WI Sukarno maximally engages the Indonesian army in the Konfontasi with Malaysia and its allies?

raharris1973

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If Sukarno maximally engages the Indonesian army in the Konfontasi with Malaysia and its allies does this = permanent Indonesian estrangement from the west?

In OTL, after the Army purge of 65 the Konfrontasi was wound down Indonesian relations with the west improved alot.

The Malaysian confrontation, or Konfrontasi saw fighting between the Indonesia on the one hand and Malaysia and British Commonwealth forces on the other, from 1963 to 1966.

It was a war mainly of special forces, guerrillas and infiltrators. It peaked in mid 64 through 65, and then tapered off after the effective takeover of Suharto and his anticommunist purge.

Although the main fronts were in the island or Borneo-Kalimantan, on both the Indonesian and Malaysian side, there were also raids and infiltration by Indonesians onto the Malayan peninsula.

However, what if in late 63 through 1964, Sukarno maximized the national commitment to the struggle, including as large a regular army build up as possible in Borneo and troops assembling for an invasion of Malaya from Sumatra, as well as commitment of the air force to tactical action in Malaysian Borneo?

While the border regions were not highly developed or super densely populated and were filled with rough jungle terrain, I don't think the Indonesians made the maximum commitment that would have been logistically possible. After all, there had been major multi-division operations in Malaya and on Borneo during WWII.

So if Sukarno orders an all-out offensive campaign:
a) Does the Army obey and commit
b) If so, does it both rally behind the war and Sukarno and become too busy to launch its coup of 1965
c) Can the British Commonwealth and Malaysia match all of Sukarno's hypothetical escalation on their own, or would they request American help?
d) If more of the Indonesian Army were committed to operations and heavy combat against Commonwealth and possibly US forces, would that turn the army officer corps completely anti-western, further eroding any willingness to suppress Communists?

or,

might Sukarno's order trigger a military coup in the first instance?

or,

might the army rally at first but after heavy combat and western imposed setbacks it mounts a coup and quits the war.

Can a larger Indonesian commitment actually lead to Indonesian occupation of Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah? Or at least pose such a strong threat that the only way to stop it is by committing US ground troops and major aerial interdiction campaigns?
 
It depends. The best POD is that the PKI is successful in getting that peasant militia thingy they wanted and that Sukarno (interestingly with the approval of the air force and navy though not the army) had approved up and running by the time this happens. That gives the leftists a lot more power and makes it a lot more likely that the Islamists, nationalists, and non-Communist parts of the military will feel like they have to go along.

How this will go is a bit hard to say; it depends a lot on exactly how effective the Indonesians are at closing off the SLOC's. I will say that geographically it's pretty reinforce to defend Malaysia from Europe. If the Commonwealth troops are not successful by themselves I think the U.S. will send aid and naval forces and possibly limited ground forces until the Brits, New Zealanders, Australians, and Rhodesians can get fully deployed and stabilize it.

As a result of all this the U.S. and the Commonwealth will definitely decide that keeping Dutch New Guinea away from Jakarta's orbit is a key Western interest.
 
If the TNI come out into the open for a stand-up fight they play into the hands of the Commonwealth with its powerful air and naval forces.
 

raharris1973

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If the TNI come out into the open for a stand-up fight they play into the hands of the Commonwealth with its powerful air and naval forces.


This is going to be very expensive for Britain, no? Apparently the pound needed a US bailout 2 or 3 times in the 60s.

And if the TNI are committed to the front and getting shot up by the Commonwealth, are they likely to launch a coup in the interior? Because they will probably be kept busy, bloody and angry by Commonwealth firepower.

As a result of all this the U.S. and the Commonwealth will definitely decide that keeping Dutch New Guinea away from Jakarta's orbit is a key Western interest.

If Sukarno is dumb enough to launch the big Borneo-Malaya invasion before September 63, when the UN withdrew from Papua, yes, I guess the US and Comonwealth will forcibly prevent incorporation of Dutch New Guinea.

