WI: Saunders-Roe Gets The Fighter Contract

Interesting numbers for the SAM systems.

From The History of the Royal Air Force, Consultant: John D.R. Rawlings
A further element in the defence of the V-bomber bases was the Bloodhound I surface-to-air guided missile, first introduced in July 1958. Over the following three years 352 were deployed in four missile wings, each with a Tactical Control Centre (TCC) to control the missile sites:
  • No. 2 Wing at Lindholme, the northern deterrent complex;
  • No. 148 Wing at North Coates covering the V-bomber bases at Scampton, Waddington and Coningsby, and the Thor squadron at Helmswell;
  • No. 151 Wing at North Luffenham defending the bases further south, and;
  • No. 24 at Watton defending those in East Anglia.
The Bloodhound I was designed to engage targets flying between 10,000ft (3,050m) and 60,000ft (18,290m) at 20 miles (32km) range. It was powered by two Thor ramjets and had four short-burning rocket-boost motors to accelerate it to its cruising speed of Mach 2; its proximity fuse actuated a high explosive warhead. On the ground a complex sequence of events would follow identification of a potential target by the C&R System and a decision at the Master Radar Station to use guided weapons rather than manned fighters. The appropriate TCC would then be given the target's position, height, course and speed, and would allot it to a selected launching site, where the missile would be fired, to home on to the reflected radar response produced by a target illuminating radar at the site.

Within 3 years of the Bloodhound I system being completed, however, it fell victim to a further round of defence economies; the TCCs, which had been found susceptible to jamming, were closed in January 1963, and the squadrons (controlled meanwhile by the Master Radar Stations at Partrington and Bawdsey) were disbanded in June 1964. An improved missile, however, the Bloodhound II, which was air-transportable, entered service with No. 25 (SAM) Squadron (previously a famous night-fighter squadron) in 1964 mainly for overseas reinforcement, but available also to strengthen home defences when not serving elsewhere. The squadron moved to Germany in 1970 and a second squadron, No. 85, was re-formed for service in the United Kingdom.
My RAF Squadrons 1950-1970 spreadsheet has 11 Bloodhound Mk 1 squadrons formed from 1st December 1958 to 10th October 1960. The first squadron to be disbanded was No. 264 on 30th November 1962. The 10 remaining squadrons were disbanded between 30th June 1963 and 30th September 1964.

The Plan P squadron patterns say that Fighter Command had 64 Bloodhound I in 2 squadrons on 31st March 1964, when my RAF Squadrons 1950-1970 spreadsheet says that there were still 4 squadrons on that date. However, that does work out at 32 Bloodhound I per squadron and 32 missile launchers x 11 squadrons = 352 missile launchers as indicated by Rawlings.

According to my RAF Squadrons 1950-70 and 1970-90 spreadsheets No. 25 Squadron disbanded as a Javelin squadron on 31st December 1962 and was not re-formed as a Bloodhound II squadron until 1st October 1973. Furthermore No. 85 Squadron didn't become a Bloodhound II squadron until December 1975.

According to my RAF Squadrons 1950-70 and 1970-90 spreadsheets No. 65 Squadron was the first Bloodhound II squadron. It re-formed on 1st January 1964 (AFAIK) in FEAF and remained there until disbanded on 30.03.70. Another 3 Bloodhound II squadrons existed in the 1960s as follows:
  • No. 33 Squadron - formed 01.03.65 in FEAF where it remained until it was disbanded 31.01.70
  • No. 41 Squadron - formed 01.09.65 at West Raynham and AFAIK remained there until it disbanded 31.07.70
  • No. 112 Squadron - formed 02.11.64 at Woodhall Spa. It moved to Cyprus on 01.10.67 and remained there until it disbanded on 01.07.75
According to the copy of Plan P, at March 1964 the plan was for a total of 4 operational Bloodhound II squadrons with 272 launchers between them and one training squadron with 12 launchers. That is:
1 squadron in Fighter Command with 72 launchers plus the training squadron
1 squadron in Cyprus with 64 launchers
1 squadron in FEAF with 64 launchers and
1 squadron in FEAF with 72 launchers.​

So the Bloodhound II squadrons of the 1960s were twice the size of the preceding Bloodhound I squadrons.
 

