WI: Russia wins Space Race

Completely agreed.

But that's for farther down the road.

"Technically" but who's going to say "no" to more money and support amIright? ;)

Say it's fall 1968. CIA tells you the Soviets are going to do a crewed Zond in December. What can you do to speed things up right now? Well, there's not anything. There's not enough time. SA-503 won't be ready before early December (and for that matter, neither will the mission software), and that's with your technicians working round the clock as it is. You move Borman's crew up to your December launch window and pray that Apollo 7 does everything perfectly and the Soviets run into some sort of hitch. Apollo was running as hard as possible at that point.

Exactly. NASA can be 'blamed' but they have the very real "bullet" in their gun of pointing out that the politicians have already curtailed the program and have been since 1965 and I don't think anyone is going to want to be drawn into that particular cat-fight.

(Moving these to reply "in-line" here)

How about the circumlunar Geminis, using the Saturn IB with a both an Centaur and Agena?

Oh, it's doable, with enough lead time.

I'm just hard pressed to think of a scenario where it makes sense to pursue it. You couldn't slap that together in a month.

Perhaps if Apollo CSM development gets more badly derailed?

Yeah, I can't see those being ready without at least 6 months of development time. And do they slow work on the Saturn V, Apollo and the LEM to get this done? I just can't see it being worthwhile.

Better to stick with Apollo and try a mission with dual Saturn IB launches or something like that (even then, it's probably not worth the delays you'd get to the main program, but at least you aren't developing new hardware).

fasquardon

Well, the problem that strikes me is that you'd have to get the funding through on the Hill.

And while LBJ was a worker of magic in this regard, it might raise some hard questions about why NASA wants to pursue this Gemini alternative at the same time they're fighting to keep Apollo intact during congressional hearings into the fire. "Have you lost confidence in Apollo? If so, why should we keep funding it?"

Because it worked, and could be used to test other Apollo hardware like the Service module, while the CM was getting fixed?

The main problem is you need an available Gemini capsule, an available Centaur, a new heat shield, (and all the calculations, testing and hard/software to go with it, reentry dynamics is KINDA important here :) ) crew training, support systems and check out, stacking and launching schedules, I can go on. And it IS a problem of side-tracking at the very least all the Apollo work to get a Gemini and Centaur into space which IS going to delay the work on Apollo no matter how you try not to. And in the end IS it worth it? You are going to do "more" with Apollo 8 than either Zond or Gemini can do and the amount of work and resources is questionable at best. And frankly almost no one at NASA was in favor of the concept let alone the mission plan.

Now having said all that let me backup a bit and go with the Apollo CM being more delayed. I've a seed of an idea for such a scenario where it is running into such issue even before the fire and with that POD I'm looking at the idea that when President Johnson is assassinated in Dallas new President Kennedy looks hard to cut back on the expenditures of this "Apollo" program and takes a good hard look at Gemini to the Moon and agrees to it. SPECIFICALLY to side-line Apollo. (Watch the Space Cadets howl over that one :) )

But what a Zond success does do is, as you say, extend Apollo's lifespan beyond the first batch of Saturn hardware. You are more likely to see something like AES or even LESA missions in the mid-late 70's, because the Soviets would be taking a lot of luster off Apollo 8 and even Apollo 11 by getting some cosmonauts to cislunar space first. Also, a success like that commits the Soviets to the race publicly in a way they can't deny later. Even Nixon would have to bite the bullet and keep up with the program.

At least some utility would come for AAP and the last couple of Lunar flights I'd think. We may see enough to get another buy of Saturn 1 and V's though maybe not. As you say though it DOES commit the Soviets to the Lunar race and that is probably the most interesting aspect since they now have to 'commit' to something to follow that up. That's going to put a lot of pressure on the Soviet Lunar Program to perform and the government to support it as well.

