WI Soviet-Japanese War in 1939

Deleted member 1487

There is some substance to this argument: the 23rd Division at Nomonhan was by far the greenest outfit in the Kwantung Army. It was widely derided and had hand-me down equipment. The Soviets meanwhile demonstrated that owing to their nominally defensive stance in the Far East they needed a considerable period of time to gather the resources necessary to push a beefed-up corps a relatively short distance across an open plain, not like the thousands of empty kilometers of the Manchurian heartland.

The problem is, as of February 1939 (a couple of months before Nomonhan) the entire Japanese Army in Manchuria numbered 359,000 people, 1,052 field guns, 585 tanks, and 355 aircraft. Korea contributed another 60,000 men, 264 field guns, 34 tanks, and 90 aircraft to this total. Against them the Soviets had thousands of tanks and planes, with probably twice the number of men. Although any offensive would obviously proceed relatively slowly the force ratio at this time is not in favor of Japan. Still, reconsidering this I partially retract my above statement: the Japanese probably could have held onto the industrialized areas in central and southern Manchuria with the forces on hand, but still given the USSR's warmaking potential and the fact that Japan hadn't yet fully mobilized Stalin could probably still strong-arm some concessions out of them the way he later did with Finland.
I don't disagree that the Japanese were very weak given a potential Soviet invasion. The question is how much the Soviets could project across the border into Manchuria where the rail gauge was probably different (don't know for sure) with a similar 5:1 advantage at Khalkin Gol to get similar results and push the Kwangtung army back into Korea. I highly doubt the 1939 Soviet military writ large was anywhere near as capable as the Khalkhin Gol forces. They were able to project a couple hundred miles, but Manchuria is much larger than that. The Soviets just didn't have the logistics to push the Japanese out of Manchuria and I strongly question how much their tank and aircraft force in the Far East was operational. They might be able to project a fraction of their overall strength across the border, which wouldn't be enough to budge the Kwangtung army. Now the Soviets were formidable on the defense when they weren't having to project on foreign soil, but their 1939 major war record was not stellar in Poland or Finland. Any conflict in Manchuria was drag out, be very bloody, and compromise Soviet security in Europe badly. That's not to mention what happens with Poland, Finland, and the occupation of the Baltics/Romania in 1940.

I'd agree that Soviet productive potential is quite high, but at the same time how much could be projected along the Trans-Siberian RR over 6000 miles? Vladivostok would be blockaded by the IJN. The US would probably give Japan a lot of leeway given that they weren't all that happy with the USSR either. Japan would go to fully mobilization and though they'd prefer to not have to fight a two front war, would probably due to 'honor' have to fight it out and reclaim their pre-war borders.

In fact a major war with Japan in 1939 and on is probably the best thing Germany could possibly hope for for 1941.
 
No in fact you didn't as Bob pointed out to you. Here is what you wrote:

Since you were talking just about the 10 day August engagement the numbers you presented for Japanese losses were incorrect, they were the entire border battle losses going by your argument above.

Too bad that is all wrong. My numbers for the Japanesevare from Coox's detailed casualty report for the 23rd division on page 1124 of "Nomonhan," and the 20th through 30 are the dates it covered in his tables. My numbers from the Soviets are from the Soviet archives.

The reason they were able to was because they had priority to do so, while the Japanese government was deescalating the conflict.

The Japanese government was not in control of the immediate military situation at the time. The Kwangtung Army was and they were doing their damnedst to ensure those two divisions all got all the logistical and air support they needed. Their problem was that their damnedst was not remotely enough.

So the entire point then is the Nomonhan engagement was not representative of what a full on war would look like, because it was a special circumstance where the Soviets pulled in their best units to beat up on one isolated, inexperienced, poorly supplied Japanese division and they could mass their full offensive force against it.

More unsupported nonsense, let's see what the actual scholars said...

