Some years ago, in a post at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/mMhFKXMfSVU/-411NnI85KgJ I discussed six alternatives to TR as Republican vice-presidential nominee in 1900--and therefore presumably president in 1901 if McKinley's assassination is not butterflied away. They were Elihu Root, John D. Long, Cornelius N. Bliss, William B. Allison, Jonathan P. Dolliver, and Charles W. Fairbanks. Most of them, I concluded, look as if they would be more conservative than TR--indeed, some of them might be more conservative than McKinley.
This does not mean that there would be no Progressive Era. The ferment in the press, in the states, etc. would still go on; and if a conservative occupied the White House he would probably have to adjust to it to some extent. Moreover, the person who becomes president in 1901 will not necessarily run in 1904 (some of the people I mentioned would be quite old by then) and even if he does, the Democrats might nominate a more progressive candidate than their OTL choice of Parker if they are facing a conservative Republican president.
Moreover, scholars in recent years have questioned the idea of a sharp break between the "Gilded Age" and the "Progressive Era." (A number have noted the "progressive" aspects of McKinley--e.g., his good relations with organized labor.) Also, on the whole matter of whether TR restored dynamism to the presidency, there's an interesting article by Charles W. Calhoun, "Reimagining the 'Lost Men' of the Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Late Nineteenth Century Presidents" in the *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* (July 2002) (unfortunately, only the first page is available to non-subscribers) at
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.23...id=2129&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21104366497831):
"For much of the twentieth century, scholars treated the Gilded Age and
the Progressive Era as starkly contrasting phases in the unfolding of the
American story: the post-Civil War dark ages followed by the bright light
of the early twentieth century. More recently, historians have recognized
the oversimplification if not downright wrongheadedness of that dichotomy.
The past few decades have witnessed an explosion of studies on a variety
of topics with coverage dates roughly from the 1870s to the 1920s. Most of
these newer works underscore the continuities between the two periods and
the relatively seamless evolution of forces and institutions. 1
"New research has begun to apply this sort of revisionist analysis to the
American presidency. Among the hoariest stereotypes in United States
history was the notion that the turn of the century somehow marked a great
watershed in the development of the office. After a period of leaden
inertia in the nation's chief executives during the Gilded Age, the
Progressive Era presidents wrought a profound transformation in the
office, making it not only 'modern' but also the undeniable and
indispensable center of American political life ever after. The underlying
premise of this semi-miraculous metamorphosis, of course, was the debility
and weakness, if not utter political impotence and ineptitude, of the late
nineteenth century presidents.
"Although twentieth-century scholars recognized a growing presidential
activism in foreign relations during the Gilded Age,1 in domestic affairs,
the principal concern of the present article, they tended to see the chief
executives as weak, isolated, and ineffectual. To a considerable degree,
these views sprang from the negative judgments of contemporary observers
in the Gilded Age itself. In 1885 the young political scientist Woodrow
Wilson published his first book, Congressional Government, which argued
that Congress had come to dominate national policymaking and that the
presidency was concomitantly feeble. Although the president's business was
'occasionally great,' it was 'usually not much above routine.' Compared
with the majority-based leadership the British prime minister exercised,
Wilson said, the president's 'usefulness is measured, not by efficiency,
but by calendar months.'2
"The British observer, James Bryce read Wilson's book before setting forth
his own observations in his massive work, The American Commonwealth, which
he completed in 1888. He, too, thought that the 'domestic authority of the
President is in time of peace very small.'...
"Many twentieth-century scholars echoed Wilson and Bryce. Although they
ascribed some elements of strength to Grover Cleveland and William
McKinley, they viewed the other chief executives of the previous century's
last three decades as inconsequential at best, if not regressive in the
office's development...
"These generalizations have not gone unchallenged. The past few decades
have witnessed a number of biographical and administrative studies that
portray the Gilded Age presidents as not quite the ciphers traditional
opinion held them to be. The first important entry in this revisionist
literature came as early as 1963 in H. Wayne Morgan's William McKinley and
His America, which cast the twenty-fifth president as an engaged and
effective leader not only in foreign affairs but in domestic policy as
well..."
After citing historians' rehabilitations of other Gilded Age presidents,
Calhoun continues:
"Taken altogether, these newer biographical and administrative studies
suggest that the central feature of the Gilded Age presidency was the
gradual recovery of the office from the blow it had suffered at the hands
of Andrew Johnson. During the struggle over the impeachment of President
Bill Clinton, press pundits and television's talking heads frequently
invoked the image of a beleaguered Johnson defending the presidency from
the unwarranted and unconstitutional assaults of his fanatical political
opponents. Historians of the period know better- that Johnson's own
stubborn behavior and contemptuous refusal to work for accommodation with
Congress invited its extreme response.11 Even the usually mild-mannered
Bryce observed that Johnson's 'foolish and headstrong conduct made his
removal desirable,' and that 'only four years after the power of the
executive had reached its highest point in the hands of President Lincoln,
it was reduced to its lowest point in those of President Johnson.'12 If
Americans had always been somewhat skeptical about presidential power,
Johnson's behavior reinforced that skepticism. For subsequent presidents
the principal institutional challenge was to rebuild confidence in the
office and somehow extend its power to meet the exigencies of a rapidly
changing nation and society.
