Depends how you get commies in Germany, you can assume Poland and the Baltics are screwed.
That's not necessarily true. Estonia fought off Bolshevik attacks for a couple years, and by the treaty of Tartu managed to actually occupy Russian and Lithuanian territory. Latvia's and Lithuania's fates depend on where the PoD goes; if you can get the Freikorps out of the Baltic early enough (say, with a PoD in 1919 or earlier), they might well fall in the Bolshevik westward offensive in 1918-1919. If you have Eastern Freikorps and a Polish-Bolshevik War, however, expect Poland and possibly Latvia and Lithuania to survive. Poland might fall if Germany gets involved in any Polish-Bolshevik War (which would make it the Polish-Communist War), but its doing so depends on your PoD. It's a general assumption that Poland gets eaten alive in this scenario, but I'm not entirely sure about that any more. It all depends on the leadership and quality of the armies and on the decisions of the political leaders, none of which are certain.
EDIT: oops, forgot the conditions specified a Red Germany in the 20s/30s. I'll leave the paragraph there as I spent a couple minutes on it, but here's a more relevant bit. The best opportunities for a Red Germany within these restrictions are 1923-24 and 1932 (I would argue that the latter is impossible, but it's not really worth doing). If you get a Red Germany in the latter, you have one that has built upon the entirety of the Weimar Republic's existence. That is, the Locarno Pact is in place, as is the Truppenamt, and the makings of an air force and panzer force (both arms were secretly trained in the USSR IOTL) if not the on-paper documentation thereof. You also have a KPD that is entirely subservient to Moscow (sorry, but sattelization is a very real possiblity here, almost inevitable), making a unified grand strategy not only possible but positively likely. Poland and the Baltics might therefore be well screwed in this instance, depending on when the Reds go to war and if the Entente intervenes.
However, in 1923-24, Russia is emerging from the Civil War still, and is about to go a viscious internal power struggle. Germany, too, will be undergoing or overcoming civil strife (you had the Kapp Putsch, von Kahr's "cell of order" in Bavaria, and other instances that presage a violent confrontation between left and right). Both will be economically stunted, Russia by the transition from the NEP to a more planned economy, Germany by hyperinflation. Neither will be a built-up military power. In this situation, Poland and the Baltics might very well survive, again depending on when the Reds decide to go to war and if the Entente intervenes.
In this scenario Germany would probably adopt whatever millitary tactics come out of Moscow, rather than devoloping their own.
Untrue. Russia's strategy (not tactics) came out of the Russian Civil War which saw large armies supplied by large manpower pools engaging each other across broad fronts with little concentration of force and equipment. The strategy of Deep Operations was designed so that such an army could effectively act as a unit and disrupt the offensive and defensive capabilities of another, similar, army. Blitzkrieg, on the other hand, emerged out of the experience of the Western Front in WWI, which saw large armies supplied by moderately-sized manpower pools engaging each other on a fairly broad front with a very high concentration of force and equipment. Whereas armies in the Russian Civil War were easy to disrupt, their communications with each other being tenuous at best, Blitzkrieg was designed to break the ability of a very concentrated army to communicate with itself, and to defeat the lost and confused sections piecemeal by maneuver. Deep Operations envisioned a sweeping attack where the enemy's capacity to communicate with itself was disrupted all along the line, thus enabling defeat of many sections at once.
Doctrine and strategy, whatever the political biases of a country's leaders, come out of its experience in war. Even a German Civil War would look substantially different to the Russian Civil War, and it's unreasonable to expect the same tactics to come out of entirely different war experiences.
Their will be alot of resistance from the people of Germany making any communist state their un-stable, as such it will be in the Sphere of Influence at least from the long built up USSR
Say not "the people of Germany". Say rather "many people in Germany". It's not as though communism was an alien idea in either 1923 or 1932; the KPD was the largest section of the Comintern in Europe outside Russia, and regularly brought in between ten and twenty percent of the vote. Also, in 1923, the Council movement was living memory for the country, and remnants of it existed here and there (the Ruhr Red Army and other militia organizations). More important is the fact that most people don't go on struggling for decades after a new system has established itself, but rather accept the status quo and get by as best they can. Using any PoD a Red Germany would have an uphill climb, but then again, when has this prevented anybody from writing AH about it? Audiences love underdogs.
Also, in 1923, the "long-built-up USSR" is nonexistant. As I mentioned earlier, it's economically in ruins and the ruling party is at war with itself. The USSR itself is only a year old, and is still digesting the smaller Republics. In 1932 you would have a point, but Germany and Russia in 1923 would deal on a much greater plane of equality. Indeed, depending on how things turn out, Germany might even be the dominant partner in the relationship.
Last but not least, I hope it's not too prolix to point to my signature.
*points to signature*