What I'm trying to say is that it's a risk calculus that the NASA of the last four decades would not dream of taking, even with much more advanced technology than Apollo (with its 46k RAM onboard computer!) had. It has too many processes in place, too much bureaucracy, too much risk aversion. Barring a killer asteroid on the way, I cannot conceive of today's NASA doing anything like this. A mission to orbit (not just fly by) another world a quarter million miles away when no one has ever gone beyond Earth orbit, and you commit to it less than four months in advance? It still takes my breath away today.

When Susan Borman forced Chris Kraft to give her an honest assessment of Apollo 8 coming back intact, he gave her 50% odds. In part that was because of his realization that that SPS engine was such a huge point failure source, but also because there was no LM backup, but above all because of all the unknowns - they didn't know what they didn't know yet, and they were aware of it. And yet, they went ahead and did it anyway. Ballsy.

But that's actually a point it that NASA can and will be 'ballsy' when it's all on the line, which arguably it has never been SINCE Apollo. NASA took huge risks with the Shuttle but they were programmatic and heavily involved that bureaucracy and politics. If faced with a choice of "doing" or "not-doing" though, (such as knowing and realizing the damage to Challenger for example, or Apollo 13) NASA would pull out all the stop to get the "mission" done and hang the risk assessment. But it HAS to be a clear and known danger or the bureaucracy goes to work to tone down the 'risk' at the cost of risking even more. It's actually not limited to NASA either as all government bureaucracies have this issue once you get beyond immediate control. "Ballsy" if it works, "disaster" if it doesn't but it is very much a "right-now" thing :)

No argument here.

Again, though, they need some months of lead time to get LM-4 down under the weight limit, or to accelerate LM-5's readiness. Of course, if the Soviets are close to doing a lunar landing, NASA is sure as hell going to know about it by late 1968 anyway. They would be preparing for the contingency.

What would really throw NASA, (and everyone else) for a loop would be the Soviets doing something they already KNEW was going to be more risky and take more time. At the time they had it 'figured' out, (and frankly most of the Soviet Lunar program officials felt the same way) that the "best" way to do the Moon was the way NASA was doing it. And at it's 'best' it was a weak Apollo-like effort but in the margins there was a way out with the multiple launch LK missions that NASA missed out on and would have come as a nasty shock to them. Sure the "Ruskie's" are testing a small lunar lander in orbit but they still need a massive booster to, what the heck? Who said they could do an EOR-assembly mission and go that way? (And keep very much in mind that is what a successful Zond circumLunar mission would POINT towards them planning :) )

And actually by 1968 it's going to be probably MORE of shock to the American system than an actual landing would be since it's not clear it IS a race and that American CAN lose it.

I agree here, too, which is why I do not buy Prolemasses' current timeline (even though I am enjoying it tremendously). Mars takes too long, too many election cycles to realize; costs too much; expanding your lunar program is the far easier choice.

Luckily you don't have to fully agree to love reading alternate history, look at me and some of my followed threads after all :) Of course the more 'implausible' the better the writing has to be so... Well there's one reason I still don't have a timeline :)

I suppose that a manned Venus flyby would be achievable with a tolerably short time-frame of preparation, even if it would be very high risk (God help them if there is a solar flare) for low scientific return...but otherwise, the much more likely outcome would be an effort to escalate to some kind of small lunar base.

I kinda am on the fence here as I think actually the Venus flyby MAY be in the cards is the Soviets even get close to the Moon. For both America and NASA the Moon was a singular and compelling goal that would establish the dominance of American technology for decades to come. Which it arguably did OTL but 'taint' that in any way and it becomes a question of degrees and given a successful Zond and possibly a later (or worst, first) Lunar landing that dominance is NOT going to be clear. If need be the can trade a later Apollo Saturn-V for the mission, (as they did for Skylab) and put a definite period on the "race" by doing what the Soviets obviously can't by going around Venus far easier than going to Mars. And without the "requirement" of landing Venus makes all sorts of sense in context. Risky as hell of course, (if you haven't read it I recommend "Island of Clouds" by Gerald Brennan, https://www.amazon.com/Island-Clouds-Great-Venus-Altered-ebook/dp/B01NH9HONF, for a good story on such a flight) but just enough plausible to make that statement loud and clear.

