WI: Target Rosyth

On 15th August 1940 the Luftwaffe carried out its only major raid on northern England in which they suffered substantial losses. The losses were so high that the scale of this raid was never repeated although there were numerous smaller and single aircraft raids throughout the remainder of 1940 and beyond.

The targets of the raids were a number of RAF airfields in North Yorkshire and around the Newcastle area. The raid consisted of approximately 135 aircraft; 65 He111 and 35 Bf110 from Norway plus 50 Ju88 from Denmark. Very few of the aircraft from Norway, whose targets were close to Newcastle, got through however the Ju88s managed to do some considerable damage to RAF Driffield where 10 British bombers were destroyed on the ground and damage done to the base. In total RAF Fighter Command managed to put 9 Squadrons into the air although only 7 were Spitfire/Hurricane squadrons and shot down 8 He111, 7 Ju88 and 8 Bf110 for the loss of just two aircraft with another half a dozen damaged plus 3 pilots seriously wounded with no loss of life.

If we then move on exactly one month to the day that is now known as the Battle of Britain Day where the Luftwaffe flew more sorties in a single day than at any other time during the battle and consider what might have been if they had decided to strike in the north again. In the south east of England and in the skies above London the bombers of the Luftwaffe were being used as bait to draw fighter command into the skies where they would then become targets for the German Bf109 escorts. The bombers were regularly out number two or three to one in the German formations which meant there were often large numbers of bombers sitting at airfields in France and Denmark etc.

What if on 15th September, following intelligence reports and recon flights the Luftwaffe decided to launch an attack on the Rosyth naval base. Such a raid would consist of anything up to 300 He111 / Ju88 bombers escorted by 100 Bf110s and would have included the 24 He115 torpedo armed floatplanes available in Norway.

At Rosyth on 15th September the Home Fleet had gathered a vast array of warships ready to repulse the expected German invasion. This fleet included two battleships, one battle cruiser, three AA cruisers, three light cruisers and eighteen destroyers (I think this is right but some may have been out on patrol).

The fighter cover at this time was a little thinned down and there were only one full strength Spitfire and one full strength Hurricane squadron within 45 minutes flying time of Rosyth plus a squadron of Defiants. In addition to this there were two training units which could put up 12 Hurricanes between them about 20 - 25 minutes away and three understrength squadrons resting and reforming 25 - 30 minutes away which had a further 24 Spitfires and Hurricanes between them. So in total Fighter Command could put in the air the equivolent of five front line squadrons plus one of Defiants against 400 + aircraft.

The other thing to consider is that fighter command would get only 30 minutes warning IF the bombers flew directly to the target ... and the number of aircraft would have been an estimate until the observer corp could get a visual fix on the formation so the full threat would not be recognised until the Germans were 10-15 minutes from their targets. In the previous raid the initial estimates from the radar only were as low as 30-50 aircraft rather than the 135 or so that actually attacked. This meant that only one RAF squadron was put in the air until it was realised the scale of the attack introducing quite a delay in the RAF's response.

So taking all that into consideration, what kind of damage could this raid do to the Royal Navies capabilities at this crucial stage of the war?
 

sharlin

Banned
Considering high altitude bombings use against warships in OTL, probably not that much. The IJN had luck at Pearl thanks to its crews being distressingly well trained and had a lot of practice with such targets which the Germans are going to be lacking.

So assuming this massive effort and breathtaking foresight by the Germans and the RAF seemingly being on the turpentine again, the RN ships would not be sitting with boilers cold, again unless they had been at the lead based paint. With enough time they could get up steam to move, you would also have AA guns on ship firing as well as destroyers laying smoke screens etc.

This is also without pointing out that the Germans lacked a decent AP bomb at this point that could threaten the capital ships.

So some hits would be scored, but unless the RN was having BBQ's in its magazines with open flame/arc weilders to cook the meat, you're not going to sink that much.
 
Considering high altitude bombings use against warships in OTL, probably not that much. The IJN had luck at Pearl thanks to its crews being distressingly well trained and had a lot of practice with such targets which the Germans are going to be lacking.

So assuming this massive effort and breathtaking foresight by the Germans and the RAF seemingly being on the turpentine again, the RN ships would not be sitting with boilers cold, again unless they had been at the lead based paint. With enough time they could get up steam to move, you would also have AA guns on ship firing as well as destroyers laying smoke screens etc.

