------The 4 Emperors League-----
Having achieved a unified Reich under Prussian control, in the early
1870s Bismarck then made sure to apply himself to the real work,
protecting the upstart Reich from the danger of European war.
Threats included foremost a France recovering with frightening speed
from its losses in the Franco-Prussian war, and hankering for
revenge. But a significant danger was also the weakness of
neighboring empires leading to wars and to the dangerous prospect of a
hostile coalition.
To Bismarck, the preservation of Austria-Hungary was paramount, for
two reasons: a) to prevent either the absorption of Catholic Germans
and minority peoples who would upset the internal balance of the
Hohenzollern Reich, and b) to prevent European conflict over
succession to Habsburg territories.
The strongest potential threat to Austria-Hungary, and strongest
potential continental ally for France, was Russia, which Bismarck and
his predecessors had cultivated for decades.
So Berlin was the best, and only, power positioned to broker
understandings with Vienna and St. Petersburg by laying the groundwork
for meetings between the German Kaiser and the Austrian Emperor and
Russian Tsar respectively.
The balancing of the empires’ interests was at the core of the
dialogue but there was also an ideological element, a defense of
monarchical authority that continued a theme Russia had attempted to
support through the failed Holy Alliance in the earlier nineteenth
century.
Consequently, Bismarck had brokered a “Three Emperor’s League” between
Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary by 1873.
The most vexing background issue between Russia and Austria-Hungary
was the fate of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Balkans.
In his “first draft” conception, Austria-Hungary would be encouraged
to expand its influence southeast at Ottoman expense as compensation
for its catastrophic loss of influence in Germany and Italy. To keep
the overall European peace, Bismarck would encourage and broker an
“equitable” partition of the Balkans between Austria-Hungary and
Russia, and/or their client states.
However, Bismarck soon decided he would have to revise his first
draft. A key problem was that partition of Ottoman territories was
more likely to spark a Russo-Austrian conflict over the division of
spoils than any other cause. Regional politics could not be decided
strictly for reasons of state by the monarchs, domestic political
pressures in the empires, and the ambitions of small unruly Balkan
client states, were complicating factors weighing a against a smoothly
agreed and implemented Austro-Russian deal.
Secondarily, Austria-Hungary had no domestic consensus on what
territorial expansion and influence it sought to gain within the
Balkans. The Magyar elite had no desire to add more ethnic Slavs or
Romanians to the empire. Earlier in the century, it had been
Metternich who had most firmly opposed foreign intervention on behalf
of the Greek rebels. Rather than be enthusiastic about partitioning
the Balkans, Austria-Hungary would be more likely to focus on
restraining Russian gains by minimizing Ottoman losses.
Finally, Russia at this point in 1873 does not have any urgent need
for a “win” at Ottoman expense. It succeeded in gaining the right to
fortify its Black Sea coast and to transit the straits in 1871, thus
removing the disabilities imposed by the Crimean War.
Internationally, Russia’s main preoccupation is the conquest of
Turkestan, and the establishment of its frontier with Chinese
Xinjiang, where Tsarist forces occupy the Manchu oasis town of Ili.
Therefore, Bismarck proposed to amend his vision to encompass a “Four
Emperor’s League”, with the Ottoman Empire joining the Germans, Austro-
Hungarians and Russians in a conservative agreement to preserve peace
and the territorial status quo in the Balkans (and by extension, in
southwest Asia and northeast Africa).
Bismarck estimates correctly that Austria-Hungary will love this
concept. Somewhat less certain is that the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Aziz
will sign on. He had cooperated chiefly with Britain and France in
the past, had fought Russia, and was basing some domestic reforms on
western European models.
On the other hand, Germany is at this stage an impressive and dynamic
power that Istanbul desires to buy arms from. Austria had ceased to
be a genuine security threat to the Ottoman Empire in the 1800s.
