WI Stalin hadn't ignored the German build-up pre-Barbarossa?

As we know, Stalin basically had his head up his read end in the period December 1940-June 1941 about the growing ominous build-up on his border, screaming 'it's not happening', basically. Stalin didn't believe Hitler would fight a two-front war and refused to believe that his own political games had backfired on him because he knew that he was likely to lose a war.

Suppose he had done something with the intelligence reports that were almost literally flooding in not only from the NKVD, but also the British and even the Swedes who gave him the exact date of the invasion. He had months to clear out the western military districts for more defensive lines that would favour the Red Army. Stalin knew as well as any of his generals that his army was in a bad state in June 1941. He also could have removed the Red Air Force from airstrips in eastern Poland and spread them out over facilities across the western Soviet Union. They could also have mobilized and/or hold military exercises to let the Germans know they know of Barbarossa. This way, many units would not have been surrounded and hundreds of thousands would have survived those first six months to fight again later. Similarly, the Red Air Force wouldn't have suffered the loss of 3922 planes (most of them on the ground) on the first day of combat.

What would the effect have been? Would the war end earlier, perhaps in the winter of 1944-'45? How far would the Germans get? Would we still see a Battle of Moscow or Stalingrad or could they be held on a Leningrad-Minsk-Dnieper line? How would the post-war world shape up with a relatively stronger USSR, possibly with the iron curtain extending further west.
 
The Union would do much better, that's for sure. In the last couple weeks before Barbarossa his commanders at the border were practically begging him on their hands and knees to be allowed to take a defensive postures, move supply depots to ready positions, cover their airfields and disperse their planes, etc. Even beginning preparation at that late a date would have resulted in far fewer planes, men and materiel being lost in the first important weeks of the war.

If he had had months to prepare, it would have likely occured to him to move back to the Stalin line (and, for that matter, he would have had time to re-build the Stalin line, since most of its resources were 'appropriated' to build the never-finished Molotov line), move about army formations to prevent German aircraft from pinpointing every concentration and reserve ahead of the invasion, mobilize Soviet reserves and ready militia units to prepare for war, etc. Any or all of these changes would have likely resulted in the German offensive bogging down somewhere short of Smolensk. Historically, the unparallelled success of Barbarossa, the way that every contact with the enemy either went according to German predictions, or went even better than German predictions due to Soviet incompetence, was rolling double sixes again and again. Even incremental Soviet improvements could have done wonders, in my opinion.

How much better is a good question. Certainly the Reds would still take Berlin, and likely it would happen some time in '44, but I can't say for sure what actions Stalin would take and therefore how useful any one would be.
 
*bump*

I imagine that communism will be more widespread. Maybe we'll see the Iron Curtain on the Rhine instead of where it was IOTL, absorbing Finland and perhaps Denmark into the Soviet Union's sphere of influence although the former could just be annexed as the Finnish SSR as they considered themselves heir to all lands of the former Russian Empire. If the Soviets have troops to spare, they might open up a front on the Nazis in Norway too, which will prompt an Anglo-American invasion and result in a weird north-south divide in Norway although that is enough for Soviet Navy access to the Atlantic. Maybe a stronger USSR can also tip the balance in favour of the commies in the Greek Civil War which would give them a presence on the Mediterranean Sea.
 
Yes this is the likely outcome given CW, but the opposite might also happen too.

Hitlers rush to invasion hinged on his belief that the RED ARMY would be little better than 1917 in actual performance. He was blind to there equipmen capacity badly underestimating the RED ARMY. Thus his telling comment later in the war, that had he realised how big and well equipped the Red Army was , he would have thought twice about attacking.

If Stalin is not careful, he might force Hitler to reconsider & revise the planned invasion as was done in France 1940, leading to a bolder German attack and more decisive victory. Such a victory could trigger a collapse.

The main reason the German offensive stalled at Smolensk is because thats when it was supposed to be over. Hitler had not planned for serious combat beyond this point and it was not expected and thus logistical provisions not planned for. Instead it was expected the RED ARMY would have been defeated by then.
 
