WI: Stalin Attacks Germany during Battle of France?

If the French are smart they do a fighting retreat all the way to the sea, if need be. They know that sooner or later (more likely sooner then later) the Germans have to leave and they can retake the land once that happens.
 
OK...

1) Since every inch of German occupied Poland is within 375 miles of bases inside Germany itself, no case here.


2) Actually the majority of the Red Army was nowhere near the German border, a large majority if you include Asia and the Far East. And the odds of Germany not noticing troop movements on such a scale are non-existant. The odds of Hitler learning of millions of Soviet troops and vast quantities of material moving towards one small portion of Soviet borders and not planning accordingly are equally small.

And how the rest of Eastern Europe would respond to such developments only plays into Hitler's hands with new allies.

Now, given that the German units in the West could reach central Poland in less than three weeks ON FOOT...


3) Look, it's getting tedious when you keep repeating points which you have failed to establish in the first place, let alone those which are utterly wrong.

Fact: At no point in WWII did the Red Army, even in 1945, achieve anything resembling an advance rate of 200 miles per week.

Fact: The skill level of the Red Army in 1939-40 shows that the ability to achieve overwhelming local superiority against even a small nation like Finland would, at best, take great time and preparation. You're presenting a level of skill which was simply not there.

Fact: That the Red Army during the initial phases of Barbarossa was crippled by both the purges of the officer corps and the mindless obedience of the remaining officers to Stalin's bizarre whims. The German officer corps is neither purged nor mindless.

Fact: The Germans were able to inflict such harm on a Red Army in 1941 with more and better equipment and whose officer corps had been given another year to recover says many things about the likely quality of the Red Army in 1940 and I might note the continuing failure of the Red Army to successfully overwhelm many pockets or kessels of German troops, even into 1944, and with much better than 3:1 odds casts question on any Soviet ability to overwhelm 600,000 German troops.

Fact: France at this point is already beaten. No Dutch or Belgian allies, no BEF, the best French units destroyed, the heart of French industry and iron and coal already lost, Paris under threat and resistance collapsing. If Germany leaves a mere 60 divisions to hold the line it is doubtful that any grand French counteroffensive will take place, although British will throw away several more desperately needed divisions in trying.


4) Help for the Germans in Poland is less than an hour away in terms of air support, days before the first reinforcing divisions arrive. The ability of the Red Army to encircle is indeed in question but the ability to advance on some vast front is equally doubtful. And if they surround the Germans with 3:1 odds there isn't anyone left to advance. If they surround at much below 2:1 odds then the troops advancing are likely to note the encirclement collapsing and German troops cutting them off from retreat.

A historically common German tactic, incidentally, to allow Soviet penetrations and then cut them off.


5) Perhaps you could research the Polish transport net of the time and particularly the limited number of major crossing points over the Vistula, the only points suitable to supply an army, along with actual Soviet logisitical capabilities of the time? You would then understand why crossing portions of the Vistula without taking the few key crossing points means large bodies of Soviet infantry cut off from resupply and heavy firepower.


6) To claim that a Red Army offensive facing heavy German resistance might be able to move faster over 200 miles than German units driving down their own highways and railroads in the face of no resistance over 350 miles...


7) Belgium is defeated, France is in no position to launch anything resembling a counter-attack, something which failed to appear OTL despite the weeks bought at Dunkirk and Calais, and the BEF is certainly not attacking while London considers evacuation.

As to numbers and equipment, the French alone, including trained and equipped reserves, enjoyed a substantial numerical advantage over the Germans and more tanks, arguably of higher quality. To be blunt:

BEFORE the offensive in the West was launched Soviet intervention would be of great value to France.

AFTER all her allies are wrecked, her best units lost, her industry shattered and her generals unable to field a defense line strong enough for the average German unit to notice, the most likely result is to further strengthen the conviction of many Frenchmen(and others) that a choice must be made between fascism and Stalin.

That may not hurt Hitler.
 
Stalin, and actually nobody, had any idea that the french would collapse as they did. Why should he attack so soon? Why not wait until germans and allies destroy one another in a long costly war, rebuilding your army in the meanwhile? France was lost in weeks, and all the players had to adujst their plans to that shocking situation.
 
Stalin, and actually nobody, had any idea that the french would collapse as they did. Why should he attack so soon? Why not wait until germans and allies destroy one another in a long costly war, rebuilding your army in the meanwhile? France was lost in weeks, and all the players had to adujst their plans to that shocking situation.

