WI: Sabres used in Vietnam War
- Thread starter Ming777
- Start date
MacCaulay
Banned
I've got a book by Lon Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age, and it states that apparently the final air-to-air engagement of the 1971 Indo-Pak war was between a Pakistani F-86 Sabre (Canadair) and an Indian MiG-21.
The F-86 did a radar-controlled intercept and downed the MiG-21.
It also mentions that there were a number of other dogfights between the two, with the F-86 mostly coming out on top due to it's tight turning radius. I remember somewhere that some pilot called the Canadair Sabre "the best dogfighter in the world".
The F-86 did a radar-controlled intercept and downed the MiG-21.
It also mentions that there were a number of other dogfights between the two, with the F-86 mostly coming out on top due to it's tight turning radius. I remember somewhere that some pilot called the Canadair Sabre "the best dogfighter in the world".
Hmm...updated F-86Hs (the last USAF version) with 4 20-mm and two AIM-9s would've been far, far better to challenge MiG-17s than F-4s or F-105s. Only problem I'd see is range: unless you're flying from Da Nang (northernmost air base in SVN), they may not have the fuel, even with drop tanks, to make it into the Red River Delta (i.e. Hanoi and Haiphong) from Thai bases.
Was I the only one thinking of cavalry when I clicked on this thread?
On topic, not sure about whether the Sabre is better than the F4, but a dogfighter would be better in at least some situations. The lack of a gun on the F4 hurt it in situations where the missiles had run out. So far as I know against Mig-21s the Sabre wins. So the main problem is that described by Matt of range. If they can fix that the Sabre might fit better than the Phantom in Vietnam.
The RAAF stationed a detachment of Avon Sabres (as good as the Canadair ones) in Thailand from 1962 - 68. Their role from 1965 was to support the US bombing of Nth Vietnam by providing base defence to free up the USAF planes for offenasive missions. However the RAAF ROE were restrictive and by 1966 the sqn was marginalised. I have wondered about this sqn moving to Sth Vietnam in 1966 upon the formation of the ATFV brigade and the taking up of an independant role for Australia in Vietnam. But if this happened the Sabres would only be used in the South as CAS and wouldn`t be heading north to battle Migs.
I think the US has plenty of suitable aircraft to tackle the Migs in the North, Robin Olds showed what the F4C could do in Jan 1967, shooting down 7 and 2 Mig 21s for no loss in 2 engagements 4 days apart. The US problem in air to air fighting wasn`t aircraft performance but training and doctrine, TopGun solved this issue for the USN by 1972 but it took the USAF until 1975 to sort out Red Flag.
I think the US has plenty of suitable aircraft to tackle the Migs in the North, Robin Olds showed what the F4C could do in Jan 1967, shooting down 7 and 2 Mig 21s for no loss in 2 engagements 4 days apart. The US problem in air to air fighting wasn`t aircraft performance but training and doctrine, TopGun solved this issue for the USN by 1972 but it took the USAF until 1975 to sort out Red Flag.
True that, Operation BOLO in Jan '67. But, the F-4 couldn't turn with a MiG-17, and most NVAF aces preferred the -17 over the -21. Having a plane that could turn and burn with a MiG-17 would've been handy.
The AF managed to get its act together in '72: look at Steve Ritchie; 5 kills, all MiG-21s, and all AIM-7s. A remarkable feat, given the poor reliablity of the Sparrow in SEA.
The AF managed to get its act together in '72: look at Steve Ritchie; 5 kills, all MiG-21s, and all AIM-7s. A remarkable feat, given the poor reliablity of the Sparrow in SEA.
Yes, but no confirmed air-to-air kills: F-100 driver Capt. Don Kilgus sprayed a MiG-17 with 20-mm fire on the AF's first Thanh Hoa Bridge raid on 4 March 65, and was credited with a damage. The Viets admitted in the 1990s that the victim did crash on landing, but the AF still credits Kilgus (now deceased) with a damage.
Oh, yeah, the Last of the Gunfighters, as they said back then. 6:1 kill ratio against NVAF MiGs, with 19 kills against 3 losses air-to-air.
I was amazed when I read the Ault Report that there was no dedicated loader for Sparrows as late as 1969. Ault said that missiles that are treated like bomb tend to perform like bombs.
