WI: singapores big guns well supplied with HE rounds?

Markus

Banned
About Matador, in "The Defence and Fall of Singapore" the author states that Percival needed London´s ok and that the execution of the whole operation from the time the japanese convoys were detected would have taken longer than the time the japanese convoys needed to cross the Thai gulf. Thus there would not have been time to dig in at Kra and that´s using the British estimates, which turned out to overestimate the speed with which their troops moved. IIRC six vs. four days. A fact sadly underlined by Operation Krocol. One of the invasion roads ran through a gorge that was rather close to the Malayan border and rather far away from the next japanese beachhead. The plan was to occupy, hold and eventually blow it up, thereby delaying the invasion for days.

But the Brits moved slower than slow and were narrowly beaten by the fast moving, hard hitting Japanese.

Better cancel Matador and have the troops man the defensive positions. I still expect the British to be beaten but not as badly as IOTL. IOTL the order to cancel Matador had been given hours after the Japanese had already landed, with the result that the troops were attacked while they were in the process of returning to their defensive positions.
 

Cook

Banned
Things do not happen in isolation.

Singapore fell on the 15 February 1942. Had Lieutenant General Yamashita’s Twenty-Fifth Army faced more stubborn resistance to the extent that he may not have been able to take Singapore he would have had the firepower of the Navy’s mobile force, the Kido Butai available to him.

This strike force consisting of the six aircraft carriers that had attacked Pearl Harbour were readily available to strike at Singapore should resistance continue there. Instead Singapore fell on the 15th of February 1942 and the Japanese Carriers struck Darwin on the 19th. This was precisely the same force that had struck Pearl Harbour ten weeks earlier, led by the same pilot, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. More aircraft were in the first attack wave upon Darwin than on Pearl and more bombs were dropped on Darwin than on Pearl, sinking more ships.

Had Singapore’s defences still been a significant issue, and land based aircraft not been sufficient for the task, those aircraft carriers would have been directed to smash any remaining resistance.
 

Redbeard

Banned
About Matador, in "The Defence and Fall of Singapore" the author states that Percival needed London´s ok and that the execution of the whole operation from the time the japanese convoys were detected would have taken longer than the time the japanese convoys needed to cross the Thai gulf. Thus there would not have been time to dig in at Kra and that´s using the British estimates, which turned out to overestimate the speed with which their troops moved. IIRC six vs. four days. A fact sadly underlined by Operation Krocol. One of the invasion roads ran through a gorge that was rather close to the Malayan border and rather far away from the next japanese beachhead. The plan was to occupy, hold and eventually blow it up, thereby delaying the invasion for days.

But the Brits moved slower than slow and were narrowly beaten by the fast moving, hard hitting Japanese.

Better cancel Matador and have the troops man the defensive positions. I still expect the British to be beaten but not as badly as IOTL. IOTL the order to cancel Matador had been given hours after the Japanese had already landed, with the result that the troops were attacked while they were in the process of returning to their defensive positions.

Percival never had the authority to launch Matador. That was bestowed on Percival's superior Brooke-Popham, the CO of Far East. Brooke-Popham by the attack did have authority to launch Matador without asking London, but mentally he was too scared by Churchill's previous instructions about not initiating war with Japan.

I agree that the forces present in OTL were too few and too green to ensure a good chance, but by not initiating Matador, they had no chance at all.

I think the first blame is to be on Churchill, and I wonder what kind of wonders could have been created if a CIGS like Alan Brooke would have been in charge a year before (he became CIGS early December 1941 in OTL).

Next if Churchill's often wild plans could be tamed (which was the speciality of Alanbrooke) it would also be possible to spare out some good commanders for the Far East. Like if Wavel doesn't fall in disgrace because Churchill's plan are impossible to implement, we still have the respected Auchinleck available for Malaya - or the Far East in general. He was from the Indian Army and by April 41 had won fame by his initiative in Iraq.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

Markus

Banned
The author of "The Defence and Fall of Singapore" says Matador needed London´s ok until Dec. 5th by which time it was already too late.

By their own estimates it would have taken the Brits 36 hours to get moving, 24 hours to reach Patani and then they would have needed another 12 hours to dig in; three days. But by the 8th the Japanese had already landed and that wasn´t the only problem with the plan.

The quality and quantity of the III Indian Corps´ troops was so low that fighting on the defensive from prepared positions was the best they could do. Malaya Command was two regiments understrenght to execute Matador and cover their other tasks, Patani could only be reached in 24 hours provided there was no Thai resistance at all and that the advance had tank support and last but not least it was assumed the invasion force would suffer some losses from air raids before the landings began. But the Thais did resist, the Brits had no tank and the Japanese lost noghting before they landed.