"...Although the rehabilitation of the presidency after the Johnson
debacle did not always follow a straight-line course, the Gilded Age
witnessed a distinct if gradual transformation in the way presidents
related with Congress, positioned themselves in public opinion, and
exercised policy leadership over such issues as civil service and
administrative structure, race relations, and economic policy. To do
justice to their efforts would require far more space than available here,
but one may offer some examples of the incremental accretion of power and
authority that rendered the office Theodore Roosevelt inherited on
September 14, 1901, far more robust than the one Ulysses S. Grant entered
on March 4,1869....'
After reviewing some of the successful and unsuccessful attempted
exercises of presidential power from Grant to the second Cleveland
adminstration, Calhoun continues:
"Many scholars now believe that it was McKinley who created the modem
presidency and gave it the preeminence in national affairs it has enjoyed
ever since. As a congressional leader, McKinley had witnessed Harrison's
legislative techniques first-hand. As president, he proved even more
successful in applying these techniques, for he did so with a warmer
personal sensitivity and greater political skill. Moreover, whereas
Cleveland had badgered members of Congress, McKinley petted and cajoled
diem. A frequent recipient of the president's touch, veteran Illinois
Senator Shelby Cullom concluded, 'We have never had a President who had
more influence with Congress than Mr. McKinley.'72 61
"McKinley also recognized the importance of carefully managing the flow of
information to the nation. His staff briefed reporters twice daily and
provided them with work space in the White House. McKinley himself became
an accomplished 'leaker' of information to individual reporters to float
ideas before the public. These efforts paid off in generally favorable
press coverage for the president's policies.73
"Building on the examples of predecessors such as Hayes and Harrison,
McKinley established the presidency as an independent source of influence
by using public appearances and speeches to carry his proposals directly
to the people. He traveled extensively, and to ensure that the president's
message reached far beyond the immediate audience, his staff took
reporters on his trips and provided the technical means to send their
stories to their home papers. Thus, effectively exploiting technological
developments--the national rail network with telegraph wires paralleling
the tracks--McKinley and his staff seized upon the new tools of modernity
to modernize the presidency. McKinley demonstrated to his successors that
the president's direct access to the public gave him the opportunity to
build a power base independent of his constitutionally defined
relationship with Congress. As one contemporary observer wrote, with
understandable hyperbole, 'The pivot upon which we revolve as a nation is
no longer the Capitol, where the people's representatives assemble, but
the White House, where one man sits in almost supreme power.'74 63
"In assessing the performance of the presidents in the Gilded Age, one
should not lose sight of the broader political context, which profoundly
influenced their effectiveness. Nineteenth-century Americans' abiding
suspicion of concentrated power persisted and was deepened by the
experience of Andrew Johnson. Moreover, for most of the period the two
major political parties were locked in an equilibrium in electoral
strength that restrained presidents and other party leaders from taking
stands so strong that they would offend some indispensable party
constituency. The closeness in party strength also deprived most of these
presidents of a clear electoral mandate, and it usually resulted in a
divided national government, with the legislative and the executive
branches at loggerheads on many issues. One of the reasons McKinley was
able to lead with the dynamism he showed, besides his inherent talent for
conciliation, was the major realignment that had occurred in 1894 and
1896, making the Republicans the nation's undisputed majority party. 64
"Despite these contextual and systemic handicaps, the presidents of the
Gilded Age presided over a gradual but undeniable accretion of authority
and influence in their office from the depths to which it had plunged in
the Johnson years. Presidents became more influential in their relations
with Congress, and in a variety of ways, including travel and press
manipulation, they increasingly attracted public attention and influenced
public attitudes. By 1888 even James Bryce saw 'reasons for believing that
[the presidency] may reach a higher point than it has occupied at any time
since the Civil War. The tendency everywhere in America to concentrate
power and responsibility in one man is unmistakable.' Because the
president was 'in some respects better fitted both to represent and to
influence public opinion than Congress,' Bryce forecast 'still undeveloped
possibilities of greatness in store for the Presidents of the future.'75
Theodore Roosevelt did not will the modern presidency into being simply by
the assertion of his own indomitable personality. Instead, he recognized
the potential foreshadowed by the efforts of his late-nineteenth century
predecessors. Building on their accomplishments and advances, he moved the
presidency to the center of national political and governmental life where
it has remained ever since."