"Soviet truck usage [at Nomonhan] dwarfed IJA capabilities and thinking at the time; the Japanese regarded 100 kilometers as "far" and 200 trucks as "many." To sustain one day of Japanese operations at Nomonhan necessitated the logistical equivalent of 320 truckloads operating across the less than 200 kilometers from Hailar. From the Trans-Baikal District, the Russians would need at least 1,300 daily truckloads. Since the Soviet command achieved its full and sustained buildup, however, IJA military observers have become convinced with the benefit of hindsight that the Russians may actually be understating the case when they say they used "only" about 4,000 trucks. . . In any event, IJA intelligence experts remain awed to this day by the amount of men and materiel moved so ruthlessly." [Coox, p.580]

"Japanese operations officers, obsessed with battle, tended to regard logistics as a bore, in part because logisticians were cautious and deliberate by nature and not cast in the glamorous mould of the saber-wielding warrior. "Logistics follows operations," an IJA saying went; the logistical annexes of operational plans were chronically thin. At least until the Kantokuen buildup of 1941, the Kwangtung Army was seriously deficient in logistical underpinning, most notably with respect to ammunition supply and organic motorization. As in the case of tanks, the Japanese thought in terms of dozens of trucks (including commandeering vehicles), whereas the Russians deployed hundreds and thousands in their tables of organization and equipment. The 200km march by the 23rd Division's infantry regiments from Hailar to Chiangchunmaio in late July 1939 attested to the stamina of the Japanese foot soldier but did not bring the troops in fresh condition to the gruelling battles on the plains in early July. Only Sumi's 26th Infantry [Regiment], which was intended to constitute a motorized reserve, was finally put upon scraped-together trucks near the front; but even that limited capability was soon lost, for no Japanese motorized units could get across the one feeble pontoon bridge that was thrown across the Halha for the offensive into Outer Mongolia." [Coox, p.1086]

Oh look, they say that the Soviets have a gross superiority in logistics both quantitatively (how many trucks they had) and qualitatively (how the trucks they did have were used) and that Khalkin Ghol demonstrated those advantages. Just like I was.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Too bad that is all wrong. My numbers are from Coox's detailed casualty report for the 23rd division on page 1124 of "Nomonhan," and the 20th through 30 are the dates it covered in his tables.
Then address what Bob wrote:
The "border war" was a series of battles fought between 1938 and 1939, the largest being Khalkhin Gol and Lake Khasan. The corresponding Soviet and Japanese casualties for Khalkhin Gol alone would be about 28,000 and 20,000 respectively.


You posted Coox's figures for the entire battle. He notes earlier that Japanese casualties (killed and wounded) prior to the Soviet offensive in August numbered about 7,200. Zhukov stated that during the August offensive there were 1,570 killed, 131 missing, and 7,583 wounded (no sick are mentioned)- a total of 9,284. Japanese casualties (killed and wounded, excluding sick) over the course of the whole battle were 7,696 killed, 8,647 wounded, and 1,021 missing. With 7,200+ of these already incurred prior to August the number of casualties the 6th Army suffered numbered no more than 10,000 or so, about equal to the Soviet total.

In other words, even at the point where the Soviets enjoyed their greatest success they only just broke even in terms of casualty ratio- for the rest of the battle the Japanese were inflicting losses at a rate of 2.6 to 1.



The Japanese government was not in control of the immediate military situation at the time. The Kwangtung Army was and they were doing their damnedst to ensure those two divisions all got all the logistical and air support they needed.
They were telling Moscow that they didn't want escalation. Stalin then felt comfortable to allow Zhukov to pull forces in from all over to conduct the attack because he knew that Tokyo was not authorizing an expansion of the conflict and Soviet forces wouldn't face a major attack anywhere else on the line. And no the Kwangtung army gave the 23rd division low supply priority, forbid bombing Soviet airfields, and was reorganizing the 6th army.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#June:_Escalation
On 27 June, the Japanese Army Air Force's 2nd Air Brigade struck the Soviet air base at Tamsak-Bulak in Mongolia. The Japanese won this engagement, but the strike had been ordered by the Kwantung Army without getting permission from Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) headquarters in Tokyo. In an effort to prevent the incident from escalating,[27] Tokyo promptly ordered the JAAF not to conduct any more air strikes against Soviet airbases.[28]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#August:_Soviet_counterattack
With war apparently imminent in Europe, Zhukov planned a major offensive on 20 August to clear the Japanese from the Khalkhin Gol region and end the fighting.[40] Zhukov, using a fleet of at least 4,000 trucks (IJA officers with hindsight dispute this, saying he instead used 10,000 to 20,000 motor vehicles) transporting supplies from the nearest base in Chita (600 kilometres away)[8] assembled a powerful armoured force of three tank brigades (the 4th, 6th and 11th), and two mechanized brigades (the 7th and 8th, which were armoured car units with attached infantry support). This force was allocated to the Soviet left and right wings. The entire Soviet force consisted of three rifle divisions, two tank divisions and two more tank brigades (in all, some 498 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks[41]), two motorized infantry divisions, and over 550 fighters and bombers.[42] The Mongolians committed two cavalry divisions.[43][44][45]

