WI Russia kept going in the 2008 South Ossetia War?

In August of 2008 Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili launched attacks into the breakaway province of South Ossetia, hoping to restore it to full Georgian control while most of the world's attention was focused on the Olympic games. Instead, Russian forces swiftly counter-attacked and over the course of several days of intense fighting threw Geogian forces out of South Ossetia and the neighboring breakaway province of Abkhazia and then launching their own attacks into Georgia proper. By the time of the cease-fire, Russian forces were in control of the main Black Sea port of Poti as well as severing the primary Georgian east-west highway at Gori. The main Georgian force had thrown together a last ditch defensive line to protect the capital Tbilisi, but chances of success against a Russian push seemed unlikely. With the victory, Russia got to give Georgia a black eye, indefinitely delay the latter's entry into NATO, trash a good chunk of Georgian military equipment, take 2 new grateful provinces under their wing, and show the West that Russia had gotten out of its sad-sack 90s existence.

So, my question is what if Russia decided to gamble a bit and keep pushing for a bit longer and settled for nothing less than a total occupation of Georgia and overthrow of President Saakashvili in favor of someone more in step with Moscow? I'm not talking annexation, simply an exercise in 'put your man in the capital', maybe keeping Russian peacekeepers in place to help keep order against resistance to the new regime.
 
There wouldn't be any point to it. They would have to occupy Georgia permanently because the moment they leave the man they put in charge would be overthrown. Even if Sakashvilli wasn't necessarily wildly popular after the war he would be vastly more popular than anybody the Russians would install. Besides which you would need a POD that completely changes Russia's war aims after the fighting started. They had no desire or need to go for Tblisi and I can't think of a scenario where they would have either the desire or need unless maybe Sakashvilli went on TV and said he was behind some of the major terrorist incidents in Russia since 2000. But that is of course ASB and insanely ASB at that.
 
FWIW I agree Georgian Epic Fail on the Abkhazia gambit

I think the Russians exercised extraordinary restraint, dope-slapping the Georgians without creating a regional refugee crisis or any need for UNSC resolutions on the issue.
I remember how after a few days, once it came out the Georgians started it, the Georgians no longer found themsleves invited to NATO, etc.
Continuing to Tblisi would have created a lot more tension than necessary and opened the Russians up to Chechnya part IX as far as partisan warfare starts up once you've taken out the leadership that can be held accountable.
 
The mainstream belief is that the Russians were as surprised as anyone else when Georgia went all in with their forces, but reacted quickly to take advantage of the situation. Given the circumstances, it was a golden opportunity to delay or reverse the encroachment of NATO. By this point most of the former Warsaw Pact had gained entry, Ukraine had gone disturbingly against their agenda with the Orange Revolution and had teetered for some time on whether to face West, and now Georgia is only a matter of months away from also joining their old military arch-foe and continuing the slow and steady strangling of the Motherland by the West. Militarily, Russia didn't have much to show the world except for a decade-plus of stalemated fighting in Chechnya which presented them more as a has-been battling just to maintain what territorial integrity they had left.

It just doesn't seem all that far-fetched to imagine the Russian leadership going that extra step and finishing off Georgia while they were on the ropes. What better way to give a contemptuous West the middle finger than with their boot on Georgia's throat? I also seem to recall that they were making a rather vocal push to try and get Taakashvili out of office during and right after the war IOTL.
 
I can't see them putting in a puppet. I CAN see them booting Saakashvili out and maybe putting him and his advisors on trial. Of course, the US would object- they still think Russia was the aggressor here! And the Georgian opposition, while still claiming South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not willing to use force on peaceful protestors like Saakashvili.
Finally, there are rumors Obama may be approving of getting Georgia into NATO...
 
The mainstream belief is that the Russians were as surprised as anyone else when Georgia went all in with their forces, but reacted quickly to take advantage of the situation.

