WI: Russian Federation becomes a 'proper' Liberal Democracy

What if the Russian Federation had become a proper functioning Liberal Democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union, meaning that:
*Genuine party political pluralism exists, and there is no one party/dominant party system.
*An incumbent political party has to loose at least one Presidential AND legislative election between 1991 and the present day.
*No Putin or anyone like him in power
*The Chechenya crisis doesn't happen - let's say that Chechenya during the USSR is an SSR in its own right and not an ASSR within the RSFSR - making its independence happen in 1991 in the same way that Kazakhstan's independence happens.
*The Georgian crisis doesn't happen either..

The question is, how would this all have changed relations between Russia and the West?
 

samcster94

Banned
What if the Russian Federation had become a proper functioning Liberal Democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union, meaning that:
*Genuine party political pluralism exists, and there is no one party/dominant party system.
*An incumbent political party has to loose at least one Presidential AND legislative election between 1991 and the present day.
*No Putin or anyone like him in power
*The Chechenya crisis doesn't happen - let's say that Chechenya during the USSR is an SSR in its own right and not an ASSR within the RSFSR - making its independence happen in 1991 in the same way that Kazakhstan's independence happens.
*The Georgian crisis doesn't happen either..

The question is, how would this all have changed relations between Russia and the West?
I do imagine it'd not be the friendliest country to the U.S. and likely extremely socially conservative(both of which are traits of India OTL), but hardly a threat in the same way.
 
The best way to get this to happen in my humble opinion?
Either don't expand NATO east after the USSR falls or let Russia join it.
Anything else will be seen as a threat.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
What if the Russian Federation had become a proper functioning Liberal Democracy after the fall of the Soviet Union, meaning that:
*Genuine party political pluralism exists, and there is no one party/dominant party system.
*An incumbent political party has to loose at least one Presidential AND legislative election between 1991 and the present day.
*No Putin or anyone like him in power
*The Chechenya crisis doesn't happen - let's say that Chechenya during the USSR is an SSR in its own right and not an ASSR within the RSFSR - making its independence happen in 1991 in the same way that Kazakhstan's independence happens.
*The Georgian crisis doesn't happen either..

You forgot to mention this:

*Russian President would be unwilling to use tanks to (literally) fire on the Russian Duma.

The question is, how would this all have changed relations between Russia and the West?

In such a TL, Russian-Western relations might have been somewhat better. However, a lot might have depended on whether Russia itself would have tried joining or at least becoming much closer with the E.U.; indeed, if Russia still insists on going its own, separate way, I could still see a lot of Russia-West tensions over Ukraine and various other ex-USSR countries.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I do imagine it'd not be the friendliest country to the U.S. and likely extremely socially conservative(both of which are traits of India OTL), but hardly a threat in the same way.
The Poles, Romanians, and Balts also appear to be relatively socially conservative and yet all of them are friendly with the West, though.

The best way to get this to happen in my humble opinion?
Either don't expand NATO east after the USSR falls or let Russia join it.
Anything else will be seen as a threat.
One crucial question here is this, though--would a genuinely democratic Russia have actually been willing to join neither NATO or the E.U.?
 
One crucial question here is this, though--would a genuinely democratic Russia have actually been willing to join neither NATO or the E.U.?
There was actually talks in Russian political circles about joining NATO as far as the early 2000's (we can debate how genuine it was, but I think there was a part of actual political will to integrate it, in order to balance American dominance "from within"), so I don't see why it wouldn't be debated ITTL a fortiori.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
There was actually talks in Russian political circles about joining NATO as far as the early 2000's (we can debate how genuine it was, but I think there was a part of actual political will to integrate it, in order to balance American dominance "from within"), so I don't see why it wouldn't be debated ITTL a fortiori.
Oh, sure, it would be debated; however, what would the final decision in Russia in regards to this have been?
 

samcster94

Banned
Oh, sure, it would be debated; however, what would the final decision in Russia in regards to this have been?
Would observer status work???
About those other countries, they are all smaller and lack the history of being a major world power.
 
Oh, sure, it would be debated; however, what would the final decision in Russia in regards to this have been?
It depends a lot of the situation in Russia, to be honest : wouldn't a Liberal Russia be more prone to secessionist/nationalist crisis, not just in Caucasus but possibly in Tatarstan?

