A few months ago, i made a thread on a hypothetical victory for Saladin against the Third Crusade's forces at the Battle of Arsuf in 1191. I wanted to bump it, but, because of the red warning, i ultimately decided not to.
I originally thought Saladin would support the Seljuks of Rum due to religious sympathies, but, after reading a short essay on Issac Angelos' alliance with Saladin and remembering the tenuous infighting and diplomacy within the Levant during the time of the Crusades, i ended up changing my mind.
So, what if the Byzantine-Ayyubid Alliance against Rum and the Crusader states had been more successful, perhaps as a result of Saladin slaying Richard the Lionheart's forces at Arsuf?
I'd wager that Saladin would be capable of conquering most, or even all, of the now dying Crusader states. By the terms of his treaties with Byzantine Emperor Isaac, how would the Levant be partitioned? My guess would be Cilicia, Antioch and Laodicea getting annexed by the Byzantines, while Saladin annexes everything else.
The western European kingdoms who supported the Crusaders, however, would now be quite furious at Constantinople's betrayal. Would an earlier attack on Constantinople be in the cards, this time with the approval of the Pope?
Any further thoughts?
 
Any further thoughts?

Great scenario for a thread. I've thought for a while the Byzantine - Saladin alliance illuminates a few things about this period.

The policy of the previous dynasty, the Komnenoi, was alliance with the crusaders against Egypt and other Muslim states in Syria. But it was always an ambivalent, troubled relationship. Crusader attacks on Byzantine territory such as Reynald de Chatillon's brutal raid on Cyprus, as well as the Crusader refusal to hand over Antioch, first during the first crusade and again in the 1140s when crusaders cheated John II Komnenos out of the city, (they betrayed him by sitting around playing dice instead of participating in the battle of Shaizar), had all created ill-will, mistrust and bad feeling between the two.

These problems were exacerbated by the princes of Antioch being the same Norman lords who repeatedly invaded the Byzantine Empire in the 1080s and again in the 1140s (and again in the 1180s).

Furthermore the Byzantines hadn't been entirely honest either. In the second crusade in particular, Manuel Komnenos broke off his war with the Turks, concluded a truce with them and marched his army west to keep an eye on the crusaders, but didn't offer any military help. It was even rumoured he paid the Turks and other bandits to attack the crusader army. The failure of the crusade and the seeming duplicity of the emperor did not help relations.

The failure of various Byzantine schemes aimed at the conquest of Egypt in the 1160s likewise seems to have been partly due to crusader mistrust bordering on treachery, as they didn't want to share the spoils.

By the 1180s, therefore, it was becoming clear that a change of direction was needed. The westerners were coming to be seen for what they were: enemies of the empire, not friends. Their interests did not align with those of the empire, and they had shown they were not to be trusted. They were as likely to attack the empire as to help it.

Add to this resentment at the over-generous terms given to Italian traders by the Komnenoi (and remember the Venetian raids against Byzantium in the time of John II Komnenos), and you have an explosive situation.

It could easily be argued that the Byzantines and other eastern Christians, who were frequently robbed and massacred by crusaders, (for example at Bilbeis in the 1160s, not to mention many other incidents), had far more in common with the civilized Muslim powers of the area than with the western invaders.

The alliance with Saladin thus made sense, on a deep level from the Byzantine perspective. From Saladin's side, he knew the crusaders had to cross Byzantine territory to reach him. He also knew the Byzantines had powerful armies and fleets, as he had fought against them and the crusaders in Egypt in the 1160s.

I suspect the deal would be that in all the lands that Saladin conquers, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch will be installed instead of the hated Latin one, and the supremacy of the Greek Orthodox Christian faith will be assured in all the churches and holy places. The city of Antioch goes to the Byzantines; the rest goes to Saladin.

The problem with the alliance OTL was that the Angeloi were very weak and incompetent rulers, and utterly failed to stop the third crusade or inflict any real damage on it. The emperor was forced into a cowardly surrender. This led Saladin to conclude that the alliance was worthless.