Zen9

Banned
The numbers are interesting when you consider the Tornado ADV numbers went to something like 165, not so far from earlier FAW numbers.

The Lightning numbers are more intriguing and I might suggest that the F.177 was intended to replace the Lightning if my reading is correct on the approximate RAF order.
But cancellation forces changes and 'now' Lightning is 'it' for QRA.
Feb '54 ordered 20 P.1B
Nov '56 ordered 50 F.1
'58 for 44 F.2
70 F.3
16 F.3A +14 upgraded F.2 and F.3
39 F.6 =15 F.3A's upgraded + 7 F.3's
31 F.2's upgraded to F.2A

So the bulk of orders are definitively after the '57 defence review's conclusions and the early production was limited in development and avionics precisely because they felt it was going to be superseded by '64 and this view of the type as a 'interim machine' lingered in RAF thinking for many years.
This traces back to that RAF figure of about 150 Saro F.177 fighters, likely because the needs of QRA dictated the numbers of aircraft.

IF a Attack/Strike version had been pursued, the approximate figure of between 150-175 is fairly stable from 'Harrier' P1154 to Jaguar implying a total RAF order for approximately 300 machines.
Combined with the FAA's figure of 150 that takes us to 450-475.
The scale of this production would have major effects on RAF and MoD perception of solutions, and exert a major influence on the companies involved.

But what it cannot fulfill is the FAW role, for that an alternative machine is needed.
 
My RAF Squadrons 1950-1970 spreadsheet has 11 Bloodhound Mk 1 squadrons formed from 1st December 1958 to 10th October 1960. The first squadron to be disbanded was No. 264 on 30th November 1962. The 10 remaining squadrons were disbanded between 30th June 1963 and 30th September 1964.

The Plan P squadron patterns say that Fighter Command had 64 Bloodhound I in 2 squadrons on 31st March 1964, when my RAF Squadrons 1950-1970 spreadsheet says that there were still 4 squadrons on that date. However, that does work out at 32 Bloodhound I per squadron and 32 missile launchers x 11 squadrons = 352 missile launchers as indicated by Rawlings.
This is the location of the 11 Bloodhound I squadrons from RAF Squadrons: A Comprehensive Record of the Movement and Equipment of All RAF Squadrons and Their Antecedents Since 1912 by C.J. Jefford combined with the dates for formation and disbandment from Flying Units of the RAF by Alan Lake.

Bloodhound I squadrons.png

I don't know, but I suspect that the plan was for No. 151 Wing to have a third squadron. If the planned squadron was to have had 32 Bloodhound launchers then:

12 squadrons x 32 launchers = 384 launchers - which is the number of launchers planned for March 1963 in the September 1957 version of Plan L.​
 
According to my RAF Squadrons 1950-70 and 1970-90 spreadsheets No. 25 Squadron disbanded as a Javelin squadron on 31st December 1962 and was not re-formed as a Bloodhound II squadron until 1st October 1973. Furthermore No. 85 Squadron didn't become a Bloodhound II squadron until December 1975.
No. 25 Squadron, RAF - a correction

According to Lake No. 25 Squadron disbanded as a Javelin squadron at Leuchars on 31st December 1962. However, he says it reformed on 1st October 1963 at North Coates on Bloodhound SAMs and remained in existence until 2nd July 1989, when it disbanded at Wyton and was absorbed by No. 85 Squadron. It re-formed at Leeming on 1st January 1990 as a Tornado ADV squadron.

The Wikipaedia entry on RAF North Coates says that No. 25 Squadron was there from October 1963 to January 1971. It also says that a Surface to Air Missile Operational Training School existed at North Coates from October 1963 to August 1964, when it was absorbed by No. 25 Squadron.