In comparison, at the point of contact the Kwantung Army had only General Komatsubara's 23rd Infantry Division, which with various attached forces was equivalent to two light infantry divisions. Its headquarters had been at Hailar, over 150 km (93 mi) from the fighting. Japanese intelligence, despite demonstrating an ability to accurately track the build-up of Zhukov's force, failed to precipitate an appropriate response from below.[46] Thus, when the Soviets finally did launch their offensive, Komatsubara was caught off guard.[46][47] To test the Japanese defences prior to their main assault on the 20th, the Soviets launched three aggressive probing assaults, one on the 3rd and the others on the 7/8th. All three were disastrously thrown back, with around 1,000 combined dead and several tanks knocked out on the Soviet side compared to just 85 Japanese casualties.[48] Moreover, the Japanese counter-attacked and routed elements of the Mongolian 8th Cavalry Division, seizing a hilly sector of the battlefront.[49] Despite the fact that no more major fighting would take place until the 20th, Japanese casualties continued to mount at a rate of 40 wounded per day.[50] Kwantung Army staff officers were becoming increasingly worried over the disorganized state of the 6th Army's headquarters and supply elements. In addition, the growing casualty count meant that the already green 23rd Division would have to take train and assimilate new replacements 'on the job.'[51] By contrast, Tokyo's oft-stated desire that it would not escalate the fighting at Khalkhin-Gol proved immensely relieving to the Soviets, who were free to hand-pick select units from across their entire military to be concentrated for a local offensive without fear of Japanese retaliation elsewhere.[52]
52) Coox, pgs. 573-574

More unsupported nonsense, let's see what the actual scholars said...

"Soviet truck usage [at Nomonhan] dwarfed IJA capabilities and thinking at the time; the Japanese regarded 100 kilometers as "far" and 200 trucks as "many." To sustain one day of Japanese operations at Nomonhan necessitated the logistical equivalent of 320 truckloads operating across the less than 200 kilometers from Hailar. From the Trans-Baikal District, the Russians would need at least 1,300 daily truckloads. Since the Soviet command achieved its full and sustained buildup, however, IJA military observers have become convinced with the benefit of hindsight that the Russians may actually be understating the case when they say they used "only" about 4,000 trucks. . . In any event, IJA intelligence experts remain awed to this day by the amount of men and materiel moved so ruthlessly." [Coox, p.580]

"Japanese operations officers, obsessed with battle, tended to regard logistics as a bore, in part because logisticians were cautious and deliberate by nature and not cast in the glamorous mould of the saber-wielding warrior. "Logistics follows operations," an IJA saying went; the logistical annexes of operationalplans were chronically thin. At least until the Kantokuen buildup of 1941, the Kwangtung Army was seriously deficient in logistical underpinning, most notably with respect to ammunition supply and organic motorization. As in the case of tanks, the Japanese thought in terms of dozens of trucks (including commandeering vehicles), whereas the Russians deployed hundreds and thousands in their tables of organization and equipment. The 200km march by the 23rd Division's infantry regiments from Hailar to Chiangchunmaio in late July 1939 attested to the stamina of the Japanese foot soldier but did not bring the troops in fresh condition to the gruelling battles on the plains in early July. Only Sumi's 26th Infantry [Regiment], which was intended to constitute a motorized reserve, was finally put upon scraped-together trucks near the front; but even that limited capability was soon lost, for no Japanese motorized units could get across the one feeble pontoon bridge that was thrown across the Halha for the offensive into Outer Mongolia." [Coox, p.1086]

Oh look, they say that the Soviets have a gross superiority in logistics and that Khalkin Ghol demonstrated those advantages. Just like I was.
Okay all this only confirms what I said that the Soviets stripped out trucks from everywhere they could to achieve localized superiority for the mission. They concentrate everything for this one action and therefore couldn't do that same for a full invasion of Manchuria, as they were only able to get this concentration to support a single attack force that was only able to get 1:1 loss rates against a force 1/5th its size, inexperienced, out of supply/command, and effectively unsupported.

