WI: Syria invades Jordan during Black September?

I am no expert on the subject, but quickly researching, it seems that during the Black September in Jordan, Syria actually did send military forces in Jordan. The Jordanian King asked Britain and the USA for help, and as a result, Israel preformed 'mock air strikes' again Syrian columns. Syria backed out of Jordan at this point. However, if Israel is unwilling to go into a war at this point, what happens? Would Syria beat Jordan in a war? What I find interesting is how this could change the regional dynamic-it could create a Jordanian-Israeli alliance, which could be achieved if Israel does enter the war.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
If Israel does nothing, then Syria could eat Jordan for breakfast. But you would need a pretty hefty POD to keep Israel from intervening.
 
I am no expert on the subject, but quickly researching, it seems that during the Black September in Jordan, Syria actually did send military forces in Jordan. The Jordanian King asked Britain and the USA for help, and as a result, Israel preformed 'mock air strikes' again Syrian columns. Syria backed out of Jordan at this point. However, if Israel is unwilling to go into a war at this point, what happens? Would Syria beat Jordan in a war? What I find interesting is how this could change the regional dynamic-it could create a Jordanian-Israeli alliance, which could be achieved if Israel does enter the war.
Syria did invade Jordan IOTL. However, the Jordanians stopped them.

Now, if we are talking about a full war, its hard to say who would have won. The Syrians certainly outweigh the jordanians by a significant factor. On the other hand, the Syrian performance during their brief intervention was rather abject. After the initial failures, Jordan put on a decent strategic show in dealing with the syrians, but their tactical performance at ar-Ramtha was pathetic. The Jordanian air force gave a good account of itself during the campaign, being critical in repulsing the Syrian (The Syrian air force, being conspicuously absent, is a bit of an unknown quantity). So the Jordanians can, in theory, hold off the syrians on their own, but Syrian numerical superiority, the dispersal of the Jordanian army, and Jordan's own failings mean that in practice Syria can bludgeon their way to a victory of some sort.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
The Jordanian military had not only superior equipment in the form of M-48, M-60 and Centurion tanks, they had superior training and morale.

It wouldn't have been like running into a brick wall the way Syrian tanks did when they took on Israeli armour in Lebanon, but in my opinion the Jordanians could've defeated them.

Basically, when you look at the history of every ground fighting system the Jordanians used, it had already been used to defeat the Syrians. The Pattons and Centurions had destroyed Syrian armour in the Golan.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
If Israel does nothing, then Syria could eat Jordan for breakfast. But you would need a pretty hefty POD to keep Israel from intervening.

Amen. And the United States.

Jordan is far and away the most reasonable of ALL states that have contact with Israel, with Egypt second. Even in 1967 they went to war being dragged kicking and screaming by Nassar.

No way Washington or Tel Aviv lets them become part of Syria.
 
The Jordanian military had not only superior equipment in the form of M-48, M-60 and Centurion tanks, they had superior training and morale.

It wouldn't have been like running into a brick wall the way Syrian tanks did when they took on Israeli armour in Lebanon, but in my opinion the Jordanians could've defeated them.

Basically, when you look at the history of every ground fighting system the Jordanians used, it had already been used to defeat the Syrians. The Pattons and Centurions had destroyed Syrian armour in the Golan.
The question is, can the Jordanian's use their equipment well enough to beat the Syrians? IIRC they were unable to really use their equipment to its full capabilities, made some fairly major mistakes, and were IOTL unable to stop a syrian incursion which should have been turned back relatively easily until the Jordanian Air Force saved the day.
 

Ak-84

Banned
They would also have been a war with Pakistan, Pakistan troops were in Jordan at the time, specifically 7 Infantry Divison.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
The question is, can the Jordanian's use their equipment well enough to beat the Syrians? IIRC they were unable to really use their equipment to its full capabilities, made some fairly major mistakes, and were IOTL unable to stop a syrian incursion which should have been turned back relatively easily until the Jordanian Air Force saved the day.

I'm actually reading Six Days of War right now, and they're talking about just this sort of thing. There were always mitigating political factors that King Hussein had to deal with during the wars against Israel that ended up saddling his forces with ungainly political hassles.

In my opinion, an all out invasion of Jordan by Syria would've been bloody to say the least but the Jordanians wouldn't have had any reason not to take the muzzle off their troops.

They had battlefield experience, and 4 times out of 5 when a Centurion or Patton driven by a crew with any experience takes on a T-55 (whether or not that crew has experience), then they'll probably win.
 
I'm actually reading Six Days of War right now, and they're talking about just this sort of thing. There were always mitigating political factors that King Hussein had to deal with during the wars against Israel that ended up saddling his forces with ungainly political hassles.

In my opinion, an all out invasion of Jordan by Syria would've been bloody to say the least but the Jordanians wouldn't have had any reason not to take the muzzle off their troops.