I agree with Uber Amoeba. The Germans were insanely lucky to go so far and last so long as it was.

Onkel Willie: The Soviets didn't leave Communism everywhere they marched. They withdrew scrupulously from Austria because a neutral state was exactly what they wanted there, so we have no proof that Stalin wasn't earnestly hoping for the same thing in Germany with his note. There was no Danish People's Republic on Bornholm, and IIRC the Soviets did cross into Norway a little, but they'd never go far south enough to make splitting an ally up worthwhile. And if they wanted a neutral Germany, they'd obviously want a neutral Denmark to go with it. Greece, though, is an interesting one.

esl: The German attack was based on the French success. Panzer spearheads, massive encirclement, all that shiz. The earliest parts of Barbarossa actually forced a revision because the USSR was in fact not France, and deep-encircling an army in Belarus was a good way to create thousands and thousands of insta-partisans. The Germans, although still obviously employing encirclement at Kiev and so on, ceased to treat it as an end in itself that could destroy the enemy's fighting piower and tried to capture strategic territory instead.

The German tactical success, as it was, was pretty outrageous. How could they, by sitting with maps for a bit longer, possibly make it moreso?
 
Onkel Willie: The Soviets didn't leave Communism everywhere they marched. They withdrew scrupulously from Austria because a neutral state was exactly what they wanted there, so we have no proof that Stalin wasn't earnestly hoping for the same thing in Germany with his note. There was no Danish People's Republic on Bornholm, and IIRC the Soviets did cross into Norway a little, but they'd never go far south enough to make splitting an ally up worthwhile. And if they wanted a neutral Germany, they'd obviously want a neutral Denmark to go with it. Greece, though, is an interesting one.

Even if communist Germany was not planned by Stalin at the moment he offered re-unification, it doesn't mean it would not be reconsidered later or that a strong communist movement wouldn't let Germany fall into Soviet camp a few years down the line. In Czechoslovakia over 4 years passed between it's liberation by Soviet troops and the Communist putsch - I dare claim that the latter wasn't meticulously planned by the Soviets from 1945 on, but resulted from a spur of the moment decision. Most probably Stalin&Co hoped for a neutral (democratic) country with a strong representation of Communists in parliament (so the country remains neutral but Soviet-friendly), and the putsch was rather planned and executed by thus emboldened local communists. Then USSR had no political choice but to embrace the results of the putsch, whether they supported it initially or not.
In Greece, IIRC, the population was rather more polarized along comunist/anticommunist lines already, and getting Greece into the Soviet camp would be only possible by getting communists into power - findlandizing wouldn't work as Greece is too far away both geographically and economically from the USSR. One would need a massive support of Tito to be able to lean on a non-communist Greece, which was illusory in 1946 already.
 
With a different situation on the field, by the time of a Yalta like comference to divide post was spheres of influence, Stalin will be in a much strongher position and the lines will be drawn over the expected meeting of the fronts...

If Barbarossa fails miserably I expect the USSR wil pretend much more of Europe, and UK and France will be in no position to denay anithingh (the U.S. will not even be at the table since by Pearl Harbour the Red Army will be marching in Berlin...
 
Even if communist Germany was not planned by Stalin at the moment he offered re-unification, it doesn't mean it would not be reconsidered later or that a strong communist movement wouldn't let Germany fall into Soviet camp a few years down the line.

That Stalin was thinking along these lines is very likely, but the point I was making is that a People's Republic of Norway is silly.

In Czechoslovakia over 4 years passed between it's liberation by Soviet troops and the Communist putsch - I dare claim that the latter wasn't meticulously planned by the Soviets from 1945 on, but resulted from a spur of the moment decision. Most probably Stalin&Co hoped for a neutral (democratic) country with a strong representation of Communists in parliament (so the country remains neutral but Soviet-friendly), and the putsch was rather planned and executed by thus emboldened local communists. Then USSR had no political choice but to embrace the results of the putsch, whether they supported it initially or not.

