WI : Syrgiannes Palaiologos was executed before the 1321 Byzantine Civil War

It seems the defection of Syrgiannes Palaiologos caused a whole mess of damage to the Empire by kick off the civil war once again.

I was wondering, with Andronikos II and Andronikos III at odds, and Andronikos III the Emperor that lost Anatolia to the Ottomans at the Battle of Pelekanon (partially by my understanding due to inferior numbers) - I assume that the first round would happen anyway. Is it possible that after Syriannes was captured after rebelling, that he could be executed - removing him from the equation and potentially leaving that civil war to only having one round?

IMO That seems the most interesting part - if this can somehow lead to no future rounds so that the Empire can be stronger and expand in Anatolia or at least prevent the expansion by Orhan. A3 certainly seemed interested in this policy, and I think it'd be an interesting PoD.
 
It seems the defection of Syrgiannes Palaiologos caused a whole mess of damage to the Empire by kick off the civil war once again.

I was wondering, with Andronikos II and Andronikos III at odds, and Andronikos III the Emperor that lost Anatolia to the Ottomans at the Battle of Pelekanon (partially by my understanding due to inferior numbers) - I assume that the first round would happen anyway. Is it possible that after Syriannes was captured after rebelling, that he could be executed - removing him from the equation and potentially leaving that civil war to only having one round?

IMO That seems the most interesting part - if this can somehow lead to no future rounds so that the Empire can be stronger and expand in Anatolia or at least prevent the expansion by Orhan. A3 certainly seemed interested in this policy, and I think it'd be an interesting PoD.

What year is the PoD?

I think Byzantine survival was not possible once they lost the Aegean coast of Anatolia, including places like Smyrna, Ephesus and Manissa...
 
What year is the PoD?

I think Byzantine survival was not possible once they lost the Aegean coast of Anatolia, including places like Smyrna, Ephesus and Manissa...

I suppose it'd be the year of capture. So.... 1320 I think.

What is interesting is that the Byzantines made a strong showing with half the troops under A3 IOTL so increasing the size of the army and avoiding the 2nd and 3rd conflicts of the civil war leaves the Byz in a better state, potentially able to stop, or end the Ottomans early, before they took the Marmara coast.

Plus also potentially avoiding the Serbian invasions/blinding them compared to OTL
 
I suppose it'd be the year of capture. So.... 1320 I think.

What is interesting is that the Byzantines made a strong showing with half the troops under A3 IOTL so increasing the size of the army and avoiding the 2nd and 3rd conflicts of the civil war leaves the Byz in a better state, potentially able to stop, or end the Ottomans early, before they took the Marmara coast.

Plus also potentially avoiding the Serbian invasions/blinding them compared to OTL

Byzantium's internal issues included loss of control over both sea trade tax revenue (Venice, Genoa) and land tax revenue (pronoiars didn't pay tax). How will these be fixed?
 
Byzantium's internal issues included loss of control over both sea trade tax revenue (Venice, Genoa) and land tax revenue (pronoiars didn't pay tax). How will these be fixed?

With this PoD? It would depend on IF this can lead to a successful campaign in Anatolia against Orhan because of a less ravaged Europe. This not only leads to loot to pay for the construction of a new fleet like A2 tried to do, but enables more revenue to revitalise the finances of the Empire. Both together are a shot in the arm to address these deeper problems.

I'd say there is POTENTIAL for a snowball effect, with Anatolia falling rapidly because it is divided for a relatively low cost, and thus large profit. Suddenly you have far more revenue and trade that isn't under Italian control.

What I would expect is the Romans adopting some Italian approaches to economics and trade in the recaptured territories, especially any Turkish converts or Anatolian Greeks. Much easier for them to get rich under that system than the traditional Roman model, and that could provide more taxes either as head taxes in growing cities, land value taxes, and tariffs.
 
The Romans were able to survive over a century after the 14th century civil war. By historical standards that's quite a long time. Had that particular civil war been prevented, it follows that their chances of surviving for as long as they did OTL are at least as high. The internal issues that the Romans faced after the end of the 13th century are not destined to destroy them, but they do require good luck as well as leadership. The collapse of Rum did not necessarily mean that an Ottoman-esque state would form as quickly as OTL, while the remaining Crusaders in Greece really only survived on the mainland as long as they did due to the ongoing collapse of Roman power. Given that Constantine XI was able to knock them about in the 15th century, it seems fair to say that an Empire that controls Thrace, Thessaloniki, and Thessaly will probably end up doing the same, and without the Ottomans around to intervene will probably annex them.

