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If Sukarno maximally engages the Indonesian army in the Konfontasi with Malaysia and its allies does this = permanent Indonesian estrangement from the west?

In OTL, after the Army purge of 65 the Konfrontasi was wound down Indonesian relations with the west improved alot.

The Malaysian confrontation, or Konfrontasi saw fighting between the Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia and British Commonwealth forces on the other, from 1963 to 1966.

It was a war mainly of special forces, guerrillas and infiltrators. It peaked in mid 64 through 65, and then tapered off after the effective takeover of Suharto and his anticommunist purge.

Although the main fronts were in the island or Borneo-Kalimantan, on both the Indonesian and Malaysian side, there were also raids and infiltration by Indonesians onto the Malayan peninsula.

However, what if in late 63 through 1964, Sukarno maximized the national commitment to the struggle, including as large a regular army build up as possible in Borneo and troops assembling for an invasion of Malaya from Sumatra, as well as commitment of the air force to tactical action in Malaysian Borneo?

While the border regions were not highly developed or super densely populated and were filled with rough jungle terrain, I don't think the Indonesians made the maximum commitment that would have been logistically possible. After all, there had been major multi-division operations in Malaya and on Borneo during WWII.

So if Sukarno orders an all-out offensive campaign:
a) Does the Army obey and commit
b) If so, does it both rally behind the war and Sukarno and become too busy to launch its coup of 1965
c) Can the British Commonwealth and Malaysia match all of Sukarno's hypothetical escalation on their own, or would they request American help?
d) If more of the Indonesian Army were committed to operations and heavy combat against Commonwealth and possibly US forces, would that turn the army officer corps completely anti-western, further eroding any willingness to suppress Communists?

or,

might Sukarno's order trigger a military coup in the first instance?

or,

might the army rally at first but after heavy combat and western imposed setbacks it mounts a coup and quits the war.

Can a larger Indonesian commitment actually lead to Indonesian occupation of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah? Or at least pose such a strong threat that the only way to stop it is by committing US ground troops and major aerial interdiction campaigns?
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