But that very much, (and the book above points this out) means something needs to be traded away to make it happen and its likely going to be both the Shuttle and most of AAP as well as any extended Lunar plans. Yes it's very much the US now picking the "low hanging fruit" that the Saturn-V and Apollo gives them but in a way it very much makes sense in context.

In a way it would have made 'some' sense for the Soviets to try something like the Venus flyby if they hadn't taken the stance they were never 'in' the race from the start. Since they took that tone OTL it wouldn't make any sense, (especially after they harped on Apollo's "risk" after 13) But in a universe where the Moon was closer, (at least a successful Zond flight) and the Soviets bide their time, (the US will run out of Apollo technology sooner or later even with an 'injection' in the late 60s) the might seriously consider another 'one-upman-ship' move that would again take America by surprise...

Randy
 
But that's actually a point it that NASA can and will be 'ballsy' when it's all on the line, which arguably it has never been SINCE Apollo. NASA took huge risks with the Shuttle but they were programmatic and heavily involved that bureaucracy and politics. If faced with a choice of "doing" or "not-doing" though, (such as knowing and realizing the damage to Challenger for example, or Apollo 13) NASA would pull out all the stop to get the "mission" done and hang the risk assessment. But it HAS to be a clear and known danger or the bureaucracy goes to work to tone down the 'risk' at the cost of risking even more.

Well, in the Killer Asteroid Scenario, all bets are off anyway; the normal rules no longer apply!

But short of that - no, I actually think it's impossible for NASA, post-1972, to knowingly, willingly take big risks like this.

The difference with the programmatic and operational risks they took with the Shuttle is that NASA managers actually would not admit - not even to themselves, really - that they WERE taking these risks. Whereas with Apollo 8, pretty much everyone was candid up front that they were taking a ballsy move.

NASA is just a s different organization than it was during Apollo. As Charles Murray and Catherine Cox, authors of Apollo: The Race to the Moon, observed, NASA got bureaucratized. "I sometimes say that the real race to the Moon was not with the Russians. It was with time—would we get to the Moon before NASA became bureaucratized? We barely made it. If you want to see how much NASA changed, compare the story of how Apollo was done with the story of how the space station was built."

I kinda am on the fence here as I think actually the Venus flyby MAY be in the cards is the Soviets even get close to the Moon. For both America and NASA the Moon was a singular and compelling goal that would establish the dominance of American technology for decades to come. Which it arguably did OTL but 'taint' that in any way and it becomes a question of degrees and given a successful Zond and possibly a later (or worst, first) Lunar landing that dominance is NOT going to be clear. If need be the can trade a later Apollo Saturn-V for the mission, (as they did for Skylab) and put a definite period on the "race" by doing what the Soviets obviously can't by going around Venus far easier than going to Mars. And without the "requirement" of landing Venus makes all sorts of sense in context.

I think it makes more sense for the Soviets.

The Manned Venus Flyby apparently scared the crap out of plenty of people at JSC, even *before* they knew about the solar flare risk. It was pretty far down on the list of Apollo Application ideas...of course, you can never say never, but I think you need something pretty extraordinary to get NASA to do it. And if they glom on to the solar flare problem, they'd have to rework it to build in a real solar flare shelter...all I meant to say is that it's an easier thing to do than Mars.

But the Soviets? Well, imagine they do the Zond flyby, and now find themselves forced to try to get to the lunar surface. But they run into developmental problems with the N1 or the LK lander or both, and the Kremlin starts breathing down Mishin's neck for a "win." At that point, a Venus flyby would look attractive, it's not as complicated as landing on the Moon; and it would fit into the Soviet interest in Venus. It would be VERY high risk, but the kind of risk that the Soviets might just take to get points on the board after Apollo 11.

Personally, I think the whole idea is insane with early 70's technology, but...