There are plenty of other risks. A Serbian or Bulgarian invasion that takes the majority of territory that the Ottomans took OTL is possible, and more remotely an invasion from Sicily or elsewhere could also occur. The role of the Italian city states is, IMO, somewhat overstated. They were certainly powerful and perfectly willing to bully anyone they could, but the chances of them re-doing 1204 I do not think are likely. Overall, avoiding the civil war or an equivalent disaster gives the Romans a modest chance of surviving as a viable state.

Longer term of course will be precarious. The demographic situation of the Romans in Anatolia is not strong, and Muslims will become the majority along the coast relatively quickly. Finding a chance to fight on a single front is itself very challenging for the Empire. In some ways, losing Anatolia but retaining the naval edge needed to prevent a Turkish crossing is actually a net benefit for the Romans, as they can focus entirely on Europe and not face a two-front disaster. Securing Greece and the Aegean is probably the best the Empire can hope for in the 14th century; any long term advances into Anatolia almost definitely require some long-term stability in Europe. How to achieve that, I don't know.
 
The Romans were able to survive over a century after the 14th century civil war. By historical standards that's quite a long time. Had that particular civil war been prevented, it follows that their chances of surviving for as long as they did OTL are at least as high. The internal issues that the Romans faced after the end of the 13th century are not destined to destroy them, but they do require good luck as well as leadership. The collapse of Rum did not necessarily mean that an Ottoman-esque state would form as quickly as OTL, while the remaining Crusaders in Greece really only survived on the mainland as long as they did due to the ongoing collapse of Roman power. Given that Constantine XI was able to knock them about in the 15th century, it seems fair to say that an Empire that controls Thrace, Thessaloniki, and Thessaly will probably end up doing the same, and without the Ottomans around to intervene will probably annex them.

There are plenty of other risks. A Serbian or Bulgarian invasion that takes the majority of territory that the Ottomans took OTL is possible, and more remotely an invasion from Sicily or elsewhere could also occur. The role of the Italian city states is, IMO, somewhat overstated. They were certainly powerful and perfectly willing to bully anyone they could, but the chances of them re-doing 1204 I do not think are likely. Overall, avoiding the civil war or an equivalent disaster gives the Romans a modest chance of surviving as a viable state.

Longer term of course will be precarious. The demographic situation of the Romans in Anatolia is not strong, and Muslims will become the majority along the coast relatively quickly. Finding a chance to fight on a single front is itself very challenging for the Empire. In some ways, losing Anatolia but retaining the naval edge needed to prevent a Turkish crossing is actually a net benefit for the Romans, as they can focus entirely on Europe and not face a two-front disaster. Securing Greece and the Aegean is probably the best the Empire can hope for in the 14th century; any long term advances into Anatolia almost definitely require some long-term stability in Europe. How to achieve that, I don't know.

I'm not sure I agree regarding losing Anatolia. One of the traditional strengths of the Byzantines was that if Anatolia was lost, Europe could retake it, and vice versa. That happened numerous times. I think they'd be in a much better state if they can take control of the West, and then North Anatolian coasts. Demographically at this point they're still majority greek and still majority very very useful. I also don't see how the demographic change on the coast is guaranteed if Turkish Beyliks are losing. The Anatolian Plateau? Certainly Turkish - but the Coasts? I don't see why the demographic change is guaranteed in this scenario.

Further, I'm not convinced that the Romans couldn't effectively take a "Peacemaker" role for the remaining Beys once they're able to establish control over the N and W coasts, that would enable them to have some level of security on the Eastern Border to secure the West. I do agree that the Romans couldn't actually retake (or attempt to convert) Anatolia without retaking Europe - but I'm pretty confident the wealth of the Anatolian coast and its isolation from European Theatres would serve the Romans better than sacrificing that revenue and manpower source.
 
In some ways, losing Anatolia but retaining the naval edge needed to prevent a Turkish crossing is actually a net benefit for the Romans, as they can focus entirely on Europe and not face a two-front disaster.

I think this is misguided. The problem is the empire's frontier in Europe is even longer than in Asia Minor. Also, the shape of the Balkans is such that any power which controls Greece and Thrace but not Bulgaria and Serbia will effectively have a very long land frontier, yet only a relatively small amount of land and population under its control.

