Interesting, might an occupied Sweden prolong the war rather than shorten it?
WI Sweden Invaded as Part of Operation Weserübung?
- Thread starter Binky the Clown
- Start date
Interesting, might an occupied Sweden prolong the war rather than shorten it?
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No, the Swedish iron mined was rigged for demolition even prior to Weserübung, they wouldn't have fallen intact. The industry is either located in major cities such as Stockholm or Gothenburg which are hard to capture (particulary Stockholm), or in locations hard to capture intact due to the geography such as Västerås.
Sure there would have been some collaborators, but not more then in Norway, and the terrain of Sweden, particularly the northern two thirds, are a bitch to attack through due to terrain and logistics.
Capturing Sweden in April 1940 would require at least 8-10 divisions of good quality (preferably a Panzer division or two), the entire Kriegsmarine and some 500-600 aircraft.
Anything less, and it's a loss. If Sweden is reinforced through Narvik by the Western Allies, Germany would likely need to at least double that troop commitment to 15-20 divisions.
Every French bridge was rigged for demolition but still they didn't do it. A German invasion of Sweden would not require entire Kriegrsmarine as it would be over the Danish Sound. The defence preparations of Southern Sweden during Weserübung were laughable and well trained German forces would just sweep away the Swedish resistance. Swedish armed forces had, what 90 days, of conscript service during 1930's. Swedish Army had a total of five moderately well equipped division and a motorized cavalry brigade.
The only well trained and equipped Swedish forces were in Swedish Lapland.
As for Luftwaffe, the Flygvapnet had just 51 Gloster Gladiators, 12 of which were still in Finland. Flygvapnet would be in no position to resist Luftwaffe in any way.
What I think would happen is that Germans could cross the Danish sound easily (after all, units of Danish Army "invaded" Sweden on 9th April 1940 with full combat equipment without anyone noticing). After beating
the Cavalry Brigade in open battle the forces could just race toward Gothenburg and Stockholm. Without any help available and the situation hopeless the Swedish goverment would capitulate in order to get the best deal possible. In this situation there's no way that ore mines would be demolished, as they would be probably the only ace in the sleeve Swedish Government would have.
Germany could well use the required, say, one light division and a few to ten infantry divisions required to effort.
As for reinforcement through Narvik, what forces exactly could Allies send? Some brigades which would be over a 1000km's away where the Swedish economic heartland is?
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My, my so little logic....
What has Franch bridges to do with Swedish iron mines?
Counterpoint: The French blew up their iron mines in Lorraine to deprive their use to the Germans, which hampered production severely there for over a year, I think the Swedish would have done the same.
Attack over the Sound? Without
A) Control over the Danish coast on April 9th?
B) Adequate naval support to protect the landings from the Swedish navy?
C) Without enough lift capacity for supplies and even for troops?
Sounds more like Seelöwe then anything else.
No, just no. The Swedish rearmament began in 1936, with extensions of the conscription time and without the reduction of amount of conscripted.
While the Swedish forces in April 1940 was positioned along the Swedish-Finnish border, it was some 60.000 of them. When the Swedish government received news of the invasion of Norway and Denmark, Sweden mobilized some 320.000 troops which were in position by April 21st in southern Sweden and along the Norwegian border.
It's 225km from Helsngborg to Gothenburg, and 575km from Helsingborg to Stockholm, both of which lies in different directions. If 'racing' the German troops will run out of fuel halfway to Gothenburg...
So ten divisions, from where? Without the Western Allies and Sweden noticing this buildup and/or withdrawal from other areas?
You do know about railroads right? And that in Sweden they run in a North-South direction right?
As for forces, the remainder of the Allied forces in Norway for one. Narvik would be held for a long time as the Germans would lack any means of reinforcing it.
What has Franch bridges to do with Swedish iron mines?
Counterpoint: The French blew up their iron mines in Lorraine to deprive their use to the Germans, which hampered production severely there for over a year, I think the Swedish would have done the same.
Attack over the Sound? Without
A) Control over the Danish coast on April 9th?
B) Adequate naval support to protect the landings from the Swedish navy?
C) Without enough lift capacity for supplies and even for troops?
Sounds more like Seelöwe then anything else.
No, just no. The Swedish rearmament began in 1936, with extensions of the conscription time and without the reduction of amount of conscripted.