However, the Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation website says that No. 25 Squadron disbanded at Leuchars on 30th November 1962 and that it re-formed the next day at North Coates as a Bloodhound SAM squadron.

That is interesting because 1st December 1962 is the day after No. 264 Squadron disbanded at North Coates. Therefore, it could have been that No. 264 squadron was re-numbered No. 25 Squadron.

No. 85 Squadron, RAF - an elaboration

According to Lake No. 85 Squadron disbanded as a Javelin squadron at West Raynham on 31st March 1963.

It re-formed on 1st April 1963 by re-numbering the Fighter Command Target Facilities Squadron of the Central Fighter Establishment. It disbanded again on 19th December 1975 at West Raynham and was absorbed by No. 100 Squadron.

However, a new No. 85 Squadron was formed as a Bloodhound squadron at West Raynham on 19th December 1975, the same day that the previous No. 85 Squadron was disbanded and absorbed by No. 100 Squadron.

As noted above No. 25 Squadron was disbanded on 2nd July 1989 and was absorbed by No. 85 Squadron, which doubled its size. Before it had had 3 flights (A to C) and now it had 6 flights (A to F).

No. 85 Squadron disbanded for the last time at West Raynham on 31st July 1991.
 
The numbers are interesting when you consider the Tornado ADV numbers went to something like 165, not so far from earlier FAW numbers.
Bear in mind that the figures that I have so far quoted are the squadron establishments and not the total number of aircraft to be purchased.

The Number of Lightnings required at September 1957 was 318 plus an undetermined number of trainers. 276 of the 318 fighter versions were to have been delivered by 31st March 1963.

Plan L 27.09.57 P12 to P14 Air Ministry Requirements & Aircraft Programmes.png
 
The Lightning numbers are more intriguing and I might suggest that the F.177 was intended to replace the Lightning if my reading is correct on the approximate RAF order.
But cancellation forces changes and 'now' Lightning is 'it' for QRA.
Feb '54 ordered 20 P.1B
Nov '56 ordered 50 F.1
'58 for 44 F.2
70 F.3
16 F.3A +14 upgraded F.2 and F.3
39 F.6 =15 F.3A's upgraded + 7 F.3's
31 F.2's upgraded to F.2A

So the bulk of orders are definitively after the '57 defence review's conclusions and the early production was limited in development and avionics precisely because they felt it was going to be superseded by '64 and this view of the type as a 'interim machine' lingered in RAF thinking for many years.
As you can see from the spreadsheet 76 Lightning fighters had been ordered before the 1957 Defence Review. These were made up of 3 P1A prototypes (including one static test article), 3 P1B prototypes, 20 P1B pre-production aircraft and finally the first production contract for 50 aircraft placed at the end of 1956.

Lightning Orders.png
 
But cancellation forces changes and 'now' Lightning is 'it' for QRA.
Feb '54 ordered 20 P.1B
Nov '56 ordered 50 F.1
'58 for 44 F.2
70 F.3
16 F.3A +14 upgraded F.2 and F.3
39 F.6 =15 F.3A's upgraded + 7 F.3's
31 F.2's upgraded to F.2A.
A grand total of 216 Lightning fighters was ultimately built. See below.

Lightning - RAF by Mark.png

However, in September 1957 - which was after the publication of the 1957 Defence White Paper - the requirement was for 318 Lightning fighters and 276 of them were to be delivered by the end of March 1963.
 

Zen9

Banned
I put it to you that the Lightning was viewed as an 'interim' type.
This is after all what just about every reasonable history reports.

This is why the fully auto-interception system, having been funded was never installed on operational aircraft.
This is why the steerable nose wheel was funded but never retrofitted to existing or then new production aircraft.
And this is why upgrades until F.3 were minimal.
In fact it's with the F.6 that the dam broke, but even then the RAF's eyes are on new future aircraft. It was still "just a few years from retirement", and consequently not worth ordering too many or spending too much upgrading existing machines.
Which is a continuing part of the story of the Lightning from it's ordering in '54.
This is why the PL.1 gained no traction with the RAF.