I will say that last night I spent hours Googling German defensive plans in the East for 1940 and found NOTHING. I learnt loads of stuff about lots of other things in my exhaustive hunt through the first 21 pages of results, but I might tentatively say that the absence of any well-documented (or easy to find) plans perhaps indicates that they were not viewed as necessary ?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
This may help or not !!

German divisions as of 10 May 1940 -

THE EASTERN FRONT

OBERBEFEHLSHABER “OST”: (Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz) OB Ost: 20.10.39 – 14.05.40

Grenzabschnittkommando “Nord”: (General der Artillerie Alfred Vollard-Bockelberg)

(zgl. Wehrkreis I):

311 Infantry Division
206 Infantry Division

XXXXV (45) Hoh.Kdo.z.b.V. (OKH Reserve): (General der Infanterie Curt von Greiff)

399 Land.Div. (z.b.V. 421)
395 Land.Div. (OFK 521)

Grenzabschnittkommando “Mitte”: (Lieutenant General Curt von Gienanth)

(zgl. XXXVI (36) Hoh.Kdo.z.b.V.):

218 Infantry Division
372 Land.Div. (Koruck 581)
393 Land.Div. (z.b.V. 423)

XXXII (32) Hoh.Kdo.z.b.V.: (General der Kavallerie Guenther von Pogrell)

209 Infantry Division
379 Land.Div. (z.b.V. 424)

XXXV (35) Hoh.Kdo.z.b.V.: (Lieutenant General Max Schenckendorff)

OFK “Warsau”
228 Infantry Division
213 Infantry Division
386 Land.Div.

Grenzabschnittkommando “Sud”: (General der Artillerie Wilhelm Ulex)

XXXIV (34) Hoh.Kdo.z.b.V.: (General der Infanterie Hermann Metz)

231 Infantry Division
239 Infantry Division
Kdtr. ”Krakau”
351 Land.Div.
358 Land.Div. (OFK 540)
425 z.b.V.Div.
365 Land.Div. (OFK “Tarnow”)

OKH RESERVES - Western Front

Armies:

Stab SECOND ARMY [AOK 2] (General der Kavallerie Maximilian von Weichs)

Corps:

Stab XVII (17) Armeekorps (General der Infanterie Werner Kienitz)
Stab XXXVIII (38) Armeekorps (Lieutenant General Erich von Manstein.)
Stab XXXXII (42) Armeekorps (General der PioniereWalter Kuntze)
Stab XXXXIII (43) Armeekorps (General der Artillerie Hermann Ritter von Speck)
Stab XXXXIV (44) Armeekorps (General der Infanterie Fritz Koch)

Divisions on Standby:

11 Infantry Brigade (mot.) (Released: 12.05.40)
SS “Verfugungs” Div. (mot.) (Released: 12.05.40)
10 Infantry Division (Released: 12.05.40)
46 Infantry Division (Released: 13.05.40)
57 Infantry Division (Released: 13.05.40)
217 Infantry Division (Released: 13.05.40)
44 Infantry Division (Released: 15.05.40)
SS “Totenkopf” Div. (mot.) (Released: 17.05.40)
22 Air Landing Div. (under Lw.control)
45 Infantry Division
50 Infantry Division
60 Infantry Division
72 Infantry Division
78 Infantry Division
86 Infantry Division
161 Infantry Division
162 Infantry Division
167 Infantry Division
169 Infantry Division
183 Infantry Division
205 Infantry Division
212 Infantry Division
221 Infantry Division
260 Infantry Division
290 Infantry Division
295 Infantry Division
299 Infantry Division

Divisions Forming at various Wehrkreise (sp!) thoughout Germany:

SS “Polizei” Div.
81 Infantry Division
82 Infantry Division
83 Infantry Division
88 Infantry Division
164 Infantry Division
168 Infantry Division
291 Infantry Division
292 Infantry Division
293 Infantry Division
294 Infantry Division
296 Infantry Division
297 Infantry Division
298 Infantry Division
395 Infantry Division
399 Infantry Division
 
1) Since every inch of German occupied Poland is within 375 miles of bases inside Germany itself, no case here.

Thats true.
But the aircraft have to fly to the front, bomb the Soviets and then fly back. Even under an optimal situation that only gives a range of around 190~ miles, which would cover most of German Poland, doesn't give much time for dogfighting, finding something worth bombing rather than going for the first target that can be found etc etc.
An effective range of about 150~ miles is probably about all your going to get, and from bases 'inside Germany' that doesn't cover large swathes of the Polish front, or atleast, not very well.