That would be a radically different situation than if the Japanese were attacked and fighting on their own turf without the need to rely on truck transport over 200 miles. The Soviets were only able to pull their truck transport off by pulling in trucks from elsewhere. Their TOE might have been to have a bunch of trucks in their divisions, but as 1941 demonstrated they did not. Plus in 1939 the Soviets need as much as they can pull in for Poland and Finland, while 1940 requires what they had for the occupations of the Baltic states and part of Romania. All the while keeping a reserve for dealing with the Germans. So for the Soviets to fight a major war in Manchuria in 1940 they couldn't do what they did on a large scale because of the demands in Europe and the huge distances and lack of living up to TOE all over their force structure. They could mobilize and go to full war with Japan, all the while keeping up with their activities in Europe, but would frighten the British for sure and weaken their economic build up going forward. And in the invasion of Manchuria its quite a different thing to fight an enemy falling back on rail supply while you have to rely on truck supply and a 6000 mile, one way, rail supply route.
 
Then address what Bob wrote:

I just did. Bob claims that Coox's numbers were for all the battles, I specifically replied that no, Coox makes perfectly clear that the number of 8,632 Japanese killed and 9,050 wounded is for the dates I said they were: August 20-30. Similarly, the Soviet casualties were were 1,570 killed, 131 missing, and 7,583 wounded, a total of 9.,824. That is when the Soviets launched their decisive offensive that decided the entire border war and when they enjoyed their greatest success. It is also pretty much what a microcosm of what a Soviet attack into Manchuria would look like.

They were telling Moscow that they didn't want escalation.

Irrelevant. Tokyo wasn't in full control of the Kwangtung Army yet and the Kwangtung Army was doing it's damnedest to escalate.

And no the Kwangtung army gave the 23rd division low supply priority, forbid bombing Soviet airfields, and was reorganizing the 6th army.

No, the Kwangtung Army did give the 23rd division supply priority and air support. In doing so, they were directly disobeying their orders from Tokyo but then that was nothing new. Nothing you have posted contradicts that. At most, it said that Tokyo responded by issuing an order forbidding the Kwangtung Army from conducting further air missions against the Soviets. It does not say the Kwangtung army obeyed those orders. It similarly undermines your positing that the Soviets were able to strip other parts of the front without fear of counter-attack. Indeed, the Kwangtung armies response to the disaster at Nomonhon in early-September was to launch a number of counterattacks, which failed. It wasn't until some general staff officers flew in directly from Tokyo with direct Imperial sanction to personally shut the Kwangtung Army's shit down did everything settle.

Okay all this only confirms what I said that the Soviets stripped out trucks from everywhere they could to achieve localized superiority for the mission.

Nowhere in that extensive quote does it say that. Once again you are making things up.

That would be a radically different situation than if the Japanese were attacked and fighting on their own turf without the need to rely on truck transport over 200 miles.

Which was much smaller then the distance the Soviets had to transport from Trans-Baikal. Essentially, the Soviets at Khalkin Ghol demonstrated the ability to logistically outmatch the Japanese when the latter was much closer to their supply sources then the former. They supported larger forces over larger distances. That does not speak well for the Japanese when both sides are much closer to their supply sources, as would be the case at the Manchurian frontier.

Plus in 1939 the Soviets need as much as they can pull in for Poland and Finland, while 1940 requires what they had for the occupations of the Baltic states and part of Romania.

Those would be the opportunity costs I was talking about in my first post. Stalin would have to forego the invasions of Finland, Eastern Poland (although he could always just be trusting Hitler to turn over Eastern Poland, but color me skeptical), and Bessarabia. The Baltic States he might still get away with though...

And Stalin realized all of this, which was why he wasn't interested in capitalizing on his success at Khalkin-Ghol with any further military adventures and settled for a restoration of borders. The Red Army may have perfectly been capable of clobbering the IJA operationally, but it wasn't in his strategic interest to do so.
 
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Too bad that is all wrong. My numbers for the Japanesevare from Coox's detailed casualty report for the 23rd division on page 1124 of "Nomonhan," and the 20th through 30 are the dates it covered in his tables. My numbers from the Soviets are from the Soviet archives.

I just did. Bob claims that Coox's numbers were for all the battles, I specifically replied that no, Coox makes perfectly clear that the number of 8,632 Japanese killed and 9,050 wounded is for the dates I said they were: August 20-30. Similarly, the Soviet casualties were were 1,570 killed, 131 missing, and 7,583 wounded, a total of 9.,824. That is when the Soviets launched their decisive offensive that decided the entire border war and when they enjoyed their greatest success. It is also pretty much what a microcosm of what a Soviet attack into Manchuria would look like.

