WI: Soviets Do Not Invade Manchuria During World War II

They do it anyways. Stalin got western permission because it nicely helped legitimize his eastern conquests but ultimately he doesn't need it because he knew Japan was on it's knees, knew that the Red Army had become the most powerful ground force in the world, and knew that the USSR had vested territorial interests that the aforementioned power of the Red Army now put in his grasp. Possession is 9/10ths of the law, especially international law, and Stalin damn well knew it. That the US wanted the Soviets in was a bonus Stalin was willing to play for all it was worth but the entry of the USSR to the Pacific War, barring Japan suddenly coming to it's senses and surrendering early, was guaranteed the moment the hammer and sickle was hoisted over Berlin
 
What if the Soviet Union is not asked by the West to invade Manchuria and Korea in August 1945?

Stalin's going to want to do it, whether or not he's asked. It's going to be very hard for the other Allies to object.

There is a way out of it: The Bomb is ready a few weeks earlier, and when it is used Japan surrenders immediately - to the US, Britain, and China. The Japanese invite Chinese forces to occupy Manchuria before Stalin can act. Soviet forces cannot enter China against the objections of the Chinese government.
 
Japan doesn't surrender even after Nagasaki, if you believe certain people. :rolleyes:
That is possible. The Japanese had devoted all of their resources on the Home Islands to defending the south (especially Kyushu) against an American attack. They figured that they weren't at war with the Soviets and if the Soviets did attack they would face a bloody campaign against determined Japanese defenders. The quick victory Stalin got scared Japan, especially since they would have had territory occupied by the Soviets (which no one wanted) and they couldn't defend the north that well.

That is not to discount the role of the atomic bomb, which terrified Japan and gave them a good excuse to exit with some dignity. It's one of those things where both were needed to cause a surrender, at least one before more atomic bombs were dropped.
 
A Narrow N victory

Well this will greatly affect the Chinese civil war because the soviet occupation of Manchuria allowed the Chinese
Communist Party refuge from the Nationalist while regaining strength. Without the occupation, it would be plausible
that the National will make a slow and grueling campaign against the communist in Manchuria and the former
Japanese puppets.
 
That is possible. The Quick victory Stalin got scared Japan, .....[/QUOTe)

Might check dates there. IRCC the defeat in Manchuria was not yet apparent when the surrender decision came. The battles were still near the borders as the cabinet members understood. The Soviet DoW was a killer blow on its own. A nuetral USSR was a cornerstone for Japan's strategy. The DoW bankrupted their strategy, even without a Red Army attack.
 
Might check dates there. IRCC the defeat in Manchuria was not yet apparent when the surrender decision came. The battles were still near the borders as the cabinet members understood.

Uh... by the time the decision to surrender came down, the Soviets had already smashed Japanese defenses pretty much all along the line. 6th Guards Tank Army had already crossed the Khingan Mountain Ranges and lead elements were nearly 300 kilometers into Manchuria. Whether this was apparent in Tokyo is an open question, given the relative snails pace of communication and how the sheer speed of the Soviet advance confounded Japanese C2. But it's pretty clear that the Soviets had already pulverized most Japanese defenses and moved into full exploitation by the time the decision to surrender was made.
 
That is possible. The Japanese had devoted all of their resources on the Home Islands to defending the south (especially Kyushu) against an American attack. They figured that they weren't at war with the Soviets and if the Soviets did attack they would face a bloody campaign against determined Japanese defenders. The quick victory Stalin got scared Japan, especially since they would have had territory occupied by the Soviets (which no one wanted) and they couldn't defend the north that well.

That is not to discount the role of the atomic bomb, which terrified Japan and gave them a good excuse to exit with some dignity. It's one of those things where both were needed to cause a surrender, at least one before more atomic bombs were dropped.

surely the Japanese realised the Soviets were gonna jump in as they had declined to renew the non-agression pact in what, March or April 45?
 
surely the Japanese realised the Soviets were gonna jump in as they had declined to renew the non-agression pact in what, March or April 45?

There was a odd kind of denialism going on where the Japanese seemed to be aware on some level that the Soviets were probably going to come in yet were counting on the Soviets to act as mediators in negotiating with the US (which Stalin wasn't interested in one bit, although he did string the Japanese along to keep them in the war long enough that he could enter). There was alot of the Japanese deluding themselves that they still had so much to offer to the Japanese, yet when they floated such ideas with Soviet diplomats they mainly received bemused stares followed by deliberately noncommittal comments in response. There are interesting parallels here with Stalin's denialism in the run-up to Barbarossa.

It is really as bizarre and irrational as it sounds, but then bizarre and irrational is a description that rather neatly encapsulates the attitude of Japanese leadership up until August 1945.
 
I agree that there is no reason for Stalin not to invade. But assuming that somehow he doesn't, I still don't see why a US ground invasion will be necessary. Even if you think the first two atomic bombs were not enough to persuade the Japanese to surrender without Soviet entry into the war, it does not follow that a *third* one would not have done the trick...
 
Uh... by the time the decision to surrender came down, the Soviets had already smashed Japanese defenses pretty much all along the line. 6th Guards Tank Army had already crossed the Khingan Mountain Ranges and lead elements were nearly 300 kilometers into Manchuria. Whether this was apparent in Tokyo is an open question, given the relative snails pace of communication and how the sheer speed of the Soviet advance confounded Japanese C2. But it's pretty clear that the Soviets had already pulverized most Japanese defenses and moved into full exploitation by the time the decision to surrender was made.