The Sovietisation of CZS certainly ended up working against Moscow, since the Czechs were quite happy to more-or-less Finlandise themselves, which would have resulted in a much more stable and content country and one less financial albatross about the neck of the USSR.

In Greece, IIRC, the population was rather more polarized along comunist/anticommunist lines already, and getting Greece into the Soviet camp would be only possible by getting communists into power - findlandizing wouldn't work as Greece is too far away both geographically and economically from the USSR.

But at the start of the civil war, the communist-dominated Greek resistance controlled the better part of the country. They had a fighting chance or better in a Greek context, and having Soviets in the Balkans as much as a year earlier will change the international situation pretty drastically. The Soviets agreed to keep out of Greece at Yalta and kept their word; what if Yalta comes off differantly?

One would need a massive support of Tito to be able to lean on a non-communist Greece, which was illusory in 1946 already.

PoD is 1941, remember?
 
I agree with Uber Amoeba. The Germans were insanely lucky to go so far and last so long as it was.

esl: The German attack was based on the French success. Panzer spearheads, massive encirclement, all that shiz. The earliest parts of Barbarossa actually forced a revision because the USSR was in fact not France, and deep-encircling an army in Belarus was a good way to create thousands and thousands of insta-partisans. The Germans, although still obviously employing encirclement at Kiev and so on, ceased to treat it as an end in itself that could destroy the enemy's fighting piower and tried to capture strategic territory instead.

The German tactical success, as it was, was pretty outrageous. How could they, by sitting with maps for a bit longer, possibly make it moreso?


Easy, Avoid thinking and seeing the battle the way you just discribed.

In the initial invasion of Poland the Panzer Korps were used just as a spearhead to each prong of the attack in a straight forward land grab, with little focus on operational maneuvre designed to defeat the enemy reserves etc. Russian invasion from the east effectively dealt with that aspect.

This was the initial idea of the invasion of France. However with the forced delay in the plan, combined with the original plan falling into allied hands , that allowed Mansteins operational concept to be combined the bulk of the armor into making a singular mechanized maneuvre, through a specific area to translate this into strategic defeat of the best reserves of the allied forces, thus leading to collapse of the allied war effort in France and the lowlands.

With the Barbarossa Invasion of Russia, the Panzer Groups where again just used to spear-head ,each of a three-four pronged invasion of the country, in what turned out to be a straight forward land grab. No effort was made to focus on the Red Army 'centre of Gravity' inorder to defeat the reserves via operational maneuvre and thus lead to a collapse of the Red Army...this in no small part because Hitler allowed his racial vision of the enemy to blur his focus and badly underestimated the size and capability of the Red Army.
 
As we know, Stalin basically had his head up his read end in the period December 1940-June 1941 about the growing ominous build-up on his border, screaming 'it's not happening', basically. Stalin didn't believe Hitler would fight a two-front war and refused to believe that his own political games had backfired on him because he knew that he was likely to lose a war.

Suppose he had done something with the intelligence reports that were almost literally flooding in not only from the NKVD, but also the British and even the Swedes who gave him the exact date of the invasion. He had months to clear out the western military districts for more defensive lines that would favour the Red Army. Stalin knew as well as any of his generals that his army was in a bad state in June 1941. He also could have removed the Red Air Force from airstrips in eastern Poland and spread them out over facilities across the western Soviet Union. They could also have mobilized and/or hold military exercises to let the Germans know they know of Barbarossa. This way, many units would not have been surrounded and hundreds of thousands would have survived those first six months to fight again later. Similarly, the Red Air Force wouldn't have suffered the loss of 3922 planes (most of them on the ground) on the first day of combat.