You mean this page, O.N?

b3srk8.jpg


What does that subtitle say?

Now I'm going to assume you got excited by the "20" and didn't read the rest because I'm not an overly suspicious or untrusting individual. I'm not going to make any accusations because things like that happen to everyone, but please remember you are talking to someone who actually owns the book in question, so it would be best if you kept all your "references" true to the original text and double-check before posting.
 
Now I'm going to assume you got excited by the "20" and didn't read the rest because I'm not an overly suspicious or untrusting individual. I'm not going to make any accusations because things like that happen to everyone, but please remember you are talking to someone who actually owns the book in question, so it would be best if you kept all your "references" true to the original text and double-check before posting.

Huh, yeah. Looks like I did. The rest of my points stand but I'll concede on this issue.
 

Deleted member 1487

I just did. Bob claims that Coox's numbers were for all the battles, I specifically replied that no, Coox makes perfectly clear that the number of 8,632 Japanese killed and 9,050 wounded is for the dates I said they were: August 20-30. Similarly, the Soviet casualties were were 1,570 killed, 131 missing, and 7,583 wounded, a total of 9.,824. That is when the Soviets launched their decisive offensive that decided the entire border war and when they enjoyed their greatest success. It is also pretty much what a microcosm of what a Soviet attack into Manchuria would look like.
I'll let Bob's response speak for itself. And no, not a microcosm, because there is no way that logistically they could have sustained such a lopsided ratio of combat power over the Japanese for the entire offensive in Manchuria over the Trans-Siberian RR. A 5:1 advantage in divisions would be required, plus all the trucks and aircraft to support them. Plus the Japanese won't be fighting isolated battles like that outside of the ability to supply them once they are on top of their own rail road network and the Soviets are even further from their with a different rail gauge. Khalkhin Gol was an anomaly.

Irrelevant. Tokyo wasn't in full control of the Kwangtung Army yet and the Kwangtung Army was doing it's damnedest to escalate.
Not in full control, but exerting enough control to get the Japanese air force to stop bombing Soviet airfields and not launching offensives on Soviet territory anywhere else in the line. So as much as you like to declare things irrelevant like you're the umpire, it really wasn't irrelevant to the situation at Nomonhan or in the entire Far East, as Tokyo's attempts to deescalate enabled Stalin to give him the ability to strip out units he hand picked from all over the area to fight his perfect battle, with all the supply and air support he wanted, something that the IJA were not being given by Tokyo or really even the IJA General Staff.

No, the Kwangtung Army did give the 23rd division supply priority and air support. In doing so, they were directly disobeying their orders from Tokyo but then that was nothing new. Nothing you have posted contradicts that. At most, it said that Tokyo responded by issuing an order forbidding the Kwangtung Army from conducting further air missions against the Soviets. It does not say the Kwangtung army obeyed those orders. It similarly undermines your positing that the Soviets were able to strip other parts of the front without fear of counter-attack. Indeed, the Kwangtung armies response to the disaster at Nomonhon in early-September was to launch a number of counterattacks, which failed. It wasn't until some general staff officers flew in directly from Tokyo with direct Imperial sanction to personally shut the Kwangtung Army's shit down did everything settle.
In August? You have quotes from Coox about that? And in mean during the battle, not during the late attempt to break the encirclement. Can Coox demonstrate when there were airstrikes on Soviet air bases post that order? Can you prove they disobeyed that order? The small unit attacks over the line were face-saving moves, not major escalations. Small attacks that were beat off in the end don't say way the Soviets could project into Manchuria either. Remember that Nomonhan was within the Soviet puppet territory of Mongolia, not within Japanese territory where they would have been better supplied due to being close to rail lines. In the end it was a series of minor clashes outside of the Nomonhan engagments.

Nowhere in that extensive quote does it say that. Once again you are making things up.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#August:_Soviet_counterattack
With war apparently imminent in Europe, Zhukov planned a major offensive on 20 August to clear the Japanese from the Khalkhin Gol region and end the fighting.[40] Zhukov, using a fleet of at least 4,000 trucks (IJA officers with hindsight dispute this, saying he instead used 10,000 to 20,000 motor vehicles) transporting supplies from the nearest base in Chita (600 kilometres away)[8]

By contrast, Tokyo's oft-stated desire that it would not escalate the fighting at Khalkhin-Gol proved immensely relieving to the Soviets, who were free to hand-pick select units from across their entire military to be concentrated for a local offensive without fear of Japanese retaliation elsewhere.[URL='https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles_of_Khalkhin_Gol#cite_note-55'][52][/URL]
Both quotes from Coox. They handpicked units for the operation, which also includes the motor pool, not something intrinsic to the divisions, they were strategic supply units.