The best POD is that the PKI is successful in getting that peasant militia thingy they wanted and that Sukarno (interestingly with the approval of the air force and navy though not the army) had approved up and running by the time this happens. That gives the leftists a lot more power and makes it a lot more likely that the Islamists, nationalists, and non-Communist parts of the military will feel like they have to go along.

If he does not have that militia thingy, will the Army just say "no sir, you can't have your war" and "it's time for you to retire" to Sukarno?
 
This is going to be very expensive for Britain, no? Apparently the pound needed a US bailout 2 or 3 times in the 60s.

And if the TNI are committed to the front and getting shot up by the Commonwealth, are they likely to launch a coup in the interior? Because they will probably be kept busy, bloody and angry by Commonwealth firepower.



If Sukarno is dumb enough to launch the big Borneo-Malaya invasion before September 63, when the UN withdrew from Papua, yes, I guess the US and Comonwealth will forcibly prevent incorporation of Dutch New Guinea.



If he does not have that militia thingy, will the Army just say "no sir, you can't have your war" and "it's time for you to retire" to Sukarno?

That aspect the U.S. will definitely help with. If it turns really prolonged you could even see the U.S. writing off all of Britain's WWII debt.

Even then the Orwellianesque "Act of Free Choice" only happened in 1969. I'm guessing a way could probably be found to derail the transfer with a POD in the early 1960s.

It's honestly very difficult to say. The Indonesian Army in the 1960s was a massive Jenga tower of conflicting loyalties. Which way they would have gone is up in the air. I will say that this is before the economy got really, really awful and these events probably butterfly the 30th of September Coup, so your stated POD time of 1963-1964 gives him a much better chance of getting aquiescence because he has more popular and institutional support.
 
If the TNI come out into the open for a stand-up fight they play into the hands of the Commonwealth with its powerful air and naval forces.

The Indonesians did have a cruiser, submarines, and lots of Tu-16 bombers from the Soviets along with powerful armed forces otherwise. I'd rate them as being a far more formidable opponent than Argentina was during the Falklands War. Then you have to consider the fact that the Soviets will be literally burying them in military aid (an opportunity like that to attrit some of the main western powers doesn't come around very often).

Other notable features of the Indonesian military are that they had 22 MiG-21 fighters at the time of the POD, a number the USSR would have been pumping up as fast as they could paint Indonesian decals on them and voluntell their own pilots to fly them a la Vietnam. This went along with numerous amounts of less capable types like the MiG-17 and 19 and 48 Il-28 medium bombers in between the army and navy. In the water, they had twelve Whiskey-class boats and lots of surface assets.

This kind of equipment (I'm assuming the Indonesian military would operate it at minimum about as well as the Vietnamese did) raised holy hell with the U.S. in Vietnam and we had a significantly stronger hand because of geography, an overall much smaller operational area, no real naval war, a much easier logistical situation, etc. Commonwealth probably still wins without the U.S. even having to get involved, but it would have been the worst naval fighting since the WWII Pacific Theater. Pretty severe losses are a given.
 
It's honestly very difficult to say. The Indonesian Army in the 1960s was a massive Jenga tower of conflicting loyalties. Which way they would have gone is up in the air. I will say that this is before the economy got really, really awful and these events probably butterfly the 30th of September Coup, so your stated POD time of 1963-1964 gives him a much better chance of getting aquiescence because he has more popular and institutional support.

It was pretty much this, and that's not taking into account the communist and the islamist. But let's say for whatever reason the army agreed to go along with Sukarno's plan this time, perhaps Sukarno's loyalist in the officer corps successfully pushed for it. Even with Soviet military aid, the economy will still deteriorated to s**t pretty quick (it went 100%+ inflation since early 1960s and went as high as 650% in 1965 IOTL). So I think there's a quite large possibility that Indonesia will crumble from within if it became open conflict, due to sheer economic burden of it.
 
