WI: Tenth Army encircled in Italy in 1944

What if, after the Anzio breakout, Clark directed the divisions of VI Corps to turn back and encircle Vietinghoff's Tenth Army, instead of making for Rome? How would such a manoeuvre impact the rest of the Italian Campaign - to what extent could it be shortened?
 
That won't encircle the 10th Army. Only part of it was retreating via Route 6. Most of the XIV Corps turned north and used the Frosinone-Arsoli road when the threat to Valmont/Route 6 became apparent. That lay on the eastern side of yet another mountain range & out of reach of the Allied VI Corps. The LI Mountain Corps was even further east & retreating up Route 82/Sara-Avezzano. Which lay east of yet another section of the central mountain massif. Seizing Valmonte & denying Route 6 to the Tenth Army is a inconvenience for XIV Corps but not the path to a actual encirclement. Jacksons 'The Battle For Italy' has a couple maps and some text illustrating this.

Jackson also points out that the redirection of the VI Corps & specifically the US 36th ID into the Monte Artemesio found a gap in the German defense, LXXVI Corps, and broke the Cesar Line before it could be consolidated. Kesselring had already noted the gap & released reinforcements to Mackensons 14th Army, Had Clark not redirected the VI Corps when he did the consolidation of the Cesar Line would have occurred and the 5th Army not only fail to encircle anything, but would have had a solid delaying position facing it after seizing Valmonte/Route 6. had that consolidation occurred Kesselrings effort to reorganize 14th and 10th Armies would have had a chance to delay the Allied entry into Rome by weeks. As it was the advance of the 36th Div onto Monte Artemisio disrupted the LXXVI Corps and flanked the I Para Corps facing the left wing of the Allied VI Corps.

A nitpick...

What if, after the Anzio breakout, Clark directed the divisions of VI Corps to turn back

They would not be "turning back" The line of advance of VI corps was already Aretena>Valmonte to the NE. Clarks orders redirected the axis of advance 90 degrees to the NW & directly towards Rome
 
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Okay I'll bear it in mind. All the descriptions can get a bit confusing without a map (for me anyway), so I'll add this in to help in visualising it, not sure how accurate it is.

1*bYhY6kHBMTgVAAkKJgrVkA.png
 
The map is accurate for topography. It may be missing many of the villages referred to in the books. The unit and front line locations are a mix from 18-30 May which is not helpful for understanding the situation. Events unfolded very fast in the last week of May & daily locations would be more helpful. I'll scan the relevant map from Jackson. Tho its only a sketch map it shows the situation from the 23d May.

On your map the roads heading north off the top of the map are the other retreat routes I referred to as used by the 10th XIV & LI Corps. The Allied VI Corps was very close to Route 6 & Valmont , but getting to the other routes was a nonstarter. The 8th Army that tried to pursue the LI Corps, Group Hauk & other units further east was stopped cold by German rear guards in the mountains shown on the map. A dozen mini Cassino positions in that mountain range along each road.
 
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Heres the map from Jackson. It largely depicts the situation of the 23d-24th. The 25th saw lead elements of VI Corps in the saddle between the Alban Hills & the Lepini hills to the SE, and from there able to see Route 6. It was late afternoon of the 25th Truscott received orders from 5th Army HQ to leave the reinforced US 3rd ID to push on to Route 6 & Valamonte, while the rest of the VI Corps turned left and attacked to the NW towards Rome. Truscott protested this order but Clark had departed his forward CP at Anzio for Cisterna & his CoS Grunther would not cancel the order. Atkinson 'Day of Battle' refers to Truscotts objections as revolving as much about the complications of reorienting much of his corps to the new direction of attack. Truscott is also quoted by Atkinson as regretting the failure to cut Route 6 on the 25th or 26th. The next four days were spent battering the Cesar Line. During this time patrols from the advancing 36th ID confirmed the Monte Artemisio in the Alban Hills was undefended, something air photos had suggested. On the night of the 30th/31st two regiments of the 36th ID made a tactical march through the rugged upland and by noon had flanked both the I Para Corps and LXXVI Corps. At a cost of eleven dead. By the end of the 31st Kesselring

Frosione, a junction between Route 6 and the branching roads leading north was not captured by 8th Army until the 31st May. Leaving the German XIV Corps five days to use the easterly route. Thus capturing Valmonte on the 25th or 26th causes a headache for the 10th Army, but would not 'trap' it.

The second map, from Atkinson, shows the 5th and part of the 8th Army front line on the morning of the 31st. Its main point for this discussion is that it shows how the 8th Army had been unable to close any encirclement by the 5th Army. It also suggests how fast the XIV Corps had been able to withdraw the five divisions and corps support group from south of Route 6. by the 30th only the 29th Pz Grenadier div manned rear guards facing the FEC & 8th Army.

!0th Army Retreat copy.jpg


Front 31 May copy.jpg
 
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