This is also without pointing out that the Germans lacked a decent AP bomb at this point that could threaten the capital ships.

So some hits would be scored, but unless the RN was having BBQ's in its magazines with open flame/arc weilders to cook the meat, you're not going to sink that much.
Firstly the only aircraft in the proposed raid not capable of dive bombing or low level bombing was the He111, this would have been used to carry out medium altitude level bombing. The He115 is there to either deploy mines in the approaches to Rosyth or potentially carry out torpedo attacks. The Bf110 is a long range escort but can quite easily be used as a low level or dive bomber. The most effective weapon against the ships would have been the Ju88.

Here is a description taken from the Battle of Britain Historical Society ...
To look at, the Junkers Ju88 looks clumsy and and all out of proportion. But as it was shown during the period of the Second World War, it was perhaps one of the most versatile aircraft of the period. It was first designed back in 1936 as a "Schnellbomber" a fast daylight bomber and surprisingly had its first flight in that same year and was soon to display its superior performance. With the demise of Professor Junkers, the engineers saw the potential of this fast medium bomber and felt that still improvements could be made that Germany could produce an outstanding aircraft. Knowing the advantages of tactical dive bombing, with the pilot aiming the aircraft at the target, tests were carried out after dive brakes had been fitted. It was to prove that the Ju88 could add another advantage over other bombers that had been produced in Germany at the time.

Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, five variants had been produced but the Ju88 never saw service in any of the early campaigns such as the Spanish Civil War or the invasion of Poland, but tests were still being carried out during this period. By March 1939, a fifth variant managed a speed of 517km per hour (321.2 mph) over a 1.000 kilometre (621 miles) test and with a payload of 2,000 kilograms (4409 pounds), set a record for a bomber of its type. When war did eventually break out in September 1939, the Ju88A-1 was at last to enter service although the first recorded mission was not flown until late in that month.

The introduction of the Ju88 was to boost the strength of Germany's bomber forces which already had He111 and Do17 bombers already in service. The Ju88 was heavier than both the Dornier and the Heinkel, but even with a bombload of two 500 or 250 kilogram bombs under each wing, and twenty eight 50 kilogram bombs stored internally, the two 1,200 hp Jumo 211B engines made it faster than the other two bombers. Although the Ju88 had an extensive array of machine guns for defensive purposes, two in the rear fusalage, one underneath, one in the cockpit and even one that could be operated by the pilot. The main problem was that all forward machine guns had to be operated by the Flight Engineer with the exception of the pilots gun. Impressive enough, it was adequate in operations over northern France, but against the much faster Hurricanes and Spitfires during the Battle of Britain that had been developed to superior standards it was to prove inneffective against the British fighters as casualty lists were later to prove. One of the aircrew of the Ju88 was the Flight Engineer who had the task of operating and firing four machine guns, always having to jump from one gun to another. This was possibly one of the worst faults of the Ju88 which was never improved.

The Ju88 gained success in the raids on radar stations where it proved that its dive bombing capablities were to prove successful. In many massed raids, the attrition rate was not to the proportions of the He111 and Do17, this was possibly due to the fact that when under attack, the Ju88 could break into as dive at considerable speed.

This was proved in a number of mass attacks by Ju88s during the Battle of Britain. One of the most successful of the Luftwaffe raids was and attack on Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight on August 12th 1940. They managed to carry out their attack successfully, then if they were intercepted by Britsh fighters as they were on this occasion, they were able to dive at high speed thus evading contact with the fighters.
Not sure why you say the RAF are on the turps here ... I'm just stating what squadrons were available within a reasonable distance of the intended target. And I'm not sure how effective they will be. Sixty aircraft against four hundred plus is not a lot. In comparison on 7th September in raids on London the Luftwaffe put 1100 aircraft in the air and Fighter Command put up in excess of 300 fighters with a kill rate of only one downed German aircraft for every five fighters scrambled. Even if the British pilots manage to double that ratio that would still only be twenty-four bombers destroyed. You could go even better than that and say every available fighter gets one kill and that would be just sixty bombers shot down.

