WI Soviet/Afghan Army Defeats The Mujahideen in Early 80s?

What if prominent Soviet politicians Grmyko and Kosygin are proven wrong and the Mujahideen take a hammering in the Soviet/Afghan war against them from 1979 to the early 80s. How can this happen? and does it help maintain the USSR? and nip Islamic fundamentalism in the bud?and what are the implications for the world today? There was a huge disparity in numbers as the holy warriors were about 10 times bigger in troop numbers!
One possible way of a Stallinist victory would be to have the United States turn the other way and give no aid/advice to the Mujahideen. I bet some wish now that they had adopted this policy!Was it their Vietnam, well the NVA-Viet Cong were mainly nationalists and in fairness not religious psychotics and their subsequent intervention in Paul Pot's Cambodia serves to prove that!
 
I'll answer part of the question.

For a large power to eliminate a guerrilla movement it needs to do one of two things:

1. Eliminate external support. In this case, the US supplies of arms and advisers.
2. Eliminate local support. Plenty (most, I gather) of the local population were willing to provide at least silent support to the resistance.

Option 1 seems to have been beyond the USSR. Option 2 breaks down into a further pair of options.

2a. Persuade the local population to support the major power.
2b. Eliminate the local population.

Option 2a also seems to have been beyond the USSR, and given that it seems equally beyond the US, I think we can rule it out.

Option 2b was certainly within the physical capabilities of the USSR, but I doubt it would have been politically feasible.

Pick one and explain how the USSR pulls it off and I'll take a shot at the long-term implications.
 
I'll answer part of the question.

For a large power to eliminate a guerrilla movement it needs to do one of two things:

1. Eliminate external support. In this case, the US supplies of arms and advisers.
2. Eliminate local support. Plenty (most, I gather) of the local population were willing to provide at least silent support to the resistance.

Option 1 seems to have been beyond the USSR. Option 2 breaks down into a further pair of options.

2a. Persuade the local population to support the major power.
2b. Eliminate the local population.

Option 2a also seems to have been beyond the USSR, and given that it seems equally beyond the US, I think we can rule it out.

Option 2b was certainly within the physical capabilities of the USSR, but I doubt it would have been politically feasible.

Pick one and explain how the USSR pulls it off and I'll take a shot at the long-term implications.



My understanding is that the USSR had driven a significant portion of the rural Afganistani population into Pakistan refugee camps, mostly though air power.

Air power took a hit once the US started sending in stingers.

Quick goggle search.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_war_in_Afghanistan#Destruction_in_Afghanistan


Estimates of the Afghan deaths vary from 1 million[101] to 2 million.[102] 5-10 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran, 1/3 of the prewar population of the country. Another 2 million Afghans were displaced within the country. In the 1980s, half of all refugees in the world were Afghan.[103]
Along with fatalities were 1.2 million Afghans disabled (mujahideen, government soldiers and noncombatants) and 3 million maimed or wounded (primarily noncombatants).[104]
Irrigation systems, crucial to agriculture in Afghanistan's arid climate, were destroyed by aerial bombing and strafing by Soviet or government forces. In the worst year of the war, 1985, well over half of all the farmers who remained in Afghanistan had their fields bombed, and over one quarter had their irrigation systems destroyed and their livestock shot by Soviet or government troops, according to a survey conducted by Swedish relief experts [103]
The population of Afghanistan's second largest city, Kandahar, was reduced from 200,000 before the war to no more than 25,000 inhabitants, following a months-long campaign of carpet bombing and bulldozing by the Soviets and Afghan communist soldiers in 1987.[105] Land mines had killed 25,000 Afghans during the war and another 10–15 million land mines, most planted by Soviet and government forces, were left scattered throughout the countryside.[106
 
My understanding is that the USSR had driven a significant portion of the rural Afganistani population into Pakistan refugee camps, mostly though air power.

There's a reason I said "eliminate" and not "reduce". Perhaps I should have put a 'totally' in front.

Killing a lot of an area's population tends to really annoy the rest, and make them even more likely to support a resistance effort. You don't get 2b until you've killed them all.
 
2a. Persuade the local population to support the major power.
2b. Eliminate the local population.

Option 2a also seems to have been beyond the USSR, and given that it seems equally beyond the US, I think we can rule it out.

Option 2A may have been viable, and as another poster alluded to, the only real option.

