WI: Sinkiang remains a Soviet puppet?

So I was reading the background information wikipedia gives on the Second East Turkestan Republic, and it seems that Soviet influence in the area was much stronger than I had believed. According to wikipedia, this changed when the strongman in Sinkiang, Sheng Shicai, switched masters (to Nationalist China) after the Soviets looked to be going down after Barberossa was launched. So WI Sheng Shicai stays loyal to Moscow (maybe he has confidence that the Soviets will eventually win in this TL) and Sinkiang continues to follow a similar path to Mongolia, what are the effects?

Would Sinkiang's resources make a big difference for the Soviet economy? Would the lack of those same resources make a big difference to China? How might the region evolve?

And what happens to Tibet? Might it end up independent or end up a Soviet puppet without China controlling the routes into the plateau from the north?

Are Soviet-Indian relations changed by India sharing a border with a puppet? (Between Indian Kashmir and Sinkiang.) Would Sinkiang end up disputing Aksai Chin with India?

How would the Chinese nuclear program evolve without "inheriting" the Soviet nuclear facilities in Sinkiang (where most of the initial work was done, and where much of the Chinese Uranium came)?

Alternatively, what might happen if the second East Turkestan Republic is recognized as an "independent" Soviet puppet by Mao when he wins the civil war? Much less of a geographic/strategic change in Asia, but China would, again, lose out on gaining the Soviet nuclear facilities I mentioned above. Any other effects people can thing of?

fasquardon
 
So I was reading the background information wikipedia gives on the Second East Turkestan Republic, and it seems that Soviet influence in the area was much stronger than I had believed. According to wikipedia, this changed when the strongman in Sinkiang, Sheng Shicai, switched masters (to Nationalist China) after the Soviets looked to be going down after Barberossa was launched. So WI Sheng Shicai stays loyal to Moscow (maybe he has confidence that the Soviets will eventually win in this TL) and Sinkiang continues to follow a similar path to Mongolia, what are the effects?

Would Sinkiang's resources make a big difference for the Soviet economy? Would the lack of those same resources make a big difference to China? How might the region evolve?

And what happens to Tibet? Might it end up independent or end up a Soviet puppet without China controlling the routes into the plateau from the north?

Are Soviet-Indian relations changed by India sharing a border with a puppet? (Between Indian Kashmir and Sinkiang.) Would Sinkiang end up disputing Aksai Chin with India?

How would the Chinese nuclear program evolve without "inheriting" the Soviet nuclear facilities in Sinkiang (where most of the initial work was done, and where much of the Chinese Uranium came)?

Alternatively, what might happen if the second East Turkestan Republic is recognized as an "independent" Soviet puppet by Mao when he wins the civil war? Much less of a geographic/strategic change in Asia, but China would, again, lose out on gaining the Soviet nuclear facilities I mentioned above. Any other effects people can thing of?

fasquardon

Xinjiang would give the Soviets more oil, uranium, natural gas; though except for uranium none of those things will be exploited pre-1991 unless you have more multiple PoDs.

Tibet independent but with an India/Soviet "Great Game" mirroring the Great Game between Britain and Russia over Central Asia. Which after 1991 leads to similar influence struggles between India and Russia on soft power in Central Asia.

It's not just India that Aksai Chin is disputed with, Pakistan also claims it as part of Kashmir and Jammu. If Xinjiang is independent I think that there may be some weak claims but no occupation, the Soviets reign that in. If it is part of the USSR then I think the USSR uses their influence and some "help" to the Indians occurs over the border to help the Indians occupy more of Kashmir than the Pakistanis. India and SU end up with similar relations as OTL, it's always been the enemy of my enemy between the two; Pakistan went pro-USA first (CENTO), leaving India to cozy up to the Soviet Union to a degree.

Chinese nuclear program delayed but not butterflied away.

Not guaranteed that Mao will win in this instance. If he does or if he doesn't no Chinese government will recognize either Tibet or Xinjiang as anything but rightfully Chinese; even Taiwan does not recognize that either have a right to self-determination; one thing both the RoC and the PRC agree on is the One China Policy, it's just who is representing the One China that is in disagreement. Since Chinese history (rightfully or propaganda) considers Tibet and Xinjiang to have been Chinese tributaries and more for "all time" and that the Han and Tang Dynasties both had some control over the Tarim Basin, no one in that proud country of China is going to recognize a right for Xinjiang to exist. It would be as complicated to create a PoD for that as it would be to find one to allow Ireland to recognize the UK's total right to have Northern Ireland.
 