The thing is that the war came about after months of escalation in the Russo-Georgian relations. In the spring Russian peacekeepers in both Abkhazia and S. Ossetia were reinforced. Putin authorized official relations with the breakaway regions in April. The same month Russians shot down a Georgian drone and Georgia deployed troops to the Abkhazian border.

In the summer, both Georgia and Russia held large-scale military exercises. After the exercises more than usual Russian troops stayed in the Caucasus and Georgia as well moved some of the troops taking part of the exercise to the border. Russia was also allowing volunteers (or "volunteers") from N. Ossetia to S. Ossetia. Late June and July were full of small clashes, in which both sides accused the other of starting hostilities. And the situation continued to deteriorate, with both the Georgian troops and Ossetian militias acting as instigators.

I think that both Saakashvili and Putin decided over the summer that given the chance, they would aim to make a bold strike to clear the air - otherwise, in my view, both sides would have done more to rein in their own troops (and dependant auxiliaries, in case of the S. Ossetian militias) and there would have been much stronger calls for restraint, maybe international mediation already in July. Thus I think neither side was surprised that it really came to blows. But both thought they had the upper hand.

In the event, however, only Russia did and Putin was the better gambler. Despite having larger and more well-prepared troops, Russia waited until Georgia made the first overt move before bringing its (very well prepared) forces to bear. And thus Saakashvili had been goaded into humiliating himself.

The bottom line? Russia needed to do no more than what it did IOTL to reach its political and military goals. Give Saakashvili and Georgia a lesson and receive as little international flak for it as possible. Mission accomplished.
 
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I guess my main attraction to this war is the sheer oddity of it all. It's one of the few times in the last few decades where fairly evenly matched and/or equipped national armies went at it with clearly defined battle lines instead of the usual First World vs. Third World curbstomps we seem to have gravitated towards. Also, Russia's previous military expeditions all tend to be defined by their sledgehammer-esque nature, so their restraint and limited aims seems more of an exception to the rule.

It ended up being a textbook operation that really couldn't have gone more in Russia's favor both militarily and diplomatically, a quick violent blip in world events of the time. Is there any point where things could have bogged down, gone further or escalated beyond the OTL, or is this all just ASB talk?
 
It ended up being a textbook operation that really couldn't have gone more in Russia's favor both militarily and diplomatically, a quick violent blip in world events of the time. Is there any point where things could have bogged down, gone further or escalated beyond the OTL, or is this all just ASB talk?

I don't see where the Georgians could have possibly bogged down the Russians on any front. They were outnumbered and outgunned. Despite possessing American training and equipment the Georgians simply could not have stopped the Russian ground advances. The Russians may have been disorganized, but they had an overall better plan and if they had really desired to, could have resorted to old fashion brute force, something which the Georgians could not have easily countered.

There apparently was some talk by the Bush administration of bombing the Roki tunnel. That could have escalated it but there was simply no sane reason for America to exert or risk this show of force.
 
There was an interesting documentary on BBC2 last night. I don't think the US would have militarily intervened as they were not willing to risk war with Russia (which woukl probably have been the start of World War 3) Military intervention with US ground troops would have made a military clash between Russian and US troops almost a certainty which is probably why Bush chose not to risk the military option. Even air or naval intervention could well have led to a clash of some form after which the conflict would most likely developed into an uncontrolable escalatioon into conventional war and possibly a nuclear exchange.

Russia could well have chosen to occupy Georgia but would have found herself in anothe Chechen style war and would have probably started another Cold War as well. Inflicting a sharp military defeat on Georgia and leaving the country weakened but independant as actually happened was probably the best option for Russia under the circumstances as the breakaway Georgian provinces were effectively secured by the Russian military victory. The last few days of the conflict were a clear and effective demonstration of what the Russian militry could have done to Georgia had their political masters in Moscow wished to go further. Georgia has lost the breakaway provinces permanently and will pobably never try to recover them again, certainly not bymilitary means.
 
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