With better Byzantine leadership though, it is interesting to speculate what might have been. Gaining Antioch would have been the culmination of what Byzantine foreign policy had been trying to achieve with limited success for a century.

Beyond that, the symbolic return of the Orthodox clergy to supremacy in the Levant under Saladin would increase the prestige of the Byzantine emperor as protector of Christians everywhere.

The reaction in the west though will not be favourable to this turn of events, and the empire can expect to be attacked again. It will be interesting to see if Saladin will send troops to assist the Byzantines against the westerners. I believe he might have, since if he saw it as a way to keep the crusaders out, it would be worth it.
 
It is an interesting scenario, and considering the fate of the Ayyubids IOTL, one that probably works very well for the Byzantines.

For one it means they can focus on securing Anatolia and their Balkans possessions, whilst both parties are closely bound with trade that I expect would be more prominent (my understanding being that the Grain Trade from Egypt to Constantinople wasn't anywhere near what it could have been in this period). Meaning good grain money for the Ayyubids, and a stronger urban base for the Romans.

Heck, I'd even go so far as to say that if this alliance can hold for more than a generation or two, you might have a major Byzantine expansion back into Norman Italy and Anatolia.

My concern is that outside of the secure northern border and the trade benefits that exist - what is the benefit for the Ayyubids? Are they going to take on the Abbasids in Mesopotamia? Focus on internal reforms to consolidate their power? Move into North Africa?

Plus, @Byzantine fanatic you mention that it would benefit the Byzantine Emperor would benefit in status - but what about Saladin if the Romans do retake Anatolia? Would reciprocity mean that Sunni Islam (I expect only some schools, not all) would be tolerated in the Empire, if not specifically installing Imams?

I like the idea in general.

It does leave me with an interesting scenario idea though - if we assume that this alliance leads so far as military co-operation, could we see a joint westward invasion? The Romans going for S.Italy, Saladin for North Africa, leaving Sicily.... independent? Up for grabs? Split between them? Under Saladins rule (I expect that is more likely than Roman, considering the relative expected balance of power IMO).
 
It does leave me with an interesting scenario idea though - if we assume that this alliance leads so far as military co-operation, could we see a joint westward invasion? The Romans going for S.Italy, Saladin for North Africa, leaving Sicily.... independent? Up for grabs? Split between them? Under Saladins rule (I expect that is more likely than Roman, considering the relative expected balance of power IMO).
Would the Pope (and, to an extent, the western European monarchs) be complicit with a now effectively "infidel" empire expanding into his backyard, though?
 
I think that after the Angeloi come to power such an alliance would lead easily to alt 4th crusade scenarios, the Latins have too much influence over trade and an alliance with the Ayyubid wouldn't change that as the Byzantines can't expect to gain much from it in terms of land and probably even less in terms of support from the Ayyubids in Anatolia.
 
Would the Pope (and, to an extent, the western European monarchs) be complicit with a now effectively "infidel" empire expanding into his backyard, though?

I don't expect they'd be a fan of an Ayyubid Sicily, but I don't think it is likely that the Ayyubid-Byzantine alliance would last much longer as with territory in Italy the Byzantines would likely want to secure their European borders at that point more than their middle eastern ones at this point (as they're going to be longer, and more vulnerable). I'd expect that at the first sign of an alliance with the West you'd start seeing an Ayyubid-Byzantine relationship start to deteriorate.
 
This period really isn't my area of expertise, but I assume the Crusades would never have gotten anywhere in the first place without the Crusaders having naval superiority. How much danger would antagonizing Venice/Genoa have posed to the Byzantines at this point?
 
Any victory at Arsuf, and any successful Byzantine-Ayyubid Alliance (No matter how long it would last.) would throw a wrench in the West's plans and actions. (One that England would find itself more stable.)
 
