I highly doubt the allies would have gotten very far into Germany. Germany's Western Border is pretty formidable assuming Dutch neutrality isn't violated by the Allies. In Belgium you've got the Ardennes. To the South you've got Metz and the huge fortresses there, and south of that you've got the Vosges mountains, and that's before you even get to the Rhine! Tanks wouldn't have been a silver bullet either, the Germans had developed and fielded(albiet by war's end in very small numbers) a heavy machine gun that would have torn apart allied tanks of the time. If the Germans could keep their people fed and their armies supplied they could have held on a long time. The real issue is domestic politics in Germany and fending off the Dolchstoss long enough to get a better peace.
WI: The Allies drive deep into Germany in WWI
- Thread starter Meadow
- Start date
As previously noted, it doesn’t really matter whether the Germans were on the brink of victory or not. What matters is that they certainly believed that they were (as did many on the Allied side - see below), and it is their perception more than the reality which will shape their memories of the war.
As to whether Allied victory was assured or not, all I can say is that it didn’t look that way to many of the Allies themselves. Pétain’s remark in March that "The Germans will defeat the English, and after that they will defeat us" is well known, as is Haig’s April "Backs to the wall" message, in which he declares that "every one of us will fight on to the end", hardly the language of a man who thinks defeat is impossible. Less famous examples include
1) John Toland (No Man’s Land, Ch 8) recounts that on June 9, 1918
"Major Lloyd Griscom was preparing to leave the capital for London on a special mission for Pershing, and stopped at the French War Ministry for the latest information. He found utter despondency, and the Chief of Staff, a perfect stranger, began pouring out his despair. "France is on the brink of catastrophe," he exclaimed. "She is exhausted. Every bayonet is at the front line, we’ve drained our factories of their best workmen, we’ve crippled our service of supply, our railroads can hardly operate." He continued in this vein for almost an hour - - -
"If you will you can render us a great service. You see, the British take the war differently from we do. Their able-bodied men by the thousands are mining coal to sell at a profit all over the world. In their munitions factories they have far more healthy sound men than they need. It is well known the number who can go on their fighting fleet is limited, yet their navy is crowded. Now is the moment for forcing the embusqués [soldiers not at the front line] into the battle lines of France. But we cannot make them comprehend our desperate straits." - - -
Griscom - - - left Paris for Pétain’s headquarters at Chantilly. The General was away but his Chief of Staff, Geenral Anthoine, spoke openly "All is lost!" he told Griscom. "Nothing can save Paris! Nothing! Griscom tried to calm him by saying that Pershing felt quite the reverse and that Anthoine’s own superior at the war Ministry wasn’t that gloomy. What do they know about it? It is we who are fighting the war who know. You as a stranger can have no idea what losing Paris means. Paris is not only our capital, but also our greatest manufacturing city. Without it we are lost." Every Frenchman realised that. - - -
Similar panic was also spreading among the British leaders in London. That day Lord Milner wrote Lloyd George:
"- - - We must be prepared for France and Italy both being beaten to their knees. In that case the Germans-Austro-Turks-Bulgar bloc will be master of all Europe and Northern and Central Asia up to the point at which Japan steps in to bar the way, if she does step in . . .
In any case it is clear that, unless the remaining free peoples of the world, America, this country, and the Dominions, are knit together in the closest conceivable alliance and prepared for the maximum of sacrifice, the Central Bloc . . . will control not only Europe and most of Asia but the whole world."
2) The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page [1] includes the following memorandum of June 10, 1918
The Germans continue to gain ground in France - more slowly, but still they gain. The French and British papers now give space to plans for the final defense - the desperate defense - of Paris. The Germans are only forty miles away. Slocum, military attaché, thinks they will get it and reports the same opinion at the War Office - because the Germans have taken such a large number of guns and so much ammunition. Some of these guns were meant for the American troops, and they cannot now be replaced in time if the German advance continues. But I do not know enough facts at first hand to form an opinion. But, if Paris be taken, the war will go on for a long time - unless the English-speaking rulers make a compromise. And then, in another form - and forms - it’ll go on indefinitely. - There has been no more perilous or uncertain or anxious time than now.
