WI: Soviets Attacked the Berlin Airlift?

What would be the consequences if the Soviet Union attempted to or succeeded in shooting down the planes during the Berlin Airlift? How would the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond?
 

A. Danov

Banned
At the time, the Soviets barely had a nuclear program, and almost no ability to deliver them. So if they did as you said?

Say goodbye to Moscow, Minsk, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Vladivostok, etc
 
Neither Truman nor Stalin wanted a war. Though there were numerous incidents of Soviet planes harassing American ones, I don't think the Soviets would've intentionally done this.

However, there is always the possibility of an accident. I think Stalin would try to defuse things, but I could also see a series of accidents, miscommunication and brinkmanship escalating to war.

The US had a small conventional army, a very small nuclear inventory, few nuclear bombers, little intelligence on Soviet defense and on Soviet targets, poorly trained crews, no bases in Europe ready to launch nukes and no realistic war plan. If the war drags on for a couple years, then these problems could be overcome, but victory would not be easy for the US.
 
The US had a small conventional army, a very small nuclear inventory, few nuclear bombers, little intelligence on Soviet defense and on Soviet targets, poorly trained crews, no bases in Europe ready to launch nukes and no realistic war plan. If the war drags on for a couple years, then these problems could be overcome, but victory would not be easy for the US.

Assembly buildings and bomb loading pits were in place in a couple of the East Anglia Bases that SAC Squadrons were rotating thru in 1947.

The USSR early warning network was of an insufficient numbers of left over L-L radars, and the domestic P-3 'Dumbo' VHF set, little different from the early war UK Chain Home sets. Still used A Scope Display, and manual rotation for Azimuth.
They also had their own RUS-2 that in many ways, even worse.

During the War,It was mostly adequate against the pathetic Luftwaffe Strategic effort. Against LeMay and the SAC he was whipping into shape?

Not so easy, even given that the nadir of SAC was better than what the best of what the Luftwaffe dreamed of being able to do. Conventionally, B-29s can wreck a good sized metro area with one raid
 
SAC was nowhere near what it would become and comparisons to VIII or XX Air Force of WW2 are laughable.
In 1948 the scientists still had to hold the militaries hand as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.
 
SAC was nowhere near what it would become and comparisons to VIII or XX Air Force of WW2 are laughable.
In 1948 the scientists still had to hold the militaries hand as far as nuclear weapons are concerned.
True but I expect the scientists could have assembled a modest number of functional bombs under "war emergency" conditions. Given "war emergency" conditions I expect the USAF (and perhaps the USN ?) could have found crews and air craft to deliver them given a reasonable notice period. IMHO a night time mission to deliver them would have had a reasonable probability of success.
 
What would be the consequences if the Soviet Union attempted to or succeeded in shooting down the planes during the Berlin Airlift? How would the United States, United Kingdom, and France respond?

This would actually be going against Stalin's whole strategy:

"Contrary to popular belief, the purpose of the Berlin crisis was to reverse political decisions already taken by the Western powers, not to force the Western garrisons out of Berlin--although the latter was a long-term Soviet goal. Stalin hoped that failure in Berlin would humiliate the Western powers and force them and the Berliners to accept Soviet aid and Soviet terms. It is clear that the Soviet leader did not want war with the United States. He was committed to attaining his goals using every method available short of an action that would provoke the Western powers." https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a433271.pdf

Besides not wanting war, the other reason Stalin would be very unlikely to do this is that for a long time neither he nor the West thought that Berlin could in fact be supplied by an airlift. The airlift had been instituted as a stopgap measure--to buy time for the West "to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis posed by the Soviet blockade. It enabled them to negotiate without either the need to give in at some point to Soviet pressure, or to escalate the situation beyond control.... [N]o one including Bevin and Clay, planned for the airlift or foresaw that it could become that expedient. It was a logical device implemented by military leaders in Germany as an immediate response to the situation. Clay had used it on a limited scale during the April crisis, and he resorted to it again in June almost as a reflex action...Finally, and most important of all, the airlift fitted into the prevailing written and unwritten ground rules already established through previous interaction with the Soviets in Germany. Tacit agreement to act within those ground rules was all important: it prevented the situation from escalating into something neither side wanted--a war in Europe." Ibid.

A more plausible (though still unlikely) way for the situation to lead to war would be by trying to send an armed convoy via the Autobahn to break the blockade, as Clay and Robert Murphy recommended: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...in-blockade-was-enacted.454005/#post-17746025
 
This would actually be going against Stalin's whole strategy:

"Contrary to popular belief, the purpose of the Berlin crisis was to reverse political decisions already taken by the Western powers, not to force the Western garrisons out of Berlin--although the latter was a long-term Soviet goal. Stalin hoped that failure in Berlin would humiliate the Western powers and force them and the Berliners to accept Soviet aid and Soviet terms. It is clear that the Soviet leader did not want war with the United States. He was committed to attaining his goals using every method available short of an action that would provoke the Western powers." https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a433271.pdf

Besides not wanting war, the other reason Stalin would be very unlikely to do this is that for a long time neither he nor the West thought that Berlin could in fact be supplied by an airlift. The airlift had been instituted as a stopgap measure--to buy time for the West "to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis posed by the Soviet blockade. It enabled them to negotiate without either the need to give in at some point to Soviet pressure, or to escalate the situation beyond control.... [N]o one including Bevin and Clay, planned for the airlift or foresaw that it could become that expedient. It was a logical device implemented by military leaders in Germany as an immediate response to the situation. Clay had used it on a limited scale during the April crisis, and he resorted to it again in June almost as a reflex action...Finally, and most important of all, the airlift fitted into the prevailing written and unwritten ground rules already established through previous interaction with the Soviets in Germany. Tacit agreement to act within those ground rules was all important: it prevented the situation from escalating into something neither side wanted--a war in Europe." Ibid.

A more plausible (though still unlikely) way for the situation to lead to war would be by trying to send an armed convoy via the Autobahn to break the blockade, as Clay and Robert Murphy recommended: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...in-blockade-was-enacted.454005/#post-17746025
Your comment about the apparent skepticism about the long term viability of the air lift is interesting to me. The successful outcome implies to me that the ability of the west to improvise under emergency conditions may have been higher than was assumed at the time.
 
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