I've read the Brennan book - great recommendation, though.
 
Well, in the Killer Asteroid Scenario, all bets are off anyway; the normal rules no longer apply!

Yep! Gabriel's and Atomic Verne guns for everyone!
(https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20000021516.pdf, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20000097368.pdf, http://www.kschroeder.com/weblog/the-verne-gun)

TLDR; Orion-drive "Cosmic" Defense missile using it's 'propellant' to re-direct threats and an atomic powered Jules Verne "gun" to shoot them off planet with no radiation release. And in fact that's my 'premise' if I ever decide to do a take on the idea of a US/USSR "Co-Dominum" set up for how it gets to that point :)

But short of that - no, I actually think it's impossible for NASA, post-1972, to knowingly, willingly take big risks like this.

I'd argue that's less true than people think. NASA has not stopped coming up with risky plans they just do what any business or agency HAS to do and manage the risk. Musk and a lot of "New-Space" folks disparage NASA for being "risk-averse" but they will end up toeing the same line because they can't NOT do so eventually. A million people with the "Right Stuff" and a devil-may-care attitude towards risk are not going to open the Solar System even if that many existed. (They don't) As long as space travel is for the few, the brave and the thrill seeker it won't ever be anything MORE than occasional exploration missions. To be wide open to the public AND acceptable enough to pay its own way your 'voyager' has to be a lot more generic and average than you'd think.

The difference with the programmatic and operational risks they took with the Shuttle is that NASA managers actually would not admit - not even to themselves, really - that they WERE taking these risks. Whereas with Apollo 8, pretty much everyone was candid up front that they were taking a ballsy move.

Which everyone should find really, really odd because they were essentially the SAME people in both cases. And that in and of itself is telling because the amount of 'risk' they were willing to take directly related to the amount of "risk" they felt the "Space Program" was under yet they had two dissimilar, (not as much as you might think given the circumstances and stakes) situations with the main differences being the amount of "risk" they were willing to admit both publicly and to themselves. I understand Apollo 8 was a risk and a ballsy move but really it was a situation that HAD to happen during the program on EVERY Lunar mission. And the main "risk" was simply the various systems had not been that far away from Earth, (and possible help) before not that they had not been tested and pretty much proven to death. Had an "13" accident happened to Apollo 8 they crew would have likely died no doubt but the odds were vanishingly smaller than "50/50". Yet most of those same "mangers" willingly went with odds a LOT worse for every flight of the Shuttle because they didn't see a 'choice' and firmly believed that "failure was not an option" which they got from Apollo.

NASA is just a s different organization than it was during Apollo. As Charles Murray and Catherine Cox, authors of Apollo: The Race to the Moon, observed, NASA got bureaucratized. "I sometimes say that the real race to the Moon was not with the Russians. It was with time—would we get to the Moon before NASA became bureaucratized? We barely made it. If you want to see how much NASA changed, compare the story of how Apollo was done with the story of how the space station was built."

I'll have to read that one but if that's a quote from it then it shows the authors bias pretty baldly. (Gahhh, have to find a library copy that's NOT a cheap book, https://www.amazon.com/Apollo-Race-Moon-Charles-Murray/dp/0671611011) Bureaucratization happens to mature systems, that's how they become mature and yes NASA today is different than NASA of the days of Apollo and the Shuttle. It has to be and frankly Apollo so warped the organization I'm surprised they managed TO change at all. Due to what Apollo represented and needed to happen NASA had to be a certain way and as much as 'failure' wasn't an option neither was loosing or even appearing to lose. But keep very much in mind that the same organization and management could not keep Apollo alive nor did they do very well with most of the later programs so they HAD to change and it hasn't stopped them from wanting to do more but they have a much better idea of what is publicly and politically supportable within those parameters now.

