WI Stillwell was replaced in July 1944 instead of September 1944 and the Allied CBI front offensives were wound down then?

9/23/15
In OTL, by the time Allied offensives restored overland traffic from India through Burma to China through the Ledo Road (aka Stillwell road) in January 1945, the whole concept of an Indian Ocean supply route to China had become almost irrelevant to the logistical needs of the war effort against Japan. The original Burma road, who sections were only opened later in the year, were even less relevant.
With US Central Pacific advances the summer of '44 (Saipan, Tinian, Guam) and the destruction of the Japanese fleet at Leyte Gulf in October '44, ISTM that a cross-Pacific route to supply China or influence the China coast would be more efficient than transport by sea through the Indian Ocean to India to then send cargo overland in China-Burma-India.
What if by June-July Gen Marshall concluded that further investment in a Burma campaign was throwing good money after bad because of the slow pace of events in Burma and the increasing probability that by the time a ground route through Burma was cleared a cross-Pacific sea and air lift route would be available?
ISTM that success at Saipan and Guam in the Marianas and the fall of the Tojo Cabinet would reinforce this point by July.
Accordingly Marshall makes the decision no later than 25 July 1944 to turn off the tap (at the most rapid appropriate speed)to the CBI front and drop plans for large offensives in Burma.
Supplies coming from Allied production centers could be redirected wherever else in western Europe or the central Pacific they might be more useful.
As for supplies that were minimally essential for sustaining existing forces or nearly in theater already such that re-routing would be inefficient, they could still go into the theater.
As for the existing forces in the theater, Chinese, British and smaller American support or specialist units (engineers, Merrill's Marauders, etc) the Combined Chiefs of Staff could authorize the theater commanders (Mountbatten, Chiang Kai-shek and Stillwell) to repurpose them or have them continue much-scaled down versions of the currently planned operations. Since Stillwell had been so associated with the Burma effort, and tensions between him and Chiang Kai-shek were patently high already, this would be a good time to make a clean break and replace Stillwell.
Chiang Kai-shek would essentially be getting his way and could pull all his "Y-force" in Yunnan to face Japanese offensives in the east. He, and even many other Chinese military commentators not loyal to his faction were noting at the time that Chinese troops in Burma were sorely needed further east in China to resist Japan's Ichigo offensives.
Given freedom, Chiang and Stilwell's replacement would release Y-Force divisions from Burma oriented duties. If feasible and optimal within the constraints of Hump Airlift capacity, Chinese troops and equipment in X-Force, on the Indo-Burma border could possibly be airlifted much closer to active battlefronts in China (or, less likely, sea-lifted to become an adjunct to those US forces taking part in the invasion of the Philippines).
Mountbatten and the British Indian forces, in addition to maintaining the defense of India, could allocate their offensive efforts in the theater in the directions they most preferred, regardless of earlier plans. So this might still involve mainly a more gradual advance into Burma, or it might involve eventual operations in Sumatra or aimed at Malaya.
How will the course of the war go between August 1944 and August 1945 under the new scheme.
Could any of the CBI resources made available be used in the ETO or PTO?
Could the Chinese mount a stronger defensive effort against Ichigo (while Japan made some serious gains in China between May '44 and July '44 it is notable that the Japanese offensive prongs from Wuhan, Canton and Indochina did not make a junction securing their continental land route until December 1944 or January 1945).
Perhaps Chinese reinforcements could prevent the Japanese junction or at least save many airbases and supplies from capture/abandonment/demolition, or if not, perhaps Japanese forces could have been more worn down and Chinese counteroffensives could start a few months earlier than OTL?
Would British Commonwealth forces shifted their offensive maneuvers and end up in a different disposition in ATL August 1945 compared OTL August 1945?
Discuss.