I read a report of a USN Commander who got his RIO to set up a sparrow shot on a contact he was prosecuting. It was all ready to go when the Cdr got a visual and fired, and it worked, none of this waiting for the missile to warm-up crap. The raw material was there for a real turkey shoot from 1965 but the USAF and USN were in the middle of an air to air slump at the time and the results reflected this.
Supersonic jet and missile air to air fighting is a fascinating topic when you get right into it, complex and engaging.
Keep in mind that the F-8 community was still dogfight oriented. Everyone else in F-4s or F-105s was oriented to either pure interception or to strike missions (the F-105's main role, though it did kill 29 MiGs during the war, mostly with the 20-mm Vulcan gun). The F-4 didn't even have an internal gun, and only when 20-mm gun pods arrived in-theater during 1967,with one crew getting two MiG-17s with the SUU-23 pod in Nov 67, and the development of the E model Phantom, did matters improve. Es got several gun kills in 1972, including the only known gun kill scored when both combatants were flying supersonic. But in '65, it was thought that missiles alone would be enough, and that most kills would be BVR. Wrong on both counts.
What the Ault Report found was that experienced fighter pilots, using their best judgement and skill, were firing missiles from outside their performance parameters about half of the time. The pilots could fly and their planes were good, but they weren`t properly trained to use the weapons at their disposal. What the Naval Air Weapons School taught pilots, using instrumented training ranges, was the engagement envelopes of their weapons. Once pilots knew the position they had to be in to get the missile kill their kill rates went up markedly.
In contrast guns were a well known quantity, you got into position and fired. This is why F8s and F105 managed to get so many kills with guns.
In contrast guns were a well known quantity, you got into position and fired. This is why F8s and F105 managed to get so many kills with guns.
True, but AIM-7 reliablity was still poor: a pk (probability of kill) of 11% in SEA. AF pilots had to ripple-fire the weapon in twos to get one to work right. Steve Ritchie did it twice, and I believe Robin Olds did it on one of his four kills. If Olds had gotten a confirmed kill on one Sparrow shot in March of '67, he would've made ace five years before Ritchie (and Randy Cunningham) did so. Incidentally, all of Randy's kills were AIM-9.
It was the Navy experience with the F-8 and the F-105 community that got pods into SEA in 1967, and led to the F-4E, with an internal Vulcan. Note that every U.S. fighter since then has been devloped with a gun: F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-22, F-35.
It was the Navy experience with the F-8 and the F-105 community that got pods into SEA in 1967, and led to the F-4E, with an internal Vulcan. Note that every U.S. fighter since then has been devloped with a gun: F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-22, F-35.
Israel got a Pk of 42% in 1973 from their 17 sparrow firings, and the sparrow featured heavily in the USAF Vietnam aces victories.
However I wonder how much this has to do with the improvements in the manufacture and support since the Ault Report of 1968? Ault found that compliance to quality standards was directly related to the amount of government monitoring. So if the USN started watching Ratheyon from 1969 it stands to reason that the missiles delivered to the USAF and Israel would be of a higher quality.
However I wonder how much this has to do with the improvements in the manufacture and support since the Ault Report of 1968? Ault found that compliance to quality standards was directly related to the amount of government monitoring. So if the USN started watching Ratheyon from 1969 it stands to reason that the missiles delivered to the USAF and Israel would be of a higher quality.
The AF didn't adopt the Ault Report: but there were only two AF units in the whole SEA theater that were oriented to air-to-air: the 8th TFW (Robin Olds' wing) and the 432nd Tac Recon/Fighter Wing (Steve Ritchie flew in this outfit). The rest of the AF TacAir community in SEA was concentrated in air-to-ground, and even in the 8th, they had at least half of their tasking as air-to-ground when the need for sorties rose. Red Flag didn't get into the AF until 1974-75.
The improvements you cite probably had that desired result, but Ritchie's unit had a policy of ripple-firing Sparrows anyway. The missile's reptutation ensured that.
The improvements you cite probably had that desired result, but Ritchie's unit had a policy of ripple-firing Sparrows anyway. The missile's reptutation ensured that.