This is going to be very expensive for Britain, no? Apparently the pound needed a US bailout 2 or 3 times in the 60s.

It will be expensive but the Konfrontasi lasted years whereas a hot war wouldn't last nearly as long, so overall it might be cheaper. What's more the forces were in the area as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve, so its no major change for Britain and the Commonwealth in terms of deployment.
 
The Indonesians did have a cruiser, submarines, and lots of Tu-16 bombers from the Soviets along with powerful armed forces otherwise. I'd rate them as being a far more formidable opponent than Argentina was during the Falklands War. Then you have to consider the fact that the Soviets will be literally burying them in military aid (an opportunity like that to attrit some of the main western powers doesn't come around very often).

Other notable features of the Indonesian military are that they had 22 MiG-21 fighters at the time of the POD, a number the USSR would have been pumping up as fast as they could paint Indonesian decals on them and voluntell their own pilots to fly them a la Vietnam. This went along with numerous amounts of less capable types like the MiG-17 and 19 and 48 Il-28 medium bombers in between the army and navy. In the water, they had twelve Whiskey-class boats and lots of surface assets.

This kind of equipment (I'm assuming the Indonesian military would operate it at minimum about as well as the Vietnamese did) raised holy hell with the U.S. in Vietnam and we had a significantly stronger hand because of geography, an overall much smaller operational area, no real naval war, a much easier logistical situation, etc. Commonwealth probably still wins without the U.S. even having to get involved, but it would have been the worst naval fighting since the WWII Pacific Theater. Pretty severe losses are a given.

I would say that going from a tiny air force with B26s to Tu16s in 3 years is a massive leap, way much for an ex colony to make, the same goes for the navy with its subs and cruisers. IIRC the navy had a stand up fight with the Dutch in 1962 with a flotilla of MTBs and the Dutch flogged them, it was a disaster for the Indo Navy. Certainly the THI/AF couldn't support these aircraft and ships after the 1965 coup, in 1971 they happily accepted ex RAAF Avon Sabres.

As for Soviet support, Indonesia is a very different beast from Vietnam, far more amenable to blockade/quarantine and with no sanctuary areas on a friendly border.
 
It was pretty much this, and that's not taking into account the communist and the islamist. But let's say for whatever reason the army agreed to go along with Sukarno's plan this time, perhaps Sukarno's loyalist in the officer corps successfully pushed for it. Even with Soviet military aid, the economy will still deteriorated to s**t pretty quick (it went 100%+ inflation since early 1960s and went as high as 650% in 1965 IOTL). So I think there's a quite large possibility that Indonesia will crumble from within if it became open conflict, due to sheer economic burden of it.

It's sort of up in the air. Dictatorships like Zimbabwe and North Korea that were in much worse economic shape than Indonesia have stayed on their feet, but they had fewer internal challenges outside of the economy. Soviet aid can kick the can down the road and stave off collapse for a bit, so that might allow the Indonesians to fight a war.

It will be expensive but the Konfrontasi lasted years whereas a hot war wouldn't last nearly as long, so overall it might be cheaper. What's more the forces were in the area as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve, so its no major change for Britain and the Commonwealth in terms of deployment.

^^Pretty much that. You could compare it to the Yom Kippur War; one of the main reasons Sadat launched it was to finally put the ruinously expensive War of Attrition to bed. Sukarno could sell it in a similar way.
 
I would say that going from a tiny air force with B26s to Tu16s in 3 years is a massive leap, way much for an ex colony to make, the same goes for the navy with its subs and cruisers. IIRC the navy had a stand up fight with the Dutch in 1962 with a flotilla of MTBs and the Dutch flogged them, it was a disaster for the Indo Navy. Certainly the THI/AF couldn't support these aircraft and ships after the 1965 coup, in 1971 they happily accepted ex RAAF Avon Sabres.