@Cook:

After PH Kido Butai´s strenght never exceeded four carriers and even with all six they could not do much damage to dug in ground forces. They could have bombed the port but in order to starve Singapore it has to be cut off from resupply. Preferably by taking southern Sumatra. And that can be done regardless of the situation on the ground in southern Malaya. Realistically only allied air parity could prevent it but that can´t be done on short notice.
 
Someone should do a quick ATL of the War after Singapore is successfully held, the IJA withdraws from the Malay P, and British land based planes control the Straits. ie: whats the payoff for Churchill doing things right in the first place?
 

Markus

Banned
Someone should do a quick ATL of the War after Singapore is successfully held, the IJA withdraws from the Malay P, and British land based planes control the Straits. ...

Ok, it´s not exactly a "quick" ATL but still :D:D:D
 
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Redbeard

Banned
The author of "The Defence and Fall of Singapore" says Matador needed London´s ok until Dec. 5th by which time it was already too late.

By their own estimates it would have taken the Brits 36 hours to get moving, 24 hours to reach Patani and then they would have needed another 12 hours to dig in; three days. But by the 8th the Japanese had already landed and that wasn´t the only problem with the plan.

The quality and quantity of the III Indian Corps´ troops was so low that fighting on the defensive from prepared positions was the best they could do. Malaya Command was two regiments understrenght to execute Matador and cover their other tasks, Patani could only be reached in 24 hours provided there was no Thai resistance at all and that the advance had tank support and last but not least it was assumed the invasion force would suffer some losses from air raids before the landings began. But the Thais did resist, the Brits had no tank and the Japanese lost noghting before they landed.


@Cook:

After PH Kido Butai´s strenght never exceeded four carriers and even with all six they could not do much damage to dug in ground forces. They could have bombed the port but in order to starve Singapore it has to be cut off from resupply. Preferably by taking southern Sumatra. And that can be done regardless of the situation on the ground in southern Malaya. Realistically only allied air parity could prevent it but that can´t be done on short notice.

36 hours just to get going is at best just an excuse for being incompetent at all aspects of leadership.

Nobody had forbade Brooke-Popham to increase preparedness, not even before 5th of December, but he was so scared of provocing a war with Japan that he did nothing.

Everybody knew that that war would come sooner or later and the British also were well aware that as long as massive forces were not available the only place to defend Malaya was at the Isthmus of Kra and that time was essential. So any military leader of just mediocre quality would of course arrange what he has so that he can react fast and occupy the Isthmus. The demand for this was even more pronounced by the complicated chain of command before 5th of December, but very little if anything was done.

I don't see how Singapore can be cut off just by taking southern Sumatra. Singapore would first of all be supplied down the Malacca Strait and it will take time and much effort before (Northern) Sumatra or Malaya can hold bases and forces strong enough to block the Malacca strait. In OTL Sumatra was only taken after Singapore had fallen, and if Singapore holds out longer I'm quite sure the allies will be able to pour in reinforcement much faster than the Japanese.

If Singapore holds out the IJN will have to commit itself in SEA to cut off reinfocements to Singapore if the IJA is to have any chance of taking Singapore. That opens up for some very interesting scenarios of the IJN operating inbetween the RN and the USN closing from each side. If the IJN can strike decisively at one the IJN have chance, if not they are in for some vey hard times. But anyway operating in such relatively confined waters as in SEA will in itself inflict extra casualties.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

Markus

Banned
36 hours just to get going is at best just an excuse for being incompetent at all aspects of leadership.

Nobody had forbade Brooke-Popham to increase preparedness, not even before 5th of December, but he was so scared of provocing a war with Japan that he did nothing.

I´m not so sure. The indian units were short of radios, some had none at all and B-P had reasons to be scared of provocing a war with Japan, the Ambassador to Thailand advised against Matador and London shared his views to a certain degree.


Everybody knew that that war would come sooner or later and the British also were well aware that as long as massive forces were not available the only place to defend Malaya was at the Isthmus of Kra and that time was essential. So any military leader of just mediocre quality would of course arrange what he has so that he can react fast and occupy the Isthmus. The demand for this was even more pronounced by the complicated chain of command before 5th of December, but very little if anything was done.
The British planned for later, that resulted in the very poor quality and insufficient number of troops when the war actually began.