The United States too late, too late, too late; what if it should turn out so?"
3) In A Bridge To France (Ch XIV) Edward N Hurley, Chairman of the United States Shipping Board during WW1, recounts a remarkable conversation with President Wilson.
"The seriousness of this situation was impressed upon me by the President when he requested that a special survey be made of cargo-ships that could be furnished - - - for the transportation of food and material supplies for the increased number of troops to meet the pressing demands of the Allies.
"Hurley" he said, "with the success of the Germans in driving a wedge between the well-seasoned troops of the British and French in the Cambrai sector, if by any chance they were to repeat their onslaught with a like result on our front and capture a hundred thousand or more of our soldiers, I dread to contemplate the feeling which would be produced in the mind of the American people. Unless we send over every man possible to support the Allies in their present desperate condition, a situation may develop which would require us to pay for the entire cost of the war to the Central Powers". [2]
He sat gazing intently out of a window towards the green fields across the Potomac; but he did not see the beautiful landscape which lay before him. What he saw was a vision of the bloody battlefields of France! He was thinking intently and earnestly. I did not interrupt his meditation. When he turned toward me again his face was pale and his features were drawn. Calmly but firmly he said, "Hurley, we must go to the limit.""
If the Germans were mistaken in believing victory to be in sight, their misapprehension was shared by a lot of important (and presumably well-informed) men on the other side, apparently including the President of the United States.
[1] Page was US Ambassador in London, 1913-18, and had been passionately pro-Ally right from the start of the war, long before there was any question of the US entering it.
[2] Hurley doesn’t indicate Wilson’s reason for believing this, but the likeliest would be that such a large number of captured Americans would be in effect hostages, held indefinitely as prisoners of war until the US signed up to a peace on German terms. In the same way, OTL, the Allies held on to their German prisoners until after (indeed many months after) Germany had signed the Treaty of Versailles. So the idea is not fanciful.
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No. All debts prior to 1917 were secured on British or other Allied property in North America, so US bondholders would not have lost their money, even if the Allies lost the War. No unsecured loans were issued until after the US had entered the war. Even then, the first "Liberty Loan" was undersubscribed at first, until the government launched a tremendous propaganda campaign (impossible had the US still been neutral) to persuade Americans that buying bonds was a patriotic duty.
Agreed. But her entry into the war was necessary for that financial support to continue.
It would of cost France and Britain tons of cash, and horrendous casualties. And its not like WW2 - despite the propaganda, British leaders did not actually despise the Germans to that level.
I haven't enough info to give a definite answer to that, but I do know -
a) When the House of Morgan (Britain's principal banker in the US) tried to float an unsecured loan in Nov 1916, the Federal Reserve Board, with President Wilson's knowledge and consent, delivered a strong warning against subscribing to it - going about as near as the law would let them to an absolute prohibition. The loan fell completely flat and there was a run on Sterling. By contrast, neither the Board nor Wilson objected to secured loans [1] so evidently did not see them as high risk.
b) The secured loans (sometimes called the "Morgan Loans") were all repaid by about 1925. Only the unsecured loans (surprise, surprise) were defaulted on. That would suggest that the debtor countries (and Britain in particular) considered paying the debt preferable to losing the collateral.
Beyond that I can't say, but on the whole it seems to corroborate my understanding of the matter.
[1] Bryan had, but not for economic reasons. He felt they broke the spirit of international law if not the letter, arguing that "Money is the worst of all contrabands because it commands all the rest".
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The public maybe did, at the time, but it didn't last long once the war was over. An emotional binge like that can't be kept up indefinitely.
Indeed, as Orwell and others noted, there was quite a marked pro-German reaction during the interwar years - hence the era of appeasement.
Reichstags elections Sep 1930: NSDAP 18.3 %
Reichstags elections Jul 1932: NSDAP 37,4 % - strongest party, but no majority
Reichstags elections Nov 1932: NSDAP 33.1 % - strongest party, but no majority
Reichstags elections Mar 1933: NSDAP 43.9 % - already ruling party
It is true, however, that in 1932/33 the Germans outvoted democracy, because KPD and NSDAP (both parties clearly announcing their will to abolish the Weimar Republic) together got more than 50 % of the votes.