While the Swedish forces in April 1940 was positioned along the Swedish-Finnish border, it was some 60.000 of them. When the Swedish government received news of the invasion of Norway and Denmark, Sweden mobilized some 320.000 troops which were in position by April 21st in southern Sweden and along the Norwegian border.
It's 225km from Helsngborg to Gothenburg, and 575km from Helsingborg to Stockholm, both of which lies in different directions. If 'racing' the German troops will run out of fuel halfway to Gothenburg...
So ten divisions, from where? Without the Western Allies and Sweden noticing this buildup and/or withdrawal from other areas?
You do know about railroads right? And that in Sweden they run in a North-South direction right?
As for forces, the remainder of the Allied forces in Norway for one. Narvik would be held for a long time as the Germans would lack any means of reinforcing it.
The French blow up every bridge over the river Meuse on May 12 1940, and probably several local bridges after that. What is Jukra trying to say by this statement?
Then Germany stands for a long drive up through big areas with lousy roads and infrastructure. Not to mention that it would demand trucks and other motor vehicles that were needed against France.
Well trained german forces? Over half the german infantery in Norway were fresh recruits with less than half a year of training behind them.
Basic Swedish conscription were 195 days. And the Swedish Army had two parts: the field army and the territorial army - Jukra only mentioned the first half. To that came the Home Guards.
Would Luftwaffe be in a position to do anything? They would be bound up by the Norwegian airlift, covering Germany against English-French air attacks, covering Norway against british carrier aviation and do basic reconnosance against Sweden. Germany have a limited number of military resources.
And the retreating Danish warned the Swedish military, that reacted. An German crossing of the sound would a) take several days to organize and b) meet a prepared defender.
Hmmm .... winning an open battle with what? How would they transport tanks and artillery to Sweden? Again, Germany had a limited number of resources, and amphibious capacity such as LST were not among them. Of course the Germans would win any open battle, sooner or later. But not that quick, that painless.
Probably. But that ignores the possibility that an officer blows up mines and infrastructure against orders, or that some anarchists/anti nazis/whatever among the miners raids the explosive store. Not to mention the potential for SOE actions later during the war. The British were already building up proto-"say behind" organisations among Swedes.
Again, limited number of resources. Weserübung were incredibly lucky, despite the loss of Blücher. It was a high risk gamble. Why add dangers without any real benefits?
IOTL Erik Lewenhaupt was a nobleman without any means, forced to abandon his military service due to illness. At the age of 34 he volontered for Finland as a car driver during the Winter War. Just back to Sweden he joined the Norwegian forces, shipped out with the British from Norway, joined the British airborne forces and ended with five combat jumps, two MCs, temporary grade of brigadeer (permanent Lt Col) and head of the officer school in Hong Kong. He was a very good example of "natural soldier discovered in wartime". ITTL timeline Lewenhaupt would discover his abilities for war home in Sweden, and in a way that weren't benefical for the german army.
As I said earlier: WW2 ends 3-6 months earlier due to even more imperial overstretch for Germany.
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Any German attack would be quite incapable of reaching Luleå-Boden-Kiruna in any reasonable time. Thus the immediate measures taken to neutralize mines are irrelevant. What matters are the political measures taken, ie. whether in case of invasion of Sweden the Swedish government decides to keep the mines intact in exchange of less harsh peace treaty etc.
Swedish Navy would have been incapable of interdicting crossing of the Sound from Sweden thanks to closed waters, enough German light naval forces and lack of Swedish preparedness on 9th April 1940.
Besides, in case of lift capacity etc. you're thinking too much in lines of opposed landings. Sweden had practically no capacity of opposing landings in Malmö-Helsingborg area on 9th April 1940. Any invasion would have been as simple as ferrying the troops and supplies with civilian ships. Add, say, company of paratroops for each port if one wants to make sure of success. I want to remind you about the historical example of Danish Army "invading" Sweden on 9th April 1940.
If, in some reason or another, Germans carry out an opposed crossing this is closer to river crossing operation than a true amphibious landing.
Most of those 60 000 troops were in the Corps deployed in Northern Sweden, together with only two mobilized divisions of Swedish Army. After mobilization Swedish forces were sizeable in manpower but really lacking in combat capacity. The entire field force available for Southern Sweden, mobilized, would have consisted of three infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade (three battalions of motorized infantry). Moreover, the training of the troops was at really low level and it's questionable whether or not they would have been capable of any real battle of manouver. This was discovered when II Corps was mobilized during start of the Winter War. It's no accident that Swedish volunteer unit took almost three months to get front responsibility in Finland.