Plus, @Byzantine fanatic you mention that it would benefit the Byzantine Emperor would benefit in status - but what about Saladin if the Romans do retake Anatolia? Would reciprocity mean that Sunni Islam (I expect only some schools, not all) would be tolerated in the Empire, if not specifically installing Imams?

IIRC there was already a mosque in Constantinople which was used by the city's Muslim inhabitants in the 12th century. When Crusaders tried to cause trouble there, the local Byzantine citizens gathered round to protect their Muslim fellow citizens.

In terms of Byzantine expansion in Anatolia, if I remember correctly Saladin was not on good terms with the Seljuks of Rum. Probably they posed more of a threat to him than the Byzantines did. There is no religious gain to be had from Byzantine expansion in Anatolia as Saladin was all about the restoration of Sunni rule over the Shia Fatimids. But Anatolia had never been Shia - it was already Sunni.
 
A Byzantine-Ayyubid alliance that brings results seems like a very good way to get an ITTL 4th crusade aimed at Constantinople, rather than the OTL one that hit it by accident.

More seriously, throwing the Latins to the wolves may bring short term gains on their eastern flank, but it invites a world of pain to come out of the West. That’s the Byzantine dilemma in this age, there are powers in all directions eager to take a piece out of them, and they aren’t quite strong enough to hold them all off. If they could gain consistent military ascendancy on one front, then they could hope to hold the other by diplomacy, but at this point the Byzantines can only manage to be a strong force on one front, not a dominant one.
 
A Byzantine-Ayyubid alliance that brings results seems like a very good way to get an ITTL 4th crusade aimed at Constantinople, rather than the OTL one that hit it by accident.

More seriously, throwing the Latins to the wolves may bring short term gains on their eastern flank, but it invites a world of pain to come out of the West. That’s the Byzantine dilemma in this age, there are powers in all directions eager to take a piece out of them, and they aren’t quite strong enough to hold them all off. If they could gain consistent military ascendancy on one front, then they could hope to hold the other by diplomacy, but at this point the Byzantines can only manage to be a strong force on one front, not a dominant one.

This is a very true post.

OTL, the westerners were dismayed by the policies of the emperors that came after Manuel I Komnenos (died 1180). The Pope himself wrote a letter to one of the Angeloi emperors, urging him to "be more like your illustrious predecessor, Manuel Komnenos, of famous memory".

Despite his troubles at times, Manuel was highly-regarded by a significant part of western opinion. For example, one of the chroniclers of the Crusades, William of Tyre, called Manuel "a wise and discreet prince of great magnificence, worthy of praise in every respect", "a great-souled man of incomparable energy", whose "memory will ever be held in benediction."

Indeed, much of the anger directed at Byzantium in the years between 1180 and 1204 was precisely because the westerners knew that things used to be better in the time of Manuel I, and they were unhappy about the change of policy after his death.

The crux of the matter is that Byzantium needed to defeat one or the other of its enemies; either the Normans of Sicily must be destroyed, or the Seljuks of Rum must be conquered. Both continually posed a mortal threat to the empire, and as long as they both existed, the empire was constantly under the Sword of Damocles, a disaster waiting to happen.

Manuel, for all his faults, at least partially recognised this. He launched invasions of both states. The problem is he failed.

Realistically, the forces he deployed in the kingdom of Sicily were not going to be enough to achieve his aims, but he seems to have over-estimated the gains that large amounts of gold could achieve by way of bribery and mercenaries. The lack of a large enough fleet also led to defeat.

In his later years he seems to have taken action to rectify this, because by the later 1160s he could send an impressive fleet of over 200 ships to invade Egypt. But arguably these resources might better have been used to attack the kingdom of Sicily. It is notable, incidentally, that Manuel's fleet was sufficiently powerful to gain victory against Venice in 1171. A fleet of 150 Byzantine ships pursued the Venetian fleet of 120 ships across the Mediterranean. This would be one of the very last major successes of Byzantium at sea, and is an example of why Manuel's reign is such an interesting turning point in the history of the empire.

