance about the goals of objectives of those plans.
Once this lodgement is established the Allies can build it up without the extra step of sending all material from the US to the UK first as was necessary for Operation Bolero. While the UK can be used as a staging are for reserve material the much more efficient direct shipment can be made with much of it. No need to establish larger storage facilities in the UK, extra camps, overload docks & railroads there.
A equally important point is once the port is established the amphibious fleet does not evaporate. It is available to carry new forces from the US to threaten over points in Europe of the Mediterranean. Even before those forces might be available this fleet can be used in deception ops to pin down Axis armies in other coastal regions.
On Sicily & in Italy the Allies were able to supply armies across the beach until ports were made operational, without Mulberries. many of the features that made the Mulberries work existed as early as 1942 & more so in 1943. ie: the ultra efficient use of the DUKW amphib trucks as lighters for cross beach discharge was used as early as the landings in Op Torch. The Mulberries were designed to establish two army groups of 30+ divisions and a tactical air force ashore in Europe in sixty days, they did that well. But if only a single army group of maybe sixteen divisions is desired a lot less in the way of beach infrastructure is needed.
The ports were the only fortified areas for most of 1943. The beach defense program did not produce significant results until very late in the year. The port defense were mostly the prewar French forts, with some 1942-43 add ons the local commanders devised. When in 1944 the Allies wanted a port badly enough they got it. Specifically Cherbourg & Le Havre. Both fell in a week once siege operations got under way. More important in 1944 were the German sabotage efforts. It took three weeks to get Cherbourg back to a useful level of operations, and double that to get it to the pre invasion targets for cargo discharge. For 1943 we have the examples of Bizerte, Tunis, Palermo. Syracuse, Naples, Bari, & others. The results of German sabatoge operations were uneven, with some efforts nearly nonexistant. In the best efforts the demolition efforts were less 'skilled' with obvious items demolished but critical items often undamaged. In the case of Naples and Bari much of the demolition was aimed at the Italians and not at things that would hinder the Commonwealth and US armies. The destruction of the French ports in 1944 were better thought out and may have benefitted from experience in the Mediterranean.
The coast between the ports were lightly defended. The German strategy until Rommel took over was to anchor the defense on the ports, denying them to the Allies for at least a month or more. Mobile reserve forces in the interior were to counter attack the landing sites & defeat the starved Allied landing parties. Note" In the German lexicon of WWII "mobile" units included those with enough horses to move all their artillery & other equipment. In France in mid 1943 horse equipped infantry divisions were approx. half of the counter attack forces. The motor or mechanized units varied from month to month as rotations to and from the eastern from of Italy occured. Typically there were two "Panzer Corps" of four to six divisions, and one or two motorized or pz grenadier divisions in other corps.
Beach defenses in late 1942 were next to nothing. In October 42 the defense of the area we call Utah Beach was in the hands of a single infantry battalion, reinforced with part of the regiment cannon company and a battery of the division artillery. Of that battalion one company was actually posted to the defense positions. Those consisted of some sand bag & log MG nests, a barbed wire fence around each MG nest, and a few mines. Defending the entire Cotentin Peninsula was one static garrison in Cherbourg & a mobile infantry division with two regiments scattered about near the beaches and the rest in a central reserve.
In 1943 reinforcement trickled in, and plans were laid for expanding the fortified zones. What construction there was went first to the ports & then mostly in the Pas de Calais area. Eventually the Todt organization got enough French laborers on the job and materials enroute, but his did not produce much of use until late in the year. Even with Rommels attention it took some time to actually set out the wire, mines, obstacles, telephone wire, concrete, and weapons.
This assumes first the Germans send the reinforcements of OTL to Africa. They rebuilt Rommels Panzer Army Africa, and established a army under Arnim.
Second, even if they do the Italians are still going to be pessimistic. Italy was suffering severe economic distress by late 1942. a Allied lodgment in France , growing into a army group as 1943 plays out suggests which way the wind is blowing, & nothing in this situation waves away the OTL German defeats in the east by the Red Army offensives. Then there is the problem of that Allied amphibious fleet stall available for attacking elsewhere. If it threatens the Mediterranean the Fascist Grand Council may decide to get off their butts, as in OTL.
Amen. Assuming this invasion is made in mid 1943, then a entire winter is spent building up and weakening the enemy. Consider what happens if the sort of breakout that occured in August 1944 occurs in April or May 1944? Or when the ground is frozen in January 44...
I'd recommend reading these before wasting time posting opinions. Not recommended is Dunns 'Lost Victory'. Recommended is Griggs '1943' on the subject, Atkinsons chapter on the Symbol Confrence in 'Day of Battle', WGF Jacksons chapter frpm 'The Battle for Italy', There are a dozen others with chapters worth reading as well
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=285956
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=275883&highlight=Operation+Sledgehammer
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=322575&page=2
According to John Ellis 'Brute Force' the German AF had about 10% more operational aircraft in mid 1943 vs June 1944. Alfred Price in his 'Luftwaffe' provides similar numbers. In either case the number is between 5,000 & 6,000 depending on how its counted. Including the Red AF the Allies were flying over 15,000 combat aircraft over Europe in mid 1943.
They still managed to assault Sicily with a seven division landing force. How much experience is required to land on the less defended beaches of France in 1943? The Axis had stronger beach defenses and reserves in sicily than were available in France in the same month.
I'd recommend Holts 'The Deceivers' for a extensive 600+ page cataloge and analysis of the Allied deception operations. The British Deception Committee was fully operational before the end of 1942 & had over a year of experience then. The deception operations covering Op Torch were quite sucessfull & the German leaders placed the actual target of French North Africa last in their estimates.