What would the effect have been? Would the war end earlier, perhaps in the winter of 1944-'45? How far would the Germans get? Would we still see a Battle of Moscow or Stalingrad or could they be held on a Leningrad-Minsk-Dnieper line? How would the post-war world shape up with a relatively stronger USSR, possibly with the iron curtain extending further west.
I think the main reason was that Stalin was actually planning to attack in Germany in 1941, but Hitler got it first with some two weeks or less. So, actually there was hundreds of thousands of soviet soldiers in German border, but main problem was that they were at offensive position, not defensive. There are some articles about that which prove it, but unfortunately they are written in finnish.
So, what to do if you were Stalin? Move your entire force to defensive position and be ready to german attack, which may be total bluff, in which case you have spent couple of months to move your troops all around. And believe me, the germans would have noticed that and could make their preparations.
And, by the way, Stalin had made his plannings many years, so I think that he hoped for the last moment that Hitler would not so stupidly attack.
 
I think the main reason was that Stalin was actually planning to attack in Germany in 1941, but Hitler got it first with some two weeks or less. So, actually there was hundreds of thousands of soviet soldiers in German border, but main problem was that they were at offensive position, not defensive. There are some articles about that which prove it, but unfortunately they are written in finnish.

Unfortunately they're also laughable horseshit.

Re esl, frankly, Barbarossa wasn't a bad plan. It hinged on hitting what were presumed 'centers of gravity' for the Union's infrastructure, railways, and industry - Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev - and I'm not sure that any proposed improvement wouldn't hamper the operation elsewhere. The fact is, the Soviets were simply able to mobilize new reserves and continue throwing new fresh-minted battalions into the jaws of death for longer than anybody thought they could. If the German army changes the gears of its operations to bleed Russia's manpower dry, they lose out in taking industrial and strategic targets. If they make plans to drive even further, logistics will be even more nightmarish, and a more prepared Soviet Union will be dealing proportionally more damage to the Wehrmacht for every mile it takes. Was Barbarossa perfect? Far from it. But I doubt that the General Staff could come up with something much better in a couple of months merely in reaction to perceived Soviet awareness.

On the other hand, they might. Ultimately, the German High Command was fairly flexible in terms of operational doctine even in the original war, so whether this new plan will survive much contact with the enemy (assuming, again, that any meaningful revision can take place in a short time period) the possibility exists, however unlikely, that German plans could be polished up. However, I suspect that on balance this TL will still be better for Stalin that for Chaplin.

As far as Greece, Stalin, as far as I know, had absolutely no interest in it, but he was aware that Churchill had a great deal of interest in it, both sentimental and political, and if he had Red Army boots on the ground in Greece by war's end, they'll likely be gone eventually, but Stalin was a master at using leverage in backroom deals, and if there is anything he wants in the rest of the world he'd twist that Greek knife as far or beyond where it could possibly go before he lets that advantage slip through his fingers. That could mean a bigger slice of the pie in Persia, China, Japan, or even his ideal German neutral state. But ultimately, Greece would be nothing to him but an Ace and a few extra chips for the time when he gets to the dealer's table. And, above all else, Stalin was a hell of a Poker player.
 

Sachyriel

Banned
So, if Russia doesn't ignore it, and breaks the treaty, or causes Germany to break the treaty earlier, would Japan do anything different? OP says POD is Dec 40 - Jun 41, so I was wondering about it.
 
That Stalin was thinking along these lines is very likely, but the point I was making is that a People's Republic of Norway is silly.

I wouldn't go that far, but it is indeed not a necessary conclusion.
To keep the CZS comparison, it might not be actually Stalin's plan but if the local communists stage a coup, USSR won't deny them support.


The Sovietisation of CZS certainly ended up working against Moscow, since the Czechs were quite happy to more-or-less Finlandise themselves, which would have resulted in a much more stable and content country and one less financial albatross about the neck of the USSR.

Of course. But not supporting the coup once it starts will undermine the credibility of the Soviet Union. The best situation for all participants including USSR would be not trying a coup at all.

But at the start of the civil war, the communist-dominated Greek resistance controlled the better part of the country. They had a fighting chance or better in a Greek context, and having Soviets in the Balkans as much as a year earlier will change the international situation pretty drastically. The Soviets agreed to keep out of Greece at Yalta and kept their word; what if Yalta comes off differently?

