I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that Crassus was probably the most powerful man in Rome at this time, and so his death here would have far-reaching implications on the strife that consumed the late Republic. I will outline what I think would be the biggest immediate consequences, although a good portion of this is speculation because Crassus' exact role in these events remains unclear.
1. Pompey's co-consul: The first and most immediate question is, who would be Pompey's co-consul in 70 BCE without Crassus? At this point, Pompey has not leveraged his military successes in a concentrated effort to form a political coalition (despite that he would now undoubtedly be one of the most powerful men in Rome). So, his co-consul would likely be an old scion of the senatorial order - Marcus Rex, Metellus Creticus, Gaius Piso, Servilius Vatia, or any other of the men who would be consuls in the following years IOTL. Whichever man would become Pompey's co-consul would have only one major piece of legislation to contend with. Pompey's main legislative accomplishment as consul was the restoration of the powers of veto to the plebeian tribunate and the reversal of Sulla's decision that tribunes could not go on to serve any other political office. This piece of legislation will have significant effects, as the events from 60-50 BCE would be greatly affected by the rise of powerful tribunes. For the sake of argument, let's say the law passes and tribunes are restored to their rightful place in the government (which was likely with or without Pompey, as any politician would be able to make a permanent name for himself and a strong political following by backing such a law).
2. Pompey's wars in the East: With the tribunes now placated, Pompey could count on their support to back his legislative agenda, which would have certainly included command in the Mithridatic War. Lucullus was already floundering here thanks to the machinations of his unruly subordinates. The eventual outcome of the war is in little doubt as the bulk of the fighting had already been undertaken by Lucullus and thus the resources left at the disposal of Pontus and Armenia could not be mustered with sufficient speed to counter the reinvigorated Roman assault. It would be here that Pompey would build his new political coalition, likely including many of the men whom had been opposed to his consulship - men like Vatia, Marcus Rex, and the various Metellus cousins. This coalition would also include the young Julius Caesar.
3. Caesar's rise stalled: It is entirely probable that Caesar may not have achieved the same heights in Rome without the patronage of Crassus. The showboating Caesar undertook in his early career, particularly during his term as aedile, put him into considerable debt, and so did his candidacy for pontifex maximus. Without Crassus, and while his patron was in Asia, Caesar would have little to do but wait idly for Pompey to return (or else accompany him to Asia and win honors in his own right).
4. Catiline and Cicero: It is suggested that Crassus was one of Catiline's principal backers, and so with him out of the picture, the conspiracy may not even come to significant fruition. Catiline himself was charged with extortion during his governorship of Africa by Clodius, and without his patron's bottomless pockets, it is likely that he would end up in exile. With the field cleared for the consulship of 63 BCE, Cicero would likely be a shoe-in, possibly accompanied by Lucius Cassius (who joined the conspiracy after his electoral loss to Cicero and Hybrida). Ironically, this would most probably harm Cicero's reputation in the long-term, as having a noble from an established family as his colleague (either Cassius, or some other patrician from the remnants of Sulla's coalition) would likely undermine his ambitions during his consulship. IOTL, Cicero used Catiline's conspiracy to springboard himself into the center of Rome's politics and the inertness of his co-consul certainly did not hurt this. Without a crisis to leverage into unheard-of political power, Cicero may simply become another senator among many, although an accomplished and respected orator, certainly not the most well-respected man in Rome and leader of the optimate faction.
5. Pompey's return: At the end of Pompey's term as the proconsul of Asia, he would return to Rome as quite possibly the wealthiest man in the world at that time. His allies in Rome would probably include Caesar, Cicero, Gaius Curio, the Metelli, and maybe even Clodius (who by this time would be a household name either from scandal or time spent in the law courts). His would be opposed most vocally by Cato, who was tribune for that year, and had already established himself as a stalwart conservative. Cato would likely form the nucleus of opposition to Pompey, accompanied by various illustrious names (probably Appius Claudius, Marcus Bibulus, the Pisones, and Domitius Ahenobarbus). At this point, Pompey would probably find himself stonewalled by the senate, who viewed him as a rabble-rouser with no respect for tradition. He would leverage his immense wealth to have his allies elected to praetorships and consulships. This would likely include his legates from the Mithridatic War first and foremost (Aulus Gabinius, Lucius Afranius, Metellus Celer, Marcus Scaurus, and others), who would attempt to repay their rewards of offices with support for Pompey's political aspirations (including probably land and debt relief for his soldiers).