My assumption is that on first radar contact the RAF would put up 111 Squadron of Hurricanes from Drem and 65 Squadron of Spitfires from Turnhouse soon afterwards (scramble times for Spitfires is always a little longer than Hurricanes). So you have two squadrons going out to either meet the enemy or patrol likely targets. It roughly takes 15 minutes for a squadron to scramble and then climb to the required height. Which means they will engage at about the same time as the observer corp start to see and estimate the size of the raid. At that point I'm guessing there would be a mini-panic and all available squadrons will be scrambled ... but that means that for the next 20 - 30 minutes 111 and 65 squadrons will be by themselves. In heavy combat such as this it is more than likely the British fighters will run out of ammo within 10-15 minutes and will have to break off the attacks to return to base for resupply. Basically it will be a bit of a mess for a while for the British until they can get all guns blazing.

As for the ships I don't know if it is possible for them to get underway and leave Rosyth with 30 minutes warning, someone may have to tell me if it is likely or not.
 
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sharlin

Banned
As long as they are not sitting there on cold boilers then its possible to build up steam pritty damn quick, depending on readyness etc you could be underway in 15 minutes so they are not tied along side or anchored in the bay.

I'll still point out that high level bombing against ships had a very poor hit rate.
 

sharlin

Banned
Then what? You're going to have HE-111's dive bombing? The JU-88 could glide bomb but if the force's attack will be 100 HE-111's and 200 JU-88's as well as 100 ME-110's for escort then you're probably stripping all of Norway, Denmark and Northern France dry of squadrons for this massed attack. And not all the JU-88 pilots were trained in dive/glide bombing attacks and would carry out level bombing attacks unless suddenly every JU-88 pilot is replaced by a Stuka man you're not going to have that many dive bombers so the majority of the attacks would stand as being level bombers.

The floatplanes would be of neglagable value, VERY slow, and they have to go even slower to launch their fish at very low altitude in defended port. You might as well line the pilots up of the planes and machine gun down 3/4 of them before they take off. And then you have things like harbour depth, torpedo nets etc.

Is this just another 'lets spank the UK/RN'? If I recall you said you wanted more stories where RN and British personnel die a good few months back.
 
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Then what? You're going to have HE-111's dive bombing?

The JU-88 could glide bomb ...

... but if the force's attack will be 100 HE-111's and 200 JU-88's as well as 100 ME-110's for escort then you're probably stripping all of Norway, Denmark and Northern France dry of squadrons for this massed attack.

And not all the JU-88 pilots were trained in dive/glide bombing attacks and would carry out level bombing attacks unless suddenly every JU-88 pilot is replaced by a Stuka man you're not going to have that many dive bombers so the majority of the attacks would stand as being level bombers.
No the He111 would not dive bomb but they can be used to damage installations and maybe a lucky bomb strikes a ship.

The Ju88 was a dive bomber and could be used at such with a comfortable 60 degree dive.

The Luftwaffe had over 1000 bombers serviceable at this point in the battle and many more awaiting repair etc. There were two main attacks on 15th September, one at 11:00 and the other at 14:00 neither of which used more than 150 bombers and a lot of those were the Do17. That leaves a lot of spare bombers sitting around doing very little. As stated earlier by myself the main point of these attacks was to draw the British fighters into the air so they could engage in combat with the 600 or so Bf109s escorting the bomber formations.

The Ju88 was regularly called upon to conduct low level/dive attacks on airfield targets prior to this date and the pilots were pretty well versed in this kind of tactic. As the Ju 87 Stuka fleet was grounded at this time there were actually over 150 pilots with dive bombing experience going spare ... it is more than likely some of those had transferred to other units already.

The floatplanes would be of neglagable value, VERY slow, and they have to go even slower to launch their fish at very low altitude in defended port. You might as well line the pilots up of the planes and machine gun down 3/4 of them before they take off. And then you have things like harbour depth, torpedo nets etc.

Which is why I said they would either be used to mine the approaches of Rosyth OR carry torpedos. I know the Germans had available a new type of torpedo that was better suited to being dropped from an aircraft however I also know there was only a limited number (plus I can't find my source on this unfortunately).
 

sharlin

Banned
Re tansfering the Stuka pilots to the JU-88s thats most unlikely, there is a huge difference between a twin engine bomber and a single engine one. Its like that horrific idea from the terbiad Pearl Harbour of the heros (fighter pilots) suddenly becoming B-25 pilots.