I confess I have to read up more on Yugoslavia fighting. Weren't Tito's forces able to drive the Wehrmacht out of most of the Yugoslavian territory - with Soviet and Western materiel support but no troops? Would this still take place with shortened war due to Barbarossa misfiring? Would the Stalin/Tito split still occur?
 
Unfortunately they're also laughable horseshit.

Re esl, frankly, Barbarossa wasn't a bad plan. It hinged on hitting what were presumed 'centers of gravity' for the Union's infrastructure, railways, and industry - Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev - and I'm not sure that any proposed improvement wouldn't hamper the operation elsewhere. The fact is, the Soviets were simply able to mobilize new reserves and continue throwing new fresh-minted battalions into the jaws of death for longer than anybody thought they could. If the German army changes the gears of its operations to bleed Russia's manpower dry, they lose out in taking industrial and strategic targets. If they make plans to drive even further, logistics will be even more nightmarish, and a more prepared Soviet Union will be dealing proportionally more damage to the Wehrmacht for every mile it takes. Was Barbarossa perfect? Far from it. But I doubt that the General Staff could come up with something much better in a couple of months merely in reaction to perceived Soviet awareness..

Well without an inspired visionary like a Manstein, yes I agree...but the more of a delay the more possiblity things could change. That can mean everything and nothing in alternative history.

Had history gotten the Germans to launch a heavy war with France in early 1940 based on the original plan and thus get bogged down as many seem to believe it would, I suspect many [in such an ATL] would have argued that had the Germans waited just a couple of months more before attacking , it could never have altered the time line enough to make a difference. History would always have played out as it did as many seemed to beleive in such butterfly effects.

Were are all mere amatures when it comes to second guessing history...which is why nothings impossible in the context of real war.

However the Blitzkrieg in its theoretical application has nothing to do with economic warfare and ought to steer far away from any mention of wars of attrition. Its mostly about maneuver designed to induce your enemy to the point of collapse so you all together avoid any war of attritiion or economic warfare.
 

Stalker

Banned
The main reason the German offensive stalled at Smolensk is because thats when it was supposed to be over. Hitler had not planned for serious combat beyond this point and it was not expected and thus logistical provisions not planned for. Instead it was expected the RED ARMY would have been defeated by then.
The Soviet Western Front WAS defeated. But there still was another Red Front actively operating - The South-Eastern Front whose flanks were threatening the German offensive further east by the mighty counteroffensive. Several armies thus were redirected to finish the Red Armies at Kharkov and that exlains the pause after Smolensk.
Concerning the main theme of the thread, it would hardly be much better than in OTL (just a little bit better, looks like). Soviets were not ready to withstand any German offensive in summer 1941. Even being warned, they would do stupid things in other areas. The COs noncoms were ill-trained, the privates were trained even worse, the logistics was auful, the weapons that were superior of German counterparts by pure technical characteristics, in reality were of poor quality and not reliable. Etc, etc, etc.
 
The Soviet Western Front WAS defeated. But there still was another Red Front actively operating - The South-Eastern Front whose flanks were threatening the German offensive further east by the mighty counteroffensive. Several armies thus were redirected to finish the Red Armies at Kharkov and that exlains the pause after Smolensk.
Concerning the main theme of the thread, it would hardly be much better than in OTL (just a little bit better, looks like). Soviets were not ready to withstand any German offensive in summer 1941. Even being warned, they would do stupid things in other areas. The COs noncoms were ill-trained, the privates were trained even worse, the logistics was auful, the weapons that were superior of German counterparts by pure technical characteristics, in reality were of poor quality and not reliable. Etc, etc, etc.


The flanking fronts were destroyed mostly in the first weeks of the invasion and hardly justified changing the main emphasis of the thrust from Moscow to Kiew. That decisions seems to have been based more on economics and politics rather than military strategy. This was a strategic mistake on Hitlers part and it cost them Barbarossa and possibly the war. But I agree in general with your post as the Red army needed years more, to recover from the Purges and perform significantly differently than they did.
 
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