WI: Shiloh smashing Confederate Victory?

[dandan_noodles]

The way it looks to me, the general concept for Johnston's counterattack at Shiloh was pretty sound; he'd take on one Union army, right wheel to cut it off from support, destroy it against the Owl Creek swamps, before turning back to block the other army. He even had the good fortune to catch them completely by surprise.

Unfortunately for him, the deployment got all mucked up, with men from different corps getting mixed up, without enough men on the right wing to cut Grant off from Pittsburg Landing, and he was shot by his own men. Halleck took over the army and proceeded inexorably to Corinth, which served as a base for Grant's operations against Vicksburg.

So what happens if Grant's army is walloped at Shiloh, and Buell is prevented from crossing at Pittsburg landing? Can Grant's army be cornered, or will it just withdraw to the north? Johnston will probably lose a lot of his men even if he wins; what's his next move? Can a sharp defeat make a permanent career casualty of Grant?

 

[Spengler]

How are they going to wallop the army when they have men who havn't had a good meal in days and the lay of the land doesn't allow for easy communication?

 

[Anaxagoras]

How are they going to wallop the army when they have men who havn't had a good meal in days and the lay of the land doesn't allow for easy communication?

Well, for one thing, the reason that the men hadn't eaten in a few days was because the commanders were very lax about discipline. When they marched out of Corinth, the men had been issued three (four?) days rations, but most of them cooked it and ate it all that very night. Had Johnston and Beauregard kept a tighter rein on the army, they could have made sure that this did not happen.

As for difficult communication, this was as much of a problem for the Union army as it was for the Confederate one. However, a major reason that the Confederate situation became so confused was because Beauregard (whom Johnston left in charge of the details) deployed the three corps one behind the other, rather than giving each corps a specific sector of the line. The result was a hopeless muddle as soon as the action started, with the corps commanders struggling to maintain order and constantly getting in one another's way. This was an elementary mistake and might easily have been avoided.

 

[Spengler]

So how are they suddenly going to change discipline standards anaxagoras. Are they going to just snap their fingers and all their officers are suddenly going to change the way they have been doing things? Doesn't changing standards take time? Also hoe could it have been avoided?

This is a map of the terrain they went through, not exactly a place conductive to easy communication.

 

[dandan_noodles]

How are they going to wallop the army when they have men who havn't had a good meal in days and the lay of the land doesn't allow for easy communication?

By giving clear missions to the subordinate commanders, and deploying in a way that facilitates their execution.

 

[Spengler]

They had already spent days deploying and it didn't help them. Also how well those commanders would carry them out should also be considered considering who these Corps commanders were.

 

[dandan_noodles]

What do you mean, they spent days deploying? They were on the march up until the morning of the battle, and when they did deploy, they did it wrong, deploying in corps-waves rather than preparing to make a left wheel by stacking their combat power on the right wing.

 

[Spengler]

THe CSA forces were already near the battle for at least two days.

 

[dandan_noodles]

I mean, if you're not gonna discuss the WI (and instead are treating it as a PC or AHC), what are you doing in the thread, other than trying to negate its entire existence?

 

[Anaxagoras]

They had already spent days deploying and it didn't help them.

It wasn't a question of time. It was a question of doing it correctly rather than incorrectly. IOTL, they did it incorrectly. Since this is alternate history, the question could be, "What if they had deployed correctly?"

Also how well those commanders would carry them out should also be considered considering who these Corps commanders were.

Bragg actually wasn't half bad as a corps commander. It was only when he got bumped up to army command that his negative personal qualities started to cause problems. Hardee and Breckinridge were skilled commanders, although it is true that Polk was a walking disaster on just about every level.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Setting aside the details, if Shiloh was a smashing Confederate victory (say, a rout of the Union army on the level of Second Manassas), it would have massive repercussions. First, it might allow the Confederates to regain control of Western Tennessee, though this would not be guaranteed. It will certainly derail Union operations in the West for some time. Perhaps most importantly, it will likely get Grant sacked, which could radically transform the subsequent course of the war.

 

[Spengler]

It wasn't a question of time. It was a question of doing it correctly rather than incorrectly. IOTL, they did it incorrectly. Since this is alternate history, the question could be, "What if they had deployed correctly?"