See my post "Sheng Shih-ts'ai Sticks with Stalin " at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/03FHdWEQ638/qhrCRt0d48AJ

Incidentally, that was not the last chance of the Soviet Union to dominate Xinjuang; there was also the Ili Rebellion which I discuss at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/FnFZxyNb1uY/MbBsO1W8owAJ (The source I give there, Mark Dickens, "The Soviets in Xinjiang," is now available at http://www.oxuscom.com/sovinxj.htm) As I note there, the Ili National Army could easily have overrun Urumchi in 1945 but Stalin held it back and brokered a compromise with Chiang instead. Dickens writes, " Why did the Soviets agree to negotiate this treaty when their puppet regime was so close to taking over the entire provincial government? One Western scholar [Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949*] suggests a number of possible reasons: 'The Soviet Union had attained its primary aims in Sinkiang and had no good reason for encouraging further INA advances on Urumchi. By extending its 'all-out support' to the Ili rebels,... the Kremlin had effectively re-established its primacy in the traditionally Soviet-influenced border districts of Ili, Chuguchak and Shara Sume.' 96 This had given the USSR access to the valuable natural resources found in the area, including oil, tungsten, copper, gold, and uranium. In addition, control of the "Three Regions," as the border districts were called, 'provided the Soviet Union with an important political card which could be played both in the international theatre... and on the regional stage, where Stalin remained uncertain as to the eventual outcome of the Nationalist-Communist power struggle in China and therefore as to which side to back.' 97 Finally, 'the further the rebel forces pushed from Ili, the weaker Soviet control became over the movement.... beyond the narrow confines of the Ili Valley anti-Soviet sentiment was rife amongst the independent Kazakhs of the Altai region, and still more so amongst the traditionally conservative Muslim population of the Tarim Basin.'"

My guess is that after World War II, Stalin was no longer so interested in Xinjiang *as a whole* (as opposed to the traditionally Russian-dominated "Three Regions"). During the war Xinjiang had been important as providing access to KMT-controlled China at a time when Japan otherwise blocked access by controlling Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. After the war, Xinjiang lost this importance. So if Chiang recalled Sheng as governor, no matter how pro-Soviet Sheng was, I don't think Stalin would try to resist except to the extent of retaining de facto control of the Three Regions.

There would be one interesting consequence if Sheng had never turned anti-Soviet, though. As I noted, " Chinese Communists and other leftists who had come to Sinkiang during Sheng's "progressive" years, were now purged, imprisoned, and in many cases killed--one of the victims was Mao Tse-min [Mao Zemin], Mao Tse-tung's brother. (Sheng seems to have had a Vyshinsky-like belief in the reliability of coerced confessions--as an appendix to his autobiography, he includes Mao Tse-min's confession, apparently thinking the reader will find it "proof" enough of Mao's guilt.)" Perhaps Mao Zemin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mao_Zemin if he survives plays an important role in subsequent Chinese Communist politics...
 
Of course, as this is a traditional part of the Chinese Empire, holding it against guerrilla attacks etc. may be an early version of Afghanistan to them.

(Leading to the proverb: "That incredible Sinkiang feeling".:p)
 

All very interesting. Much food for thought here.

Of course, as this is a traditional part of the Chinese Empire, holding it against guerrilla attacks etc. may be an early version of Afghanistan to them.

(Leading to the proverb: "That incredible Sinkiang feeling".:p)

Outer Mongolia was part of China for longer than Sinkiang was. The pro-remain-a-Chinese-province faction in outer Mongolia was crushed pretty quickly and the Soviets kept their hold on it right until the whole empire broke up.

And I suspect that any guerrillas that cropped up in Sinkiang would not be pro-Chinese except insofar as they felt China was the most gullible outside patron.

fasquardon
 
So focusing on the nuclear effects of Sinkiang never being part of China, what effects does a delayed Chinese atom bomb have? And does anyone have an idea on how big a delay not getting ahold of the Soviet facilities in Sinkiang would cause? I would have guessed it would take the Chinese a year or two to build their own facilities, but that there would be little else that would really delay the Chinese much.

fasquardon
 
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