I think that we have to accelerate the development of the SR.53 and SR.177 to make the OP feasible.
Some quotes from Derek Wood in Project Cancelled
"While the SR.53 was being completed and flown, however, the main effort at Saunders-Roe was devoted to the SR.177 which promised to be a project on a very large scale with full-production ultimately for both the RAF and the Royal Navy. Even before the award for a £30,000 design contract in May 1955, Saunders-Roe had been involved in a series of discussions with Service and Ministry officials. Company executives had seen the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall (later Sir Thomas) Pike; Sir John Baker and Air Commodore Kirkpatrick, the Deputy Director Operational Requirements. The RAF was enthusiastic, and the plan was to operate the P.1 Lighting and 177 side-by-side. The Royal Navy's interest was by no means luke-warm and Captain Hopkins, the Director of Warfare, and Mr Broddington, Director of Aircraft Research (RN), visited Cowes. The May 1955 contract reflected the dual interest, as it was for an RAF/RN aircraft which should be as closely integrated into one design as possible. The service requirements were NA.47 for the Navy and OR.337 for the RAF which was issued by the MOS as specification F.177D."
And
"Saunders-Roe set a target date of July 1954 for the first flight of the SR.53, but because of the complexity of the design and delays in the supply of an operational Spectre engine this forecast proved to be far too ambitious. The first flight eventually took place on 16 May 1957."
And
"The greatest problem was lack of access, which from the earliest days of assembly, until the first flight, kept the number of men that could be usefully employed on the machine to a very low figure indeed. For instance in the accessory bay, where several thousands of man hour work had to be done, it was impossible to have more than one operator or one inspector in the bay at one time. On the HTP system there were difficulties in satisfactorily welding the light alloy. If in the Argon Arc welding process a fragment of tungsten electrode became included in the weld it was deemed to be incompatible with the HTP. All welded parts had therefore to be sent for X-ray and any found with an inclusion had to have that area cut away and re-welded."
Sturtivant in British Research and Development Aircraft wrote,
"Meanwhile SR.53 construction was proceeding rather slowly, partially because of the difficulty of working in such a small aircraft packed with equipment, but also due to delays in the delivery of its Spectre rocket motor."
Sturtivant also wrote that the first flight date for the SR.177 (though more correctly SR.55) was set for mid-1957, but he does not say when this date was set.[/QUOTE]As I have shown in more detail in Post 46:
- 2 English Electric P.1A aircraft were ordered in April 1950 and were flown in August 1954 and July 1955 respectively;
- 3 English Electric P.1B aircraft were ordered in August 1953 made their first flights between April 1957 and January 1958;
- 20 English Electric Lightning pre-production aircraft were ordered in February 1954 and made their first flights between April 1958 and September 1959;
- 50 English Electric Lightning production aircraft were ordered in November 1956. Only 48 were built consisting of 19 F Mk 1 and 28 F Mk 1A aircraft and one static test article. The 47 aircraft that actually flew made their first flights between October 1959 and September 1961.
ITTL what if?
POD: August 1951.
The Operational Requirements branch of the Air Staff issues a more ambitious OR.301 leading to the Ministry of Supply issuing a more ambitious Specification F.124T in January 1952. That is they were effectively the OTL OR.301 (Issue 2) and Specification F.138D.
The Ministry of Supply still orders 3 aircraft from Saunders Roe in May 1953 and still issues Specification F.138D in June 1953. The Air Staff still produced OR.301 (2nd Issue) in August 1953. However, all 3 were more ambitious ITTL. The 3 aircraft ordered from Saunders Roe were SR.177 prototypes. Specification F.138D was effectively the OTL Specification F.177D issued in July 1956. OR.301 (Issue 2) was effectively the OTL OR.337 issued in December 1955.
Meanwhile Avro would have been given a contract to develop a Type 720 that was bigger and powered by a more powerful jet engine. However, the project for the aircraft and its Armstrong Siddeley Screamer rocket motor would be cancelled outright in January 1954. This was instead of one prototype cancelled in January 1954, the Avro 720 being cancelled in September 1955 and the AS Screamer being cancelled in March 1956. The redundant design teams at Avro and Armstrong Siddeley instead made an earlier start on the Blue Steel stand-off missile and it Stentor HTP rocket motor. (There was no Avro 730 and Armstrong Siddeley P.176 engine ITTL because both companies were concentrating on their Blue Steel work. This also means no Bristol Type 188 either and the money was instead spent on the Blue Steel programme, although Bristol and De Havilland Engines may have been subcontractors on the project.)