Bragg actually wasn't half bad as a corps commander. It was only when he got bumped up to army command that his negative personal qualities started to cause problems. Hardee and Breckinridge were skilled commanders, although it is true that Polk was a walking disaster on just about every level.

And if they had the time to figure it out they were not going to do so. Also as I noted the problem of discipline is not going to be solved in two days either. Also before you start going with "Well their going to win" We need to ask how they'll win. Also there are plenty of talented northern generals as any good reading of the civil war will tell one. Finally it should be obvious I am not talking about Bragg.

 

[dandan_noodles]

The How has already been established; their plan points the way to a victory, the scenario assumes things go according to plan. More men on the right wing, they break through the Union line faster, and cut Grant off from Pittsburg Landing and his army either disintegrates fighting with the swamps to their backs or has to make a hasty retreat to Savannah. The first day was a near run thing OTL, and that was with terrible confederate deployment and Peabody acting outside his orders; a better handled deployment against completely unprepared Union troops has a good chance for success. Deploying the army in line-of-columns instead of column-of-lines will reduce the problem of men from different corps getting mixed together, so communication, command, and control will be easier and movement swifter.

Is there any reason to believe that Grant won't get permanently canned if his army is routed?
Does Halleck still become General in Chief?
After driving off Grant's army, where does Johnson halt to make a base for operations?
Does Bragg still mastermind the invasion of Kentucky?

 

[Spengler]

Actually it hasn't because the how hasn't because at the moment we have Johnson just snapping his fingers and everything changing just like that, its rather unbelievable. As has been established the army just want disciplined enough to not stop and loot the Union camps, likewise the ground did not facilitate communication neceserry to carry out this operation. THen there is also the fact no army in the civil war ever was destroyed except at Nashville.

 

[dandan_noodles]

What, you want after action reports from all the regimental commanders?

The how is that different orders get written and sent down from army headquarters, and then the corps commanders do what the orders say; do you not think Johnston is physically capable of writing something other than the OTL plan? Once battle is joined, army hq plays a relatively limited role; if the corps commanders know their jobs and how the plan fits together, they can carry them out and the plan will work. Grant's army can be destroyed because it's being caught by complete surprise with only one route to retreat.

At this point you're just refusing to accept the premise of the discussion; it's like you're watching a movie but refusing to believe it's not just light projected against a screen.

 

[Spengler]

Actually I would, please provide them. Also I refuse to accept the premise if it is rather fanciful and not based on the general reality at the time. I mean at the moment it seems to me rather then presenting say the life of WIlliam Wallace you're presenting me Braveheart. BTW something alot of you people who defend the CSA forget aobut this battle is the CSA had two commanders present kind of makes command and control hard.

 

[dandan_noodles]

What made C3 hard was that AJ decided to spend the day as a glorified brigade commander instead of actually leading the army, and Beauregard (second-in-command, not a dual commander) drew up a Bad Plan for the army's deployment. Neither of those had to happen, and considering the blow the Army of Mississippi landed OTL with those handicaps, I see no reason why their performance would not be dramatically better without them.

The obvious solution is to just not watch the movie then; you're wasting everyone's time by barging into the thread for the sole purpose of refusing to accept the premise.

 

[Spengler]

Well maybe ASJ jsut wasn't actually up to snuff. Really the only reason he had his place was because of the hero worship he got from Davis. Frankly he did what he did because its all he knew. Also as I have noted that the less then stellar corps commanders meant that the CSA couldn't perform much better. Also I have the right to question the premise if its faulty. Also me not thinking the premise is good doesn't mean I am drunk, unlike you suggested in the other thread.

 

[dandan_noodles]

Obviously, because Bearegard, tasked with drawing up the deployment, made a mistake in this one instance, it was utterly impossible for Johnston to have made an alternative decision that would give better results. And it hardly takes a tactical genius to command a corps as part of a left wheel. Right wing advances through completely surprised Union troops until they take Pittsburg Landing, then turn left to take the road to Savannah. Slam dunk for AJ.

Regardless of what you have the right to do on this board, doesn't change the fact that you're wasting everyone's time and not moving the discussion forward.

 

[Spengler]

Yet they didn't and the communications problems at the battle prevented them from actually doing that. So it seems unlikey that would happen.