Stalin did not interfere with the British suppression of Greek Communists in 1944. When the Greek Civil War broke out after WWII, however, Soviet bloc states did provide backing to the Communist guerrillas. However, as quoted in Milovan Djilas’ “Conversations with Stalin”,by late 1947 or early 1948, Stalin had concluded the geopolitical odds were stacked against any Communist success in Greece, Britain and America simply would not allow Communist victory there. From that, he concluded the war should be wound down.
But that was not the sole plausible conclusion from Stalin’s defeatist analysis on Greece. He could have judged that although there was no hope of Communist victory, it would be relatively inexpensive to prolong the Greek Civil War and keep it going, and America would be compelled to keep spending resources propping up its side, and that the Communist bloc could get the better end of this exchange.
What changes, if anything, in US Cold War strategy if a fairly intensive guerrilla war is continuing in Greece through 1950-51, and this requires continual rotations of US advisors along with a high level of military support?
Is the US ability to commit to fight in Korea affected at all?
If the Greek insurgency is still kicking in 1950-51 and enjoying Soviet support via Bulgaria and Albania, how is Yugoslavia reacting? Are they still providing support, or have they quit doing so because of the split with the USSR?
Longer-lasting Greek Communist insurgency will certainly be frustrating to the US, demanding, at a minimum, greater US resources to counter it. However, would the persistence and frustration of conflict there lead the US to any escalatory measures, bringing us anywhere closer to the brink of WW3 than OTL crises like Berlin and Korea?
But that was not the sole plausible conclusion from Stalin’s defeatist analysis on Greece. He could have judged that although there was no hope of Communist victory, it would be relatively inexpensive to prolong the Greek Civil War and keep it going, and America would be compelled to keep spending resources propping up its side, and that the Communist bloc could get the better end of this exchange.
What changes, if anything, in US Cold War strategy if a fairly intensive guerrilla war is continuing in Greece through 1950-51, and this requires continual rotations of US advisors along with a high level of military support?
Is the US ability to commit to fight in Korea affected at all?
If the Greek insurgency is still kicking in 1950-51 and enjoying Soviet support via Bulgaria and Albania, how is Yugoslavia reacting? Are they still providing support, or have they quit doing so because of the split with the USSR?
Longer-lasting Greek Communist insurgency will certainly be frustrating to the US, demanding, at a minimum, greater US resources to counter it. However, would the persistence and frustration of conflict there lead the US to any escalatory measures, bringing us anywhere closer to the brink of WW3 than OTL crises like Berlin and Korea?