The Red Air Force is also being ignored. It seems just because much of it was destroyed on the ground in Barbarossa, it is permanently deleted in timelines. While I doubt it would accomplish much, it would more than serve to challenge the airspace, if by shere bulk rather than anything else.

2) Actually the majority of the Red Army was nowhere near the German border, a large majority if you include Asia and the Far East. And the odds of Germany not noticing troop movements on such a scale are non-existant. The odds of Hitler learning of millions of Soviet troops and vast quantities of material moving towards one small portion of Soviet borders and not planning accordingly are equally small.

And how the rest of Eastern Europe would respond to such developments only plays into Hitler's hands with new allies.

Now, given that the German units in the West could reach central Poland in less than three weeks ON FOOT...

Since almost 1 million went into Poland for the carve up, it would seem that the Soviets did have substantial forces in the West. Since there were approximately 3~ million there for Barbarossa it doesn't seem impossible that around 2 million could have been moved there if Stalin wanted to attack once Germany was engaged with France. The Soviets have approximately 6~ months to make this happen (November through to May)

Again, what can Germany do? He cannot just deploy a half to a third of his forces on the Soviet border because 'Stalin might attack'. 1.5~ million German soldiers are not going to defeat going on 3 million French, British and so on soldiers. The breakthrough that led to victory will probably not occur. If it doesn't occurs then the entire western front has changed. Assuming this status quo remains, the result is just slow starvation for Germany.

The other Eastern Europeans are quite frankly irrelevent. As is Japan. Romania and Finland are hardly going to commit suicide by declaring war on the USSR unless they have significant German support (and a real belief that Germany is going to win). They wouldn't declare war the moment the Soviets declared war upon Germany. A relatively small garrison would serve to keep them inline. The same goes for Japan. The Soviets have already given them a bloody nose and the only way Japan will ever be able to consolidate her gains is if the USSR is literally on her knees. The USSR going into Germany while Germany is distracted in the west certainly doesn't qualify.

So the Germans can move from the border to central Poland in three weeks. So thats what, 2 weeks to redeploy across Germany and another 3 to get to the border? A good 5~ weeks before the Soviets run into fresh forces beyond the approximate 600,000 can be relieved. Thats plenty of time.

3) Look, it's getting tedious when you keep repeating points which you have failed to establish in the first place, let alone those which are utterly wrong.

Fact: At no point in WWII did the Red Army, even in 1945, achieve anything resembling an advance rate of 200 miles per week.

The 200 miles per week was just by way of example. The Soviets couldn't go that fast. I freely state it. I don't however think that covering 200 miles in 3~ weeks, a rate of roughly 10 miles a day, is out of the question.

Fact: The skill level of the Red Army in 1939-40 shows that the ability to achieve overwhelming local superiority against even a small nation like Finland would, at best, take great time and preparation. You're presenting a level of skill which was simply not there.

The Finland front was very limited by geography, in a manner completely different to this invasion of Poland. The Mannerheim line for example covered only 100km. Difficult given such a small size to outflank or really use the Soviet numerical superiority. Even envelopment is challenging. The Vistula by comparrison covers 1000km. Finnish winter weather rendered vehicles unreliable at best, this was not the same as in Poland during spring. German lines of supply in Poland are not as good as they would be 200 miles to the west in Germany.

Fact: That the Red Army during the initial phases of Barbarossa was crippled by both the purges of the officer corps and the mindless obedience of the remaining officers to Stalin's bizarre whims. The German officer corps is neither purged nor mindless.

Yes it is true most of the current Soviet officers are inexperienced and reluctant to take the initiative. If they were going up against the full German army they would likely be massacred. They are not. Invading empty space is not challenging. Ordering suicidal attacks and relying on your 4:1 advantage of numbers and greater in terms of tanks/aircraft does not require a great strategic mind. If Stalin demands an attack, they will attack. In some areas there will likely be great failures, but not everywhere across the entire line.

Fact: The Germans were able to inflict such harm on a Red Army in 1941 with more and better equipment and whose officer corps had been given another year to recover says many things about the likely quality of the Red Army in 1940 and I might note the continuing failure of the Red Army to successfully overwhelm many pockets or kessels of German troops, even into 1944, and with much better than 3:1 odds casts question on any Soviet ability to overwhelm 600,000 German troops.