Note that without the finassing of the Monarchists only one regular ballot (in May 1932 -following the regular elections of May 1928) in this period would have been necessary.
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My bad, I thought you were referring to an actual coup attempt, not simply the political manouverings of the monarchists et al.
Beer, ever heard of the Brest Litovsk Treaty 1917? When those jolly nice German chaps denuded Russia of an awful lot of territory and resources? Incidentally the Kaiserschlact never had a cat's chance in hell of success.
Actually, it was a coup because the bloody idiots destroyed a working democracy and paralysed a functional parliament - only to discover that they had no monarch to present, who might be acceptable to the German people.
And then - in their desperation - chose to engage Hitler and his gang in 'support' of their wet dreams.
Brüning was not the valiant fighter against the forces of the extreme wings, but a spineless yes-man to the Hindenburg clique.
Umm.. The Weimar Republic was a working democracy?..........
Again with all the era of almost a kanzler for year, the same than you think than the anti-democracy party... the weimar republic was a experiment of the SPD who gonne wrong(much similar to several constution here in latin america in thw 19th century)
Well, after 1923, it was working quite acceptably, until the economic upheaval of the big recession and the silly monarchist coup co-incited.
Beer
Banned
Dear LordIreland, B-L is the result of the unrational decision of Russia of fighting on after Germany gave them a far more lenient proposal FIRST! Something the allied side is hush-hush about.
Oh, knock it off the pair of you.
After the amount of effort and sacrifice that had been poured out by even 1917, neither side could be satisfied with less than a complete (and punitive) victory - as long as there was any hope of securing one. They would settle for a "moderate" peace only if they were clearly getting the worst of it - when of course it would be too late.
Brest-Litovsk, or something very like it, was a foregone conclusion if the Germans won, and Versailles, or worse, pretty certain if the Allies did. The war had a momentum of its own by then, and it's futile to grumble and point fingers.
Actually both treaties basically consisted of chopping off the ethnic minority regions from the other guy - the usual pattern for WW1 peace treaties. It was Russia's bad luck that she had more such regions than Germany, and Austria/Hungary's and Turkey's bad luck that they had more than Russia.
As noted in my message #22, it sure didn't look that way to the Allies at the time. I'm not inclined to blithely assume that I know better than contemporaries.
Typo
Banned
How does that make a difference?
The Germans could have negotiated a peace treaty before Operation Michael too by that logic
Deleted member 1487
They could have, but would the Allies have accepted by that point? It would be considered a sign of weakness for the Germans to have offered a peace deal, especially as time was on the Allies' side. They could just wait for better terms, much as the Germans did. In reality asking for peace would just make the Allies think the German weak and wait until the US came so they could gain total victory.
The Germans had to launch their offensives to get acceptable terms, but the only issue with that would then be to ask at the right time and offer the right terms. With Ludendorff in charge that wouldn't be an option, because he wanted to keep Belgium, which would mean the British would not accept that peace no matter what. They could continue to fight even with the French out of the war, but that would require the Germans to occupy all of France or at least to drive the British off the continent and capture Paris making Clemenceau's government fall. Despite what has been posted, the French leadership did not think they would lose the war. Petain was notable for his defeatism all throughout the war, making him a poor barometer for the mood of the government and the military leadership. Foch, the man actually in charge and who's opinion actually mattered, really understood that France would win no matter what so long as they waited for the Americans.
By 1918 the power balance was such that Germany really couldn't ask for peace and get anything that war remotely acceptable. That is why they waited until defeated in October to ask for peace based on the 14 points, which were just months before unacceptable. But by then it was too late.
Beer
Banned
The difference was, the Entente never gave Germany an halfway acceptable proposal at all, whereas the first B-L in 1917 was something Russia could have accepted with some stomach grumbling, but it was not harsh. Only the second B-L proposal months later was what came to be B-L.
Typo
Banned
How does that change the fact that Germans imposed a Carthaginian peace on Russia? It's like a robber justifying shooting a victim by saying well I gave him a chance to give me all his money.
With the exception of the reparations and war guild clause Versailles was pretty reasonable.