I don't see how Singapore can be cut off just by taking southern Sumatra. Singapore would first of all be supplied down the Malacca Strait and it will take time and much effort before (Northern) Sumatra or Malaya can hold bases and forces strong enough to block the Malacca strait. In OTL Sumatra was only taken after Singapore had fallen, and if Singapore holds out longer I'm quite sure the allies will be able to pour in reinforcement much faster than the Japanese.
The 7th Amoured Brigade could have arrived within two weeks and the lead elemenst of two australian divisions within another two weeks but if southern Sumatra has already fallen they have no place to go. The airfields in the north were few and poor and neutralized by japanese planes operating from ex-RAF bases in northern and central Malaya. That left Suda Strait as the only route for resupply. And the Japanese landed on Sumatra even before the Battle of Singapore was over. Singapore fell on the 15th, the airborne landings on Sumatra were on the 14th, naval on the 15th.


If Singapore holds out the IJN will have to commit itself in SEA to cut off reinfocements to Singapore if the IJA is to have any chance of taking Singapore. That opens up for some very interesting scenarios of the IJN operating inbetween the RN and the USN closing from each side. If the IJN can strike decisively at one the IJN have chance, if not they are in for some vey hard times. But anyway operating in such relatively confined waters as in SEA will in itself inflict extra casualties.
The USN was operating rather cautiously in the Pacific and the RN lacked carriers, while the IJN had both carriers and superior land based airpower. If the invasion of southern Sumatra does not go south somehow, there is no way of getting reinforcements to Java, much less Singapore.
 
After PH Kido Butai´s strenght never exceeded four carriers and even with all six they could not do much damage to dug in ground forces. They could have bombed the port but in order to starve Singapore it has to be cut off from resupply. Preferably by taking southern Sumatra. And that can be done regardless of the situation on the ground in southern Malaya. Realistically only allied air parity could prevent it but that can´t be done on short notice.

The Indian Ocean Raid had Akagi, Hiryū, Sōryū, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku of the carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor. Ryūjō also participated, but I am told did not operate with the other five carriers.

The ability of Kido Butai to operate in the IO with five carriers raises the question of why the IJN did not cross-deck the Shōkaku air groups over to Zuikaku and send five carriers to Midway. The IJN knows that the 2 Yorktowns they think are left PLUS Midway make the battle too even by numbers of available aircraft. The principle of More Dakka seems to require that you send everything you've got for "The Decisive Battle."
 

Cook

Banned
After PH Kido Butai´s strenght never exceeded four carriers and even with all six they could not do much damage to dug in ground forces. They could have bombed the port but in order to starve Singapore it has to be cut off from resupply. Preferably by taking southern Sumatra. And that can be done regardless of the situation on the ground in southern Malaya. Realistically only allied air parity could prevent it but that can´t be done on short notice.

The Kido Butai attacked Darwin on 19th of February 1942 with All Six Aircraft Carriers and more aircraft than had attacked Pearl Harbour on December 7th. They later attacked British bases in Ceylon.

The Imperial Japanese Navy was at this time establishing sea and air control of the Dutch East Indies. With that established there would be no resupply of Singapore.

Since all of Japan’s successful attacks involved the heavy use of air power suggesting that the Kido Butai would not have been significant is ridiculous.
 

Markus

Banned
The Imperial Japanese Navy was at this time establishing sea and air control of the Dutch East Indies. With that established there would be no resupply of Singapore.

Since all of Japan’s successful attacks involved the heavy use of air power suggesting that the Kido Butai would not have been significant is ridiculous.

Don´t get me wrong, KB was lethal to ships of any kind but targets on land are a different matter, especially ground forces that are dug in, dispered and camouflaged. Singapore had also just gotten two triple-A regiments right before it fell.

And KB had one problem, it could not linger in an area for long enough to cut off SLOCs permanently. The IO-raid lasted ten days, the garrisions of Java, Sumatra and Singapore would not have run out of supplies in that time. A permanent airbase like Palembang would have closed the Suda Strait for good.


edit: I think you are wrong about the number of carrier at Darwin, wiki, combinedfleet and one of my books say KB was down to four, not six.
 
edit: I think you are wrong about the number of carrier at Darwin, wiki, combinedfleet and one of my books say KB was down to four, not six.

The books I have say Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu and IIRC, Kaga had suffered underwater damage just prior to this which meant she missed out on the Indian Ocean raid.
 
The books I have say Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu and IIRC, Kaga had suffered underwater damage just prior to this which meant she missed out on the Indian Ocean raid.

As I noted, Shōkaku and Zuikaku showed up for the Indian Ocean raid. That makes FIVE carriers operating together - which is more than the four Markus claims was the maximum that ever operated together after Pearl Harbor.

He is wrong. He should own up to it.
 
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