WI: Stonewall Jackson in the post-Gettysburg campaigns of the East?

CalBear

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Which is why you need to read both sources instead of just cherry picking one, with the second going into more detail. Specifically, the lack of Ewell and Hill doing anything of note at Mine Run while Longstreet and Jackson both had gained a reputation for strong flanking attacks, which had become their specialty. Lee's comment is also not just blaming himself, but pointing to the fact he can't make up for his subordinates failures on his own.



No, you're literally taking the single engagement at Bristoe's Station and applying it to the entirety of the campaign. There are literally no other examples of Confederates doing what you claimed, nor even a stubborn defense by the Federals outside of Hill's screw up for which he was castigated for by Lee.
This style of debate often works in Jr. High, where a little knowledge can be used to beat up someone with none. It works poorly when both sides have near equal understanding. You have demonstrated reliance on it, even when, perhaps especially when, you have a weak position.

It IS a form of trolling/bullying/arguing in bad faith.

It IS going to stop. One way or another.
 
I'd be more interested in how he gets along post-war. My knowledge of the ACW and Reconstruction are very limited, even more so my knowledge of the specific individuals.

So (assuming the south still loses) does a surviving Jackson change the postwar south?
 
Would Jackson have done well in an independent command? Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't his subordinates/staff always frustrated with him for not divulging his plans until just prior to battle. Not sure how effective that command style would have been if he was directly coordinating the strategic actions of an army.
 
Would Jackson have done well in an independent command? Correct me if I'm wrong, but weren't his subordinates/staff always frustrated with him for not divulging his plans until just prior to battle. Not sure how effective that command style would have been if he was directly coordinating the strategic actions of an army.

Jackson did have at least semi-independent command in his Valley Campaign and did very well there. His failures, most notably during the Seven Days battles, came when he was acting as a Corps commander under Lee. Jackson did have trouble getting along with his subordinates. IIRC, the chief areas of friction were Jackson's intolerance of deviating from orders, even when it was necessary, and a tendency give the credit for his successes to God and the credit for his failures to his subordinates. The only subordinate that Jackson seemed to get on well with was Ewell, with Jackson and AP Hill seeming to get on very poorly.

Even if Jackson's reasons for his orders were not clear, his orders made it very clear what he wanted his subordinates to do. This caused a problem for both Ewell and AP Hill when they were raised to Corps command after Jackson's death and started taking orders from Robert E Lee. Lee's orders provided a flexibility that Jackson had not allowed his subordinates, but they could also be vague and sometimes self-contradictory. During the Gettysburg Campaign, but well before the battle, a supernumary officer named Trimble would record Ewell expressing great frustration at the vague orders he had been given and wondering if anyone on Lee's staff actually knew how to write and an order.
 
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