Now also assuming (which you are kinda here) a 100% in service rate for this massive 300 plane raid and the 600 fighters waiting for the RAF to come blindly, lowing like cattle to their well coreographed slaughter you've got to move this 900 plane mass to their staging grounds etc, from fields in France to the North to get ready for this attack. This is not going to be unnoticed. So whilst the Germans prepare for this uber co-ordinated attack on a scale simply not seen before by the Luftwaffe since perhaps the outbreak of the Battle of France or perhaps the Battle of Britain is the RAF and UK in general going to sit on its hands and not react to the sudden shift of hundreds upon hundreds of aircraft, their personnel, supplies etc and go 'Hmm...i'm sure those Germans are just going up North to get some Dutch cheese or something.' and not react?
 
Re tansfering the Stuka pilots to the JU-88s thats most unlikely, there is a huge difference between a twin engine bomber and a single engine one. Its like that horrific idea from the terbiad Pearl Harbour of the heros (fighter pilots) suddenly becoming B-25 pilots.

Now also assuming (which you are kinda here) a 100% in service rate for this massive 300 plane raid and the 600 fighters waiting for the RAF to come blindly, lowing like cattle to their well coreographed slaughter you've got to move this 900 plane mass to their staging grounds etc, from fields in France to the North to get ready for this attack. This is not going to be unnoticed. So whilst the Germans prepare for this uber co-ordinated attack on a scale simply not seen before by the Luftwaffe since perhaps the outbreak of the Battle of France or perhaps the Battle of Britain is the RAF and UK in general going to sit on its hands and not react to the sudden shift of hundreds upon hundreds of aircraft, their personnel, supplies etc and go 'Hmm...i'm sure those Germans are just going up North to get some Dutch cheese or something.' and not react?

Select Stuka pilots were already used elsewhere, notably in the Bf110 ... which has two engines just like the Ju88 (which was a forgiving aircraft noted for its ease of operation).

On 7th September the Luftwaffe launched an 1100 plane raid after moving all of its personnel, creating new landing grounds etc. It may not have gone unnoticed but it still caused some surprises for fighter command. So this scale of raid had been seen before and had been a success. On the 15th September in OTL there were two raids of 750 + aircraft one at 11:00 and the other at 14:00 plus many smaller raids. I'm not sure why this surprises some people that the Luftwaffe despite its many faults could and quite often did have a huge force available to them. In the early stages of the battle they had close to 3000 aircraft SERVICEABLE including just over 1000 Bf109s. Just because they were losing twice as many aircraft as fighter command it doesn't mean by any stretch of the imagination that they were running short after all they started the campaign with three times as many aircraft as the Brits.
 
Ian

Just to clarify, when you're talking about ambushing FC with ~600 Be-109s are you talking about something in the south or in this attack on Rosyth? The former may be possible although you need at least some fighters with the bombers else their likely to get slaughtered before the fighters attack.

If you're talking about Rosyth then I rather think the Be-109 doesn't have anything like the range. That was why the August attack was escorted by Be-110s and the heavy losses were why it wasn't repeated. If the proposed attack is made with 100 Be-110s escorting they will still suffer some heavy losses, especially if the escorts are loaded up as bombers as well. They could well drop a lot of bombs on the port and might get lucky and do some seriously damage to one of the big ships but its unlikely to be cost effective and repeated.

Steve
 
Ian

Just to clarify, when you're talking about ambushing FC with ~600 Be-109s are you talking about something in the south or in this attack on Rosyth? The former may be possible although you need at least some fighters with the bombers else their likely to get slaughtered before the fighters attack.

If you're talking about Rosyth then I rather think the Be-109 doesn't have anything like the range. That was why the August attack was escorted by Be-110s and the heavy losses were why it wasn't repeated. If the proposed attack is made with 100 Be-110s escorting they will still suffer some heavy losses, especially if the escorts are loaded up as bombers as well. They could well drop a lot of bombs on the port and might get lucky and do some seriously damage to one of the big ships but its unlikely to be cost effective and repeated.

Steve
Just to clarify ...

Raid One (OTL) - 11:00 to 13:00

A force of approximately 200 bombers (Mainly Do17 and He111) and twin engined fighters escorted by 500-600 Bf109. The bombers form various V formations of 3, 5 nd 7 aircraft at heights between 15,000-26,000 with the Bf109 flying higher and slightly behind the lead bombers.