Finally, despite historic collaboration with the west against Russia,
the west had not entirely left the Ottoman Empire alone. The French
had taken Algiers and supported Muhammad Ali’s revolt in the 1830s,
when they were under a form of Ottoman vassalage (not to mention
Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt). In 1839 the British had seized Aden,
also at the time under Ottoman suzerainty. Both had intervened in the
Levant. Finally, both either could not or would not help the empire
withstand Russian pressure to open the straits in 1871. Signing onto
an alliance with Russia would take some explaining domestically and
would be unnatural for Istanbul, but it could be justified by the
doctrine of keeping one’s enemies close. Istanbul would be unlikely
to be in a better negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia at any other
time in the future, because the powerful German Reich might not be so
interested in facilitating a Russo-Ottoman agreement later on. If
successful, the Four Emperor’s League would remove the most serious
threats to the Ottoman Empire by committing Russia to the Balkan
status quo, and by undermining the confidence of the small Balkan
states and Orthodox minority nationalities in Russian support. All in
all, the potential security gains of this diplomatic entente far
outweigh the risks of associating too closely with Russia and
irritating London and Paris
Of any of the four, Russia is the power most likely to object. The
Ottoman territories had been their arena of expansion over the last
two centuries. Expanding the Emperor’s League to include the Ottomans
seems somewhat perverse because it means letting the historic foe into
what is seen as a revamped version of the old Russian-inspired Holy
Alliance. Personal and household relations with the Ottoman Sultan
likewise could never be as close as with European monarchical houses,
because of different religious and marital customs.
Nevertheless, Russia is likely to carefully consider Bismarck’s
concept. Firstly, Russia has regained its rights to transit the
straits (in 1871) and does not require immediate gains at Ottoman
expense. Secondly, Russia is consumed with internal development and
reform, and would be just as happy, even happier, with the Balkans
stable rather than stirred up. Third, maintaining the friendship of
Berlin is of paramount value for St. Petersburg.
St. Petersburg and Berlin had had positive relations for generations.
Mutual cooperation on Poland had been critical. Berlin also had shown
itself to be a dangerous opponent when crossed, as it showed in its
rapid victories over Denmark, Austria and France over the previous
decade. St. Petersburg definitely would not want to lightly scuttle
the Four Emperor’s League concept and thereby find itself isolated
while ties between Berlin, Vienna and Istanbul tightened.
This is especially so in the early 1870s, given that Russia really has
no better alliance options to the west. France is weak, anarchic and
republican after its defeat at Prussian hands. Britain is seemingly
more focused on opposing Russia in Asia than in upholding the European
balance of power against rising forces like the new German Reich.
Italy does not count for very much in the grand scheme.
As for expansionary impulses, Russia already has more territory than
it can handle in the west. To the southwest, it has rights to transit
the straits, and is as concerned that other states like Austria,
France and Britain not benefit *more* from Ottoman collapse than
Russia would. Russia’s primary expansionary focus at this time is due
south, into Turkestan. Berlin and Vienna make it clear that they have
no objection to Russian expansion in the direction of Persia. They
also do not object to Russian expansion in the Far East, at the
expense of China, Korea, and possibly Japan. Gorchakov would be the
most likely Russian official to object, because of his persistent
personal disdain for Bismarck, but he is not the only factor in
Russia.
So, by 1874 the Four Emperor’s League is well in place, somewhat to
the consternation of Britain and France, and very much to the
consternation of Italy and the small Balkan states.
An immediate consequence of the League is Russia following a
restrained policy in the Balkans. St. Petersburg demands
the Ottomans also reject asylum for anti-Tsarist activity (Turkey had
sheltered Hungarian and Polish refugees after the failed rebellions of
1848, and Russia and Austria had attempted, unsuccessfully, to press
Istanbul for extradition at that time) on its territory in exchange
for its restraint, and the Ottomans have every incentive to comply.
In 1875 a revolt in Bosnia begins among the province’s Muslims.
