To expand a bit and consider alternatives:
Beria certainly did have the notion that the USSR could abolish the Party, back off from its commitment to radical socialism, and the current apparatchiks ("suitably" purged and streamlined of course!) could simply rule directly via an autocratic Soviet state, with none of the pretense that the Soviet Union was a democratic republic whose people just happened to routinely vote for the Communist Party with 99.995 percent margins because the Bolsheviks were just such swell guys. All this sounds progressive and reasonable to (most) Western ears, right?
Well, I think the consensus among the rulers that this was all dangerous nonsense is pretty well verified by the events of 1991, and it would have been even more so in 1952 or 1945. The odd "church-state" division between Party and Soviet state that seems so quaint and redundant actually served important functions and if Beria thought he could just ditch it, that's where he was a dummy.
Now while it was widely known, at least in high ruling circles, that Beria had these notions by 1952, I am not at all sure even he thought this way in 1945, and if he did I'm pretty sure (though I could be wrong about this) he kept these notions very much to himself, if he knew what was good for him. So perhaps Beria could seize power without the other apparatchiks realizing he had such ideas.
But I really don't think he could seize power at all exclusively in his own name. His role while Stalin lived was to serve as Stalin's attack dog; he was the "bad cop." (A very very bad cop indeed!) He made Stalin look merciful and appealing by comparison--considering that many Soviet citizens had no illusions about how ruthless the Vozd could be, that says a lot for how chilling Beria's reputation was. The thought of this attack dog running around loose not on Stalin's leash anymore must have been too terrifying to contemplate, and I think Beria understood that full well.
His best shot at survival then would be to find allies quickly, that he could plausibly be seen as again subordinate to; the logical candidate again seems to be Molotov, as Stalin's widely known right-hand man.
So, whether Beria survives or not is a race between his putting himself fully at Molotov's service against all rivals and Molotov's decision he'd best eliminate Beria. In the former case, the Stalinist regime continues, modified only by the difference between Molotov and Stalin. I daresay Molotov wasn't quite the politician Stalin was (though he was pretty well honed by then) and might have slipped up, perhaps in a way that might tempt Beria to try to take over on his own behalf which would surely begin with killing Molotov. After that--would Beria be able to hang on on his own? Maybe, though I doubt it--the more likely outcome seems to me to be a bloody civil war in the high apparatus which might degenerate into mass civil war in the Union as a whole.
And if he does manage to hang on anyhow, with suitable mixes of purge and bribery, and does try for his "normalization" scheme, that will trigger off another round of unrest and probably doom the USSR to collapse, unless the apparatchiks belatedly eliminate him then.
OTL Molotov lived until the 1960s; if he hangs on and the greater stresses of his position (not that he was rolling in puppies OTL once Khrushchev purged him) don't prematurely age him, we might see essentially a continuation of a basically Stalinist type of regime, probably more moderated and nuanced by Molotov's more cosmopolitan (if still hard-edged and ruthless) world-view, but continuing something like a decade longer. I have no idea how long Beria would have lived if he weren't killed, but presumably when he died there would have been a successor for his position.