Which was much smaller then the distance the Soviets had to transport from Trans-Baikal. Essentially, the Soviets at Khalkin Ghol demonstrated the ability to logistically outmatch the Japanese when the latter was much closer to their supply sources then the former. They supported larger forces over larger distances. That does not speak well for the Japanese when both sides are much closer to their supply sources, as would be the case at the Manchurian frontier.
They outmatched them by being willing to bring in whatever forces were needed to win. The Japanese were not willing to do that at all, something the Soviets exploited to mass an overwhelming force and sit on 1 Japanese division it could isolate. Again none of what they did at Nomonhan was typical of the rest of the Soviet force, it was a special purpose offensive put together at one point in the line to win a local skirmish by escalating it far beyond the point either had to that point. The only way the Soviets could have put together similar force ratios to invade Manchuria (which would require a lengthy build up, which would trigger a Japanese build up) and supply it would have been to strip forces out of European Russia, which precludes the attacks on Finland, which required the Soviets to strip a bunch of men and equipment out of their existing forces to finally win. The difference though is that vs. Finland, who's military was no better than that of Japan, they were already in Europe, while in the Far East they'd have to transport and supply 5:1 manpower and firepower advantage over the Japanese over a 6000 mile long rail road. In fact the Finns had about the same number of men in the Winter War as the Japanese had in the Kwantung army in June 1939. Except the Finns had a lot less firepower in terms of aircraft, tanks, and artillery than the Japanese, plus a lot less combat experience, and the Finns were right next to Soviet factories in Leningrad. The Japanese were 6000 miles from European Russia, somewhat less for the Ural factories, which weren't what they became after 1941. When the Japanese were close to their supply lines and willing to escalate and fight a major defensive war to defend Manchuria their ability to counter the Soviets would have been FAR different than a skirmish in Mongolia.

Those would be the opportunity costs I was talking about in my first post. Stalin would have to forego the invasions of Finland, Eastern Poland (although he could always just be trusting Hitler to turn over Eastern Poland, but color me skeptical), and Bessarabia. The Baltic States he might still get away with though...
Sure they could try and do that and see what happened, but then it would be like fighting the Winter War, just over 6000 miles from Moscow and the major production centers of the USSR, plus they'd have to strip out their military in Europe for forces and equipment and face and enemy who's starting strength is more than the Finns fielded in total in the Winter War. Plus they have a lot more combat experience and tanks, artillery, AT guns, aircraft, and reserves that are double their standing force. Meanwhile the Soviets have to attack at the far end of their Empire supplied over 6000 miles by a relatively low capacity rail line and then convert gauge at the border. I mean they could totally mobilize their economy and improve things, but so would Japan. And Japan is on the defensive and not embargoed.

And Stalin realized all of this, which was why he wasn't interested in capitalizing on his success at Khalkin-Ghol with any further military adventures and settled for a restoration of borders. The Red Army may have perfectly been capable of clobbering the IJA operationally, but it wasn't in his strategic interest to do so.
The reasons he'd be stupid to do so are the very things hamstringing his ability to fight the Japanese in 1939. Yes in 1940 or 1941 Hitler could have invaded the USSR with his entire military, but there were massive consequences to doing so. We cannot just speak theoretically here, there were geo-strategic things going on that would hobble a Soviet war effort against Japan in 1939 that would have to be factored in.
 

Deleted member 1487

Huh, yeah. Looks like I did. The rest of my points stand but I'll concede on this issue.
That's the problem. When you concede that point you are also conceding that the Soviets suffered as many or worse losses at Nomonhan in August 1939 despite having 5:1 superiority in division equivalents, plus air superiority, plus a huge tank and artillery advantage, and a massive supply advantage. That doesn't bode well for a Soviet attack on Manchuria, which would have required the Soviets to achieve the same overall force ratios to get the same results in worse circumstance due to better Japanese ability to supply and reinforce. And that makes no mention of the extensive Japanese fortifications in Manchuria that will be defended.
 