In the case of the Seljuks of Rum, Manuel launched an attempt to take their capital in 1176, but was defeated in battle at Myriokephalon. Although the actual fighting was technically a draw, Manuel's siege equipment was destroyed, and thus the campaign was no longer viable. Strategically therefore, it was a major humiliation.

Returning to the Byzantine-Saladin alliance, therefore, it seems that it would have been a populist policy which might have played well with domestic opinion at the time, particularly given popular resentment at the west. This is especially so, given the Norman invasion and sack of Thessaloniki in 1185 (after which the Normans were defeated in battle and driven out). It also offered the chance of swiping Antioch once and for all, thus settling the score and putting right one of the major Byzantine grievances against the west, which had been festering for a century.

Beyond that though the policy does set the empire on a collision course with the Third Crusade, which OTL they utterly failed to handle. Byzantium needs competent leadership to succeed. The trouble is by the time the Byzantine-Saladin alliance comes about, the empire is in a difficult situation. Bulgaria rebelled in 1185 and became independent, greatly reducing the empire's ability to project its power. Serbia (a vassal) also broke away, as did Hungary and the Crusader states (all vassals of the empire in Manuel's day).

Bulgaria rebelled because of Isaac's taxation demands. But perhaps heavier taxes were needed, because of the costs imposed by the Norman invasion, and the fact that Manuel had spent so much money on his various failed campaigns in Italy, Egypt and Anatolia, plus his successor Andronikos had been violently overthrown and the chaos had probably further depleted the treasury.

Ultimately therefore it seems an alliance with Saladin won't fix the core problems of the empire, which had built up over the last century. Byzantium needed to retake Anatolia to be secure; only then could it really afford an all-out war with the west. Short-term gains from the alliance probably played more to popular appeal than long-term careful strategic thinking. In the circumstances, it might have been wiser to continue Manuel's pro-west policy for a while, attempt to improve relations with Venice to keep the Normans in check, and focus on fighting the Turks.

For example, the Third Crusade took Konya in 1190. Had the Byzantines wholeheartedly allied with the west, instead of allying with Saladin, they might have been much better placed to occupy the city and hold it for the empire. That would have opened the possibility of major gains in Anatolia, completely changing the situation of the empire much for the better.

But it's easy to say that with the benefit of hindsight. At the time, the political situation and public opinion demanded a tough anti-western stance. So we end up back where we started; the empire is menaced on both sides by dangerous enemies, but lacks the ability to fight both at once. The massacre of the Latins in 1182 would have made it difficult to repair relations with Venice. Campaigns to defeat the Normans are impossible while the Turks are at war with the empire. But resources for the east are difficult to muster when Bulgaria is in rebellion in the west. The empire is surrounded on all sides by enemies and its resources are diminishing.

The only way out would appear to be a series of decisive military and diplomatic victories. But it would not be easy, whichever way one looks at it. That's why the reign of Manuel I Komnenos is all the more tragic. He had the wealth, the power, and the armies and fleets, as well as the time and diplomatic space to tackle his enemies. He just failed to do so effectively.

The empire would not get another chance.
 
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This is a very true post.

OTL, the westerners were dismayed by the policies of the emperors that came after Manuel I Komnenos (died 1180). The Pope himself wrote a letter to one of the Angeloi emperors, urging him to "be more like your illustrious predecessor, Manuel Komnenos, of famous memory".

Despite his troubles at times, Manuel was highly-regarded by a significant part of western opinion. For example, one of the chroniclers of the Crusades, William of Tyre, called Manuel "a wise and discreet prince of great magnificence, worthy of praise in every respect", "a great-souled man of incomparable energy", whose "memory will ever be held in benediction."

Indeed, much of the anger directed at Byzantium in the years between 1180 and 1204 was precisely because the westerners knew that things used to be better in the time of Manuel I, and they were unhappy about the change of policy after his death.