NASA of Apollo had ONE job to do while officially having several so while the ONE job got done the other areas suffered greatly. Today's NASA still has that same bias, (space is primary, manned space is secondary and all others are somewhere far below that) but a bit broader base of activities. And this is how it should be with an agency with such a broad activity spectrum. But that same agency today could not do "Apollo" like the old agency. Then again NASA of Apollo couldn't do the ISS they way today's agency did either so it's a trade off.

Coming back to it, NASA of Apollo COULD do a Venus flyby and would do so under the right circumstances and so could today's NASA. Those circumstances are the key of course. And I'll agree with the authors that WITHOUT OTL's "Apollo" goal it is not as likely as some think that anyone WOULD have gone to the Moon by now and it's not really a "risk" question either :)

I think it makes more sense for the Soviets.

Again under the right circumstances I can see it. See below.

The Manned Venus Flyby apparently scared the crap out of plenty of people at JSC, even *before* they knew about the solar flare risk. It was pretty far down on the list of Apollo Application ideas...of course, you can never say never, but I think you need something pretty extraordinary to get NASA to do it. And if they glom on to the solar flare problem, they'd have to rework it to build in a real solar flare shelter...all I meant to say is that it's an easier thing to do than Mars.

With 70s technology it SHOULD scare the heck out of anyone with brains :) But so did going to the Moon with 40/50s technology so the difference is relative to the requirement. Venus is vastly easier than Mars and as we've noted has the distinct advantage you start from the assumption you're not going to land. Needs-must and all that but really it would take a LOT to make it something NASA "needs" to do at the time.

But the Soviets? Well, imagine they do the Zond flyby, and now find themselves forced to try to get to the lunar surface. But they run into developmental problems with the N1 or the LK lander or both, and the Kremlin starts breathing down Mishin's neck for a "win." At that point, a Venus flyby would look attractive, it's not as complicated as landing on the Moon; and it would fit into the Soviet interest in Venus. It would be VERY high risk, but the kind of risk that the Soviets might just take to get points on the board after Apollo 11.

Personally, I think the whole idea is insane with early 70's technology, but...

Actually the Soviets were far more interested in Mars than Venus it was just the same 'go for the easy goals' that made it seem they focused on Venus. (And they had better success at it) Insanely risky with the given tech but arguably the Soviets are in the position to have a bit more orbital assembly (especially without the N1) they can send a larger IMLEO mass to start with so they could probably build in some redundancy that a single giant launch could not. And once they are clearly "in" the Race it would be a big blow to the Americans which WOULD over-shadow the Lunar landings. But again the circumstances have to be right to get that kind of decision.

I've read the Brennan book - great recommendation, though.

He does great job of showing off the dichotomy of the characters of Shepard and Aldrin which to me was a clear metaphor for "exploration of space" versus "exploitation of space" which I believe was the point. And it points out how close the mission would have been to viable even with the known risks. Good series of books all around.

Randy
 
I'd argue that's less true than people think. NASA has not stopped coming up with risky plans they just do what any business or agency HAS to do and manage the risk.

The best argument I think you can come up with for this is STS-1, which was a pretty big gamble - putting crew on a space vehicle on its very first launch. And it was a vehicle with all kinds of new failure modes - and as we know, we very nearly DID lose the crew. There was no hiding the risk on that one.

But that *was* 37 years ago. The closest thing I have seen to that recently was NASA's initial plan to launch the EM-2 crew on what would have been the first flight of the SLS Block 1B with a previously untested Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) - sadly, because the damned thing is so expensive and production cadence so low that they can't easily afford another test flight. Then again, the Astronaut Office was still fighting that one, I hear, when they finally had to push Block 1B back a few years; and at least Orion has an LES. The Shuttle did not, unless you count those suicidal ejector seats on STS-1 through STS-4 (Bob Crippen: "Survival was not very probable.")

Generally speaking, though, I think NASA *is* a lot more risk averse, and it would take something truly extraordinary to throw that out the window.

Had an "13" accident happened to Apollo 8 they crew would have likely died no doubt but the odds were vanishingly smaller than "50/50". Yet most of those same "mangers" willingly went with odds a LOT worse for every flight of the Shuttle because they didn't see a 'choice' and firmly believed that "failure was not an option" which they got from Apollo.