The officer corps hadn't really been given time to recover. I suppose another year or so of peace time training (if much actually occured) might be of some benefit, but the actual progress is likely to be minimal. The officers will learn more in Poland in the first few weeks of the war. The Soviets were largely incapable of closing German pockets because the Germans were very capable of relieving them. Prior to 1944 German Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions tended to go through Soviet lines with ease. In this situation there is no available relief for atleast a couple of weeks, possibly a month.

I would again say that by 1944, the Soviets were regularly surrounding German forces and destroying them in detail. Bagration saw the destruction of army group center. The attack from the Vistula to the Oder saw the almost total destruction of yet another German Army Group.

Fact: France at this point is already beaten. No Dutch or Belgian allies, no BEF, the best French units destroyed, the heart of French industry and iron and coal already lost, Paris under threat and resistance collapsing. If Germany leaves a mere 60 divisions to hold the line it is doubtful that any grand French counteroffensive will take place, although British will throw away several more desperately needed divisions in trying.

Which point? When is Stalin attacking in your version of events? If its very late May you are right. If its early May, say 15-20, then events are drastically changed. A week makes all the difference The BEF/Belgians and French forces have not yet been defeated. If fully half the German army is to be rushed to the east, they may well not be.

4) Help for the Germans in Poland is less than an hour away in terms of air support, days before the first reinforcing divisions arrive. The ability of the Red Army to encircle is indeed in question but the ability to advance on some vast front is equally doubtful. And if they surround the Germans with 3:1 odds there isn't anyone left to advance. If they surround at much below 2:1 odds then the troops advancing are likely to note the encirclement collapsing and German troops cutting them off from retreat.

A historically common German tactic, incidentally, to allow Soviet penetrations and then cut them off.

I think it will take a little more than an hour to fly planes from the Western front to the middle of Poland. A day atleast. As for days before reinforcing divisions arrive, are these just the 10 relief divisions already outlined to bulk up the German force to 600,000, or forces from France? I don't believe the Germans can move divisions from the French front all the way to central Poland in a matter of days, it will take atleast a couple of weeks.

So in your view German forces can be surrounded, cutting them off from supplies and then not only break out, but go into fresh Soviet divisions and cut them apart? I see. No wonder its easy to imagine 600,000 defeating 2,000,000.

Yes it was a common tactic to cut off Soviet breakthroughs. Its a very good tactic. A difficult one to effect when your outnumberd three to one. If the Germans concentrate their forces to ensure only a defficiency of 2:1 in local circumstances, they leave gaps which would just invite fresh Soviet breakthroughs.

5) Perhaps you could research the Polish transport net of the time and particularly the limited number of major crossing points over the Vistula, the only points suitable to supply an army, along with actual Soviet logisitical capabilities of the time? You would then understand why crossing portions of the Vistula without taking the few key crossing points means large bodies of Soviet infantry cut off from resupply and heavy firepower.

All I can say is that it didn't seem to stop them much (if at all) in 1945. Ofcourse they need to take the key crossing points, but you seem to imagine the Soviets line themselves up in ranks and just advance upon a few concentrated German defensive positions. The result is a nice massacre with 5-10 Soviets dead for every German. Yes they need to take these points, but there are more ways than just frontal attacks and even frontal attacks can be effective given an overwhelming local advantage in men and machines. The Germans have to hold every strong point along the line, the Soviets do not have to attack at every strong point. The Soviets would be more than capable of having a local advantage greater than 3:1, since they are the attacker.

6) To claim that a Red Army offensive facing heavy German resistance might be able to move faster over 200 miles than German units driving down their own highways and railroads in the face of no resistance over 350 miles...

I don't say that the Russians would be in Berlin by the time resistance gets there, merely that they would be threatening to be so. You seem to have them trapped on the Vistula or covering almost no ground at all.

As to numbers and equipment, the French alone, including trained and equipped reserves, enjoyed a substantial numerical advantage over the Germans and more tanks, arguably of higher quality. To be blunt:

Germany had more men on the western front. Not alot more, but she did. She did have fewer tanks and argueably they were worse.

BEFORE the offensive in the West was launched Soviet intervention would be of great value to France.

AFTER all her allies are wrecked, her best units lost, her industry shattered and her generals unable to field a defense line strong enough for the average German unit to notice, the most likely result is to further strengthen the conviction of many Frenchmen(and others) that a choice must be made between fascism and Stalin.

That may not hurt Hitler.