It'd be interesting to have a Manuel dies very VERY old - (Like Godric of Finchale old) as a PoD, as that gives the Empire another 40 years of Manuel I, and easily allows him to secure his heir to rule (and maybe even his heir!)

The crux of the matter is that Byzantium needed to defeat one or the other of its enemies; either the Normans of Sicily must be destroyed, or the Seljuks of Rum must be conquered. Both continually posed a mortal threat to the empire, and as long as they both existed, the empire was constantly under the Sword of Damocles, a disaster waiting to happen.

Manuel, for all his faults, at least partially recognised this. He launched invasions of both states. The problem is he failed.

Sadly for Manuel.


Returning to the Byzantine-Saladin alliance, therefore, it seems that it would have been a populist policy which might have played well with domestic opinion at the time, particularly given popular resentment at the west. This is especially so, given the Norman invasion and sack of Thessaloniki in 1185 (after which the Normans were defeated in battle and driven out). It also offered the chance of swiping Antioch once and for all, thus settling the score and putting right one of the major Byzantine grievances against the west, which had been festering for a century.

Beyond that though the policy does set the empire on a collision course with the Third Crusade, which OTL they utterly failed to handle. Byzantium needs competent leadership to succeed. The trouble is by the time the Byzantine-Saladin alliance comes about, the empire is in a difficult situation. Bulgaria rebelled in 1185 and became independent, greatly reducing the empire's ability to project its power. Serbia (a vassal) also broke away, as did Hungary and the Crusader states (all vassals of the empire in Manuel's day).

Bulgaria rebelled because of Isaac's taxation demands. But perhaps heavier taxes were needed, because of the costs imposed by the Norman invasion, and the fact that Manuel had spent so much money on his various failed campaigns in Italy, Egypt and Anatolia, plus his successor Andronikos had been violently overthrown and the chaos had probably further depleted the treasury.

Ultimately therefore it seems an alliance with Saladin won't fix the core problems of the empire, which had built up over the last century. Byzantium needed to retake Anatolia to be secure; only then could it really afford an all-out war with the west. Short-term gains from the alliance probably played more to popular appeal than long-term careful strategic thinking. In the circumstances, it might have been wiser to continue Manuel's pro-west policy for a while, attempt to improve relations with Venice to keep the Normans in check, and focus on fighting the Turks.

For example, the Third Crusade took Konya in 1190. Had the Byzantines wholeheartedly allied with the west, instead of allying with Saladin, they might have been much better placed to occupy the city and hold it for the empire. That would have opened the possibility of major gains in Anatolia, completely changing the situation of the empire much for the better.

I wonder what you'd think of a joint-PoD. Manuel lives longer (lets say he pushes it to 90 years, extreme, but still not so extreme as to be impossible) - this gives us three decades, in which I assume we'd still see something like the Third Crusade, a long-lasting Pro-West policy, and a more secure inheritance. I expect you'd agree it was the right approach, but I'm curious as to whether you'd agree on whether those three decades would be enough to not just secure Anatolia, but leave a window where Manuel has to decide his price for working with Barbarossa - after all they were at war because of the Lombard League. Would it be Anatolia? Would it go further to have an Imperial-Imperial Alliance to divide Italy and ensure that the Pope and the Italian Cities would remain pliable?
 
On the note of a fourth crusade aimed at constantinople, maybe it would work worse or maybe not at all.

They screwed Byz. by getting in to constantinople peacefully then they got hungry and greedy and pillaged the place, right?
 
Bump.

Considering that a Byzantine-Ayyubid Alliance would surely infuriate the Pope, i'd wager that he'd authorize the Fourth Crusade to attack Constantinople from its inception. An earlier Fourth Crusade would have been interesting, especially considering that the Asen rulers of Bulgaria (Ivan, or maybe Kaloyan if the former is still murdered) still have favorable relations to Rome. Would the Pope support the Asens' expansion efforts?
 
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