I'm going to disagree on the latter assertion.

On the former, risk analysis is necessarily a difficult and even arbitrary exercise, and only as good as the data it is based on. Kraft may or may not have been exaggerating, but based on what they knew, NASA managers had reason to think the risks were high on Apollo 8. Of course, had they known about the SM oxygen tanks, lunar mascons, solar flares, micrometeorite risks...their systems may have been (mostly) better than they feared, but there were plenty of things they did *not* know.

You can say that Glenn Lunney and Arnold Aldrich (to take two examples) were old Apollo hands, but it's also not evident that they had accurate information on certain risks with the Shuttle. The real problem was that so many of the middle managers in the program were *not* Apollo veterans.

I'll have to read that one but if that's a quote from it then it shows the authors bias pretty baldly. (Gahhh, have to find a library copy that's NOT a cheap book, https://www.amazon.com/Apollo-Race-Moon-Charles-Murray/dp/0671611011)

I'll just say that there's a lot of people who think that it's the best overall one volume history of Apollo that's been written. (This might be the only book I know on Amazon with more than 20 reviews that has 100% 5 star reviews.) It's true that Murray leans libertarian, but I don't think the problems he points out in post-Apollo NASA are without foundation. At any rate, it doesn't really come up in the book.

If you really want to skim it, by the way, you can find it online here.

Coming back to it, NASA of Apollo COULD do a Venus flyby and would do so under the right circumstances and so could today's NASA. Those circumstances are the key of course.

Again, though, the question is not whether NASA was *capable* of putting together an Apollo-based Soyuz flyby. But the risk level was extremely high even by Space Race era standards, even based on what NASA managers of the time knew, and I think something very, very extraordinary is needed to get them to commit (and sell it to Congress). I think it's much more plausible to see them opting for an extension of the lunar program if they're looking for another brass ring - the key factor being confidence in their life support systems. Even a three week AES/ALSS mission to the Moon is not remotely as demanding in this regard as a 14 month interplanetary flight. NASA in 1972 had never put any human being in space for longer than two weeks. Even Skylab topped out at only 84 days. Today, of course, we have far more experience.

I do think it's easier to see the Soviets attempting it, given that they generally had a higher risk tolerance than NASA did, and it would make more sense to them as a catchup move given their capabilities. Of course, I'd give them no better than 50/50 odds of getting the crew back alive...

I will say that a Venus or Mars flyby mission in the early 70's is pretty hard to justify, even as a political stunt, in terms of return on risk. All of the Apollo missions were pretty high risk, but at least you were getting onto a surface, and able to do a surprising amount of scientific return even in a single EVA. There's literally nothing in a planetary flyby you could do in the early 70's that requires human beings; if anything, that is even more true today. And once you add in the solar flare danger, well...I don't see how any sane man could justify it.
 
The best argument I think you can come up with for this is STS-1, which was a pretty big gamble - putting crew on a space vehicle on its very first launch. And it was a vehicle with all kinds of new failure modes - and as we know, we very nearly DID lose the crew. There was no hiding the risk on that one.

Actually they did and quite well by talking past it a LOT. They knew the risks and the dangers but it was THE program so... If you will it was simply an Apollo-8 level of risk :)

But that *was* 37 years ago. The closest thing I have seen to that recently was NASA's initial plan to launch the EM-2 crew on what would have been the first flight of the SLS Block 1B with a previously untested Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) - sadly, because the damned thing is so expensive and production cadence so low that they can't easily afford another test flight. Then again, the Astronaut Office was still fighting that one, I hear, when they finally had to push Block 1B back a few years; and at least Orion has an LES. The Shuttle did not, unless you count those suicidal ejector seats on STS-1 through STS-4 (Bob Crippen: "Survival was not very probable.")