What is included in impressive mobilization numbers are the number of Landstorm units (Hemvärnet did not even exist yet). While the guys with three cornered hats and buckshot shotguns were good for morale, they made Nazi Volkssturm look like elite units.
Swedish books on the issue are well available. What many people seem to be doing is confusing the well equipped and trained Swedish armed forces which were born in the confusion of German invasion scare of 1940 to those forces that actually existed in 1940.
And this is in a country which has not mobilized and is in no way spiritually prepared for a surprise attack.
Sweden was caught pants down with invasion of Norway and Denmark. There's no real reason why an invasion of Sweden at same moment would be noticed. As for shipping preparations etc. the Northern German ports were filled with German merchant ships anyway, as they could not participate in world trade. As for troops, Northern Germany was a massive military camp.
If the Swedish military HQ decided to transport II Corps to southern Sweden via the Inlandsbanan this will take a long time. Even longer if Germans decide to distrupt this via aerial bombing which, like I remind you, Sweden would be totally unable to resist.
Yes, and abandoned finally after Fall of France. Quality of British troops in Norway was quite low, excluding Guards, and French and Polish troops were few in numbers. If they want to deploy them in Southern Sweden this means a supply line of 1500km with a single rail.
I don't see why not. After all, there's virtually no Swedish air opposition and after conquering Denmark there are a number of air bases nearby. Conquest of Sweden would require only a few air units.
Sweden would be a gain, not drain for Germany. Historically Sweden gradually cut it's trade with Germany. A conquered Sweden would add to Reich's industrial and military capacity in far larger scale. Bofors produced guns, SAAB produced airplanes, Volvo produced trucks and Kockums produced warships would all be useful to German war effort. OTL these resources went to build up Swedish military to a respectable level force in 1939-1945.
As for the military effort to keep Swedes down this would require just a minor number of second line units. The Netherlands in 1943 required four second line or training infantry divisions. I don't see a reason why Sweden would require more.
The german conquest of England only required a few air units. Not. Again you underestimate the problems and overestimates the german capacity in specialised roles such as amphibious assault, tank transport and road building.
Historically lack of manpower was almost as damaging to Germany as the lack of oil. Germany could not get enough goods from Sweden to compensate for all the german soldiers (=potential workers) needed for occupying Sweden. And exactly what could Sweden produce that Germany by 1940 didn't already imported?
Regarding the number of troops needed, take another look at the map. Sweden is 449,964 square kilometers, Netherlands 41,526 square kilometers. And by 1940 with a far better road network. Four divisions in Netherlands meant that a brigade always was maximum an hour away from any rebellion, troublemakers or SOE insertion. The Swedish population was also far more rural than the Dutch. Guess why the Germans kept around 400 000 men in Norway? Because they loved cod, or because it was needed?
First of all, Germany do not have the naval lifting capacity to invade Norway and Sweden at the same time. Weserûbung was a huge gamble that paid off in a spectacular way when the Germans took all Norwegian industrial and population centres on the first day, crippling the Norwegian ability to mobilize and resists.
Secondly, the Norwegian army, while it fought bravely, especially around Narvik, was in a pathetic state 1940. All soldiers, including NCOs, had 85 days of conscription and no other training. There were no AT weapons at all, no hand grenades, no bundle chagres, no mines, no SMGs and no heavy artillery. There was only a smattering of medium artillery, no motorized units, only 12 fighters (of which not all were ready) and only 4 bombers and a smattering of recon planes. The Norwegians had no armoured cars, a single tank with a mild-steel turret and no way to move troops north of Trondheim except by sea due to lack of infrastructure.
The Swedish army had 240 days of conscription for the regular soldier, more for the NCOs, some heavy AT rifles, lots of 37mm AT guns, some SMGs per regiment, plenty of hand grenades, bundle charges, AT and anti-personell mines, light, medium and heavy artillery in each division, 48 Gladiators (F19 had returned from Finland by Weserübung), 12 Fiat CR.42 and 12 Seversky EP-35 (with another 48 in ships on their way). Sweden had about 50 armoured cars and about 60 tanks in service at the time of Weserübung. Sweden has four railroad links with ice-free ports in Norway and a top-notch railroad infrastructure with both electrical locomotives and steam dito in reserve in case electricity fail. It takes less than 24 hours to ship a train full of equipment from Narvik to Göteborg or Malmö if given priority. Sweden has 100 bombers and about 50 recon planes too.
