An old post of mine from soc.history.what-if at
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/PcUI2UCLr8o/_3347Oxl15YJ (with one link updated)
***
There were widespread rumors in 1916 of secret talks aiming at a separate
Russian-German peace--Germany to get Congress Poland (which would become
nominally independent), Russia to get eastern Galicia.
I don't know if there was any real chance of such an agreement. According
to Richard Pipes (in *The Russian Revolution*, p. 246):
"Persistent rumors that the monarchy was secretly negotiating a separate
peace added to the unhappiness of upper society. They were not entirely
groundless, for the Germans and Austrians did indeed put out feelers to
Petrograd. One such approach was made through Alexandra's brother, Prince
Ernst Ludwig of Hesse. Protopopov, while traveling in Sweden, was
contacted by a German businessman. These and similar approaches met with
no response from the Russian side. Researches in Russian and Western
archives after the Revolution have failed to reveal any evidence that the
Imperial Government desired or even contemplated a separate peace.
Nicholas and Alexandra were determined to wage war to the bitter end
regardless of the domestic consequences. But the rumors caused the
monarchy untold harm, alienating its natural supporters among the
conservatives and nationalists who were ferociously anti-German."
Lenin, who believed such a separate peace possible, saw the Tsarist
government reasoning as follows:
"If 'we' go after too much booty in Europe, 'we' run the risk of utterly
exhausting 'our' military resources, of gaining almost nothing in Europe
and of losing the opportunity of getting 'our share' in Asia. This is how
tsarism argues, and it argues correctly from the standpoint of imperialist
interests. It argues more correctly than the bourgeois and opportunist
chatterboxes, the Milyukovs, Plekhanovs, Guchkovs and Potresovs.
"If no more can be obtained in Europe even after Rumania and Greece (from
which 'we' have taken all we could) have joined in, then let us take what
can still be had! England cannot give us anything just now. Germany will
perhaps return to us Courland and a part of Poland, certainly Eastern
Galicia--which 'we' particularly need for the purpose of throttling the
Ukrainian movement, the movement of historically hitherto dormant people
numbering many millions, for freedom and the right to use their native
language--and, very likely, Turkish Armenia also. If we take this now, we
may emerge from the war with increased strength, and tomorrow we may, with
the aid of Japan and Germany, with a wise policy and with the further aid
of the Milyukovs, Plekhanovs and Potresovs in 'saving' the beloved
'fatherland', get a good slice of Asia in a war against England (the whole
of Persia and the Persian Gulf with an outlet to the ocean much better
than Constantinople, which is an outlet only to the Mediterranean and is
guarded by islands which England can easily take and fortify, thus
depriving 'us' of every outlet to the open sea), etc."
http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/nov/06.htm
Lenin here is doing something he quite frequently did--projecting his own
cynicism on to others. If *he* were in power, he would make a separate
peace if necessary to save his regime (as indeed he was to do at Brest-
Litovsk, of course on much less favorable terms than Russia could have
obtained in 1916), so he assumed that the Tsar was willing to do so.
(Similarly, after the July Days he thought Kerensky would have him killed
because that is what he would have done to Kerensky had their positions
been reversed at the time.) But let us say that the Tsar really did think
in such terms, and really could be persuaded to make a separate peace. I
see three obvious problems.
First, there is the question of whether such a peace, though meant to
forestall a revolution, would instead provoke one. One could say that the
average peasant-conscript would be glad to see the war over, but he would
still be embittered at having had to fight for two years for (as far as he
could see) nothing, he would still want his own land, etc. Still, there
would be less to fear from a revolution by "peasants in uniform" in this
ATL than in OTL. However, it was not just a popular revolution that the
Tsar had to fear but a palace coup from anti-German aristocratic circles.
There was much discussion of such a coup in 1916, sparked by (among other
things) the false rumors of a separate peace; the actuality of such a
peace could turn the talk into reality.
Second, there is of course the question of whether a Germany victorious
over the Western Allies, and in a dominant position in Europe, would honor
the peace agreement she had made with Russia. (Note that this objection
would be applicable even if Germany agreed to give not only Courland and
Lithuania but also Congress Poland back to Russia.) This would be true
not only with respect to the European territorial agreements but also to
any express or implied promise that Russia could be compensated in Asia
for the disappointing results of the war in Europe: A victorious Germany
might tell the Russians, "Oh, yes, we did say that once we won, we would
share with you the spoils from Great Britain's Asian colonies and spheres
of influence, but we've decided to keep them for ourselves. The same
thing with territory gained or regained from Japan..."