Look what the U.S. did in Iraq: Though the Iraqi insurgents lacked super power backing, the U.S. was able to completely silence the insurgency through a combination of killing hard core insurgents, spending lots of money to buy off the less hard core, and implementing good policies leading to improvements for citizen "X". The Mudgehadin were a pretty fragmented coalition. Some were beyond talking to, others may have been open to talks linked to local autonomy.
 
Is that why car bombs are still going off?

Ok, your right, competely silence is the wrong word. But if you look the current situation constrasted with the past situation, you will see that the insurgency is not what it used to be.

To win, the USSR did not need to completely silence the afghan insurgency either.
 
Ok, your right, competely silence is the wrong word. But if you look the current situation constrasted with the past situation, you will see that the insurgency is not what it used to be.

To win, the USSR did not need to completely silence the afghan insurgency either.

Bombs are still going off on a weekly basis, last I checked. That doesn't seem very silenced at all, to me. Bear in mind also that the insurgents have WON. They wanted the US out, and the US is leaving. They don't need to kill US troops anymore; they can hold their fire until the US is gone and then go after or subvert the government that it leaves behind.

BTW, superpower backing isn't necessary. I'm sorry if I implied I thought it was. The Iraqi guerrillas had (have) plenty of outside backing. All the outside power needs to do is funnel in weapons and supplies, and the odd adviser. That doesn't take a superpower, especially if there's a long common border.
 
Bombs are still going off on a weekly basis, last I checked. That doesn't seem very silenced at all, to me. Bear in mind also that the insurgents have WON. They wanted the US out, and the US is leaving.
Insurgents did not win. The US is leaving, but in their own time. One could also say the U.S. war goal was the installation of a functioning Iraqi government that is not in dnager of collapse. This goal has been accomplished.

Look at this link to see when the down turn in U.S. deaths occurred:
http://icasualties.org/
 
Insurgents did not win. The US is leaving, but in their own time. One could also say the U.S. war goal was the installation of a functioning Iraqi government that is not in dnager of collapse. This goal has been accomplished.

The US military is leaving after a deadline, not a victory. Declaring a victory doesn't mean you've won a victory.

No guerrilla movement that I know of has kicked out an occupying force without major, overt, external military support. The Iraqis did NOT have this, so the US was always going to leave when it decided to, not when it was forced to. The present administration decided that it was time to leave, so the US is leaving. The US could have completely wiped out the guerrillas and then left; that would have been a victory. The US could have grabbed Saddam, shot him, and then left; that would have been a minor victory.

I would very much like to see the Iraqi government survive (and thus not collapse) after the US finishes pulling out. I give it two years, on the outside, however, before it does, or is fully subverted by the fanatics.
 
Comparisson To the US In Vietnam And US In Iraq?

Do these comparissons stand up to the Soviets in Afghanistan at all?
 
Would It Kill Militant Islamic Fundamentalism?

Even with defeat in Afghanistan, militant Islamic fundamentalism would still exist in Iran, Algeria, Saudi, Lebanon and within parts of the Palestinian diaspora! But it would have received a right spanking through this defeat, as Mujahideen came from all over the Islamic world!
 
I think it's worth pointing out that ethnic ''Afghans'' don’t exist. The country is broken up on tribal lines with the two biggest groups the Tajik’s supporting the Kabul government and the Pashtuns supporting the Islamic guerrillas respectively

It is also worth pointing out the Communist regime in Kabul. Lasted several years after the fall of the U.S.S.R without outside support and even if it’s support base weren’t a majority of the population they were still numerous enough to allow for a relatively stable government. Should most organized guerrilla resistance be crushed.

The idea that guerrillas cant be beaten by a conventional army & local death squads is farcical. Look at Chechnya. In far less ideal circumstances, the Russians have pretty much destroyed all major resistance beyond a few small terrorist groups who cant do more than irritate them, and have a stable puppet in charge who does most of the local repression himself.
 
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What wouldgo a long way toward for victory is stable soviet leadership, not having GenSecs with one foot in the grave alreadywhen taking the office. His let the army without clear guidiance.

Larger LCOSF. Health problems combined with need to guard roads, bases and outposts Soviets were hard pressed to scrap together big enough mobile reserve.

Quicker realisation that conventional tactics don't work. Study your friendly insurgents, see what it worked then work onhow to defeat that.
 
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