Now I know that the plan wasn't all that great and was probably doomed to fail from the get go. However, what if the British were able to take and hold the bridges they were assigned? Would the war really be over by Christmas? Could the WAllies snagged more of Germany?
WI: Successful Operation Market Garden?
- Thread starter ThatOneGuy
- Start date
Ian_W
Banned
I don't think it would have been as successful as Monty had hoped - the Bulge counterattack soon after showed Germany still had reserves (even if the 9th and 10th SS Panzer arent in a position to attack the paratroops, they have to be *somewhere*). On the other hand, if the "Market Garden Salient" is over the Rhine with intact bridges, I can't see the Ruhr holding once the British fill the supply depots with artillery shells and petrol.
I thought they lost a handful because the Germans were able to destroy them?
The probability of "Market Garden" working is as high as the probability of "Sichelschnitt" working in 1940. How the dice fell determines which one we see as masterpiece and which as a folly.
IF Market Garden works somewhat in the intended scope, i.e. Arnhem and the connection thereto are secured, it will be a game changer. I live in Dorsten, at that point of the time hosting the Ruhr's two Northernmost coalmines, already North of the Lippe. From here, it is not even 100km to Arnhem, with no major natural obstacle in between. These 100km will see major fighting, on terrain much less favourable for the Germans than the forested Ardennes of the battle of the bulge.
Bear in mind that in OTL, it took the British until MARCH 1945 to get across the Rhine in that area, near Wesel.
And by expanding northwards from Arnhem by just a few dozen km, Germany and the core of the Netherlands would be separated from each other. The horrible last chapter of the German occupation there would be written differently.
IF Market Garden works somewhat in the intended scope, i.e. Arnhem and the connection thereto are secured, it will be a game changer. I live in Dorsten, at that point of the time hosting the Ruhr's two Northernmost coalmines, already North of the Lippe. From here, it is not even 100km to Arnhem, with no major natural obstacle in between. These 100km will see major fighting, on terrain much less favourable for the Germans than the forested Ardennes of the battle of the bulge.
Bear in mind that in OTL, it took the British until MARCH 1945 to get across the Rhine in that area, near Wesel.
And by expanding northwards from Arnhem by just a few dozen km, Germany and the core of the Netherlands would be separated from each other. The horrible last chapter of the German occupation there would be written differently.
POD
Approaches to Antwerp Harbour are clearer in early September before Germans have time to fortify them.
XXX Corps steadily advances with few pauses for tea or night harbours.
Polish Paratroopers land in the first wave. They secure southern approaches to Arnhem Bridge and blunt counter-attacks. British second and third waves land in the same polder. British and Polish artillery observers have better radios that allow them to talk directly to Typhoons.
LAPES cargo consistently lands on the correct polder.
Approaches to Antwerp Harbour are clearer in early September before Germans have time to fortify them.
XXX Corps steadily advances with few pauses for tea or night harbours.
Polish Paratroopers land in the first wave. They secure southern approaches to Arnhem Bridge and blunt counter-attacks. British second and third waves land in the same polder. British and Polish artillery observers have better radios that allow them to talk directly to Typhoons.
LAPES cargo consistently lands on the correct polder.
Several conditions need to be met for Market-Garden to be the success the OP would permit. These include:-
1) Better weather for the second waves and follow on resupply, not to mention CAS.
2) Better planning including direct assaults on all bridges, along the line of Pegasus Bridge in Normandy.
3) Radio’s that work for better control of 1AB.
4) More urgency by Horrocks and XXX Corps. I’ve recently reread A Bridge to Far and it occurs to me that Horrocks who was otherwise a very good Corp commander seems strangely absent in this campaign. Was he ill?
5) Prior to Jump Day 11th armoured pushes north to cut off Von Zangens army. Keeping them isolated would reduce the pressure on the “highway”
I’m sure there are a hundred other items, including luck that could also be included.
1) Better weather for the second waves and follow on resupply, not to mention CAS.
