1st off, to the OP and the question the OP reiterated, I think Cook had the best answer-
On Hawaii
Quote:
Originally Posted by Wendell View Post
Are we assuming that things regarding Hawaii go the same as in our timeline up until 1941?
Hawaii fell rather nicely into American hands and served as a proper buffer to the US. Even without a Spanish-American War to snatch the Philippines away I still see Hawaii following a similar course to OTL. It would be a territory still as we knew it to be. My question is what Japanese - American relations would be with a more isolationist America.
Given a more isolationist America due to no American Phillipinnes, then would the US interact with Japan enough for long enough time to develop economic ties for which the cutting of would mean an attack on America by Japan? I doubt it.
Although having the Spanish-American War did not hurt, there was an independent impetus for the US taking Hawaii by about the time it did. Longer term US involvement and settlement, greater proximity, etc. Plus there had been the Dole revolution. It would likely have occurred by about the same time with or without the S-A war.
A great source on this period is "Pacific Gibraltar"
http://www.pacificgibraltar.com/
It actually shows that Hawaii itself was a point of tension in US-Japanese relations......but in the 1890s rather than 1940s. And once the US made its intention & determination clear, the Japanese were not going to contest them, in Hawaii.
---I am not certain that the power of the China Lobby and US-China trade in general were very intimately tied with US possession of the Philippines in OTL. You could have had fairly similar US sentiments towards China by mid-century, even with no US territorial possessions west of Hawaii.
I think the Spanish Pacific would be a vast oceanic neutral zone if you used butterfly nets to get a similar WWII. Japan would be much less likely to attack the US for strategic reasons, even if there was mutual acrimony over China and sanctions. The big Spanish neutral zone is an advantage for the Japanese against the Allies, even if the US does come in or get dragged in to the Allied side, because it channels the potential allied lines of advance to the southwest Pacific, eastern Indian ocean, or northern Aleutians-Kuriles route.