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Japan's Chinese adventure might be derailed by a full Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and if it replaces the Finnish Winter War then it could do well for the Red Army's war experience (fighting a large scale war against a SOMEWHAT peer that has armor and actually attacks).
 

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The actual question is WHY Stalin chooses to escalate. What is his goal?

He can defeat the Kwangtung Army. Better equipment on the ground, including a massive advantage in both number of and quality of tanks available (even if you reduce actual Red Army inventory by half, they still vastly outnumber the IJA), more heavy artillery, etc. They have an effective push in the air. The I-16, at least Model 10 and later, is somewhat superior to the Ki-27 (something that was demonstrated both during OTL's border war and while in Service with the Chinese) and the Ki-21 is just filtering into squadron service (the IJA would have somewhere between 100 and 150, for all needs, both in the North and for use against the Chinese) the Ki-30 is serviceable, but not earth shaking and both are reasonable well matched by the Soviet DC-3/Il-4 and KhAI-5. Fortunately for the IJA the very good Pe-2 (which was an easy 40 mph faster than the Ki-27) is not yet in squadron service. I give the Red Army the nod on strategic planning since Shtern & Zhukov is still in charge (tactically, it isn't even close, the Red Army has at least the basics of combined arms in place, while the IJA lacks enough tracked vehicles to even try combined action on more than a battalion scale).

However, assuming his force manage to inflict a defeat on the Japanese, what does he do then? Stalin was spending lots of effort convincing himself that the Reich wasn't going to stab him in the back (something he managed to do, despite considerable actual good intel, until about two days AFTER the war started) but he wasn't totally clueless. What does he get out of the effort. The Winter War was meant to reacquire most, if not all, of Finland. The strategic advantages there are pretty clear. What is his motivation on the Far East?
 
What is his motivation on the Far East?
The best live-fire training exercise possible? :p

As long as Germany was at war with France, it couldn't attack the SU, even if it wanted to. Stalin could easily prolong any conflict with the Japanese all the way to June 1940 without any fear of German attack
 
What is his motivation on the Far East?

Making sure Japan can't stab him in the back during the future war with Germany could be a reason. Besides that, Manchuria is very industrialized (by Chinese standards) and the extra resources could be useful for the Five Year Plans.
 
The best live-fire training exercise possible? :p

As long as Germany was at war with France, it couldn't attack the SU, even if it wanted to. Stalin could easily prolong any conflict with the Japanese all the way to June 1940 without any fear of German attack

But, there's no guarantee that such a war with Japan would be wrapped up by the time Germany gets through in the West. If a diplomatic solution isn't reached Stalin might end up with a two front war on his hands.
 

Deleted member 1487

But, there's no guarantee that such a war with Japan would be wrapped up by the time Germany gets through in the West. If a diplomatic solution isn't reached Stalin might end up with a two front war on his hands.
And a badly weakened military in the process. Just like during the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 the Russians had a problem supplying and reinforcing units well over 6000 miles from Moscow along just the Trans-Siberian RR. Plus it derails Japan's moves in China, which guarantees that Japan won't trigger a US embargo and therefore the path to war. It will probably freak out Britain a fair bit and might even get them to make deals with Japan if they see Germany and the USSR as part of an alliance. Perhaps Operation Pike even happens.
 
And a badly weakened military in the process. Just like during the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 the Russians had a problem supplying and reinforcing units well over 6000 miles from Moscow along just the Trans-Siberian RR. Plus it derails Japan's moves in China, which guarantees that Japan won't trigger a US embargo and therefore the path to war. It will probably freak out Britain a fair bit and might even get them to make deals with Japan if they see Germany and the USSR as part of an alliance. Perhaps Operation Pike even happens.

As far as the Trans-Siberian railroad goes, at least now it's complete IIRC, unlike in 1905. As far as a Soviet-Japanese War goes, assuming it ends in a stalemate like you predict, how does that affect the Sino-Japanese War? IMHO it would go on unless the Red Army removes the Japanese from Manchuria completely, which begs the question what the Soviets will do with Manchuria. As for Operation Pike, wouldn't that bring the USSR into the conflict as an Axis power? That would make Britain's situation worse.
 