2) Better planning including direct assaults on all bridges, along the line of Pegasus Bridge in Normandy.
3) Radio’s that work for better control of 1AB.
4) More urgency by Horrocks and XXX Corps. I’ve recently reread A Bridge to Far and it occurs to me that Horrocks who was otherwise a very good Corp commander seems strangely absent in this campaign. Was he ill?
5) Prior to Jump Day 11th armoured pushes north to cut off Von Zangens army. Keeping them isolated would reduce the pressure on the “highway”
I’m sure there are a hundred other items, including luck that could also be included.
The purpose of Market Garden was to cut off the German XVth Army in the Scheldt Estuary near Antwerp by taking a corridor up to the Zunder Zee. This would have reduced the supply distance both land and sea for the main forces. Montgomery's claim that the objective was a strike to the Ruhr doesn't bear water. The allies were having real supply problems as it was, why attack where the supply lines would be longest and there was enemy on both sides? Once the XVth had been cut off and destroyed Antwerp's pretty close and the Ruhr attack might be a good idea. Alternatively a diversionary attack, which the Germans could not afford to ignore, could have been launched. They would definitely have had to pull some troops from the front lines back to protect the Ruhr. Bear in mind at this point they barely have enough feul to even retreat.
IOTL it took over a month and 12,000 casualties to take the Scheldt Estuary and over 1/3 of the XVth got to run away and fight another day. Without a MG success of course the Ruhr was secure. Figure at least 50% less time and allied casualties if the XVth have no supply or chance of retreat. So that's 6,000 less dead and wounded and over 30,000 extra German prisoners. As previously mentioned a Ruhr run is now a possibility that at least has to be addressed by the Germans. Their lines are technically slightly shorter but given they've lost an army and the Ruhr is under threat they're basically stretched even thinner. But the big thing is time, 2 weeks worth of extra supplies streaming into Antwerp and lots of other ports means 2 weeks less recovery time for German units. Many of those units were shredded and needed every day to get replacement troops, recover their morale (if they can) etc. I don't think it would mean a western collapse of the Wermacht but it could. I don't know how bad their morale was at this point.
So what changes are needed? Number one, ignore the Groesbeek Heights and have the 82nd go for the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as feet hit ground. That's basically it really. Hell it doesn't have to be all of the 82nd, an insurbordinate commander going for the bridge against orders would have done it. If the 82nd have the bridge before the Germans get there it saves XXX Corp 36 hours and Frost and his guys are still holding when the tanks roll up. XXX wren't slow, until the got to Nijmegen Bridge. If anything they were ahead of schedule. The fact that this alone would have turned Market Garden from a disaster to a success, albeit probably an expensive one, shows that it wasn't doomed. If it had been carried out as intended and Gavin and Browning hadn't have delusions of a massive German force that never existed it would have worked.
Market-Garden should have been a Canadian Army operation, aimed at the Scheldt estuary, and executed at least a week earlier. Preferably two weeks earlier. As soon as Brussels was secured 21 AG directs a air/ground operation to secure both the Scheldt & Antwerp. OTL the XXX Corps rolled into Antwerp 4 September. Fuel and ammunitions should have been sent along with orders for XXX Corps to cross the water obstacles into the northern suburbs & then on to secure the Beveland isthmus. Airborne landings would be conducted concurrently to assist the XXX Corps & seize the ferry crossings to Beveland and Waal island. Control of XXX Corps would be shifted to the Canadian army temporarily. The Canadians would be given priority for fuel and supply & the mission of closing to and crossing the Scheldt to relieve the airborne. I'd expect Eisenhower would endorse this operation readily as it fit his messages to 21 AG to give opening the port of Antwerp priority.
The bulk of the 15th Army was still south of the Scheldt estuary & had difficulty operating in daylight 4 September. The defenses of Beveland & Waal island were disorganized and uneven for several days after 4 September & the morale of the Germans brittle. As with the Mons or Dijon pockets resistance is liable to collapse quickly. More so with the increased distance and obstacles to safety.