Time. Its not as if the attack is launched and its all over.
The German attack begins on the 10th of May.
By the 16th the Germans have overrun Sedan.
By the 21st they have broken through to the Sea.
By around the 25th the surrounded allied pocket is in a desperate situation, although evacuation occurs for around a week and it isn't closed untill June the 4th.

Now, as you can see there is a significant window here. If Stalin attacks at around the 15th-16th the Germans are cut in a bind. Yes they can punch through Allied lines (assuming no butterflies, which might be unwise), get their encirclement and then crush it, but all that will take two weeks. It will consume alot of ammunition, supplies and so on.

If on the otherhand Hitler demands divisions immediately drop everything and are rushed to the east, there may well not be a push to the sea. The BEF, Belgians etc have not been defeated. The French still have much of their motorized and armoured forces. The front has significantly changed and is not offering a 2:1 advantage in numbers to the allies, more so in regards to aircraft and tanks if those are being sent to the east as fast as possible.

Obviously if Stalin only attacks as the evacuation of Dunkirk is occuring, the scenario is quite different.
 

Redbeard

Banned
In my initial (and superficial) survey I could only identify 10 Divisions in the East with another 10 from OKH Reserve. That made me in doubt of who would prevail and I made it dependent on the launch time of the attack.

According to Whatsinaname's OoB in the post above the actual number of German Divisions immediately available in the east appear to have been double of that. That IMO makes it close to impossible for the 1940 Red Army to hope for any success. With 20+20 Divisions the Germans even have a chance of doing a Tannenberg - before the forces from France arrive.

It is my impression that the Luftwaffe's main effort was in the first week or two, and that considerable Luftwaffe forces thus could be shifted to the east without changing the general outcome of the campaign. It might even mean Dunkirk failing for the British, as Göring now can't offer to do the job and the Heer now has to finish it.

But as others have said, deploying the necessary Soviet force can't be kept secret for the Germans - will Hitler in that situation would launch an attack on France? Pre-May 1940 not even Hitler thought that a campign vs. France could be over in a few weeks.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
Also another thought, the Wehrkreise in the east where based on Corps commands(?) and would have a large number of instructors to form ad hock units (battle groups).

The Red Army as pointed out had not yet evolded into the powerful military force it would become and the German army in 1940 was at the top of is game. The German army would do what it is best at improvise units until more forces could be moved etc to the east.

These ad hock units would include police, SS and other units.

Poland would also provide a good buffer zone.

German AF recon would provide warning of an attack, but my question would be "how much warning?" If it is days then the german military will have time to start moving troops to the boarder etc and the boarder troops would be on alert.
 
Another point is that German supply lines would not only be relatively short, but also representing state-of-the-art militairy transportation. Hitler built his Autobahnen in the 30's in a west-east direction to prepare for his attack on the SU and now he could use them to defend the fatherland.

Soviet supply lines would run through central Poland with its....well....rather unfavourable roads. This is critically important, since advancing Soviet armys took horrendous losses in WWII even when fighting an exhausted German army.
 

hammo1j

Donor
On balance this seems workable with a POD that Stalin's purges of the Red Army do not occur. Wasn't there a some rumour that the purges were instigated on the misinformation of a German spy?

If Stalin invades before the UK gets kicked into the sea then it will be a 2 front war for Germany. Effectively we jump straight away to 1944. With a stronger Germany and weaker allies are we going to get a WWI scenario though?
 
I'm amazed that no-one has mentioned the economy. In 1940, Germany got massive shipments of cheap raw materials from the USSR. The Red Army isn't going to do well in Poland, for all the reasons in this thread, but the reduction of raw material inputs will be very serious for the Germans in the medium-to-long term.

If Hitler is smart (and in 1940, he's at least lucky a lot) he'll sign a very light peace with France - Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, demilitarized zone along Germany/Luxembourg/Belgium borders, immediate prisoner release (after asking the to join Charlemagne-equivalent), nothing else - and yell as loudy as possible that the Communists are coming to conquer Europe (true) and that everyone should join with Germany to throw them back (and can point to a stopped Soviet invasion as evidence that Germany's the best for the job). All the historical European Axis countries will join, there will be a lot more volunteers from neutrals than OTL, and France, Spain, and Yugoslavia may join against the USSR, too. Britain will continue the war, but can do almost nothing outside North Africa (which Hitler will have correctly identified as a sideshow in this TL). If Japan goes as historical, Germany will not DoW the USA, and the USA stays in the Pacific Theater only. If they attack the USSR, the USA never gets into the war at all, and is content with selling stuff to anyone who can get a ship to them.
 
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