While the Swedish army was caught unawares by Weserübung, by the 10th of April, the local defence of Skåne could muster at least 20 000 men in Landstormen. There's about 450 000 men to be mobilized, many of them in local defence units that can be ready in a few hours - it took the army about a week to march up to the Norwegian border with more than 200 000 men - in an area with very rough terrain and lousy infrastructure.
The German fighters have very short range, and from Denmark, they can only cover a part of Scania. Unless they capture an airfield intact (and even if they do, they soon need another) they cannot support any kind of race northwards. The distances in Sweden are great.
Unlike Norway, it is not possible to take out Swedish industrial and population centras by naval landings - they are spread out, behind large archipelagos and many of them are inland (such as Linköping and Västerås).
If the Germans do invade Sweden in Weserübung, they cannot take Narvik and Trondheim at the same time (not enough naval capacity). It also means that the Norwegian 1. Division, that OTL in a semi-mobilized state retreated into Sweden to be interned (with the only medium artillery battery the Norwegians managed to mobilize) will continue to fight. Half of Norway continues to fight, and Narvik is open as a port for western allied aid, including lots of ordered fighters (Hawk 75A for Norway, Seversky EP-35 and Vultee 48C Vanguard for Sweden) from USA.
So, let us say the Germans land an infantry division in Scania on the 10th (they are capable of this if they neglect Trondeim and Narvik) supported by air units and a company of paratroopers. They'll face a Danish company that OTL took the ferry over to fight as they thought Sweden was under attack too, and wanted to continue the fight, a couple of semi-mobilized local defence battalions, enough to delay them for a few days, while the army is mobilized. They'll take Malmö, Helsingborg, Lund and the coast of Scania pretty easily, but in central Scania they'll face two divisions railroaded from Norrland.
The Germans will probably be able to sweep the local defence away from Scania in a week, but then they hit more forested terrain, must supply and reinforce their troops overseas, will face the majority of the Swedish army, and even if they capture Bulltofta intact (it is a grass base and not usable for heavy German planes) they'll have problems maintaining any kind of air presence over the front, while much of the Swedish air force can base out of any grass field. They'll have to fight the Norwegian 1. Division in Bohuslän plus Swedish forces in the area while trying to drive north to Lillehammer at the same time, as the Norwegians have had time to mobilize at least 60 000-100 000 men while Sweden will have time to put about 400 000 men in the field.
Bottom line - the Germans can do it. Not easily, but they can do it - if they postpone the invasion of France (they'll need 10+ infantry divisions for the invasions, plus air transports for supply and paratroopers and a large chunk of the air force). And that will put up huge butterflies giving the French and British more time to prepare. The 2nd BEF, the huge French weapon production, the integration of A and B units in the French army, etc.
Secondly, the Norwegian army, while it fought bravely, especially around Narvik, was in a pathetic state 1940. All soldiers, including NCOs, had 85 days of conscription and no other training. There were no AT weapons at all, no hand grenades, no bundle chagres, no mines, no SMGs and no heavy artillery. There was only a smattering of medium artillery, no motorized units, only 12 fighters (of which not all were ready) and only 4 bombers and a smattering of recon planes. The Norwegians had no armoured cars, a single tank with a mild-steel turret and no way to move troops north of Trondheim except by sea due to lack of infrastructure.
The Swedish army had 240 days of conscription for the regular soldier, more for the NCOs, some heavy AT rifles, lots of 37mm AT guns, some SMGs per regiment, plenty of hand grenades, bundle charges, AT and anti-personell mines, light, medium and heavy artillery in each division, 48 Gladiators (F19 had returned from Finland by Weserübung), 12 Fiat CR.42 and 12 Seversky EP-35 (with another 48 in ships on their way). Sweden had about 50 armoured cars and about 60 tanks in service at the time of Weserübung. Sweden has four railroad links with ice-free ports in Norway and a top-notch railroad infrastructure with both electrical locomotives and steam dito in reserve in case electricity fail. It takes less than 24 hours to ship a train full of equipment from Narvik to Göteborg or Malmö if given priority. Sweden has 100 bombers and about 50 recon planes too.