As for Soviet support, Indonesia is a very different beast from Vietnam, far more amenable to blockade/quarantine and with no sanctuary areas on a friendly border.

They lost four torpedo boats while trying to land commandos when they were confronted by a large Dutch navy task force that included destroyers. Not a great showing, but also not a reflection of how they would have done if it had been a true peer-to-peer fight (large surface and air assets vs. large surface and air assets). The Indonesians had a sophisticated combined arms op planned to take West New Guinea, Operation Trikora, and it frightened the Dutch enough that they backed down and ceded the territory to the U.N. before it could start. That might be somewhat telling.
 

raharris1973

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i guess we also get to the question of Indonesian ability to mass alot more of the TNI against Borneo and Malaya in logistical terms in 63 or 64. if there is visible air to air and naval combat in those years, might the US prioritize finishing of those Indonesian threats and helping the commonwealth over escalating in Vietnam for the moment?
 
They lost four torpedo boats while trying to land commandos when they were confronted by a large Dutch navy task force that included destroyers. Not a great showing, but also not a reflection of how they would have done if it had been a true peer-to-peer fight (large surface and air assets vs. large surface and air assets). The Indonesians had a sophisticated combined arms op planned to take West New Guinea, Operation Trikora, and it frightened the Dutch enough that they backed down and ceded the territory to the U.N. before it could start. That might be somewhat telling.

Why were a flotilla of MTBs meeting more powerful Dutch forces in the first place? The Dutch bailed because the US wouldn't support them, wanted them to concentrate on NATO in Europe.

i guess we also get to the question of Indonesian ability to mass alot more of the TNI against Borneo and Malaya in logistical terms in 63 or 64. if there is visible air to air and naval combat in those years, might the US prioritize finishing of those Indonesian threats and helping the commonwealth over escalating in Vietnam for the moment?

I doubt they'd be needed to win the stand up fight.
 
I would say that going from a tiny air force with B26s to Tu16s in 3 years is a massive leap, way much for an ex colony to make, the same goes for the navy with its subs and cruisers. IIRC the navy had a stand up fight with the Dutch in 1962 with a flotilla of MTBs and the Dutch flogged them, it was a disaster for the Indo Navy. Certainly the THI/AF couldn't support these aircraft and ships after the 1965 coup, in 1971 they happily accepted ex RAAF Avon Sabres.

They lost four torpedo boats while trying to land commandos when they were confronted by a large Dutch navy task force that included destroyers. Not a great showing, but also not a reflection of how they would have done if it had been a true peer-to-peer fight (large surface and air assets vs. large surface and air assets). The Indonesians had a sophisticated combined arms op planned to take West New Guinea, Operation Trikora, and it frightened the Dutch enough that they backed down and ceded the territory to the U.N. before it could start. That might be somewhat telling.

It's not what you've got, but how you fly it, otherwise it's just a massively expensive lawn ornament.

I know that this is extremely unreliable. But I think Indonesian Wikipedia's entry on KRI Irian (former Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze, that big-ass cruiser that you guys mentioned earlier) could shed some light into the state of readiness of Indonesia's military arsenal at that time. It stated that the massive and rapid buildup at that time really took the toll of the young Indonesian navy as they went from small sized navy to massive sized navy in practically no time, and they resorted to trial and error. It is recorded that on November 1963, one destroyer (I assume one of the Skorry) broken down, diesel engine of one of the submarine broken down due to "hydraulic impact" during surfacing, and 3 of the 6 KRI Irian's boiler were completely wrecked. In 1964, after only one year of service in Indonesian navy, KRI Irian was completely broke and must be sent back to Vladivostok for repairing. At least on KRI Irian's part, it is stated that the Soviets originally planned to overhaul the ship so it could operate optimally in tropical climate, but the Indonesian representative sent there said that Indonesia didn't have the money for the overhaul, so the Soviets only installed extra ventilators and their generators.