6. Socio-political implications: A huge implication of this TL thus far is the unresolved issue of indebted plebeian veterans from the armies of Sulla, who had been settled in Italy without much further support apart from a small grant of land. This was the cause undertaken by Catiline IOTL, but without him as a political factor, and Pompey's inability to support his own veterans after his return from the East, there would be huge numbers of dispossessed veterans needing land and bailouts. This would likely become Pompey's cause. IOTL he leveraged a mutual friendship with Caesar to essentially bribe Crassus into allowing Pompey to accomplish this legislative agenda. Without the opposition of Crassus, this might be easier, as Crassus maintained a broad range of political ties IOTL. The elder political opponents of Pompey (Hortalus, Catulus, Lucullus, etc) will have gradually died off during this period, so his only opposition would crystalize around young rising politicians, who would themselves not serve as a sufficient political force to block these reforms. The implication of this is clear: Pompey did not need Caesar anymore. Without the mutual patronage of Crassus to leverage against Pompey, Caesar would probably be hung out to dry by his erstwhile ally to be consumed by his debtors and live the rest of his life in exile.
7. Consequences abroad: Assuming that the major foreign threat of the Helvetii and Suebi would translate over to TTL, Pompey's reaction to them would be of paramount importance. It is unlikely that he would take the governorship of Gaul for himself, and it would instead fall to one of his subordinates. Whether or not this man becomes realized with the same ambitions as Caesar is an open question, but one can be certain that without the ironclad support of both Pompey and another commanding presence (Crassus IOTL), this governor would certainly not rise to the heights to which Caesar did and the "Gallic Wars" would probably be just another in a long series of "just foreign wars", rather than the icon of classical history that they are ITOL. The threat of the Parthians also remains open. The Romans up to this point did not consider them a threat, and a big reason behind Crassus' untimely Parthian campaign was the disequilibrium that underlies the inner politics of the First Triumvirate. Ergo, without these developments, Parthia would likely be an inert threat at least until the 40s BCE. That leaves only one open question: the status of Egypt. The succession dispute there would allow Pompey to throw around his political weight to leverage a favorable deal for Rome, likely retaining Egypt as a stable client kingdom.
8. Long-term effects: Obviously, Pompey could not remain the dominant figure in Rome forever, and his star would fade as younger politicians rose in his advanced age. Among these men would be the sons of Crassus, Marc Antony, and a whole cohort of men who died prematurely IOTL because of Caesar's civil war. He would likely be eclipsed in his power (or die) by the early 30s BCE, whereafter his sons would carry on his political legacy. What this implies for the Republic itself is uncertain. A big destabilizing factor for the government IOTL was the independence of proconsular armies from the control of the central government, and I don't believe that Pompey would be visionary enough to have taken measures to counter this. I am skeptical of the idea that Caesar was unique in his ambitions and impact on history, and I would not be at all surprised if a populist politician in the same vein leverages a major conquest to wrest absolute control of the state. Whether or not this results in anything resembling the "Roman Empire" is impossible to say, but I am fairly confident that Rome would remain a major (if not the only) Mediterranean power for at least another century.
1. Pompey's co-consul: The first and most immediate question is, who would be Pompey's co-consul in 70 BCE without Crassus? At this point, Pompey has not leveraged his military successes in a concentrated effort to form a political coalition (despite that he would now undoubtedly be one of the most powerful men in Rome). So, his co-consul would likely be an old scion of the senatorial order - Marcus Rex, Metellus Creticus, Gaius Piso, Servilius Vatia, or any other of the men who would be consuls in the following years IOTL. Whichever man would become Pompey's co-consul would have only one major piece of legislation to contend with. Pompey's main legislative accomplishment as consul was the restoration of the powers of veto to the plebeian tribunate and the reversal of Sulla's decision that tribunes could not go on to serve any other political office. This piece of legislation will have significant effects, as the events from 60-50 BCE would be greatly affected by the rise of powerful tribunes. For the sake of argument, let's say the law passes and tribunes are restored to their rightful place in the government (which was likely with or without Pompey, as any politician would be able to make a permanent name for himself and a strong political following by backing such a law).
2. Pompey's wars in the East: With the tribunes now placated, Pompey could count on their support to back his legislative agenda, which would have certainly included command in the Mithridatic War. Lucullus was already floundering here thanks to the machinations of his unruly subordinates. The eventual outcome of the war is in little doubt as the bulk of the fighting had already been undertaken by Lucullus and thus the resources left at the disposal of Pontus and Armenia could not be mustered with sufficient speed to counter the reinvigorated Roman assault. It would be here that Pompey would build his new political coalition, likely including many of the men whom had been opposed to his consulship - men like Vatia, Marcus Rex, and the various Metellus cousins. This coalition would also include the young Julius Caesar.
3. Caesar's rise stalled: It is entirely probable that Caesar may not have achieved the same heights in Rome without the patronage of Crassus. The showboating Caesar undertook in his early career, particularly during his term as aedile, put him into considerable debt, and so did his candidacy for pontifex maximus. Without Crassus, and while his patron was in Asia, Caesar would have little to do but wait idly for Pompey to return (or else accompany him to Asia and win honors in his own right).