While the Swedish army was caught unawares by Weserübung, by the 10th of April, the local defence of Skåne could muster at least 20 000 men in Landstormen. There's about 450 000 men to be mobilized, many of them in local defence units that can be ready in a few hours - it took the army about a week to march up to the Norwegian border with more than 200 000 men - in an area with very rough terrain and lousy infrastructure.
The German fighters have very short range, and from Denmark, they can only cover a part of Scania. Unless they capture an airfield intact (and even if they do, they soon need another) they cannot support any kind of race northwards. The distances in Sweden are great.
Unlike Norway, it is not possible to take out Swedish industrial and population centras by naval landings - they are spread out, behind large archipelagos and many of them are inland (such as Linköping and Västerås).
If the Germans do invade Sweden in Weserübung, they cannot take Narvik and Trondheim at the same time (not enough naval capacity). It also means that the Norwegian 1. Division, that OTL in a semi-mobilized state retreated into Sweden to be interned (with the only medium artillery battery the Norwegians managed to mobilize) will continue to fight. Half of Norway continues to fight, and Narvik is open as a port for western allied aid, including lots of ordered fighters (Hawk 75A for Norway, Seversky EP-35 and Vultee 48C Vanguard for Sweden) from USA.
So, let us say the Germans land an infantry division in Scania on the 10th (they are capable of this if they neglect Trondeim and Narvik) supported by air units and a company of paratroopers. They'll face a Danish company that OTL took the ferry over to fight as they thought Sweden was under attack too, and wanted to continue the fight, a couple of semi-mobilized local defence battalions, enough to delay them for a few days, while the army is mobilized. They'll take Malmö, Helsingborg, Lund and the coast of Scania pretty easily, but in central Scania they'll face two divisions railroaded from Norrland.
The Germans will probably be able to sweep the local defence away from Scania in a week, but then they hit more forested terrain, must supply and reinforce their troops overseas, will face the majority of the Swedish army, and even if they capture Bulltofta intact (it is a grass base and not usable for heavy German planes) they'll have problems maintaining any kind of air presence over the front, while much of the Swedish air force can base out of any grass field. They'll have to fight the Norwegian 1. Division in Bohuslän plus Swedish forces in the area while trying to drive north to Lillehammer at the same time, as the Norwegians have had time to mobilize at least 60 000-100 000 men while Sweden will have time to put about 400 000 men in the field.
Bottom line - the Germans can do it. Not easily, but they can do it - if they postpone the invasion of France (they'll need 10+ infantry divisions for the invasions, plus air transports for supply and paratroopers and a large chunk of the air force). And that will put up huge butterflies giving the French and British more time to prepare. The 2nd BEF, the huge French weapon production, the integration of A and B units in the French army, etc.
Guns, aircraft, ships, trucks etc.
Germany kept around 400 000 men in Norway because Hitler thought the Allies might invade the country. Pacification of Norwegian population was never an issue at all. In a famed occurrence the Luftwaffe started to enroll local paid workforce already by 10th April in Forneby.
In case of Sweden this would be possible as well on the West Coast as Sweden was even less prepared than Norway, which was at least trying to think what to do with the information. There's not even need for a large number of warships as it was the case with Norway as distance to Germany is shorter and there's no fear of RN and MN intervention. Thus civilian ships, more suitable for transporting troops and more inconspicious, can be used.
If we speculate on need for troops on traditional 2:1 superiority one would need six divisions. This would not cripple Fall Gelb in any way as there was some surplus of infantry divisions anyway. One motorized brigade (11. Schützen Brigade) was already deployed in Denmark and could be used as exploitation force.
Say, two divisions for Göteborg, one for Helsingborg, one for Malmö and one for Trelleborg and Scanian southern coast. Against these landings no precautions existed. Southern Sweden was not effectively mobilized yet.
When the Swedish field forces would be mobilized there's important difference between a division mobilized and a division which would be combat ready. Any units entering the battle with German units would be one haphazardily mobilized and not really combat ready.
As for Swedish equipment, a lot of it was still in Finland or being deployed in Northern Sweden. Severskys were not yet operational and the Swedish air force consisted of 122 operational military aircraft with beforementioned Gladiators forming the entire fighter force. Bomber force consisted of Hawker Harts with a few Ju-86's being only modern bombers.
Bf-110, most useful fighter in conquest of Norway, had ample combat range from German bases to be used in Southern Sweden. They could sweep the Gladiators, Harts and Ju-86's from the skies. Bases in Denmark would just help this.
