WI Sadat does not interfere in the October War

[Nassirisimo]

The October War is often said to have been the closest the Arabs have come to securing at least a limited victory over Israel. This was partially due to the realistic Egyptian (though not Syrian) assessment of their capabilities and proper planning around this. However, the tide turned against the Egyptians when Sadat first ordered a further advance into the Sinai, which went against the Egyptian plan. It is argued by some in the Egyptian high command that Sadat was one of the reasons that the Israelis were able to break through the Egyptian lines at the Battle of the Chinese Farm.

So the question is, what if Sadat decides not to interfere in the conduct of the war, and it results in the Egyptians staying put rather than launching another offensive? Do the Israelis manage to break through anyway? Is their task significantly more difficult?

Edit- Apologies for the confusing wording in the second part of the post.

 

[Armored Diplomacy]

An IDF reconnaissance unit had identified a crucial gap between the Egyptian Second and Third armies that could be exploited to launch a breakthrough. In OTL, they were afraid of crossing due to the size of Egyptian armored forces present in the area, and waited for an opportunity to reduce Egyptian armored strength before attempting a breakthrough. The Battle of Mitla Pass provided the IDF with that opportunity.

Had the Egyptians not attacked, Israel would have had to launch an attack before a UN-imposed ceasefire came into effect. The United States wanted to see Israeli forces in Egypt, so Kissinger would likely have given Israel the needed cover.

The fighting would have been fierce and brutal, with heavy casualties on both sides, and I'm not sure how it would end, but the superior quality of IDF tanks would make me bet on an Israeli victory. From then on, the IDF would advance into Egypt much like in OTL.

 

[danderson]

I believe that this was covered in a timeline done a while back about a John Wayne presidency. It's not the main focus of course, but it's there. As I recall Syria got soaked but Egypt made gains in the Sinai. Israel is not happy. Longer term Sadat runs into problems with other Arab leaders, although im not sure that was fleshed out before it died.

Link

 

[Nassirisimo]

An IDF reconnaissance unit had identified a crucial gap between the Egyptian Second and Third armies that could be exploited to launch a breakthrough. In OTL, they were afraid of crossing due to the size of Egyptian armored forces present in the area, and waited for an opportunity to reduce Egyptian armored strength before attempting a breakthrough. The Battle of Mitla Pass provided the IDF with that opportunity.

Had the Egyptians not attacked, Israel would have had to launch an attack before a UN-imposed ceasefire came into effect. The United States wanted to see Israeli forces in Egypt, so Kissinger would likely have given Israel the needed cover.

The fighting would have been fierce and brutal, with heavy casualties on both sides, and I'm not sure how it would end, but the superior quality of IDF tanks would make me bet on an Israeli victory. From then on, the IDF would advance into Egypt much like in OTL.

I think you're correct about the Israelis launching the attack anyway, but I'm not too sure that they would be successful. While Israeli tank crews were better than the Egyptian ones, the Egyptians still have the Saggar missile to partially offset the Israeli superiority. There is also the question of how the 4 Egyptian armour brigades held back OTL would effect the battle.

 

[Dave Howery]

Once the Syrian forces were defeated (which was a damn close run, closer than many give the Syrians credit for), I'd think the Israelis could clear the Egyptians from the east side of the Canal, although it would be a grim and costly fight. But it may not get that far... the Americans were leaning towards a peace treaty early on, and were actually not that unhappy that "the Arabs had gotten their honor back" (to quote someone from that time). So, with Syria beaten in the north but Egypt sitting secure on the Canal in the south, the war may just end there, with negotiations between Egypt, Israel, and the USA sure to be... interesting.

 

[Anaxagoras]

Even with the Israeli repulse of the second Egyptian offensive (which was largely due to Israeli air power as the Egyptian advanced past their SAM umbrella) the Israeli attack to punch through the gap between the two Egyptian armies and cross the Canal was a near run thing. If the Egyptians had still had all their armored forces intact and their morale high by their earlier victories over the Israeli armored divisions, I can easily see the Egyptians beating the Israelis back.

This, needless to say, would be a disaster, as the UN ceasefire might have taken hold with the Egyptians still in possession of the east bank of the Canal without any Israeli forces on the west bank. Kissinger would have tried to delay the ceasefire to give the Israelis times to inflict a defeat on the Egyptians, but if they tried and failed to do so, how long could he keep it up?