Flickers of unrest spread to the Serbian Orthodox population, but this
is not fanned by Russian agents, and these are contained without
excessive publicity. The biggest difference is that there is no
Bulgarian rebellion and anti-Bulgarian repression to stir up outrage
throughout Europe and Great Britain.
Serbia is stuck focusing on internal development, not external
ambitions. Romania is a core buffer state, a junior partner of the
Four Emperor’s League. It may have to end up retroceding the southern
Bessarabian strip Moldavia had acquired from Russia after the Crimean
war.
There are several significant knock-on effects as the Russo-Turkish
war of 1877-1878 is avoided and Abdul Hamid inherits a fairly stable
empire in 1878.
The Ottomans control more of the Balkans, and Serbia, Montenegro,
Greece and Romania remain small.
Other powers are less eager to scavenge on Ottoman territory. For
instance, Cyprus most probably remains out of British hands. There is
some likelihood that Tunis is also retained under some Ottoman
suzerainty. While Bismarck is all for French colonial enterprise, he
encourages it more in sub-Saharan Africa and the Far East rather than
in the Mediterranean.
With less fear of French expansionism across North Africa, Britain may
even be somewhat less likely to occupy Egypt, or at least to occupy it
for any length of time. The Four Emperor’s League may formally
support a return to Ottoman suzerainty over Egypt, even while
tolerating British occupation on a temporary basis and avoiding
strident demands for a pullout. If the British and French do occupy
Egypt and/or Tunis, this would certainly not cause the three Christian
Emperors in the League to go to war or become confrontational. The
Ottomans, less isolated, may be more supportive of resistance to
western occupations, but they might not, given the distance of the
territories from the Ottoman core and their vast military inferiority
to France and Britain.
Italy is frustrated in the colonial realm, but may end up turning in
the direction of Greece, following on historic Venetian claims. In
practice that could mean the Peloponessus, as Istanbul still rules
Cyprus, the Dodecanese and Crete. Here though, Britain and France,
and even Russia, may oppose Italy, even if Germany, Austria and the
Ottomans don’t care.
Assuming peace is kept in the Balkans from the period 1875 to 1885,
this has further knock-on effects. The Russian conquest of Turkestan
may be speeded, and Russia may find itself in conflict with Britain
over Persia or Afghanistan. The Ili crisis may expand into a larger
conflict with China over eastern Turkestan.
If there are no substituted wars, the scramble for Africa proceeds.
However, Russia is very likely to get involved in the Franco-Chinese
war of 1884-1885. While initial Chinese prowess against the French is
a cautionary factor, the opportunity to press China and win
concessions in Sinkiang, Mongolia, Manchuria and even Korea or Tibet
looms large.
Under these circumstances, Japan is likely to join France and Russia
in an anti-Chinese pile-on.
Britain may be a wildcard. It can end up opposing the other powers,
using considerable naval and expeditionary strength, or it can, more
likely, seek compensatory gains for itself, by means of additional
treaty ports, especially in the Yangtze Valley, and most of all, by
absorbing Tibet.
Leaving the British aside, results of this big anti-Chinese war will
probably be, Indochina and Taiwan for France (possibly with Yunnan and
Kwangsi also), Treaty ports in Shandong and Korea and Chekiang, and
possibly the interior, for Japan, and occupation of Sinkiang,
Manchuria and Mongolia for Russia. These severe losses will be a huge
shock for the Qing dynasty, and will spur revolutionary agitation.
This could all lead to genuine partition of China with Britain also
taking a huge chunk. Germany is poorly positioned at this time to
gain a slice.
Russian-occupied Manchuria may attract substantial Russian, Ukrainian
and Baltic settlement, and settlement by Volga Germans. Conceivably,
it could create a more restrictive environment for Chinese
settlement.
However, it’s likely that development will spur Chinese settlement,
but Manchuria will be far more diverse in character than in OTL, with
much less land ownership in Chinese hands, even amidst a large tenant
farming population and “Chinatowns” in the region.