Fighter command release 23 squadrons in total from 11 Group with reinforcements from Middle Wallop sector (10 Group) and Duxford Sector (12 Group "Big Wing"). The Bf109s broke formation and headed to attack the RAF fighters immediately. As per normal the Spitfire squadrons concentrated on keeping the escorts busy whilst the Hurricanes worked on breaking up the bomber formations. Even the Duxford "Big Wing" managed to make their mark for a change due to the Luftwaffes slow build up. Very few of the German bombers got through to the target, London's East End, and those that did released their bombs as quickly as possible whether they were over specific targets or not. Not a great success for the Germans with lazy planning and over-confidence resulted in a lengthy build up giving fighter command plenty of time to prepare and the attack was repulsed far too easily.

Raid Two (OTL) - 14:00 to 15:00

Three waves of bombers were launched by the Luftwaffe for the afternoon attacks each seperated by 10 - 15 minutes. In total there were approximately 220-250 bombers and twin engined fighters escorted again by 500-600 Bf109. Again the target was London.

This time the attacks were more direct with a much quicker build up giving the RAF less time to prepare. Fighter Command scrambled the same number of squadrons as earlier in the day to meet the new threat. As before the bombers formed V formations with the fighter escort above however this time the fighters only attacked when the bomber formation was threatened directly. Therefore the German fighter cover was maintained right up to the target rather than being drawn away by the British Spitfires. The Duxford "Big Wing" was far less effective on this occasion with less time to prepare and with the enemy bombers retaining fighter escorts the "Big Wing" was attacked whilst still forming. On this occasion a larger proportion of the bombers got through and fighter command suffered almost twice as many losses as they had done in the earlier attack.

At the time Fighter Command claimed the destruction of 185 German Aircraft however it is believed that only 60-80 Luftwaffe planes were lost (over estimates happened on both sides). In comparison the RAF had 56 of their fighters damaged or destroyed with 13 pilots killed, one taken POW and 8 wounded (not including slight injuries).

So here is the difference ...

Raid One and a Half (NOT Real, POD) - 11:00 to 16:30

100 + He111 escorted by a similar number of Bf110 with long range drop tanks start their 2 1/2 hour journey to Rosyth, Scotland from bases mainly in the Netherlands. They are followed 30 minutes later by 200 Ju88 bombers and at the same time 24 He115 torpedo bombers launch from Norway; 8 are carrying torpedos with the remainder containing mines. The bomber formations maintain a coure that keeps them at least 150 miles from the British coast until they are off the coast of southern Scotland when they turn east preparing for attack. The He111s are the first to arrive followed by the Ju88s now just 10 minutes behind their slower counterparts.

The British radar picks up the first wave of aircraft whilst they are approximately 100 miles off the coast estimating the strenght at about 50 aircraft. Both 65 Squadron (Spitfire) at RAF Turnhouse and 111 Squadron (Hurricane) at RAF Drem are put on alert and as the bombers get closer 111 Squadron are scrambled followed 10 minutes later by 65 Squadron. As the fighters climb to meet the enemy at 20,000 ft it becomes obvious that the formation is much larger than anticipated. The German bombers split with the larger formation attacking Rosyth naval base and three much smaller formations heading for each of the airfields in the immediate area. Over the next 10 - 15 minutes both training squadrons at Prestwick and Dyce are scrambled as are the two squadrons currently based at Acklington recently moved up from 11 Group to rest and refit. In total Fighter Command can muster just

The second wave of bombers, Ju88s, following 10 minutes behind the first wave go almost unnoticed travelling at a much lower altitude getting to within 50 miles before radar contact.

So I will repeat the question ... what happens next?
 
Ian

Thanks for clarifying.

I would say the two southern raids go as OTL, since there's no real time to interact between them and the forces in northern England/Scotland.

The northern raid will cause a lot of concern when its size is realised and may cause some significant damage if the a/c get lucky, although the mines might be a greater threat, especially since in the general confusion they might not be noticed. However its likely to see fairly heavy German losses as the bombers are only defended by heavily laden Be-110's, which have already shown their not up to mixing it with single engined fighters. Furthermore they have a much greater distance to travel to reach safe bases so likely to see more losses due to damaged or faulty a/c being lost at sea.

The big problem might be that the British feel they have to maintain more forces in the north to prevent against further attacks, weakening the main battle over SE England. Not greatly enough to alter things as its too late for even an unsuccessful invasion of England by Germany this year. Hence while it would cause problems for Britain I think they would be fairly trivial.