By my estimation, the likely order would have been capped at approximately 120 machines if that. Once the Saro fighter had proved serviceable. If only because the mixed power plant fighter was thought to be more flexible, and cheaper.
Reality might have been different I grant you.
But that was their thought processes at the time.
 
I put it to you that the Lightning was viewed as an 'interim' type.
This is after all what just about every reasonable history reports.

This is why the fully auto-interception system, having been funded was never installed on operational aircraft.
This is why the steerable nose wheel was funded but never retrofitted to existing or then new production aircraft.
And this is why upgrades until F.3 were minimal.
In fact it's with the F.6 that the dam broke, but even then the RAF's eyes are on new future aircraft. It was still "just a few years from retirement", and consequently not worth ordering too many or spending too much upgrading existing machines.
Which is a continuing part of the story of the Lightning from it's ordering in '54.
This is why the PL.1 gained no traction with the RAF.

By my estimation, the likely order would have been capped at approximately 120 machines if that. Once the Saro fighter had proved serviceable. If only because the mixed power plant fighter was thought to be more flexible, and cheaper.
Reality might have been different I grant you.
But that was their thought processes at the time.

The Lightning story is pretty sad, it was akin to conspiracy theory against the aircraft.

In my mind any Britwank would involve the production of a bunch of Lightnings and developing it as far as it can be, without the ridiculous like swing wings.
 

Zen9

Banned
It's not such a Britwank as one might think, had the right changes happend at the right time.
 
I read a thesis about the post-war RCAF on-line, which said that the F-11F-1 Super Tiger was the aircraft that the RCAF preferred.
To be fair however, this was before the mission tasking of 1 Air Division with NATO/4 ATAF was changed to that of all weather strike from day fighter/air superiority.
The F-11F-1 would be certainly inferior (from a pilot's perspective) @ 550+KTAS on the deck with a B28/B61 strapped to it's belly and it would also need extensive avionics upgrades (NASSAR) integrated to be even nominally capable in this new (Government mandated) role. The CF-104 was as good a machine as you could ask for at the time; the real travesty is the political garbage involved in getting the six squadrons tasked with tactical strike duties actually armed with the weapons required and operational.
That all said, I can't speak as to the "Super Tiger's" suitability for use by the Luftwaffe/DKM in a far wider variety of roles. It is obvious that the F-11F-1 certainly had advantages in specific areas of the flight envelope over the "zipper".
I definitely think that the RCAF got the right machine to fill the role it was tasked with. The specialized "attack version" F-104G was already developed and fully tested when the contract was signed. The same can not be said about the "Super Tiger", which was a "paper airplane" with two flying prototypes. When we consider the budgetary constraints that the RCAF faced in 1959 and the spending commitments it had to meet (SAGE/Bomarc/Pinetree/C-130) then the CF-104 makes even more sense on a "dollar for dollar" basis.
The F11-F-1 did not have the legs (or the avionics suite) for our NORAD role, nor did it have any appreciable advantages in the Nuclear Strike role (briefly) adopted for our NATO commitment.

What should have happened is the re-equipment of the Air Division in the early 1970's (when we abandoned tactical (Nuke) Strike) with the F-4E, saving the abject waste of money on the CF-116 (CF-5) fiasco and re-applying it to a real conventional air to ground capability. But that's not happening with Trudeau holding the purse strings. Our F-5's were a great (i.e. T-38) lead-in trainer, but pretty much useless for anything else.
They (operational guys with 434 Sqd.) called it the "ERB" when I lived in Cold Lake in the mid-late 1970's.
End of Runway Bomber.
Enough said.
 
I put it to you that the Lightning was viewed as an 'interim' type.
This is after all what just about every reasonable history reports.

This is why the fully auto-interception system, having been funded was never installed on operational aircraft.
This is why the steerable nose wheel was funded but never retrofitted to existing or then new production aircraft.
And this is why upgrades until F.3 were minimal.
In fact it's with the F.6 that the dam broke, but even then the RAF's eyes are on new future aircraft. It was still "just a few years from retirement", and consequently not worth ordering too many or spending too much upgrading existing machines.
Which is a continuing part of the story of the Lightning from it's ordering in '54.
This is why the PL.1 gained no traction with the RAF.