Deleted member 1487

As far as the Trans-Siberian railroad goes, at least now it's complete IIRC, unlike in 1905. As far as a Soviet-Japanese War goes, assuming it ends in a stalemate like you predict, how does that affect the Sino-Japanese War? IMHO it would go on unless the Red Army removes the Japanese from Manchuria completely, which begs the question what the Soviets will do with Manchuria. As for Operation Pike, wouldn't that bring the USSR into the conflict as an Axis power? That would make Britain's situation worse.
The Sino-Japanese war would pretty much grind to a halt as far as the Japanese offensive goes. Japan would go to full war economy and mobilize a bunch of new divisions. In the meantime the KMT would launch their 1940 offensive and maybe do better than IOTL. Japan is not going to be getting much further given it's situation against the USSR. Depends on when the Soviets are able to mount a full invasion of Manchuria it might derail or prevent entirely the 1st Battle of Changsha.

If that happened then yes, the Soviets would probably at least become a Nazi co-belligerent. The thing is if the Soviets are stuck in a war with Japan they won't really have that much spare capacity to do much in the Middle East and threaten the Allies. So the British, apparently the most gungho about the operation, would have even greater reason to think they could get away with it.

The Axis didn't exist until late 1940 IOTL and the anti-comintern pact would make things politically uncomfortable for the Germans and Italians:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Comintern_Pact
I'm going to assume that the Soviets wait until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is signed before they go to war in the East and wait until the Germans are involved in the war in Poland and with the Allies before moving on Japan, which pushes things back to at least some time in September if not later. But then Winter will hit during a 1939 Soviet build up/offensive, which given the mountains in Manchuria is not a good place to invade in Winter.
 
The Sino-Japanese war would pretty much grind to a halt as far as the Japanese offensive goes. Japan would go to full war economy and mobilize a bunch of new divisions. In the meantime the KMT would launch their 1940 offensive and maybe do better than IOTL. Japan is not going to be getting much further given it's situation against the USSR. Depends on when the Soviets are able to mount a full invasion of Manchuria it might derail or prevent entirely the 1st Battle of Changsha.

If that happened then yes, the Soviets would probably at least become a Nazi co-belligerent. The thing is if the Soviets are stuck in a war with Japan they won't really have that much spare capacity to do much in the Middle East and threaten the Allies. So the British, apparently the most gungho about the operation, would have even greater reason to think they could get away with it.

The Axis didn't exist until late 1940 IOTL and the anti-comintern pact would make things politically uncomfortable for the Germans and Italians:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Comintern_Pact
I'm going to assume that the Soviets wait until the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is signed before they go to war in the East and wait until the Germans are involved in the war in Poland and with the Allies before moving on Japan, which pushes things back to at least some time in September if not later. But then Winter will hit during a 1939 Soviet build up/offensive, which given the mountains in Manchuria is not a good place to invade in Winter.

Interesting, so the Anti-Comintern Pact falls apart because Germany doesn't back up Japan. Then Britain launches Operation Pike and brings in the USSR as a co-belligerent of Germany. So we get the USSR+Germany vs. Great Britain+France+Japan (Italy is still neutral).
 
Interesting, so the Anti-Comintern Pact falls apart because Germany doesn't back up Japan. Then Britain launches Operation Pike and brings in the USSR as a co-belligerent of Germany. So we get the USSR+Germany vs. Great Britain+France+Japan (Italy is still neutral).

possible earlier deal (or dealings) with USSR with Stalin attempting to disrupt any Anti-Comintern Pact and Germans wanting easier trading with KMT China and Iran?

if there were even a couple of years of German-Soviet collaboration it would appear more of durable nature and more of threat. instead of waiting for thieves to fall out, the Allies might have to back Japan and/or strike Soviets.
 

Deleted member 1487

Interesting, so the Anti-Comintern Pact falls apart because Germany doesn't back up Japan. Then Britain launches Operation Pike and brings in the USSR as a co-belligerent of Germany. So we get the USSR+Germany vs. Great Britain+France+Japan (Italy is still neutral).
I didn't say Britain would for sure do that. I said it is a potential possibility. Britain might want allies in the conflict and could potentially pick one off of Germany. That helps secure the Pacific and may not piss off the US given that the USSR after getting involved in Poland was viewed as part of Germany's conspiracy to take over the world. Japan was to a degree too, but by the USSR going after Japan then the China conflict gets put on hold and Britain can theoretically channel her aggression toward the USSR, which is a more tolerable position for the US and provides them a way to get resolution to the China situation and effectively ensure Japan is locked down either fighting the USSR or guarding its border heavily, which precludes further aggression in China.
 
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