Steve
 
On 15th August 1940 the Luftwaffe carried out its only major raid on northern England in which they suffered substantial losses. The losses were so high that the scale of this raid was never repeated although there were numerous smaller and single aircraft raids throughout the remainder of 1940 and beyond.

The targets of the raids were a number of RAF airfields in North Yorkshire and around the Newcastle area. The raid consisted of approximately 135 aircraft; 65 He111 and 35 Bf110 from Norway plus 50 Ju88 from Denmark. Very few of the aircraft from Norway, whose targets were close to Newcastle, got through however the Ju88s managed to do some considerable damage to RAF Driffield where 10 British bombers were destroyed on the ground and damage done to the base. In total RAF Fighter Command managed to put 9 Squadrons into the air although only 7 were Spitfire/Hurricane squadrons and shot down 8 He111, 7 Ju88 and 8 Bf110 for the loss of just two aircraft with another half a dozen damaged plus 3 pilots seriously wounded with no loss of life.

If we then move on exactly one month to the day that is now known as the Battle of Britain Day where the Luftwaffe flew more sorties in a single day than at any other time during the battle and consider what might have been if they had decided to strike in the north again. In the south east of England and in the skies above London the bombers of the Luftwaffe were being used as bait to draw fighter command into the skies where they would then become targets for the German Bf109 escorts. The bombers were regularly out number two or three to one in the German formations which meant there were often large numbers of bombers sitting at airfields in France and Denmark etc.

What if on 15th September, following intelligence reports and recon flights the Luftwaffe decided to launch an attack on the Rosyth naval base. Such a raid would consist of anything up to 300 He111 / Ju88 bombers escorted by 100 Bf110s and would have included the 24 He115 torpedo armed floatplanes available in Norway.

At Rosyth on 15th September the Home Fleet had gathered a vast array of warships ready to repulse the expected German invasion. This fleet included two battleships, one battle cruiser, three AA cruisers, three light cruisers and eighteen destroyers (I think this is right but some may have been out on patrol).

The fighter cover at this time was a little thinned down and there were only one full strength Spitfire and one full strength Hurricane squadron within 45 minutes flying time of Rosyth plus a squadron of Defiants. In addition to this there were two training units which could put up 12 Hurricanes between them about 20 - 25 minutes away and three understrength squadrons resting and reforming 25 - 30 minutes away which had a further 24 Spitfires and Hurricanes between them. So in total Fighter Command could put in the air the equivolent of five front line squadrons plus one of Defiants against 400 + aircraft.

The other thing to consider is that fighter command would get only 30 minutes warning IF the bombers flew directly to the target ... and the number of aircraft would have been an estimate until the observer corp could get a visual fix on the formation so the full threat would not be recognised until the Germans were 10-15 minutes from their targets. In the previous raid the initial estimates from the radar only were as low as 30-50 aircraft rather than the 135 or so that actually attacked. This meant that only one RAF squadron was put in the air until it was realised the scale of the attack introducing quite a delay in the RAF's response.

So taking all that into consideration, what kind of damage could this raid do to the Royal Navies capabilities at this crucial stage of the war?

They could do a lot of damage and kill a few sailors and more civilians. I don't see them actually sinking many capital ships. Even if they do they will be refloated and repaired. It won't change the cancellation of Sea Lion. The surface raiders get an easier time for a few months but the RN ships are repaired by the time Bismarck enters service.

As for the Germans. They face the AA fire from the British ships (quite heavy if they are manning action stations) and a small initial fighter response but take heavy losses when the other squadrons arrive. My best guess is they would lose about 10-15 aircraft from AA fire and another 30-40 from fighters including the Defiants. The Bf 110's are only providing limited protection.

Hitler may want to know why the Luftwaffe is bombing the RN in Scotland when they were supposed to be achieving air superiority over Southern England and the Channel.
 
Technically there would have been a more logical sort of strike, which the Luftwaffe at that time in the war frequently deployed: offensive minelaying. If the Luftwaffe was using aircraft capable of dropping some large (contact, influence, magnetic and aucoustic) mines in the Firth of Forth, near Rosyth, the Royal Navy would have been blocked, as there was no way the fleet could ignore this and the Forth is quite large to clean completely. The Homefleet would be bottled up for a while at least, for less tisks to bombers, which now did not need numbers that big and could avoid difficult bombingruns.