By my estimation, the likely order would have been capped at approximately 120 machines if that. Once the Saro fighter had proved serviceable. If only because the mixed power plant fighter was thought to be more flexible, and cheaper.
Reality might have been different I grant you.
But that was their thought processes at the time.
I think that we are talking (or should that be writing) at cross purposes. I'm not so much arguing against your idea of only building the Lightnings that had had been ordered before the 1957 Defence Review and then ordering SR.177s in favour of the Lightnings ordered afterwards as saying, "These were the plans in the 1957 Defence Review, which were less severe than what actually ended up happening in the next 5 or 6 years," to show what might be possible ITTL.

Again this is something I have transcribed from Project Cancelled for another post that I'm working on. I'm putting it in this post to show that IOTL the RAF seems to have seen the Lightning and SR.177 as complementary aircraft. That is for them it was not Lightning or SR.177 - it was Lightning and SR.177
Earlier on, Wood wrote, "While the SR.53 was being completed and flown, however, the main effort at Saunders-Roe was devoted to the SR.177 which was devoted to the SR.177 which promised to be a project on a very large scale with full-production ultimately for both the RAF and the Royal Navy. Even before the award for a £30,000 design contract in May 1955, Saunders-Roe had been involved in a series of discussions with Service and Ministry officials. Company executives had seen the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall (later Sir Thomas) Pike; Sir John Baker and Air Commodore Kirkpatrick, the Deputy Director Operational Requirements. The RAF was enthusiastic, and the plan was to operate the P.1 Lighting and 177 side-by-side. The Royal Navy's interest was by no means luke-warm and Captain Hopkins, the Director of Warfare, and Mr Broddington, Director of Aircraft Research (RN), visited Cowes. The May 1955 contract reflected the dual interest, as it was for an RAF/RN aircraft which should be as closely integrated into one design as possible. The service requirements were NA.47 for the Navy and OR.337 for the RAF which was issued by the MOS as specification F.177D."
However, the RAF might have had a different opinion in 1955 if the SR.53 had flown in July 1954 (as planned by Saro in May 1953, when the 3 prototypes were formally ordered, but that is for the other post that I am working on.
 
I put it to you that the Lightning was viewed as an 'interim' type.
This is after all what just about every reasonable history reports.
I put it to you that by today's standard all 1950s aircraft were "interim" types.

In the 1950s most aircraft only served for 5-10 years before being replaced by completely new aircraft. Meanwhile individual marks of aircraft were only in service only a few years before they were replaced by the next mark of the same aircraft.

What changed was the ever increasing cost of developing and then building new aircraft. Plus aerodynamics seem to have been reaching their practical limits. That is it was prohibitively expensive to build aircraft that could fly faster and higher than the aircraft that were coming into service around 1960. Instead of trying to fly faster and higher the emphasis seems to have changed to low flying to go "under the radar", ECM and improving dogfighting characteristics.

The Lightning wasn't the only British (or foreign aircraft for that matter) to have served in the front-line for much longer than expected. I doubt that anyone imagined aircraft like the Hunter and the V-bombers remaining in front-line service for as long as they did.

I must emphasise that I'm not saying that the Lightning was not developed as fast or as fully as it could have been due to the Powers That Be thinking that it would be not cost effective because it was to have been replaced by something better soon afterwards or (probably more likely that the Powers That Be didn't have enough money to do both). What I am saying is that it was a common occurrence in British defence planning at the time.
 
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I think that we have to accelerate the development of the SR.53 and SR.177 to make the OP feasible.