 

[Dave Howery]

At the time of the Egyptian decision to commit the remainder of their armored forces, the lines had become pretty solid... the Israelis had come up with some countermeasures against the Saggers (although not 100% effective), and Israeli losses had gone way down. Of course, an attack straight into the Egyptian lines with the Egyptian armor still intact on the west bank would have been costly.
I don't think Kissinger or the Americans in general would try to stop a cease fire in hopes of an Israeli victory. For once, the American government and Sadat had common goals... weaning Egypt away from the Russians and getting negotiations going with Israel. There was some sentiment in America early in the war to get peace talks going, while Egypt was still sitting strong on the Canal, for precisely this reason. In fact, Israel had to launch the Canal crossing in a hurry, mainly because America and Sadat were looking for a cease fire, and Israel wanted to be across the Canal and in a winning position before that happened. So, if the war had become stalemated, with Egypt sitting strong on the Canal, Sadat and Kissinger would be hammering out a cease fire pretty soon...

 

[Armored Diplomacy]

I don't think Kissinger or the Americans in general would try to stop a cease fire in hopes of an Israeli victory. For once, the American government and Sadat had common goals... weaning Egypt away from the Russians and getting negotiations going with Israel. There was some sentiment in America early in the war to get peace talks going, while Egypt was still sitting strong on the Canal, for precisely this reason. In fact, Israel had to launch the Canal crossing in a hurry, mainly because America and Sadat were looking for a cease fire, and Israel wanted to be across the Canal and in a winning position before that happened. So, if the war had become stalemated, with Egypt sitting strong on the Canal, Sadat and Kissinger would be hammering out a cease fire pretty soon...

And the USA could not have weaned Egypt from the Soviets unless Israel, America's ally, had Egypt by the balls, so that the USA could effectively decide Egypt's fate.

That couldn't happen unless Israel had made substantial gains. Kissinger's goal was an Israeli quasi-victory, but not a total and complete smashing victory. He likely would not have allowed the war to drag on forever, but Israel would be given ample time to divert resources from the Syrian front, mass them in the Sinai, and launch it's attack.

And I think that the IDF would have won. By that time, they had developed some countermeasures to the Saggers, and it would likely be a joint tank-infantry affair, with heavy artillery support. The battle would be so crucial that the IAF would probably get involved, after having transferred air power from the Syrian front and receiving additional planes from the American airlift, even with the presence of Egyptian SAMs. By this time the IAF had developed tactics to thwart the SAMs, but there would still have been losses.

Overall, the battle could drag on for two days, but in the end, it would likely be an Israeli victory. Israeli tank crews and tanks were simply better. But it would go down as by far the most horrific battle in Israeli history. Casualties on both sides could climb into the thousands. At the end of it all, the battlefield would probably resemble something out of hell.

I think that the IDF would have established a bridgehead and crossed the canal, though the advance might be a bit more limited in gains.

 

[Nassirisimo]

And the USA could not have weaned Egypt from the Soviets unless Israel, America's ally, had Egypt by the balls, so that the USA could effectively decide Egypt's fate.

That couldn't happen unless Israel had made substantial gains. Kissinger's goal was an Israeli quasi-victory, but not a total and complete smashing victory. He likely would not have allowed the war to drag on forever, but Israel would be given ample time to divert resources from the Syrian front, mass them in the Sinai, and launch it's attack.

And I think that the IDF would have won. By that time, they had developed some countermeasures to the Saggers, and it would likely be a joint tank-infantry affair, with heavy artillery support. The battle would be so crucial that the IAF would probably get involved, after having transferred air power from the Syrian front and receiving additional planes from the American airlift, even with the presence of Egyptian SAMs. By this time the IAF had developed tactics to thwart the SAMs, but there would still have been losses.

Overall, the battle could drag on for two days, but in the end, it would likely be an Israeli victory. Israeli tank crews and tanks were simply better. But it would go down as by far the most horrific battle in Israeli history. Casualties on both sides could climb into the thousands. At the end of it all, the battlefield would probably resemble something out of hell.

I think that the IDF would have established a bridgehead and crossed the canal, though the advance might be a bit more limited in gains.

Although Israel had re-learnt the value of combined arms after the thrashing they received at the beginning of the October war, it still wouldn't affect the fact that they are going against stronger forces than they faced OTL when it was as Anaxagoras put it "a near run thing", as well as possible reinforcements from the first army. I don't think the chances of Israeli success are that certain (though of course, a successful Egyptian defense isn't guaranteed). The Israelis still maintained a superiority in the skill of its tank crews but they would basically be driving into a strong Egyptian defensive force that is well prepared for the task.