Granted, Battle of Narvik would end up as German disaster but this would be rather small setback. The Allied position in Northern Norway was untenable in long term.
I'm reasonably sure a country's degree of mobilisation and preparedness
for surprise attack has no actual relevance for the amount of time and
fuel required to drive a specific distance unopposed.
I mean, you still can't drive at more than top speed or drive any further than a full tank of fuel allows without stopping.
Even though Nazis weren't master of logistics, they had access to practice called refilling the fuel tanks. In a country in peacetime posture practices like requisitioning civilian vehicles, using peacetime fuel dumps and gasoline stations etc. is a full possibility, like Germans historically did in Norway.
This is what I mean for spiritual preparedness for a surprise attack. It's preparing one self to act on one's own initiative in case of a command links lost. Historically we have a perfect example what happened in Norway when a country expecting a slow escalation of hostilities was struck by coup de main.
The difference is that the towns of western Sweden is behind an extensive archipelago, that is already partially mined. The Germans need pilots (or at least very accurate sea charts) and need to sail during daytime at low speeds to not run aground. It takes a day to navigate the archipelagos, and you'll pass forts, fishing villages, naval bases and simply small hamlets where anyone can raide the alarm. The coastal fortifications close to Göteborg are quite extensive (much better protected than the ones at Oslo, for example). The Germans can simply not steam right in during night like they did in the Norwegian fjords.
The Germans were already using their entire navy and almost every merchant ship that was available for the invasion of Norway - both for shipping in the troops and for supply. They landed two divisions in Norway and later transported in another three. They cannot land another two in Sweden at the same time. They simply do not have the capacity.
Any traditional attack demand 3:1 superiority. You have six Norwegian divisions and six Swedish (plus enough regular troops for another five divisions not organised into divisions), which means you need 32 German divisions for your 2:1 superiority and 48 for 3:1. How will the Germans supply all these troops oversea? Note that Denmark surrendered only after it was clear the Germans were not attacking Sweden. If Sweden is confirmed to be under attack, the Danish army will most likely see itself as honour-bound to at least put up token resistance and destroy airfields and infrastructure, which will mess up the German supply situation even more. The Danish navy would steam over to Sweden - and it had quite a number of coastal destroyers and submarines to add to the already extensive number of Swedish destroyers and submarines.
The main German problem however is not infantry, it is supplying an offensive over such distances. They will need to pull a lot of air units and transport planes out of the attack in the west to do this, and reduce the supply for Fall Gelb when fighting in Sweden and Norway. Note that it took the Germans 6 months to restore their stocks of ammunition and fuel after the Polish campaign.
The Bf 110C, of which 76 were commited to Weserübung, had an operational range of 770km. It does allow it to fly from Copenhagen to Stockholm, and operate for maybe ten minutes (the distance is 520km). The Swedish air force can easily base itself outside even the Bf 110 range.
It is a myth that Sweden gave away much of its equipment to Finland - most of what was given was returned in March and April. Sweden had 74 million rifle cartridges on hand and were producting more than 10 million a month in April 1940. By the end of the year, production was up to 20 million rifle cartridges a month.
12 J 9 Seversky were operational in 1:a/F8 on April 1940 and another 48 were in ship crates crossing the Atlantic. 12 J 11 CR.42 were available in depots. There were 56 B 3 (Ju 86), 43 B 4 (Hawker Hart), 47 S 6 (Fokker C.V). The first B 4 (Northrop A-17) was delivered in April 1940 and another 102 would be delivered before the end of the year. If Sweden and Norway continues to fight, the Hawk 75A, Seversky EP-35s and Vultee 48C Vengenaces will be delivered - through Narvik or Petsamo.
While the Germans might be able to sail into Helsingborg and Malmö harbours, and meet only token resistance, the squadron attacking Göteborg will have to sail through one of three possible sailing routes, that merge long before entering Göteborg harbour, all covered with forts (and we're talking multiple forts here, see the image below).
It is not possible to sail through this at nighttime, and the distance from the outer parts of the sailing channel to the harbour is at least 40km, probably more, that have to be sailed through at low speed.