Again that's the "program" they have so they have no choice but to go for it. The 'risk' is vastly different though because a lot is built in but it's very manageable given the technology. The Shuttle was the tail end of "astronauts are test pilots" era though and again arguably supportable despite the risks. NASA at this point needs to be this way because space exploration needs to be this way. Private ventures can reach outside this but as an agency NASA can't and shouldn't.

Generally speaking, though, I think NASA *is* a lot more risk averse, and it would take something truly extraordinary to throw that out the window.

Depends I think in that NASA isn't given a choice as politically, (and publicly after Challenger and Columbia) they are held to higher standards than was 'allowed' in the early Space Race era. Arguably not a bad thing as between "Mayflower" and "Titanic" levels of risk per se. And yes we agree it took a lot 'throw' it out but they did in fact do it to an extent and given the proper "incentive"...

I'm going to disagree on the latter assertion.

On the former, risk analysis is necessarily a difficult and even arbitrary exercise, and only as good as the data it is based on. Kraft may or may not have been exaggerating, but based on what they knew, NASA managers had reason to think the risks were high on Apollo 8. Of course, had they known about the SM oxygen tanks, lunar mascons, solar flares, micrometeorite risks...their systems may have been (mostly) better than they feared, but there were plenty of things they did *not* know.

You can say that Glenn Lunney and Arnold Aldrich (to take two examples) were old Apollo hands, but it's also not evident that they had accurate information on certain risks with the Shuttle. The real problem was that so many of the middle managers in the program were *not* Apollo veterans.

We can agree to disagree but really those in charge WERE old Apollo hands and those in the 'middle' at the time were raised on the Apollo program by those same hands so... In my mind "to big to fail" and "they won't let us fail" as a risk management strategy was very much a factor

I'll just say that there's a lot of people who think that it's the best overall one volume history of Apollo that's been written. (This might be the only book I know on Amazon with more than 20 reviews that has 100% 5 star reviews.) It's true that Murray leans libertarian, but I don't think the problems he points out in post-Apollo NASA are without foundation. At any rate, it doesn't really come up in the book.

If you really want to skim it, by the way, you can find it online here.

Going to have to read it now :)

Again, though, the question is not whether NASA was *capable* of putting together an Apollo-based Soyuz flyby. But the risk level was extremely high even by Space Race era standards, even based on what NASA managers of the time knew, and I think something very, very extraordinary is needed to get them to commit (and sell it to Congress). I think it's much more plausible to see them opting for an extension of the lunar program if they're looking for another brass ring - the key factor being confidence in their life support systems. Even a three week AES/ALSS mission to the Moon is not remotely as demanding in this regard as a 14 month interplanetary flight. NASA in 1972 had never put any human being in space for longer than two weeks. Even Skylab topped out at only 84 days. Today, of course, we have far more experience.

Oh I agree it's a long shot like no other but keep in mind that NASA may not be allowed to take the 'easy' path :) What they would prefer to do and what the "power-that-be" may decree without really putting it in writing are two different things. Heck if it looks like we are beating them to the Moon and the Russians make moves that look like they are going to go beyond that I'm not so sure even hand-wringing and wailing is going to convince panicked politicians to take the 'safe' bet. Look how much traction "Lunar Gemini" got from higher up despite all the negative views at NASA et-al.

I do think it's easier to see the Soviets attempting it, given that they generally had a higher risk tolerance than NASA did, and it would make more sense to them as a catchup move given their capabilities. Of course, I'd give them no better than 50/50 odds of getting the crew back alive...

Well taking into account their VERY real fear of public failure... Which is why I'm on the fence about it. But really it's a very plausible idea under the right circumstances.

I will say that a Venus or Mars flyby mission in the early 70's is pretty hard to justify, even as a political stunt, in terms of return on risk. All of the Apollo missions were pretty high risk, but at least you were getting onto a surface, and able to do a surprising amount of scientific return even in a single EVA. There's literally nothing in a planetary flyby you could do in the early 70's that requires human beings; if anything, that is even more true today. And once you add in the solar flare danger, well...I don't see how any sane man could justify it.