 

[Armored Diplomacy]

Although Israel had re-learnt the value of combined arms after the thrashing they received at the beginning of the October war, it still wouldn't affect the fact that they are going against stronger forces than they faced OTL when it was as Anaxagoras put it "a near run thing", as well as possible reinforcements from the first army. I don't think the chances of Israeli success are that certain (though of course, a successful Egyptian defense isn't guaranteed). The Israelis still maintained a superiority in the skill of its tank crews but they would basically be driving into a strong Egyptian defensive force that is well prepared for the task.

Israeli victory is not a sure-run thing, but it's very likely. For one, they would have likely had air support, and would have braved the SAMs, though they would have applied tactics to minimize aircraft losses.

Secondly, the IDF force would have been significant in size, and I find it likely that the attack would be delayed for a few days while significant armored forces were transferred to the south.

Now, this significantly-sized IDF force would be superior in both the quality of tanks and in tank crews. And it's not just that Israeli tanks were better. The Centurion had a higher profile than the T-55, meaning it could bring it's gun to bear fire from behind dunes and positions while showing less of it's body, making it less vulnerable. It was better suited for desert combat.

And Israeli infantry accompanying the tanks would probably be equipped with TOW missiles, which shredded Egyptian tanks in OTL (though I concede that Egyptian Saggers would also take their toll).

The only advantage the Egyptians have is that they're more numerous and in defensive positions.

And you're forgetting one thing. The Egyptians, likely after having taken a pounding from artillery fire and airstrikes, would only have a window of time to blast away from their defensive positions before the IDF came charging right in and forcing them to engage them in a confusing all-out free-for-all across the desert, like what happened on the Golan Heights. And that's where the superior skill and quality of military equipment of the Israelis would come into play.

The Egyptians did have the numbers on their side, and they had a hell of a lot of tanks, and they could do quite some damage during the initial advance, so it's not a sure thing, but I would bet on an Israeli victory. Although admittedly, the losses might be so grievous that the IDF would have to stop to regroup and reorganize before advancing into Egypt.

 

[Anaxagoras]

It's worth pointing out that the Syrians were far from finished on the Northern Front. After the Israelis had pushed the Syrians out of the Golan and a few miles into Syria proper, the front stabilized and the Syrians received enormous amounts of equipment from the Russians. Large numbers of Jordanian and Iraqi troops had also assembled on the front. In fact, when the cease-fire went into effect, the Syrians were about to open a major counter offensive against the Israelis to drive them back into the Golan.

If the Israelis are having a rougher time in the Sinai than they did IOTL, having to commit more of their air power and armor to the region, it would probably have delayed a cease-fire long enough to give the Syrians time to launch their counter attack. Whether it would have succeeded or not is an open question, but it certainly would have been tough for the exhausted Israelis to hang on to their gains.

 

[Armored Diplomacy]

It's worth pointing out that the Syrians were far from finished on the Northern Front. After the Israelis had pushed the Syrians out of the Golan and a few miles into Syria proper, the front stabilized and the Syrians received enormous amounts of equipment from the Russians. Large numbers of Jordanian and Iraqi troops had also assembled on the front. In fact, when the cease-fire went into effect, the Syrians were about to open a major counter offensive against the Israelis to drive them back into the Golan.

If the Israelis are having a rougher time in the Sinai than they did IOTL, having to commit more of their air power and armor to the region, it would probably have delayed a cease-fire long enough to give the Syrians time to launch their counter attack. Whether it would have succeeded or not is an open question, but it certainly would have been tough for the exhausted Israelis to hang on to their gains.

The Syrians may have had their losses replaced in equipment, but they had lost most of their trained, veteran tank crews. Their offensive would have consisted of inferior tanks manned by young, barely trained crewmen charging towards entrenched IDF forces superior in quality, training, and experience, with air and artillery cover. They would have endured a horrific slaughter to capture a few miles.

 

[Anaxagoras]

The Syrians may have had their losses replaced in equipment, but they had lost most of their trained, veteran tank crews. Their offensive would have consisted of inferior tanks manned by young, barely trained crewmen charging towards entrenched IDF forces superior in quality, training, and experience, with air and artillery cover. They would have endured a horrific slaughter to capture a few miles.