Some quotes from Derek Wood in Project Cancelled
"While the SR.53 was being completed and flown, however, the main effort at Saunders-Roe was devoted to the SR.177 which promised to be a project on a very large scale with full-production ultimately for both the RAF and the Royal Navy. Even before the award for a £30,000 design contract in May 1955, Saunders-Roe had been involved in a series of discussions with Service and Ministry officials. Company executives had seen the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall (later Sir Thomas) Pike; Sir John Baker and Air Commodore Kirkpatrick, the Deputy Director Operational Requirements. The RAF was enthusiastic, and the plan was to operate the P.1 Lighting and 177 side-by-side. The Royal Navy's interest was by no means luke-warm and Captain Hopkins, the Director of Warfare, and Mr Broddington, Director of Aircraft Research (RN), visited Cowes. The May 1955 contract reflected the dual interest, as it was for an RAF/RN aircraft which should be as closely integrated into one design as possible. The service requirements were NA.47 for the Navy and OR.337 for the RAF which was issued by the MOS as specification F.177D."
And
"Saunders-Roe set a target date of July 1954 for the first flight of the SR.53, but because of the complexity of the design and delays in the supply of an operational Spectre engine this forecast proved to be far too ambitious. The first flight eventually took place on 16 May 1957."
And
"The greatest problem was lack of access, which from the earliest days of assembly, until the first flight, kept the number of men that could be usefully employed on the machine to a very low figure indeed. For instance in the accessory bay, where several thousands of man hour work had to be done, it was impossible to have more than one operator or one inspector in the bay at one time. On the HTP system there were difficulties in satisfactorily welding the light alloy. If in the Argon Arc welding process a fragment of tungsten electrode became included in the weld it was deemed to be incompatible with the HTP. All welded parts had therefore to be sent for X-ray and any found with an inclusion had to have that area cut away and re-welded."
Sturtivant in British Research and Development Aircraft wrote,
"Meanwhile SR.53 construction was proceeding rather slowly, partially because of the difficulty of working in such a small aircraft packed with equipment, but also due to delays in the delivery of its Spectre rocket motor."
Sturtivant also wrote that the first flight date for the SR.177 (though more correctly SR.55) was set for mid-1957, but he does not say when this date was set.[/QUOTE]As I have shown in more detail in Post 46:

  • 2 English Electric P.1A aircraft were ordered in April 1950 and were flown in August 1954 and July 1955 respectively;
  • 3 English Electric P.1B aircraft were ordered in August 1953 made their first flights between April 1957 and January 1958;
  • 20 English Electric Lightning pre-production aircraft were ordered in February 1954 and made their first flights between April 1958 and September 1959;
  • 50 English Electric Lightning production aircraft were ordered in November 1956. Only 48 were built consisting of 19 F Mk 1 and 28 F Mk 1A aircraft and one static test article. The 47 aircraft that actually flew made their first flights between October 1959 and September 1961.
ITTL what if?

POD: August 1951.

The Operational Requirements branch of the Air Staff issues a more ambitious OR.301 leading to the Ministry of Supply issuing a more ambitious Specification F.124T in January 1952. That is they were effectively the OTL OR.301 (Issue 2) and Specification F.138D.

The Ministry of Supply still orders 3 aircraft from Saunders Roe in May 1953 and still issues Specification F.138D in June 1953. The Air Staff still produced OR.301 (2nd Issue) in August 1953. However, all 3 were more ambitious ITTL. The 3 aircraft ordered from Saunders Roe were SR.177 prototypes. Specification F.138D was effectively the OTL Specification F.177D issued in July 1956. OR.301 (Issue 2) was effectively the OTL OR.337 issued in December 1955.

Meanwhile Avro would have been given a contract to develop a Type 720 that was bigger and powered by a more powerful jet engine. However, the project for the aircraft and its Armstrong Siddeley Screamer rocket motor would be cancelled outright in January 1954. This was instead of one prototype cancelled in January 1954, the Avro 720 being cancelled in September 1955 and the AS Screamer being cancelled in March 1956. The redundant design teams at Avro and Armstrong Siddeley instead made an earlier start on the Blue Steel stand-off missile and it Stentor HTP rocket motor. (There was no Avro 730 and Armstrong Siddeley P.176 engine ITTL because both companies were concentrating on their Blue Steel work. This also means no Bristol Type 188 either and the money was instead spent on the Blue Steel programme, although Bristol and De Havilland Engines may have been subcontractors on the project.)