The bulk of the 15th Army was still south of the Scheldt estuary & had difficulty operating in daylight 4 September. The defenses of Beveland & Waal island were disorganized and uneven for several days after 4 September & the morale of the Germans brittle. As with the Mons or Dijon pockets resistance is liable to collapse quickly. More so with the increased distance and obstacles to safety.
Cryhavoc101
Donor
The ‘British’ were always going to have to take the Scheldt estuary and the terrain to the East of the Netherlands that bordered Germany if still under German occupation (Captured during the MC op) would pose a threat to any such large operation.
If Op M/C is launched as a supporting op to the Scheldt Estuary battle and Walcheren Island assault then it would make a lot of sense
Many of the units equipped for the assault on the Islands were Commando units who in Sept had only just been relieved from operations in Normandy where they had been the longest units employed in Battle and needed time to Rest and rebuild before training for the attacks. They are not going to be ready much before beginning of October anyway.
However if the Canadians are freed up earlier from the thankless tasks of besieging the 3 ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk – Once Antwerp had been captured – replace those Canadian troops with recently raised Green French Divisions or recently arrived Green US Divisions (no offence intended).
And have those Canadian troops start the job of clearing the Estuary earlier.
Use the 52nd Lowland Mountain division (designated and equipped as an air deployable unit) as part of the op earlier so they can begin training earlier.
Opening Antwerp should be the prize.
Also specialist equipment such as Buffaloes and Ducks as well as boats etc needed to be sent to those units (the Canadians?) tasked with clearing the estuary – how long would this take?
So all in all I would say that if the Op was launched with the Scheldt battles in mind rather than a cut thrust into the ‘beating heart of Germany’ it would make a lot more sense (in hindsight – OTL all the main Wallied leaders were looking to jump the Rhine – and this desire did not stop with Monty)
So let’s use Op Market garden as a supporting op to shield the Scheldt rather than a more ambitious attempt to ‘end the war by Christmas’ while at the same time the operation to clear the Scheldt is started.
Perhaps ignore Arnhem and instead don’t go ‘a bridge too far’ and aim to capture the Nijmegen Bridge on day one with 1st AB Div with the US Division Occupying the Heights to the East of the City.
A better start of course would be Horrock’s pushing on for another 100 miles with XXX Corps and crossing the Albert canal (something he regretted not doing – but too be fair his Corps had just managed an incredible advance) – I don’t think anyone expected the Port to be captured so quickly after the Normandy campaign.
If Op M/C is launched as a supporting op to the Scheldt Estuary battle and Walcheren Island assault then it would make a lot of sense
Many of the units equipped for the assault on the Islands were Commando units who in Sept had only just been relieved from operations in Normandy where they had been the longest units employed in Battle and needed time to Rest and rebuild before training for the attacks. They are not going to be ready much before beginning of October anyway.
However if the Canadians are freed up earlier from the thankless tasks of besieging the 3 ports of Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk – Once Antwerp had been captured – replace those Canadian troops with recently raised Green French Divisions or recently arrived Green US Divisions (no offence intended).
And have those Canadian troops start the job of clearing the Estuary earlier.
Use the 52nd Lowland Mountain division (designated and equipped as an air deployable unit) as part of the op earlier so they can begin training earlier.
Opening Antwerp should be the prize.
Also specialist equipment such as Buffaloes and Ducks as well as boats etc needed to be sent to those units (the Canadians?) tasked with clearing the estuary – how long would this take?
So all in all I would say that if the Op was launched with the Scheldt battles in mind rather than a cut thrust into the ‘beating heart of Germany’ it would make a lot more sense (in hindsight – OTL all the main Wallied leaders were looking to jump the Rhine – and this desire did not stop with Monty)
So let’s use Op Market garden as a supporting op to shield the Scheldt rather than a more ambitious attempt to ‘end the war by Christmas’ while at the same time the operation to clear the Scheldt is started.