However the Japanese strategy in Manchuria did not depend on defending the border "line". The Kawntung Army & related forces were to make their stand in central Manchuria around the interior industrial region. At the point of surrender it was not yet apparent that strategy was a non starter. Part of the problem was breakdown in communications between the border zone forces and the interior command. it was not understood the bulk of those forces were near or at the point of destruction & unable to retreat to the interior.

yes the reports reaching Tokyo were bad, but still inadaquate for showing the actual operational picture.

There was a odd kind of denialism going on where the Japanese seemed to be aware on some level that the Soviets were probably going to come in yet were counting on the Soviets to act as mediators in negotiating with the US (which Stalin wasn't interested in one bit, although he did string the Japanese along to keep them in the war long enough that he could enter). There was alot of the Japanese deluding themselves that they still had so much to offer to the Japanese, yet when they floated such ideas with Soviet diplomats they mainly received bemused stares followed by deliberately noncommittal comments in response. There are interesting parallels here with Stalin's denialism in the run-up to Barbarossa.

It is really as bizarre and irrational as it sounds, but then bizarre and irrational is a description that rather neatly encapsulates the attitude of Japanese leadership up until August 1945.

Yep from our PoV the "denialism" of Japans leaders is odd. I lived there two years in the 1980s & worked with JSDF officers, gaining some insight into how the Japanese 'think'. Also read a few histories of Japan written by scholars who actually went there & researched japanese sources. With some difficulty I can find some hints of rationality in their thinking. One thing that is clear to me is the warhawks still supporting resistance in August 1945 had been deluding themselves for so long they were incapable of accepting or giving critical thinking to the evidence at hand. Another key point I noticed is those advocating resistance were the Army generals & those associated with the Army. The Naval officers and 'civilians' like Prime Minister Suzuiki were those who leaned towards seeking peace. The predominance of Army associated men among warhawks gives some hints as to the sources rational behind policy.

... (which Stalin wasn't interested in one bit, although he did string the Japanese along to keep them in the war long enough that he could enter). There was alot of the Japanese deluding themselves that they still had so much to offer to the Japanese, yet when they floated such ideas with Soviet diplomats they mainly received bemused stares followed by deliberately noncommittal comments in response. There are interesting parallels here with Stalin's denialism in the run-up to Barbarossa.

....

Soviet deception doctrine was also at work there. The Soviet diplomats contributed with noncommital remarks that amoounted to 'I'll pass that along' or we'll think about it'. Their analysis suggested the Japanese leaders would misinterpret this & continue the policy of drawing down the forces in Manchuria for use elsewhere.
 
I agree that there is no reason for Stalin not to invade. But assuming that somehow he doesn't, I still don't see why a US ground invasion will be necessary. Even if you think the first two atomic bombs were not enough to persuade the Japanese to surrender without Soviet entry into the war, it does not follow that a *third* one would not have done the trick...

The 'Third' bomb was the Agricultural Report on the harvest of 1945. the numbers came together in June/July & even before the full analysis & report were distributed it was clear Foos supplies would drop below starvation level for the entire population. During 1945 the eldery, insane, seriously ill, & other unproductive residents were eliminated from the food ration rolls. They were already starving to death of what their families or others were attempting to share. Even regular army soldiers were on reduced rations in August of 1945. Allied POW in Japan were starvation rations even tho they were usually working at war critical tasks.

I cant recall the number of calories percapital predicted for Dec 1945 was, tho the figure of 800 calories per day comes to mind.

As for atomic bombs: Sources like Rhoades 'the Making of the Atomic Bomb' state clearly there was another Plutonium core enroute to Tinian when the surrender came and Plutonium being shaped for two more, with production of Plutonium and shping of the same for a minimum of two more by December 1945. So, five more atomic bombs in four months, plus whatever the USAAF might accomplish with conventional attacks, plus the USN raids...

Without Soviet intervention Japan might have not come to surrender for several more weeks or even months, but a invasion was uncessary.
 
Look up a copy of Colonel Yaharas book on the battle of Okinawa. Yahara was the operations officer for the japanese army defending Okinawa. When the end came he was ordered by the army commander to escape & report to the home army in Japan. He survived & his observations on the battle are extremley interesting.

Some of the pointshe makes on the closing stage of the battle or campaign contradict the popular view of Japanese resistance.

1. The militia of Japanese citizen formed to supplement the Army was near useless. They seldom actualy fought the US ground forces, When they did they inflicted little damage, they failed to fight in any significant numbers in the last days & more or less disappeared.

2. The regular army soldiers failed to fight to the last man, & failed to commit suicide in large numbers. I dont have either US or Yaharas exact numbers at hand but Okinawa represented the first Pacific island battle where more than 1% of the Japanese soldiers survived. Yahara described how in the last week as the infantry battalions faded to platoon strength the 20,000 odd support troops of artillery, engineers supply, units evaded going forward to join the infantry. A lot of those did commit suicide but it appears a very large number either surrndered to the US mop up forces, or drifted around for weeks disguised as Japanese & Okinawan civilians.

3. Unlike Guam or other isolated islands only small numbers of Japanese civilians resisted or sought death. This is excluding the Okinawan natives & only counts 'Japanese' settlers on the island.

Yaharas testimony has a tiny bit of collaboration by a friend of mine Earl Kehrberg. Kerhberg was a radar tech with the Marine air wing & ashore at the end of the Okinawa battle. He described how as few days after the battle offcially ended a pair of Japanese soldiers appeared in the breakfast line hoping to be fed and not shot. Interrogation revealed they had been in the camp since dusk the previous evening and watched the movie screened near the mess tent.

Basic point here is the relatively large number of Japanese giving up as the battle faded out suggests fanatical resistance was not universal and morale was declining.
 
If the soviets break their part of the deal and don't invade then there is a good chance that there will be a unified korea.
 
Top