Göteborgseskadern (under command of A.Cassel) in April 1940:
3. Pskdiv (HMS Manligheten, HMS Tapperheten) (Marstrand) - two armoured ships.
4. Jagardiv (HMS Ragnar, HMS Sigurd) (Marstrand) - two (old) destroyers
5. Jagardiv (HMS Wrangel, HMS Wachtmeister) (Kungsbacka) - two (old) destroyers.
3. Ubåtsdiv (HMUB Delfinen, HMUB Springaren, HMUB Nordkaparen) (Göteborg) - three submarines, small (4x533mm TTs, first delivered 1936)
6. Ubåtsdiv (HMUB Sälen, HMUB Hajen, HMUB Valrossen, HMUB Valen) (Varberg-Falkenberg) four submarines, same size, but from 1918.
3. Minsverpardiv (Styrbjörn, Starkodder, Hv 383, Hv 384) (Marstrand) four minesweepers.
1. Mtbdiv (T 3, T 4, T 11-T14) (Halmstad) six MTBs.
Hjkb 41 Skagerack - auxiliary gunboat.
Hjkb 43 Odin - auxiliary gunboat.
19. Vbdiv (6 Hv) - 6 patrolboats (usually 2nd ord 3rd class torpedo boats without TTs).
36. Vbdiv (6 Hv) - 6 patrolboats (usually 2nd ord 3rd class torpedo boats without TTs).
42. Vbdiv (6 Hv) - 6 patrolboats (usually 2nd ord 3rd class torpedo boats without TTs).
In addition, the following military units are stationed in Göteborg and the surrounding area;
Göteborgs Landstormsregemente (a regiment of local defence)
I6 infantry regiment.
I9 mixed regiment (one battalion infantry, one battalion tanks)
I15 infantry regiment
I16 infantry regiment
KA3 coastal artillery regiment (the coastal artillery had lots of 10,5cm bofors 1934 cannons that worked like field guns)
A2 artillery regiment
A9G AA battalion
But the bottom line is that the Germans committed their entire navy and as much of their merchant marine as they possibly could to Norway - and landed three divisions to later reinforce these troops with another three divisions. Note that all these troops were landed in proper harbours, unopposed. Where do they find the naval capacity to suddenly land and another four divisions, supply, support and reinforce them?
No, Sweden was more prepared than Norway in April 1940. Sweden had an army corps fully mobilised, oine that could be in Scania within 48 hours by the excellent Swedish railway net. Swedish coastal fortifications and AA units were already manned on the 9th of April by local defence units and coastal artillery units.
In Scania, on the evening of the 9th were;
1 Danish line company.
1 regular infantry battalion.
~10 000 men local defence, with all AA guns and coastal artillery manned.
1 company of armoured cars.
1 battery of 10,5cm cannons.
Note that the AA guns were equipped and trained to fight both air and land targets - they were trained to deploy on the beaches and fire on landing ships as well with 40mm Bofors AA guns.
There were about 20 75mm and 24 40mm AA guns, with dual 8mm machineguns for close support.
Even if there were very little regular units in Scania on the 9th and 10th of April, there were considerable AA and local defence units in the coastal fortifications ready for action. Do not forget the Per Albin Hansson line of coastal fortifications in Scania, and the coastal artillery of the harbours, that WAS manned by local defence units.
Regarding what a German-occupied Sweden could produce for Germany
a) Sweden doesn't have oil or specialized metals lika chrome and vanadin (used in armour plates or jet engines). That was what Germany lacked, not production facilities.
b) Would the positive effect of some more trucks and guns be higher than the cost of occupying Sweden? Just routine patrolling would take a lot of gasoline - gasoline that Sweden didn't have and had to be taken from the german stores.
c) In the end Germany had a lot of Me 262, but neither pilots nor fuel for the planes. Having access to Sweden wont cure lack of resources nor strategic stupidity. Having to place occupying forces in Sweden will however demand a lot of manpower that Germany can't afford.
a) Sweden doesn't have oil or specialized metals lika chrome and vanadin (used in armour plates or jet engines). That was what Germany lacked, not production facilities.
b) Would the positive effect of some more trucks and guns be higher than the cost of occupying Sweden? Just routine patrolling would take a lot of gasoline - gasoline that Sweden didn't have and had to be taken from the german stores.
c) In the end Germany had a lot of Me 262, but neither pilots nor fuel for the planes. Having access to Sweden wont cure lack of resources nor strategic stupidity. Having to place occupying forces in Sweden will however demand a lot of manpower that Germany can't afford.