Third, there is the problem of the reaction from Japan. As George Kennan
writes in *Russia Leaves the War,* pp. 275-6:
"A separate peace between Russia and Germany was, in the early stages of
the war, the Japanese nightmare. It might well have meant a general
German victory, the demise of Japan's one great ally--Britain--and the
emergence of a vengeful Germany as a power in the Far East. Having
gratuitously entered the war on the Entente side and having exploited this
association in order to seize German possessions in Shantung, Japan had no
reason to count on German benevolence in such a contingency. At best, she
would have to face a powerful German bid to recover her possessions in
Shantung. At worst, the Germans might appear, depending on the nature of
the German-Russian relationship in the wake of a German victory, as the
eager patrons of Russian aspirations in the Far East from which they too
would expect to profit, or as the heirs to Russian claims and rights in
that area. The Japanese had not forgotten Germany's encouragement of
Russian expansion in the Far East, and particularly Bulow's refusal, in
1900, to concede that Manchuria was part of China and subject to such
restrictions as the Chinese treaties placed on the ambitions of the other
powers with respect to China. The Japanese also had in mind the precedent
they themselves had established by insisting that they were the heirs, by
conquest, to the entire German position in Shantung. A Germany victorious
over Russia could, by the same token, lay claim to Russia's entire
position in Manchuria...
"The growing evidences of the failure of the creaking Tsarist system to
measure up to the strains of a prolonged modern war convinced the Japanese
that if events were allowed to take their course, a separate German-
Russian peace would be inevitable. To this danger, the Japanese
responded...by a combination of military aid to Russia (for a serious
price) and veiled threats of a military occupation of Russian territory in
the Far East in case a German-Russian peace should become a reality. At
the same time, and to some extent as a *quid pro quo* for military aid,
Japan moved to take advantage of Russia's weakness and the reduced
interest of other European powers in Far Eastern affairs by expanding her
own position in Manchuria at Russia's expense."
Kennan indeed quotes Viscount Ishii's memoirs, where Ishii expresses the
opinion that the fear of a Japanese invasion of Siberia was *the* reason
Russia did not make a separate peace. (*Russia Leaves the War*, p. 276)
In *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* Kennan does not go quite
so far but says that "Possibly the Germans could have had such a peace in
1916, had it not been for the far-reaching demands of the German High
Command with respect to the future of Poland, and the fears of the Tsar's
government as to what the Japanese would do if Russia failed in her
obligations to the Entente." (p. 37)
So does anyone see any chance that despite these three problems, Russia
might have agreed to a separate peace with Germany in 1916? The chief
argument for such a peace is that the *risks* involved (of German non-
compliance, Russian internal revolution, or Japanese intervention) were
lesser evils than the *certainty* of catastrophe for both the regime and
Russia if it stayed in the war. But of course that assumes that the Tsar
could see how catastrophic the situation was becoming...
BTW, I have seen at least one source (Stefan Possony, whose biography of
Lenin is interesting but a bit too inclined to see German money behind
everything that went wrong in Russia) who argues that while the Tsar may
have been opposed to a separate peace in 1916, by the eve of the February
Revolution, things might have been different:
"There were good reasons for the Tsar to fear a separate peace which might
lead to uprisings and also might deliver him to the mercies of his cousin,
Wilhelm II. Nevertheless, he was in a quandary, for he realized that, for
compelling political reasons, the war could not be continued indefinitely.
The time for negotiation had not yet arrived, but Nicholas had to
determine the basis on which the Germans would be willing to negotiate.
The conditions of 1916, as reported by Protopopov, were unacceptable.
"There is evidence which indicates that the Tsar opposed a separate peace.
Much of this evidence, however, should be considered with caution since it
is derived mainly from statements made prior to these critical days.
There is no documentation to indicate whether the Tsar, during the last
weeks of his regime, wanted or did not want a separate peace. But ample
evidence exists that peace discussions (not negotiations, in the technical
meaning of the term) had been going on since mid-1916; that leading
personalities of the Russian government were involved in these
discussions; and that by February-March 1917, Germany and Austria, hardly
without Russian encouragement, were preparing to step up these contacts.
(4) The Tsar, in fact, did nothing to halt these activities. On the
contrary, he furthered the career of some of those who had been seeking
contacts with the enemy."
https://archive.org/stream/LeninCom... Revolutionary Possony 1964#page/n41/mode/2up