Anatolia's shape in that respect is better - a power in western Anatolia has a relatively large area of land and population available, and a relatively shorter frontier due to the shape of the Anatolian peninsula.

Plus western Anatolia probably was the stronger population and economic base. That's why the empire of Nicaea won, while Epirus lost.

Other factor is that Constantinople's power had always been based on controlling both sides of the Bosporus. An empire based in Constantinople that entirely gives up Anatolia doesn't have a future, imo.
 
[QUOTE="Byzantine fanatic, post: 18502879, member: 86106"snip[/QUOTE]

The Roman Empire fell apart quite quickly once it hard to worry constantly about two fronts at once. Nicaea was successful because the Anatolian frontier was relatively stable while it focused on Europe. Once Anatolia played up again, the Empire was immediately overstretched and torn in two directions. OTL, Europe won out at the expense of Anatolia. If a lasting peace can be established on one frontier, then the other can be worked on. That is the trick for the post-Manzikert Empire. And I do mean post-Manzikert; the Komnenian Restoration ultimately failed because the Empire was too distracted to focus on the Anatolian frontier. Post 1204 there was even less slack.

Anatolia is rich, certainly, and in the 14th century at least there is a large Roman population though OTL showed that this changed pretty quickly during the 15th century, if not late 14th. How are the Romans going to take it back when they are under attack in Europe? With what army? Resources are seriously limited, and the Turks are militarily stronger than the Crusaders. It is much more cost effective to take easier territory that is contiguous than to reopen a larger, more dangerous front. If we were talking about the 1265 Empire I'd have a different view, and IMO it was still possible at that point to maintain two fronts with a great deal of care and skill, and this was a possibility OTL. Michael and his successors should have taken more care in preventing the implosion of Roman Anatolia. By 1300 though, and certainly by 1320, Anatolia was lost. A strong navy that keeps them out of Europe is just as necessary to keeping a lid on the Italians, making it relatively cost effective at controlling two different fronts. Reopening another land front however is just asking for an ambitious Crusader, Italian, Sicilian, Serbian, Bulgarian, or other leader to steamroll poorly defended European territories.

Just like how Anatolia was overwhelmed by the Turks.
 
The Roman Empire fell apart quite quickly once it hard to worry constantly about two fronts at once. Nicaea was successful because the Anatolian frontier was relatively stable while it focused on Europe. Once Anatolia played up again, the Empire was immediately overstretched and torn in two directions. OTL, Europe won out at the expense of Anatolia. If a lasting peace can be established on one frontier, then the other can be worked on. That is the trick for the post-Manzikert Empire. And I do mean post-Manzikert; the Komnenian Restoration ultimately failed because the Empire was too distracted to focus on the Anatolian frontier. Post 1204 there was even less slack.

Anatolia is rich, certainly, and in the 14th century at least there is a large Roman population though OTL showed that this changed pretty quickly during the 15th century, if not late 14th. How are the Romans going to take it back when they are under attack in Europe? With what army? Resources are seriously limited, and the Turks are militarily stronger than the Crusaders. It is much more cost effective to take easier territory that is contiguous than to reopen a larger, more dangerous front. If we were talking about the 1265 Empire I'd have a different view, and IMO it was still possible at that point to maintain two fronts with a great deal of care and skill, and this was a possibility OTL. Michael and his successors should have taken more care in preventing the implosion of Roman Anatolia. By 1300 though, and certainly by 1320, Anatolia was lost. A strong navy that keeps them out of Europe is just as necessary to keeping a lid on the Italians, making it relatively cost effective at controlling two different fronts. Reopening another land front however is just asking for an ambitious Crusader, Italian, Sicilian, Serbian, Bulgarian, or other leader to steamroll poorly defended European territories.

Just like how Anatolia was overwhelmed by the Turks.

The two-front thing is somewhat overblown - if the resources are there to secure fronts, then you can have two fronts (the point of the PoD is to minimise the loss of resources in the Civil War, and prevent the loss of the Anatolian resources) - as long as it isn't a two-front war, but that comes down to diplomacy as much as anything else. At this point, being able to stop someone like Orhan enables that front to be secure. I don't doubt the rest of your thesis in this regard, but dropping Anatolia just moves that second front to Constantinople and the Marmara - and this is for a state that isn't exactly a naval power either.
 
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