Specialist hardware like the funnies were uneeded vs the thinly defended beaches of France in mid 1943. The better defended Sicillian coast was taken without those, so was the beach head at Salerno & Anzio
First off pwerful forces were sent against the Allies in Africa & failed to "pulverize" them. With shorter supply lines, larger and better airbases much closer, larger air forces at hand why would the Germans do any better?
This is a important point. Many of the negative views about Operation Sledgehammer, or the Round Up plans, result from a ignorance about the goals of objectives of those plans.
Once this lodgement is established the Allies can build it up without the extra step of sending all material from the US to the UK first as was necessary for Operation Bolero. While the UK can be used as a staging are for reserve material the much more efficient direct shipment can be made with much of it. No need to establish larger storage facilities in the UK, extra camps, overload docks & railroads there.
A equally important point is once the port is established the amphibious fleet does not evaporate. It is available to carry new forces from the US to threaten over points in Europe of the Mediterranean. Even before those forces might be available this fleet can be used in deception ops to pin down Axis armies in other coastal regions.
On Sicily & in Italy the Allies were able to supply armies across the beach until ports were made operational, without Mulberries. many of the features that made the Mulberries work existed as early as 1942 & more so in 1943. ie: the ultra efficient use of the DUKW amphib trucks as lighters for cross beach discharge was used as early as the landings in Op Torch. The Mulberries were designed to establish two army groups of 30+ divisions and a tactical air force ashore in Europe in sixty days, they did that well. But if only a single army group of maybe sixteen divisions is desired a lot less in the way of beach infrastructure is needed.
The ports were the only fortified areas for most of 1943. The beach defense program did not produce significant results until very late in the year. The port defense were mostly the prewar French forts, with some 1942-43 add ons the local commanders devised. When in 1944 the Allies wanted a port badly enough they got it. Specifically Cherbourg & Le Havre. Both fell in a week once siege operations got under way. More important in 1944 were the German sabotage efforts. It took three weeks to get Cherbourg back to a useful level of operations, and double that to get it to the pre invasion targets for cargo discharge. For 1943 we have the examples of Bizerte, Tunis, Palermo. Syracuse, Naples, Bari, & others. The results of German sabatoge operations were uneven, with some efforts nearly nonexistant. In the best efforts the demolition efforts were less 'skilled' with obvious items demolished but critical items often undamaged. In the case of Naples and Bari much of the demolition was aimed at the Italians and not at things that would hinder the Commonwealth and US armies. The destruction of the French ports in 1944 were better thought out and may have benefitted from experience in the Mediterranean.
The coast between the ports were lightly defended. The German strategy until Rommel took over was to anchor the defense on the ports, denying them to the Allies for at least a month or more. Mobile reserve forces in the interior were to counter attack the landing sites & defeat the starved Allied landing parties. Note" In the German lexicon of WWII "mobile" units included those with enough horses to move all their artillery & other equipment. In France in mid 1943 horse equipped infantry divisions were approx. half of the counter attack forces. The motor or mechanized units varied from month to month as rotations to and from the eastern from of Italy occured. Typically there were two "Panzer Corps" of four to six divisions, and one or two motorized or pz grenadier divisions in other corps.
Beach defenses in late 1942 were next to nothing. In October 42 the defense of the area we call Utah Beach was in the hands of a single infantry battalion, reinforced with part of the regiment cannon company and a battery of the division artillery. Of that battalion one company was actually posted to the defense positions. Those consisted of some sand bag & log MG nests, a barbed wire fence around each MG nest, and a few mines. Defending the entire Cotentin Peninsula was one static garrison in Cherbourg & a mobile infantry division with two regiments scattered about near the beaches and the rest in a central reserve.
In 1943 reinforcement trickled in, and plans were laid for expanding the fortified zones. What construction there was went first to the ports & then mostly in the Pas de Calais area. Eventually the Todt organization got enough French laborers on the job and materials enroute, but his did not produce much of use until late in the year. Even with Rommels attention it took some time to actually set out the wire, mines, obstacles, telephone wire, concrete, and weapons.
This assumes first the Germans send the reinforcements of OTL to Africa. They rebuilt Rommels Panzer Army Africa, and established a army under Arnim.
Second, even if they do the Italians are still going to be pessimistic. Italy was suffering severe economic distress by late 1942. a Allied lodgment in France , growing into a army group as 1943 plays out suggests which way the wind is blowing, & nothing in this situation waves away the OTL German defeats in the east by the Red Army offensives. Then there is the problem of that Allied amphibious fleet stall available for attacking elsewhere. If it threatens the Mediterranean the Fascist Grand Council may decide to get off their butts, as in OTL.
Amen. Assuming this invasion is made in mid 1943, then a entire winter is spent building up and weakening the enemy. Consider what happens if the sort of breakout that occured in August 1944 occurs in April or May 1944? Or when the ground is frozen in January 44...
Last edited:
?
Except the Italians might still be 'fighting' for the Axis (or at least doing police-duty in the Balkans) if France happens instead of Italy in '43; if they were wouldn't that mean potentially more German troops to go around?
Annnndd... another invasion 1943 discussion added to my bookmarks.
There are a couple serious hindrances, well maybe one. But I very seldom see it raised & certainly never with all the usual objections. Maybe next time
There are a couple serious hindrances, well maybe one. But I very seldom see it raised & certainly never with all the usual objections. Maybe next time
OTL they weren't ready, ATL, given the right PoDs I could see it as just about viable.