While I doubt that the Syrian counter offensive would have been successful in driving the Israelis back into the Golan, it certainly would have put the Israelis under extreme pressure. They would not have had much air cover, as most of the IAF was fixated on the fighting around the Suez (which would have been the case even more so in this scenario). Moreover, the Israelis troops on the Golan were exhausted and had suffered heavy casualties in manpower and material themselves. The Israelis had had some difficulty repulsing the haphazard counter attacks the recently-arrived Iraqi troops had mounted in the days leading up to the cease-fire and had been rather worn down in the process.

Whether or not the Syrians would succeed is not as important to ask as how the counter offensive would have impacted the overall conflict. If the Israelis are still struggling to fight their way onto the west bank of the canal down in the Suez, and suffering heavier losses than they did IOTL, the demonstration that the Syrians are still game enough to take the offensive on the Northern Front would be an event of considerable importance.

 

[lucaswillen05]

I doubt very much there would even be a war in the event Egypt and Syria did not agree to a joint attackonIsreal.Themotivations for theattackare clear-bothnations want to recover territory lost in1967 (the Sinai and the Golan Heights.

If either Egypt orSyria tried attacking on their own the IDF would crush them evenwith theIsraelis leaving enough ofa precautionary covering force to hold a possible offensive(in this case that wouldbe to watch Egypt) TheSyrianattackwould havebeenstoppeddeadafter the firstcouple of days(in OTL the Isrealis held the Golan for four days with what they actually had while simultanousllyholding the Sinai against the Egyptians) In the eventof Syria going towar on their ownIDF reserves reach the front faster andinmuchgreaternumbers,crush the Syrian offensive. The IDF launch theircounteroffensiveseveraldays earlier thanOTL,crush the Syrianarmy,end the warby encircling Damascus. Syrian army officers likely mount a coup,overthrow Assad(he ends up dead) andd sue for peace. Syria may well end up ceding theGolan as the price of peace and of recovering a large additional chunk of lost territory in Syria.

Assad was no foolandknew perfectlywella result like that wouldhappenif hetried it onhis own whichis why hewentwith Egypt and other Arab Allies like Iraq and Jordan.

 

[Anaxagoras]

I doubt very much there would even be a war in the event Egypt and Syria did not agree to a joint attackonIsreal.Themotivations for theattackare clear-bothnations want to recover territory lost in1967 (the Sinai and the Golan Heights.

That's not the question. Reread the OP. The question is what would have happened if Sadat had not interfered with the course of the war by pressuring his generals to launch the Egyptian offensive on October 14.

 

[lucaswillen05]

The question was badly worded. It said "So the question is, what if Sadat decides to keep out of the war"

If Nassirismo said "If Sadat did not interfere with the management of the war and did potpressurehis generals ntomounting theOctober 14 attack" I would say that the IDF would stillcross thecanal butit wouldbe a harder fight and Egyptian III Army might avoid encirclementifmore Egyptian reservesare kepton theWest Bank.Isreal stll wins butby anevennarrowe margins.

AlternativelyIDF defemnds intheSiai on the positions they took up following their failedcounter attackand concentrates on Syria.Captured Syrian territorycould be negotiated away for the Sinai bridgehead. Alternatively,after knocking Syria out a large part of the IDF redeploys to the Sinai to win against Egypt.

 

[Grimm Reaper]

In fact it was Syria's poor performence which convinced Sadat to intervene against the Eygptian plan, which had made history in terms of proceeding as it was intended to, a very rare thing in history.

 

[Armored Diplomacy]

It's worth pointing out that the Syrians were far from finished on the Northern Front. After the Israelis had pushed the Syrians out of the Golan and a few miles into Syria proper, the front stabilized and the Syrians received enormous amounts of equipment from the Russians. Large numbers of Jordanian and Iraqi troops had also assembled on the front. In fact, when the cease-fire went into effect, the Syrians were about to open a major counter offensive against the Israelis to drive them back into the Golan.

If the Israelis are having a rougher time in the Sinai than they did IOTL, having to commit more of their air power and armor to the region, it would probably have delayed a cease-fire long enough to give the Syrians time to launch their counter attack. Whether it would have succeeded or not is an open question, but it certainly would have been tough for the exhausted Israelis to hang on to their gains.

True, but at that point, it would be too late to switch forces, so both fronts would have to make do with what they have. It would make the Israeli cabinet seriously begin to consider a ceasefire, but after a day or two, it would probably be clear that Israel would be coming out on top (Like I said, an Israeli victory in the Sinai in those circumstances is not certain, but I would bet on it.).

