Charles Emmanuel III, the King of Sardinia, fought on the side of the “Pragmatic Allies” (Austria, Britain, and the Netherlands) during the War of the Austrian Succession. By the end of that war, however, his relationship with Austria was extremely strained. The alliance forged between them by the Treaty of Worms was borne of desperation, as Austria badly needed Sardinia’s help to keep the Bourbons from seizing Milan and Mantua. Maria Theresa resented that Charles Emmanuel had extorted her in this moment of weakness, demanding Austrian territory as the price of his aid. Late in the war, the Austrians even proposed a separate peace with France that would have screwed over Sardinia, and tried until the very end to get out of the promises they had made to CE3 in the Treaty of Worms. For his part, Charles Emmanuel was furious that the final peace denied him territories he had been promised in the Treaty of Worms - the Genoese territory of Finale (which would have finally given Piedmont a port on the east side of the Alps) and the Austrian territory of Piacenza (which went to the new Bourbon Duke of Parma instead). Maria Theresa hated Frederick of Prussia above all, but Charles Emmanuel was a close second.
When the Seven Years’ War broke out, Sardinia remained neutral. This was probably a good call - while they had been on the winning side of the previous war, the conflict had been costly and the government was focused on paying down the country’s war debt. More importantly, Sardinia’s strategic situation had become much worse after the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. Previously, the Savoyards benefitted from the rivalry between the Habsburgs and Bourbons which allowed them to play one against the other; now these two powers were allied and Sardinia was sandwiched between them. If Sardinia joined the war, Britain would no doubt have supported them with their naval and financial resources, but in terms of land forces the Sardinians would be quite alone in Italy.
Nevertheless, there were ministers in CE3's own government who urged him to join the war on the side of the British and Prussians. What if he had?
The earliest time for this to occur is probably in the summer of 1758. Frederick’s signal victories at Rossbach and Leuthen were won in late 1757, and in the spring of 1758 Brunswick drove the French back over the Rhine and Britain concluded a formal alliance and subsidy agreement with Prussia. With the anti-Prussian coalition seemingly on the back foot, the time looks ideal to strike. The Milanese is only lightly held - from what I can tell, at this moment Austrian Italy was defended by only about 6-7 Austrian battalions spread between the Milanese and Mantua. They were supported by 2,700 Modenese soldiers which the Duke of Modena (who at the time was serving as the governor of Milan) had lent to Austria to garrison Italy.
I’m not clear on exactly how large the Sardinian army was in 1756, but at its peak during the WAS in 1747 it reached around 55,000 men. A few regiments were disbanded after the peace, but reaching or exceeding this strength - particularly with British subsidies, which they would be happy to provide - would probably not be difficult.
The most sensible strategy is probably to ignore France and focus on the reduction of the Milanese. France will probably honor its treaty obligations to Austria, but I doubt their full effort will be spent in Italy. After the disasters of 1758 France’s newly-appointed chief minister Choiseul chose to concentrate on Britain and Western Germany, and he might still do that even if Sardinia entered the war (particularly if Sardinia makes no attempt to attack French territory). Still, a French occupation of Savoy seems likely (being on the other side of the Alps, it was a difficult territory for Sardinia to defend), and the French could make an attempt against Nice/Villefranche to cut Sardinia off from their British allies. An offensive against Piedmont proper, however, would be more challenging. Britain’s presence in the Mediterranean and Genoa’s neutrality means that it can really only be done with a campaign over the Alps, which had not gone very well for the French when they tried it at Assietta in 1747. Nevertheless, the Sardinians still have to guard against such a move, tying down a significant part of their army.
There is also the question of what Austria’s response would be. A Sardinian invasion of the Milanese cannot go unanswered, but diverting an army from the Prussian front will further weaken Austria in a contest they already appear to be losing. Would the Austrians cut a deal with one of their enemies in order to focus on the other, as they had done during the WAS?
Could Sardinia plausibly emerge from this war as one of the victors and gain territory in Lombardy, or is this certain to be the worst mistake the Savoyard monarchy ever made?
When the Seven Years’ War broke out, Sardinia remained neutral. This was probably a good call - while they had been on the winning side of the previous war, the conflict had been costly and the government was focused on paying down the country’s war debt. More importantly, Sardinia’s strategic situation had become much worse after the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756. Previously, the Savoyards benefitted from the rivalry between the Habsburgs and Bourbons which allowed them to play one against the other; now these two powers were allied and Sardinia was sandwiched between them. If Sardinia joined the war, Britain would no doubt have supported them with their naval and financial resources, but in terms of land forces the Sardinians would be quite alone in Italy.
Nevertheless, there were ministers in CE3's own government who urged him to join the war on the side of the British and Prussians. What if he had?
The earliest time for this to occur is probably in the summer of 1758. Frederick’s signal victories at Rossbach and Leuthen were won in late 1757, and in the spring of 1758 Brunswick drove the French back over the Rhine and Britain concluded a formal alliance and subsidy agreement with Prussia. With the anti-Prussian coalition seemingly on the back foot, the time looks ideal to strike. The Milanese is only lightly held - from what I can tell, at this moment Austrian Italy was defended by only about 6-7 Austrian battalions spread between the Milanese and Mantua. They were supported by 2,700 Modenese soldiers which the Duke of Modena (who at the time was serving as the governor of Milan) had lent to Austria to garrison Italy.
I’m not clear on exactly how large the Sardinian army was in 1756, but at its peak during the WAS in 1747 it reached around 55,000 men. A few regiments were disbanded after the peace, but reaching or exceeding this strength - particularly with British subsidies, which they would be happy to provide - would probably not be difficult.
The most sensible strategy is probably to ignore France and focus on the reduction of the Milanese. France will probably honor its treaty obligations to Austria, but I doubt their full effort will be spent in Italy. After the disasters of 1758 France’s newly-appointed chief minister Choiseul chose to concentrate on Britain and Western Germany, and he might still do that even if Sardinia entered the war (particularly if Sardinia makes no attempt to attack French territory). Still, a French occupation of Savoy seems likely (being on the other side of the Alps, it was a difficult territory for Sardinia to defend), and the French could make an attempt against Nice/Villefranche to cut Sardinia off from their British allies. An offensive against Piedmont proper, however, would be more challenging. Britain’s presence in the Mediterranean and Genoa’s neutrality means that it can really only be done with a campaign over the Alps, which had not gone very well for the French when they tried it at Assietta in 1747. Nevertheless, the Sardinians still have to guard against such a move, tying down a significant part of their army.
There is also the question of what Austria’s response would be. A Sardinian invasion of the Milanese cannot go unanswered, but diverting an army from the Prussian front will further weaken Austria in a contest they already appear to be losing. Would the Austrians cut a deal with one of their enemies in order to focus on the other, as they had done during the WAS?
Could Sardinia plausibly emerge from this war as one of the victors and gain territory in Lombardy, or is this certain to be the worst mistake the Savoyard monarchy ever made?