redlightning
Banned
What if the Soviet Union is not asked by the West to invade Manchuria and Korea in August 1945?
What if the Soviet Union is not asked by the West to invade Manchuria and Korea in August 1945?
That is possible. The Japanese had devoted all of their resources on the Home Islands to defending the south (especially Kyushu) against an American attack. They figured that they weren't at war with the Soviets and if the Soviets did attack they would face a bloody campaign against determined Japanese defenders. The quick victory Stalin got scared Japan, especially since they would have had territory occupied by the Soviets (which no one wanted) and they couldn't defend the north that well.Japan doesn't surrender even after Nagasaki, if you believe certain people.![]()
Japan doesn't surrender even after Nagasaki, if you believe certain people.![]()
That is possible. The Quick victory Stalin got scared Japan, .....[/QUOTe)
Might check dates there. IRCC the defeat in Manchuria was not yet apparent when the surrender decision came. The battles were still near the borders as the cabinet members understood. The Soviet DoW was a killer blow on its own. A nuetral USSR was a cornerstone for Japan's strategy. The DoW bankrupted their strategy, even without a Red Army attack.
Might check dates there. IRCC the defeat in Manchuria was not yet apparent when the surrender decision came. The battles were still near the borders as the cabinet members understood.
That is possible. The Japanese had devoted all of their resources on the Home Islands to defending the south (especially Kyushu) against an American attack. They figured that they weren't at war with the Soviets and if the Soviets did attack they would face a bloody campaign against determined Japanese defenders. The quick victory Stalin got scared Japan, especially since they would have had territory occupied by the Soviets (which no one wanted) and they couldn't defend the north that well.
That is not to discount the role of the atomic bomb, which terrified Japan and gave them a good excuse to exit with some dignity. It's one of those things where both were needed to cause a surrender, at least one before more atomic bombs were dropped.
surely the Japanese realised the Soviets were gonna jump in as they had declined to renew the non-agression pact in what, March or April 45?
Uh... by the time the decision to surrender came down, the Soviets had already smashed Japanese defenses pretty much all along the line. 6th Guards Tank Army had already crossed the Khingan Mountain Ranges and lead elements were nearly 300 kilometers into Manchuria. Whether this was apparent in Tokyo is an open question, given the relative snails pace of communication and how the sheer speed of the Soviet advance confounded Japanese C2. But it's pretty clear that the Soviets had already pulverized most Japanese defenses and moved into full exploitation by the time the decision to surrender was made.
There was a odd kind of denialism going on where the Japanese seemed to be aware on some level that the Soviets were probably going to come in yet were counting on the Soviets to act as mediators in negotiating with the US (which Stalin wasn't interested in one bit, although he did string the Japanese along to keep them in the war long enough that he could enter). There was alot of the Japanese deluding themselves that they still had so much to offer to the Japanese, yet when they floated such ideas with Soviet diplomats they mainly received bemused stares followed by deliberately noncommittal comments in response. There are interesting parallels here with Stalin's denialism in the run-up to Barbarossa.
It is really as bizarre and irrational as it sounds, but then bizarre and irrational is a description that rather neatly encapsulates the attitude of Japanese leadership up until August 1945.
... (which Stalin wasn't interested in one bit, although he did string the Japanese along to keep them in the war long enough that he could enter). There was alot of the Japanese deluding themselves that they still had so much to offer to the Japanese, yet when they floated such ideas with Soviet diplomats they mainly received bemused stares followed by deliberately noncommittal comments in response. There are interesting parallels here with Stalin's denialism in the run-up to Barbarossa.
....
I agree that there is no reason for Stalin not to invade. But assuming that somehow he doesn't, I still don't see why a US ground invasion will be necessary. Even if you think the first two atomic bombs were not enough to persuade the Japanese to surrender without Soviet entry into the war, it does not follow that a *third* one would not have done the trick...