WI: Sandinistas win Nicaragua's 1990 election?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaraguan_general_election,_1990

Many outside observers back in the day expected the FSLN to win the election. What would be different if they did? I'm running a geopolitical simulator set in 1990 and, after I decided on 8 out of 10 chance the FSLN would lose as they did in real life, the random number generator I use to determine outcomes decided they would win.

Pro-Sandinista sources argue that much of the FSLN's defeat was due to the US threatening to perpetuate sanctions and the Contra war if the electorate made the "wrong" decision. On the other hand, the FSLN in subsequent years (after losing 1990) built up ties with the Church, former Contras, and generally projected a more moderate image. I'd assume the FSLN winning 1990 would still continue the pro-market reforms it had been undertaking since the late 80s in an effort to improve the economy and, with the "fall of Communism," convince the US to at least tolerate a Sandinista-ruled Nicaragua.
 

raharris1973

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I agree they'll probably hold off on thumbing their nose at the US and moderate until the late 1990s and the rise of Chavismo
 
I agree they'll probably hold off on thumbing their nose at the US and moderate until the late 1990s and the rise of Chavismo
In the game thus far the US player declared that, "Any improvement of US - Nicaraguan relations will be contingent on the speedy resolution of the claims of US citizens arising from Sandinista confiscations and expropriations." I assume the FSLN would not be interested in undoing such things, so it seems relations remain bad. :p
 
There is the possibility that the Sandinistas might figure they just need to hold out until the USA has a new party in charge, and maybe a later President or Congress will be more reasonable with them.

They can counter to claims on expropriated property, claims due to damage the US-backed Contras did, and see if Washington will negotiate on those terms--claim the Contras did so much harm it amounts to the value of anything the regime took, and refer the out-of-pocket claimants to Uncle Sam for reimbursement. They can add in liability for crimes the Somoza regime committed going back to the 1920s.

In short, "we can do better by being frozen out of relations with you, the USA, than by cozying up and then being raped again. If you want to settle claims, let's settle all of them and see who owes whom!"

That attitude is a red flag before Bush and the Republicans in Congress, and also quite a number of hawkish Democrats, and if they can hold out until 1993, they may be sadly disappointed with the Clinton Administration's offers. Also if the Sandinistas are not driven from power, it could butterfly the 1992 election in Bush's favor somehow. Perhaps more likely might be that in addition to invading Panama and the Gulf War, US forces simply invade Nicaragua as well and instead of going into political eclipse but being allowed to live and politick for a comeback, they are hunted down, either killed or driven into exile, presumably to Cuba since Bush would leave few other safe places.

And it is possible in turn that such a drastic act over and above the other interventions might boomerang on Bush, particularly since he'd have to leave some force in place to make sure the new right-wing government he imposes stays in power. Depending on the timing, occupation of Nicaragua might be the issue he is perceived to lose on, and Clinton might have a mandate for reforms there that open the door to surviving FSLN to start to recover politically. Of course, if Clinton simply withdraws the troops and then the Sandinistas take over all over again, the narrative on the right would be Clinton is either pro-Communist or anyway too weak to deal with them. But it is not clear to me whether the American people would respond by not reelecting him; the Republicans smeared both Clintons as the Antichrist incarnate anyway and yet people preferred him to war veteran Dole. Meanwhile, with no Soviet Union to support them and Cuba on the ropes, the Sandinistas are going to have to find some way of negotiating with capitalist powers, if not necessarily Uncle Sam, somehow or other. I do think that moderate democratic socialism can pull off enough wins as perceived by the working class public to secure an ongoing political mandate. Especially if the US government is not in fact spending loads of money to send in "freedom fighters" to commit sabotage, murder and rape. If they can have that until 2001, I suppose they can be in a strong position to resist such tactics from Bush the Lesser, and if W decides he has a mandate to invade Nicaragua--he might find it very costly indeed. Nor will such antics help his standing with the rest of the Western world when he tries to get support for schemes such as invading Iraq. Perhaps Nicaragua will ground out all his lightning, so the outcome is once again naked and successful repression in Central America, but we have no leverage to depose Saddam Hussein. Nor get entangled in all the other messes we have in the Middle East since then.

Personally I think Bush would focus on Iraq and treat Nicaragua as peripheral, and very likely start a new edition of the Contras. He can plausibly deny all he wants but it would be evident globally who backs the sudden resurgence of "freedom fighters." It sure would torpedo the rhetoric of "War on Terror" though. That might still go forward as yet another Bush supporter mantra, one far fewer of those with some distance from total support for W would be able to stomach though given the obvious hypocrisy. And for that reason perhaps he would be forced to choose between letting Nicaragua ride, sanctioned and stonewalled but largely left alone like Cuba, versus another invasion.

Or of course, the Clinton Administration might continue to support whatever junta GHW Bush put in, and supply them with enough resources and intel on the side that it stays in power. So perhaps it would indeed be with the rise of Chavez that the W administration finds itself too stretched thin to resist a belated Sandinista comeback, probably not through democratic means.
 
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