I'd personally lean (but with limited knowledge, so anyone is welcome to correct me) that part of the reason of the political choice of an authoritarian demcoracy was to curb down the possibility of inner break-down : in this case, joining with NATO makes sense, while not obvious I grand you this : but it seems to me the main obstacle isn't a really conservative mindset (Poland and Hungary are "shining" exemples), but geopolitical concerns.

EDIT : This being said, I agree it wouldn't work on the long term. If Russia joins NATO, it could likely lead to Russia leaving NATO after a while at the first major diplomatical/political crisis, further deepening it.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
It depends a lot of the situation in Russia, to be honest : wouldn't a Liberal Russia be more prone to secessionist/nationalist crisis, not just in Caucasus but possibly in Tatarstan?

I'm not sure about that; after all, a liberal Russia might be less inclined to centralize power and thus less prone to angering ethnic minorities within Russia.

I'd personally lean (but with limited knowledge, so anyone is welcome to correct me) that part of the reason of the political choice of an authoritarian demcoracy was to curb down the possibility of inner break-down : in this case, joining with NATO makes sense, while not obvious I grand you this : but it seems to me the main obstacle isn't a really conservative mindset (Poland and Hungary are "shining" exemples), but geopolitical concerns.

Belgium Slovakia, and Romania all have large ethnic minorities and are NATO members and yet aren't experiencing anything even remotely close to a national breakdown, though.

EDIT : This being said, I agree it wouldn't work on the long term. If Russia joins NATO, it could likely lead to Russia leaving NATO after a while at the first major diplomatical/political crisis, further deepening it.

I'm not so sure about that; indeed, it depends on what exactly the other NATO countries want (NATO) to do.
 
Belgium Slovakia, and Romania all have large ethnic minorities and are NATO members and yet aren't experiencing anything even remotely close to a national breakdown, though.
Well, Belgium is blessed with an old and structurated state appartus, contrary to an early 90's Russia.
Slovakia is the result of a national breakdown, alotugh a largely managed one.

As for Rumania...Well, if you look at the Hungarian minority reaction in the late 80's and early 90's, it almost went this way.

You still have a main difference with Russia : what threatened in Eastern Europe were essentially a generalized irredentism than separatism (Yugoslavia being a bit more, IMO, a mixed case where the first part dominated), while Russia had to deal with movement as in Chechenia or Tatarstan that didn't involved the pression from another state or state-like structure, but (like in Moldova) inner tensions. While military interventionism in Eastern Europe was less possible, as possibly leading to a shitty mess, it was accepted IOTL as a police operation (when I say accepted, I don't mean it wasn't particularily criticized and denounced).

Eventually, it's kind of my point : NATO or the prospect to join NATO or EU provided to be a stabilizing element where it existed (on the other hand...Yugoslavia), which is why it could have been seen as beneficiable in a Russia with a worse management of separatism. Again, only my two cents.

I'm not so sure about that; indeed, it depends on what exactly the other NATO countries want (NATO) to do.
Of course : I'm mostly thinking of NATO members trying to manage a more unstable Russia (I didn't said a Yugoslavian situation, just more unstable, of course) and being generally carried by the aftermath of the victory of their political/economical/institutional model. With a big hangover when they realized they took more than they could shew.
 
One change that has to happen is for there to be no shock therapy. Shock therapy created a massive economic collapse and a lot of chaos, which the Russian people quickly came to associate with democracy. It also paved the way for Putin to offer economic growth in exchange for undemocratic governance and restrictions on civil liberties. It would also be useful if oil prices began to rise in the early 1990s, because the Russian economy is/was dependent on oil (IOTL growth really only began again after oil prices rose at the end of the decade).

Beyond that, a good POD would be in late 1991. By that point it was clear that the Soviet Union was on the way out, and Russia's leaders had to come up with a new system. They responded by giving President Yeltsin broad powers of decree, and copying several elements of the Soviet system (such as the Supreme Soviet and the federal structure). This created a situation where the President was overly powerful, the legislature was ineffective (because the Supreme Soviet had little role in the governance of the Soviet Union it quickly became little more than a platform for grandstanding), and there was constant fighting between the central government and the republics. The 1993 crisis and much of the chaos and conflict of the 1990s comes from this decision. Had the leadership instead attempted a different system, with more limited Presidential power, a stronger legislature, and some sort of different federal structure, Russian democracy would have been a lot better off (but again, only if shock therapy is avoided).
 
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