Heres the map from Jackson. It largely depicts the situation of the 23d-24th. The 25th saw lead elements of VI Corps in the saddle between the Alban Hills & the Lepini hills to the SE, and from there able to see Route 6. It was late afternoon of the 25th Truscott received orders from 5th Army HQ to leave the reinforced US 3rd ID to push on to Route 6 & Valamonte, while the rest of the VI Corps turned left and attacked to the NW towards Rome. Truscott protested this order but Clark had departed his forward CP at Anzio for Cisterna & his CoS Grunther would not cancel the order. Atkinson 'Day of Battle' refers to Truscotts objections as revolving as much about the complications of reorienting much of his corps to the new direction of attack. Truscott is also quoted by Atkinson as regretting the failure to cut Route 6 on the 25th or 26th. The next four days were spent battering the Cesar Line. During this time patrols from the advancing 36th ID confirmed the Monte Artemisio in the Alban Hills was undefended, something air photos had suggested. On the night of the 30th/31st two regiments of the 36th ID made a tactical march through the rugged upland and by noon had flanked both the I Para Corps and LXXVI Corps. At a cost of eleven dead. By the end of the 31st Kesselring
Frosione, a junction between Route 6 and the branching roads leading north was not captured by 8th Army until the 31st May. Leaving the German XIV Corps five days to use the easterly route. Thus capturing Valmonte on the 25th or 26th causes a headache for the 10th Army, but would not 'trap' it.
The second map, from Atkinson, shows the 5th and part of the 8th Army front line on the morning of the 31st. Its main point for this discussion is that it shows how the 8th Army had been unable to close any encirclement by the 5th Army. It also suggests how fast the XIV Corps had been able to withdraw the five divisions and corps support group from south of Route 6. by the 30th only the 29th Pz Grenadier div manned rear guards facing the FEC & 8th Army.