No doubt except it IS manned with all that implies behind it. NASA swore off on the idea of flybys by the late 60s as probes got more reliable and ended up cheaper. The Soviet rotten luck with probes not withstanding they too were moving in that direction for similar reasons. (And face it a failed probe was FAR less costly in PR than a failed manned mission) On the gripping-hand however no one is probably going to defend that politics is the refuge of "sane" men so...

And once they officially throw their hat into the ring, (and there's really no way to pass off a successful cirum-Lunar voyage as anything else) and the Russians are kind of hoisted on their own petard as it were. They HAVE to do something to back that up and landing second, with one man for a few hours is likely not going to do it for them after the US puts Apollo up there. It's arguable they could still go to the Moon only bigger and 'better' using similar technology but it's a question of a larger and more complex seeming effort versus something that looks so 'easy' and 'simple' despite not being at all so. And sticking to the aim at 'easy' targets doing a flyby of Venus takes that option off the US's table so to 'keep up' they would have to go to Mars which they were manifestly unwilling to do. It would seem a 'poker' type move but it's classic chess really. Putting your opponent into a disadvantageous position and letting him either concede or try to recover. A gamble to be sure either way.

Randy
 
Well taking into account their VERY real fear of public failure... Which is why I'm on the fence about it. But really it's a very plausible idea under the right circumstances.

This raises an intriguing alt-history question in my mind: How would the Soviets have publicized a manned Venus flyby?

As we all know, they typically would not announce a mission until it was well underway or even completed, to make it easier to cover up any failures. But a manned Venus flyby is not just a quick hop to orbit and back. Would they wait until the crew had done its flyby of Venus to announce it? Could they keep it under wraps that long? But hell, they couldn't hide Soyuz 11, so...

On the gripping-hand

Bonus points for the Mote in God's Eye reference!

And once they officially throw their hat into the ring, (and there's really no way to pass off a successful cirum-Lunar voyage as anything else) and the Russians are kind of hoisted on their own petard as it were. They HAVE to do something to back that up and landing second, with one man for a few hours is likely not going to do it for them after the US puts Apollo up there. It's arguable they could still go to the Moon only bigger and 'better' using similar technology but it's a question of a larger and more complex seeming effort versus something that looks so 'easy' and 'simple' despite not being at all so. And sticking to the aim at 'easy' targets doing a flyby of Venus takes that option off the US's table so to 'keep up' they would have to go to Mars which they were manifestly unwilling to do. It would seem a 'poker' type move but it's classic chess really. Putting your opponent into a disadvantageous position and letting him either concede or try to recover. A gamble to be sure either way.

No, I agree, they are committed.

It depends on what the POD here is. A Zond circumlunar flight is a different set of hardware than their lunar landing architecture had. In this respect, it doesn't show a lot of new capability, which makes it unlike Apollo, which quite clearly showed some major new capabilities (i.e., the ability to successfully insert and depart from low lunar orbit) essential for any lunar landing. And it doesn't require much of a point of departure, either. Is just the Zond and Proton getting a kick ahead, or the N1 and LK lander, too?

That said, the N1 was clearly going to be a struggle to make operational. Even if the Soviets green light it 2 or 3 years earlier, it's hard to see how it can be ready in time to beat Apollo.

What I *could* see the Soviets doing is a couple more circumlunar flybys, perhaps combined with a robotic lander or even rover, and have the crew teleoperate one from cislunar space. They could do that to buy some time. NASA would not be impressed, but a lot of other people might be. At least they'd look like they're in the game.

But if they decide that dropping a solo cosmonaut on the lunar surface well after the Americans have sent a half dozen guys and Al Shepard's six iron is going to be a letdown for Team Red, a Venus flyby might start to look attractive to throw into the pile. If they can manage a couple of Salyut missions to test out long-term life support by 1970-71 (which is very doable), they might feel confident enough to try it.
 
Top