I was hoping that the 3 SR.177 prototypes ordered (and built) ITTL would take less time to make than the SR.53 prototypes that they take the place of due to them being bigger. However, that still leaves the problems of the HTP system in the aircraft and delays in the delivery of the Spectre rocket motor.

If progress on the prototypes was fast enough for the first one to fly in July 1954 (one month ahead of the P.1A) it would lead to a re-evaluation of both projects in 1954.

The English Electric P.1 programme would be cancelled in January 1954. However, the pair of P.1A prototypes (ordered in April 1950) might still be flown for research purposes. The money saved by cancelling the 3 P.1B aircraft (ordered in August 1953) in January 1954 made cancelling the third Saunders Roe prototype unnecessary. In any case cancelling it in January 1954 ITTL is unlikely to have saved much money as the aircraft is likely to have been at a much more advanced stage of construction than it was IOTL. Furthermore, it was needed for the development programme which would turn the aircraft into an operational combat aircraft.

A pre-production batch of 27 SR.177s would be ordered in February 1954 (in place of the 20 pre-production Lightnings that were ordered in February 1954 IOTL) and make their first fights between April 1957 and September 1959. This would lead to 50 production SR.177 F Mk 1 aircraft being ordered in November 1956 in place of the first 50 production Lightnings of OTL.

The version of Plan L dated 30th January 1957 showed that RAF Fighter Command had 560 fighters in 35 squadron at 31st December 1956 cosisting of:
272 All Weather Fighters in 17 squadrons of 16 aircraft (one Javelin, 8 Meteor and 8 Venom squadrons)
288 Short Range Day Fighters in 18 squadrons of 16 aircraft (2 Meteor and 16 Hunter squadrons)​

However, on 31st March 1963 this was to be reduced to 280 aircraft in 20 squadrons with 12 or 16 aircraft as follows:
160 All Weather Fighters in 10 squadrons of 16 (all 10 squadrons having Javelins)
120 Short Range Day Fighters in 10 squadrons of 12 (all SR.177 and marks not specified)​

The first 3 SR.177 squadrons were to form in the quarter ending 30th September 1959. The aircraft requirements section showed a total requirement for 300 fighter versions of the SR.177 plus an undetermined number of SR.177 trainers. However, the 300 fighters included some of the pre-production aircraft.

The version of Plan L dated 27th September 1957 (that is after the Sandys White Paper was published) showed that at 30th June 1957 RAF Fighter Command had 512 fighters in 32 squadrons of 16 consisting of:
256 All Weather Fighters in 16 squadrons (8 Meteor, 4 Venom and 4 Javelin)
256 Short Range Day Fighters in 16 squadrons (all Hunters)​

A reduction to 280 aircraft in 20 squadrons was still planned. However, the number of Javelins and SR.177s was different. That is:
124 All Weather Fighters in 8 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft (all Javelins)
156 Short Range Day fighters in 12 squadrons of 12 or 16 (all SR.177s)​

The first 2 SR.177 squadrons were now to form in the quarter ending 30th September 1960, which is a year later than was planned 8 months earlier. (In the January 1957 plan there were to have been 4 SR.177 squadron at 30th September 1960.)

The aircraft requirements section showed a total requirement for 318 SR.177 fighters (which this time did not include any of the pre-production aircraft) and an undetermined number of SR.177 trainers. The deliveries were spread over a larger period than the January 1957 version of Plan L. In that plan the 300 SR.177 fighters required were to have been delivered by March 1961. However, in the new plan only 276 (of 318 aircraft required) would have been delivered by the end of March 1963. On the other hand the September 1957 version of Plan L was the first to show more than one mark of SR. 177. That is the 318 aircraft were made up of 50 Mk 1 (already on requisition), 158 Mk 2 and 110 Mk 3.