They had battlefield experience, and 4 times out of 5 when a Centurion or Patton driven by a crew with any experience takes on a T-55 (whether or not that crew has experience), then they'll probably win.
I'm not sure if the problem facing the Jordanians is political in nature, nor one of commitment.

The one time that Syrian and Jordanian forces met in the field during 1970, the reinforced Syrian 5th division, with up to 300 T-55s, encountered Jordanian units consisting of the 25th Infantry and elements of the 40th Armoured brigades (about 100 Centurions, IIRC) around ar-Ramtha. The Jordanians were occupying two ridges blocking the Syrian advance. The Syrians stumbled into them, and attempted to force their opponents off the heights. The Syrian attack was filled with errors (lack of coordination between infantry and armor, tactics involving all the subtlety of a bull in a china shop), but the Jordanians pushed out of their positions and forced to retire. Instead of, say, flanking the Syrian advance and counterattacking, the Jordanians just let the enemy come to them, failed to make even basic maneuvers, suffered loses in material at a ratio of 2:1, and in the end failed in their task. Though the core of the Jordanian forces was relatively intact, the invasion was halted by air attacks which sapped Syrian morale, not any feats of arms on the ground.

So, what lessons can we take from this? The Syrians are by no means going to perform brilliantly. Rather, they are going to attack in a very straightforward manner, and the Jordanians are going to sit there and let the Syrians come. And, given the Jordanian performance, such a battle is going to develop into some sort of slogging match in which Syrian numbers will wear down the Jordanian forces. The Syrians will have issues, but unless their opposition can improve its abilities on the battlefield, Syria just might stumble into Amman.
 
I'm not sure if the problem facing the Jordanians is political in nature, nor one of commitment.

The one time that Syrian and Jordanian forces met in the field during 1970, the reinforced Syrian 5th division, with up to 300 T-55s, encountered Jordanian units consisting of the 25th Infantry and elements of the 40th Armoured brigades (about 100 Centurions, IIRC) around ar-Ramtha. The Jordanians were occupying two ridges blocking the Syrian advance. The Syrians stumbled into them, and attempted to force their opponents off the heights. The Syrian attack was filled with errors (lack of coordination between infantry and armor, tactics involving all the subtlety of a bull in a china shop), but the Jordanians pushed out of their positions and forced to retire. Instead of, say, flanking the Syrian advance and counterattacking, the Jordanians just let the enemy come to them, failed to make even basic maneuvers, suffered loses in material at a ratio of 2:1, and in the end failed in their task. Though the core of the Jordanian forces was relatively intact, the invasion was halted by air attacks which sapped Syrian morale, not any feats of arms on the ground.

So, what lessons can we take from this? The Syrians are by no means going to perform brilliantly. Rather, they are going to attack in a very straightforward manner, and the Jordanians are going to sit there and let the Syrians come. And, given the Jordanian performance, such a battle is going to develop into some sort of slogging match in which Syrian numbers will wear down the Jordanian forces. The Syrians will have issues, but unless their opposition can improve its abilities on the battlefield, Syria just might stumble into Amman.

Well based on my understanding of the two opposing nations, its very possible that Syria would in a sense spam the Jordanians with men and armor and eventually just wear them down, just as you have stated. It would be costly both politically and militarily for the Syrians to seize Amman. I wonder could they possibly draw the Saudis and the Iraqis into a conflict with Syria over Jordan or are the other Arab states willing to abandon Jordan? Also could the mounting costs of a major war between Syria and Jordan lead to an earlier blow up between al-Assad and Jadid?
 
Well based on my understanding of the two opposing nations, its very possible that Syria would in a sense spam the Jordanians with men and armor and eventually just wear them down, just as you have stated. It would be costly both politically and militarily for the Syrians to seize Amman. I wonder could they possibly draw the Saudis and the Iraqis into a conflict with Syria over Jordan or are the other Arab states willing to abandon Jordan? Also could the mounting costs of a major war between Syria and Jordan lead to an earlier blow up between al-Assad and Jadid?
Aside from Israel and Syria, the most important Middle Eastern State in this may well be Iraq. For one thing, the 3rd Armoured division was present in Jordan at the time, necessitating that forces be detailed to keep an eye on them. I'm honestly not sure which way Iraq jumps, if, indeed, it intervenes (which, sooner or later, it may have to). It's a Baath state at the time, but I dont think they were on great terms with the Syrians. I've heard references to the Iraqi's backing the Jordanians during '70, also the opposite, although in any case they did not directly intervene.

Not really sure what happens with the Saudi's. My guess is that they sponsor one side or the other but are content to sit on the sidelines and watch the fireworks.

As for the power struggle, that certainly seems possible (IOTL you can see the results of political conflicts in the syrian invasion, and Assad's coup came in early '71). On the other hand, a prolonged war may mean (temporary?) national unity.
 
Actually, Israel was involved in defending Jordan in '70- Nixon asked Meir and Rabin to intervene. The US would also send equipment to help defend Jordan. What would be Turkey's role?
 
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