If we assume this happened all over the military, we could suspect that the actual readiness of the military at that time was less than optimal.
 
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If we assume this happened all over the military, we could suspect that the actual readiness of the military at that time was less than optimal.

Joseph Daves in From Revolusi To Reformasi Vol 1 agrees with this statement, and states "Indonesian forces almost certainly would have suffered heavy losses if they had proceeded with the operation" (pg. 474).

For that specific example, he claims the Dutch had good intelligence and correctly suspected the location of the initial landing (Biak). The most highly he states of the Trikora plan was that it possibly spooked the Dutch into trying for a diplomatic solution (pg 475). The small-scale landings on that island were all failures. (The parts on the Konfrontasi itself are just as skeptical, although Daves doesn't go into a counterfactual there).

Soviet aid is something of a red herring (no pun intended) because by the time the Konfrontasi really revved up, Sukarno had burned his bridges with Moscow in favor of the considerably less capable China.
 
Why were a flotilla of MTBs meeting more powerful Dutch forces in the first place? The Dutch bailed because the US wouldn't support them, wanted them to concentrate on NATO in Europe.

They weren't supposed to fight a surface action, they were just supposed to drop commando teams and slip away. They got more than they bargained for.
 
I know that this is extremely unreliable. But I think Indonesian Wikipedia's entry on KRI Irian (former Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze, that big-ass cruiser that you guys mentioned earlier) could shed some light into the state of readiness of Indonesia's military arsenal at that time. It stated that the massive and rapid buildup at that time really took the toll of the young Indonesian navy as they went from small sized navy to massive sized navy in practically no time, and they resorted to trial and error. It is recorded that on November 1963, one destroyer (I assume one of the Skorry) broken down, diesel engine of one of the submarine broken down due to "hydraulic impact" during surfacing, and 3 of the 6 KRI Irian's boiler were completely wrecked. In 1964, after only one year of service in Indonesian navy, KRI Irian was completely broke and must be sent back to Vladivostok for repairing. At least on KRI Irian's part, it is stated that the Soviets originally planned to overhaul the ship so it could operate optimally in tropical climate, but the Indonesian representative sent there said that Indonesia didn't have the money for the overhaul, so the Soviets only installed extra ventilators and their generators.

If we assume this happened all over the military, we could suspect that the actual readiness of the military at that time was less than optimal.

Fair enough. Might need a POD further back to give the Indonesian military time to get its growing pains behind it.
 
I know that this is extremely unreliable. But I think Indonesian Wikipedia's entry on KRI Irian (former Soviet cruiser Ordzhonikidze, that big-ass cruiser that you guys mentioned earlier) could shed some light into the state of readiness of Indonesia's military arsenal at that time. It stated that the massive and rapid buildup at that time really took the toll of the young Indonesian navy as they went from small sized navy to massive sized navy in practically no time, and they resorted to trial and error. It is recorded that on November 1963, one destroyer (I assume one of the Skorry) broken down, diesel engine of one of the submarine broken down due to "hydraulic impact" during surfacing, and 3 of the 6 KRI Irian's boiler were completely wrecked. In 1964, after only one year of service in Indonesian navy, KRI Irian was completely broke and must be sent back to Vladivostok for repairing. At least on KRI Irian's part, it is stated that the Soviets originally planned to overhaul the ship so it could operate optimally in tropical climate, but the Indonesian representative sent there said that Indonesia didn't have the money for the overhaul, so the Soviets only installed extra ventilators and their generators.

If we assume this happened all over the military, we could suspect that the actual readiness of the military at that time was less than optimal.

It's tough to make massive leaps in capability as well as in size, but doing one or the other is much more manageable. It's easier when a country has very close ties with a great power which can provide things like senior officers, training, command structures and all sorts of technical backup, such as Australia had with Britain, but to build this stuff up from scratch in 5 years is very difficult and I'm not surprised Indonesia struggled with it.
 
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