I was hoping that the 3 SR.177 prototypes ordered (and built) ITTL would take less time to make than the SR.53 prototypes that they take the place of due to them being bigger. However, that still leaves the problems of the HTP system in the aircraft and delays in the delivery of the Spectre rocket motor.
If progress on the prototypes was fast enough for the first one to fly in July 1954 (one month ahead of the P.1A) it would lead to a re-evaluation of both projects in 1954.
The English Electric P.1 programme would be cancelled in January 1954. However, the pair of P.1A prototypes (ordered in April 1950) might still be flown for research purposes. The money saved by cancelling the 3 P.1B aircraft (ordered in August 1953) in January 1954 made cancelling the third Saunders Roe prototype unnecessary. In any case cancelling it in January 1954 ITTL is unlikely to have saved much money as the aircraft is likely to have been at a much more advanced stage of construction than it was IOTL. Furthermore, it was needed for the development programme which would turn the aircraft into an operational combat aircraft.
A pre-production batch of 27 SR.177s would be ordered in February 1954 (in place of the 20 pre-production Lightnings that were ordered in February 1954 IOTL) and make their first fights between April 1957 and September 1959. This would lead to 50 production SR.177 F Mk 1 aircraft being ordered in November 1956 in place of the first 50 production Lightnings of OTL.
The version of Plan L dated 30th January 1957 showed that RAF Fighter Command had 560 fighters in 35 squadron at 31st December 1956 cosisting of:
272 All Weather Fighters in 17 squadrons of 16 aircraft (one Javelin, 8 Meteor and 8 Venom squadrons)
288 Short Range Day Fighters in 18 squadrons of 16 aircraft (2 Meteor and 16 Hunter squadrons)
However, on 31st March 1963 this was to be reduced to 280 aircraft in 20 squadrons with 12 or 16 aircraft as follows:
160 All Weather Fighters in 10 squadrons of 16 (all 10 squadrons having Javelins)
120 Short Range Day Fighters in 10 squadrons of 12 (all SR.177 and marks not specified)
The first 3 SR.177 squadrons were to form in the quarter ending 30th September 1959. The aircraft requirements section showed a total requirement for 300 fighter versions of the SR.177 plus an undetermined number of SR.177 trainers. However, the 300 fighters included some of the pre-production aircraft.
The version of Plan L dated 27th September 1957 (that is after the Sandys White Paper was published) showed that at 30th June 1957 RAF Fighter Command had 512 fighters in 32 squadrons of 16 consisting of:
256 All Weather Fighters in 16 squadrons (8 Meteor, 4 Venom and 4 Javelin)
256 Short Range Day Fighters in 16 squadrons (all Hunters)
A reduction to 280 aircraft in 20 squadrons was still planned. However, the number of Javelins and SR.177s was different. That is:
124 All Weather Fighters in 8 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft (all Javelins)
156 Short Range Day fighters in 12 squadrons of 12 or 16 (all SR.177s)
The first 2 SR.177 squadrons were now to form in the quarter ending 30th September 1960, which is a year later than was planned 8 months earlier. (In the January 1957 plan there were to have been 4 SR.177 squadron at 30th September 1960.)
The aircraft requirements section showed a total requirement for 318 SR.177 fighters (which this time did not include any of the pre-production aircraft) and an undetermined number of SR.177 trainers. The deliveries were spread over a larger period than the January 1957 version of Plan L. In that plan the 300 SR.177 fighters required were to have been delivered by March 1961. However, in the new plan only 276 (of 318 aircraft required) would have been delivered by the end of March 1963. On the other hand the September 1957 version of Plan L was the first to show more than one mark of SR. 177. That is the 318 aircraft were made up of 50 Mk 1 (already on requisition), 158 Mk 2 and 110 Mk 3.
In the event No. 74 Squadron converted from Hunters to SR.177s in June 1960 and at 31st March 1963 there were only 48 SR.177s in 4 with 12 aircraft each, which was about 30% of the 156 SR.177s in 12 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft each planned for this date in September 1957.
The Javelin force was also small than planned 5½ years earlier. Instead of 124 in 8 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft there were 4 squadrons. I don't know how many aircraft were in the 4 squadrons in March 1963, but I do know that the 2 Javelin squadrons that remained in Fighter Command at 31st March 1964 had 14 aircraft each. Therefore, my guess is that the 4 squadrons that existed in March 1963 also had 14 aircraft each for a total front-line of 56 Javelins.