In the event No. 74 Squadron converted from Hunters to SR.177s in June 1960 and at 31st March 1963 there were only 48 SR.177s in 4 with 12 aircraft each, which was about 30% of the 156 SR.177s in 12 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft each planned for this date in September 1957.

The Javelin force was also small than planned 5½ years earlier. Instead of 124 in 8 squadrons of 12 or 16 aircraft there were 4 squadrons. I don't know how many aircraft were in the 4 squadrons in March 1963, but I do know that the 2 Javelin squadrons that remained in Fighter Command at 31st March 1964 had 14 aircraft each. Therefore, my guess is that the 4 squadrons that existed in March 1963 also had 14 aircraft each for a total front-line of 56 Javelins.
 
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This is an extract from Scenario 1957 in the conclusion of Project Cancelled.
The Mk1 P1121 goes into RAF service in 1962, and sells extremely well abroad. The development cycle is maintained with greatly increased weapons load and range as more thrust become available. A version with completely up –dated avionics, new weapons and short field performance is a standard RAF squadron type in 1976. Sorting out the FD.2 and the SR.177 proves to be a more difficult problem. It is realised that Britain cannot go it alone for ever with rising costs and budget limitations, and that the European industry is re-establishing itself. At top level the Government decided to use both types as the start of ‘collaboration’ and as a means of combating the tremendous sales efforts being made buy the US.

Negations with the federal German Republic (begun in 1956) are completed for the joint development and production of the SR.177 rocket-plus-turbojet interceptor. As Armstrong Whitworth is to be the main UK production centre, the aircraft side of Saunders Roe is taken over by Hawker Siddeley and the de Havilland Engine Company. Two variants of the SR.177 are agreed upon: the basic mixed power, rapid-reaction, high altitude interceptor for air force/naval use, and a medium to low altitude strike/fighter variant with turbojet only, rocket fuel tankage being used for kerosene and a four per cent thickness wing being employed. German pressure leads to the adoption of a Rolls Royce turbojet in place of the Gyron Junior. The MoD agrees to three RAF squadrons in Germany being equipped with SR.177’s, while the type becomes the standard FAA fighter. Both the Luftwaffe and the German Navy adopt the SR.177 a standard and the joint production programme becomes the largest in Europe. The Lockheed bid with the F-104 Starfighter comes to nothing.

In the case of the FD.2, Whitehall opens discussions with the French on a collaborative agreement between Fairey and Dassault. Information is pooled and joint airframe development started. A batch of six aircraft is ordered in both France and Britain, the former with the SNECMA Atar engine and the latter with the reheated Avon. The outcome is a basic Mach 2.0 aircraft, which becomes standard in France and in Britain, begins to replace the Hunter in 1962. With steady development, the production lines keep rolling to meet export orders, right through to the seventies.
IOTL the RAF also had a requirement for an aircraft to replace the Swift in the 2 fighter-reconnaissance squadrons in Germany and the Venom fighter-bomber in the overseas commands. After considering the Folland Gnat the RAF had 161 Hunter Mk 6 aircraft rebuilt to FGA Mk 9 and FR Mk 10 standard. The Hunter FGA Mk 9 made its first flight on 3rd July 1959 and entered service with Nos. 1 and 8 Squadrons in January 1960. The Hunter FR Mk 10 made its first flight on 7th November 1958 and entered service with No. 4 Squadron in January 1961.

As I've wanked the SR.177 so that it can be built instead of the Lightning it would make sense for ground attack and reconnaissance versions of the SR.177 to be built for the RAF in place of the rebuilt Hunters. If the decision was made early enough I think that the FGA and FR versions of the SR.177 could be put into service at the same time as these version of the Hunter IOTL. For example it might be possible to complete some of the 27 pre-production aircraft ordered in February 1954 to prototypes of the FGA and FR versions.

That would increase the total number of SR.177s built for the RAF from 258 aircraft (216 interceptors and 42 trainers) to 419. However, I also think that some two-seat versions of the FGA version will be needed for conversion training, which would add more aircraft to the total.
 
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