Perhaps ignore Arnhem and instead don’t go ‘a bridge too far’ and aim to capture the Nijmegen Bridge on day one with 1st AB Div with the US Division Occupying the Heights to the East of the City.
A better start of course would be Horrock’s pushing on for another 100 miles with XXX Corps and crossing the Albert canal (something he regretted not doing – but too be fair his Corps had just managed an incredible advance) – I don’t think anyone expected the Port to be captured so quickly after the Normandy campaign.
If my information on the condition & deployment (or chaos) of the 15th Army 4 - 11 September is correct a set piece amphib op with specialist units may not be necessary. If the airborne operation captures the 2 or three primary ferry sites the 15th Armies crossing plan is trashed & they will have to improvise, while being overrun using whatever other boats they can bring up the coast and canals. The only actual garrison I can identify on Walchern Island on the 4th are some artillery men at a 'fortress' position on the west end of the island & some anti aircraft units. What portion of the 15th Army field units & support crossed by the 11th I have no information on.
Defences of Walcheren (which was designated an Atlantic Wall Fortress) include:
6 batteries of naval guns, each at least 4 guns in 94 - 202 mm range
17 batteries of smaller close defence guns along the coast
7 heavy anti-aircraft batteries in the interior
89th Fortress Regiment
1018th and 1019th Regiments of 70th Division each with 3 battalions.
Two of these regiments were sent south of Ghent "in the first days of September" to reinforce 15th Army, but I assume they would still be in Walcheren or Breskens on the 4th.
All from Moulton's Battle for Antwerp.
FAAA refused an airborne landing on Walcheren, the specialist naval assault and close support vessels will still off Le Havre until it fell on 12th September; the landward approach was along a narrow km+ embankment - it is very difficult to construct a scenario where Walcheren falls quickly or cheaply.
However taking Breskens and the ferry sites stops 15th Army crossing the Scheldt and interfering in Market Garden.
Eisenhower didn't give Antwerp priority at the time, it was just in his list of targets which IIRC also included the Saar, Ruhr and Rotterdam.
Port issues - Antwerp IIRC was never used for personnel and ammunition as it was considered too close to the front lines, and subject to heavy German attacks including V2s.
Dieppe, Boulogne and Calais were critical to British logistics - IIRC they would meet all British supply needs as far as Berlin.
Cryhavoc101
Donor
Good point Aber
So we are back to the operation to clear the Scheldt probably not being realistically possible before October anyway due to the OTL troops that took part not being available till then.
So back to Op Market Garden - perhaps the Paratroopers could be deployed in such a fashion as too 'Encircle' 15th Army and seek its destruction rather than bounce the Rhine
But again all the senior Wallied leaders where fixated on bouncing the Rhine before Market - Garden!
hipper
Banned
You have it correct, the plan was poor, too much was attempted with to few resources, The correct plan would be to have used the US VIII corps in support of market garden or have 30 corps and the Airbone army support the attack on Aachen. Carrying out two offensives in different directions speaks of poor planning.
WILDGEESE
Gone Fishin'
Would an earlier air drop work also.
It seems silly for the operation to kick off at around 14.00 hrs instead of around 07.00ish in the mourning, that would give time for a probable 2nd drop and allow XXX Corp the chance to gain some extra miles before dusk.
Regards filers.
Cryhavoc101
Donor
Totally - a double drop on Day one would have paid massive dividends.
I would also argue that the AB Corps HQ landing in the first wave was a waste of Air lift (IIRC 33 gliders - which was enough for much of a Brigade)
It could have followed XXX Corps by land instead
Also the US Staff officers body would not be found by the Germans in a Crashed glider with the entire plan on his body as he would not be there!
If Everything goes as OTL up until September 17 1944 they are now in controll of a narrow higway with enemies on Three sides and wery Little room inside the bulge. It will be a beacon of light, a shining star in the night, the last best hope for Germany to crush the wallies advance. They will not be able to reach further than Arnhem in the North due to resistance.