The basical point is: you don't have to hit ships physically to ignore their user to use them normally. Just blockade them, or otherwise prevent them to do their thing. This is not glorious, but wars are not won by playing things fair.
 
Given that the LW has already been shown that bombers unescorted by Me109's get massacred, why are they planning a raid on Rosyth rather than Portsmouth or Chatham, both of which hosted ships and could be covered by the single engine fighters?

Assuming that all the British fighters are now down south seems a rather optimistic assumption.
 
Given that the LW has already been shown that bombers unescorted by Me109's get massacred, why are they planning a raid on Rosyth rather than Portsmouth or Chatham, both of which hosted ships and could be covered by the single engine fighters?
Because in reality on 15th September 1940 the largest concentration of Royal Navy ships was at Rosyth not Portsmouth or Chatham. The fleet at Rosyth was put together specifically to counter the German invasion of Britain and its assembly was observed by aerial recon. more than once. The ports you mentioned would never have hosted this kind of fleet at this time for the exact reason you stated ... the British weren't silly enough to place their major ships in the south and south east where not only would they be in range of the Bf109 but also the Ju87 Stuka.
Assuming that all the British fighters are now down south seems a rather optimistic assumption.
If you are suggesting I have assumed that all British fighters are in the south I haven't ... I've just looked through the records to see what squadrons were stationed where, what their status was and how many aircraft they were likely to have available.

If however you are suggesting that the Luftwaffe are assuming that all the British fighters were in the south, well this is one of the mistakes the Germans made often. It was the assumption they made on 15th August which prompted their earlier attack, it was the assumption they made on 3rd September when they met and decided to change tactics to attack London and draw out the (what they assumed) 300 remaining British fighters into the air. So why would that assumption change less than two weeks later?
 
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Technically there would have been a more logical sort of strike, which the Luftwaffe at that time in the war frequently deployed: offensive minelaying. If the Luftwaffe was using aircraft capable of dropping some large (contact, influence, magnetic and aucoustic) mines in the Firth of Forth, near Rosyth, the Royal Navy would have been blocked, as there was no way the fleet could ignore this and the Forth is quite large to clean completely. The Homefleet would be bottled up for a while at least, for less tisks to bombers, which now did not need numbers that big and could avoid difficult bombingruns.

The basical point is: you don't have to hit ships physically to ignore their user to use them normally. Just blockade them, or otherwise prevent them to do their thing. This is not glorious, but wars are not won by playing things fair.
I hear exactly what you are saying but I personally feel this kind of strike is as much about issuing a grand statement to the Royal Navy as anything else. That message being "you may think you are safe but believe me you are not"
 
I hear exactly what you are saying but I personally feel this kind of strike is as much about issuing a grand statement to the Royal Navy as anything else. That message being "you may think you are safe but believe me you are not"

I wasn't aware that the Royal Navy or anyone in Britain thought they were safe in September 1940. 'Grand statements' by Hitler were no longer relevant by the Autumn of 1940. Everyone knew he bombed things and soon he would be bombing London too.

RAF Fighter command would think 'Oh, he's bombing Rosyth! Great he's not bombing the airfields and we can pick off his bombers because they lack effective fighter escort. Let's hope he bombs Rosyth, Scapa Flow and Loch Ewe and does it every day'
 
Interesting, Hathaway...

...The raison d'etre for the raid carried out by LZ-36 in 'Zeppelin' - and probably about as strategically insignificant.

The OP is intriguing, but somehow I feel that the very long distance flight for the raid may not justify its performance.

Mines offer better results for less risk to the Luftwaffe.

Why not look into better air-sea co-ordination be the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine? A combination of guided bombs and submarine-launched torpedoes would devastate any convoy in the South West Approaches or the Irish Sea. In OTL, the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine wasted resources trying to outdo one another - thank Heaven.
 
stevep said:
the British feel they have to maintain more forces in the north to prevent against further attacks, weakening the main battle over SE England.
Doesn't it just mean Dowding has to finally settle the question of support of 11 Group? I'm seeing this as demanding more from 12 & 13 Groups, which were mostly uninvolved OTL, & even in these changed conditions, I'm not seeing a huge impact.
 
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