4. Catiline and Cicero: It is suggested that Crassus was one of Catiline's principal backers, and so with him out of the picture, the conspiracy may not even come to significant fruition. Catiline himself was charged with extortion during his governorship of Africa by Clodius, and without his patron's bottomless pockets, it is likely that he would end up in exile. With the field cleared for the consulship of 63 BCE, Cicero would likely be a shoe-in, possibly accompanied by Lucius Cassius (who joined the conspiracy after his electoral loss to Cicero and Hybrida). Ironically, this would most probably harm Cicero's reputation in the long-term, as having a noble from an established family as his colleague (either Cassius, or some other patrician from the remnants of Sulla's coalition) would likely undermine his ambitions during his consulship. IOTL, Cicero used Catiline's conspiracy to springboard himself into the center of Rome's politics and the inertness of his co-consul certainly did not hurt this. Without a crisis to leverage into unheard-of political power, Cicero may simply become another senator among many, although an accomplished and respected orator, certainly not the most well-respected man in Rome and leader of the optimate faction.
5. Pompey's return: At the end of Pompey's term as the proconsul of Asia, he would return to Rome as quite possibly the wealthiest man in the world at that time. His allies in Rome would probably include Caesar, Cicero, Gaius Curio, the Metelli, and maybe even Clodius (who by this time would be a household name either from scandal or time spent in the law courts). His would be opposed most vocally by Cato, who was tribune for that year, and had already established himself as a stalwart conservative. Cato would likely form the nucleus of opposition to Pompey, accompanied by various illustrious names (probably Appius Claudius, Marcus Bibulus, the Pisones, and Domitius Ahenobarbus). At this point, Pompey would probably find himself stonewalled by the senate, who viewed him as a rabble-rouser with no respect for tradition. He would leverage his immense wealth to have his allies elected to praetorships and consulships. This would likely include his legates from the Mithridatic War first and foremost (Aulus Gabinius, Lucius Afranius, Metellus Celer, Marcus Scaurus, and others), who would attempt to repay their rewards of offices with support for Pompey's political aspirations (including probably land and debt relief for his soldiers).
6. Socio-political implications: A huge implication of this TL thus far is the unresolved issue of indebted plebeian veterans from the armies of Sulla, who had been settled in Italy without much further support apart from a small grant of land. This was the cause undertaken by Catiline IOTL, but without him as a political factor, and Pompey's inability to support his own veterans after his return from the East, there would be huge numbers of dispossessed veterans needing land and bailouts. This would likely become Pompey's cause. IOTL he leveraged a mutual friendship with Caesar to essentially bribe Crassus into allowing Pompey to accomplish this legislative agenda. Without the opposition of Crassus, this might be easier, as Crassus maintained a broad range of political ties IOTL. The elder political opponents of Pompey (Hortalus, Catulus, Lucullus, etc) will have gradually died off during this period, so his only opposition would crystalize around young rising politicians, who would themselves not serve as a sufficient political force to block these reforms. The implication of this is clear: Pompey did not need Caesar anymore. Without the mutual patronage of Crassus to leverage against Pompey, Caesar would probably be hung out to dry by his erstwhile ally to be consumed by his debtors and live the rest of his life in exile.
7. Consequences abroad: Assuming that the major foreign threat of the Helvetii and Suebi would translate over to TTL, Pompey's reaction to them would be of paramount importance. It is unlikely that he would take the governorship of Gaul for himself, and it would instead fall to one of his subordinates. Whether or not this man becomes realized with the same ambitions as Caesar is an open question, but one can be certain that without the ironclad support of both Pompey and another commanding presence (Crassus IOTL), this governor would certainly not rise to the heights to which Caesar did and the "Gallic Wars" would probably be just another in a long series of "just foreign wars", rather than the icon of classical history that they are ITOL. The threat of the Parthians also remains open. The Romans up to this point did not consider them a threat, and a big reason behind Crassus' untimely Parthian campaign was the disequilibrium that underlies the inner politics of the First Triumvirate. Ergo, without these developments, Parthia would likely be an inert threat at least until the 40s BCE. That leaves only one open question: the status of Egypt. The succession dispute there would allow Pompey to throw around his political weight to leverage a favorable deal for Rome, likely retaining Egypt as a stable client kingdom.
8. Long-term effects: Obviously, Pompey could not remain the dominant figure in Rome forever, and his star would fade as younger politicians rose in his advanced age. Among these men would be the sons of Crassus, Marc Antony, and a whole cohort of men who died prematurely IOTL because of Caesar's civil war. He would likely be eclipsed in his power (or die) by the early 30s BCE, whereafter his sons would carry on his political legacy. What this implies for the Republic itself is uncertain. A big destabilizing factor for the government IOTL was the independence of proconsular armies from the control of the central government, and I don't believe that Pompey would be visionary enough to have taken measures to counter this. I am skeptical of the idea that Caesar was unique in his ambitions and impact on history, and I would not be at all surprised if a populist politician in the same vein leverages a major conquest to wrest absolute control of the state. Whether or not this results in anything resembling the "Roman Empire" is impossible to say, but I am fairly confident that Rome would remain a major (if not the only) Mediterranean power for at least another century.
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