By 1942, it's a bit of a moot point really- I assume you mean 1941.
It's a while now, but the name to look for is Dmitri Volkogonov, the former head of the Red Army Historical Branch, who had this argument in print with Suvorov/Rezun in the late nineties;
Volkogonov's points were that in the prevailing political climate, to speak truth to power was essentially suicidal. Planning for defence was something that was worth your life to be caught doing.
The only ideologically acceptable defence measure for the vanguard of Communism was immediate, aggressive counterattack, spoiling attacks, break up the enemy offensive. And if anybody in the Red Army remembered the french Plan XVII, they kept very quiet.
These counterattack plans were largely wishful thinking and party line blather, nobody really wanting to stick their head far enough up to have it chopped off- unrealistic but nobody wanting to admit it.
Historically, the best way to fight the Russians, when they are at their weakest, is when they have to fight an away match; when they have to come to you, and all sorts of logistic and political-command things can go wrong.
Think about the Crimea, the Russo-Japanese War, Tannenberg, the early Napoleonic wars up to Eylau; off home ground, without General Winter, not such a good record, is it?
Attacking, with the Red Army in the state it was in, would probably have been even more disastrous than the opening stages of Barbarossa as it played out; less loss of territory, less dislocation of production, but even greater casualties and much less left to reorganise with and hold back the Wehrmacht.
Could be a German victory here. Hm.