 

[lucaswillen05]

By the14th the IDF had strongpositions inthe Sinai andthe counter offensive versus Syria waswell underway.Redeploying a division or so was possible ifyoupostpone the Suez crossing toknock Syriaout of the war. Theywouldstill have run intothe Arab counterattack butthe IDF now have more troopsi in the north than OTL whileleaving enough toholdthe Sinai.

 

[Clint]

The October War is often wrongfully said to have been the closest the Arabs have come to securing at least a limited victory over Israel.

Fixed that for you. It should be the 1948 war, but nobody seems to take notice that it's the only war where an Arab army was able to obtain Israeli territory by force of arms.

This was partially due to the realistic Egyptian (though not Syrian) assessment of their capabilities and proper planning around this.

Wrong on both accounts. The Egyptians were right that they cannot defeat Israel if they try to retake the entire Sinai, so they developed the beliefe that trying to fight the same enemy, only limiting yourself to smaller gains would logicaly lead to better results. It didn't work out, as the Israeli crossing and circling of the third army proved. The planning was also lacking in so many aspects I can't realy figure where to start. There is a difference between a plan that looks nice and orderly on paper, where everyone down the chain of command down to the last soldier knows what to do at T+16h34m45s, and a plan that bloody works.

However, the tide turned against the Egyptians when Sadat first ordered a further advance into the Sinai,

No, it turned the second Egypt declared war, should have been visible by the sixth hour(ish) of the operation, and only dawned on Egypt around the 16th/17th of October.

which went against the Egyptian plan.

Again, false. It went exactly according to the plan, the only difference is that the plan said to go there if things look like you are winning, and based on several pre-conditions. Like I said, Egypt by this time still has no idea of what is realy going on, and assumes that so far all is (pretty much) good.

It is argued by some in the Egyptian high command that Sadat was one of the reasons that the Israelis were able to break through the Egyptian lines at the Battle of the Chinese Farm.

They don't say, these people who are responsible to plan and execute the plan blame Sadat, for an order he gave about a week after the setting for defeat was there, for thier failures? Shocking.

So the question is, what if Sadat decides not to interfere in the conduct of the war, and it results in the Egyptians staying put rather than launching another offensive? Do the Israelis manage to break through anyway? Is their task significantly more difficult?

Regarding Sadat it's hard to say, as there are different depictions of just what were Egypt's goals. So I'll just stick to the usual "WI: No Egyptian offensive on the 14th?"

No, the task is not significantly more difficult.

The Time: The plan to cross was originally intended for the 15th. Intelligence that an Egyptian offensive was planned for the 14th meant that there were a few movements of units to defend against the coming attack, and then on the 15th some movements back to the starting points for the crossing on the 15th. So as far as the time factor is concerned, we are still good to go.

The Location: The seam between the Egyptian armies was known since about the second/third day of the war (can't recall right now, I'll check if anyone wants), when a full Israeli recon battalion went there to spend the night and make sure there are no Egyptian units there. There weren't, since like I said a few moments ago, Egypt lost the war on the first day. The plan was to start off with 5 divisional beach-heads with a 10km radius, that will later link up and creat the first stage of Operation Badr, a 10km deep defensive line, from which the second stage (the one we are discussing) will be launched from,, together with the copying of the missile wall to the eastern bank of the Suez. Now Egypt lost the war when it failed to fulfill stage 1, and later still tried to fulfill stage 2. The Seam was not only across the entire Great bitter lake, but it also streached a bit to it's north, thus creating an opening for Israeli forces to begin the crossing, before Egypt knew that anything was going on. So as far as the location factor is concerned, we are still good to go.

The Opposition: During the offensive on the 14th, Egypt lost over 250 tanks. Now this is the point where usually people think that Egypt could have profited from not launching the offensive. "If Egypt holds on the 14th, it still has 250 tanks and more guys to hold the Israelis, right?". Not exactly. See, these 250 tanks were lost all along the front, not just from units close to the crossing point. Those were around 20 or so. Not a big deal, especially when you consider that the problem was not with the numbers, it was the command. The Egyptian forces from the 2nd army couldn't hold back the Israeli forces due to problems with synchronizing the defense properly. The whole allignment was set to defend to the east, not to the south. The forces from the 3rd army, well, anyone who has a little understanding of what happened to the Egyptian 25th armored brigade, and why that happened, understands that numbers mattered little there, and that simply saying "well, here is another 100 tanks" just isn't good enough. So as far as the opposition factor is concerned, we are still good to go.

So to repeat my answear, no, the task is not significantly more difficult.