WI: Russia doesn't commit to the defence of Serbia

Historically, it actually seems that the Serbians were prepared to capitulate to the Austrian demands this is evidenced by Pasic's telegram on July 25th where Pasic said Serbia would be "conciliatory on all points" and give Austria "full satisfaction. This view was confirmed by a telegram sent from Crackenthorpe to Grey that same day. It was only the Russian reply that completely changed the stance of the Serbian government.

Nah...Serbia was firmly opposed to points #5-#6 of the Austrian ultimatum. In fact, the Russian response (which was...discouraging, to say the least) made Serbia slightly more willing to consider full acceptance of the ultimatum.
See Decisions for War by Hinley and Wilson - Chapter 3.

As for the main question: if Russia refuses any support - as in, doesn't even maintain some diplomatic pressure on Austria - then the exact text of the Serbian reply probably doesn't matter. Even if the controversial point is nominally accepted, Austria will likely declare the response unsatisfactory due to some technicality and attack Serbia anyway - this, after all, was its actual goal to begin with. What follows is a military, political and humanitarian debacle for Austria - but one that Austria can't exactly lose.
Expect WWI to break out in a year or two, due to continued tensions between the Entente and the emboldened and increasingly aggressive Central Powers.
 
Nah...Serbia was firmly opposed to points #5-#6 of the Austrian ultimatum. In fact, the Russian response (which was...discouraging, to say the least) made Serbia slightly more willing to consider full acceptance of the ultimatum.
See Decisions for War by Hinley and Wilson - Chapter 3.

As for the main question: if Russia refuses any support - as in, doesn't even maintain some diplomatic pressure on Austria - then the exact text of the Serbian reply probably doesn't matter. Even if the controversial point is nominally accepted, Austria will likely declare the response unsatisfactory due to some technicality and attack Serbia anyway - this, after all, was its actual goal to begin with. What follows is a military, political and humanitarian debacle for Austria - but one that Austria can't exactly lose.
Expect WWI to break out in a year or two, due to continued tensions between the Entente and the emboldened and increasingly aggressive Central Powers.

"A telegraph from Crackenthorpe to Grey, dispatched just after midday on 25 July, confirms that at this point the Serbs were even willing to accept the notorious points 5 and 6 calling for a mixed commission of enquiry, 'provided that the appointment of such commission can be proved to be in accordance with international usage'. It may have been the reassurance from the Russians that stiffened the backs of the Serbs."
From page 461-462 in The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark

Depending on the extent and conditions surrounding the Serbian invasion, it may not have worsened Austria's position, perhaps even enhancing it.

You may see a general European war break out in a year or two, but not a World War. The British Foreign Office was growing increasingly suspicious of Russia in the last two years before WWI, Grey even stated that he doubted the Anglo-Russian Convention would be renewed in 1915. What kept Britain from completely breaking off Russia for Germany was the vast overestimation of the capabilities of the Russian Empire by Britain. It is entirely doubtful that this display of Russian weakness (in the form of abandoning Serbia) and comparative strength of the Central Powers would not significantly readjust the British position.
 
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On the idea that "public opinion" forced the Tsar to go to war: Some of his advisers at the time did warn that there would be a revolution if the Tsar decided against war, and Brusilov later argued that there would indeed have been a revolution in 1914 instead of 1917 in that event. Orlando Figes in A People's Tragedy notes that this seems overstated:

"...Sazonov recommended a general mobilization, realizing that a German declaration of war against Russia was now imminent (it came on 1 August). He warned the Tsar that 'unless he yielded to the popular demand for war and unsheathed the sword in Serbia's behalf, he would run the risk of a revolution and perhaps the loss of his throne'. Nicholas went pale. 'Just think of the responsibility you're advising me to assume!' he said to Sazonov. But the force of his Ministers argument was incontrovertible and, reluctantly, the Tsar called for the general mobilization on 31 July.

"Brusilov later claimed that the Tsar had been forced to go to war by the strength of his own people's patriotic fervour: 'Had he not done so, public resentment would have turned on him with such ferocity that he would have been tumbled from his throne, and the Revolution, with the support of the whole intelligentsia, would have taken place in 1914 instead of 1917.' This is undoubtedly an overstatement of the case. The middle-class patriots who assembled in front of the Winter Palace to greet the Tsar's declaration of war on Sunday 2 August — clerks, officials, high-school students and housewives — were hardly the people to start a revolution. Many of them, according to foreign observers, had been ordered to turn out by their employers or masters. But on that sunny afternoon, as Nicholas stood on the balcony of his Winter Palace and surveyed in the square below him the vast flag-waving and cheering crowds, who then, as one, knelt down before him and sang the national anthem, the thought must have crossed his mind that the war had at last united his subjects with him and that perhaps, after all, there was some reason for hope. 'You see,' he told his children's tutor shortly after in a state of great emotion, 'there will now be a national movement in Russia like that which took place in the great war of 1812.'" https://intranet.cesc.vic.edu.au/StudentPublic/VCE REVS/A People's Tragedy Orlando Figes.pdf

The upper- and middle-class patriots would grumble if the Tsar would not fight--but start a revolution? Hardly, especially since they were well aware that their own property (and lives!) would be in mortal danger once the revolution turned to the left, as it inevitably would...
 
"The regime representatives felt" does not mean that this was a real problem, just that the people in power felt like they had to take it into account, like I said. The outcome of Russo-Japanese war had really shaken the ruling elite, and they were scrambling to regain their perceived prestige at home and abroad. This included the Czar himself, although he couldn't help but return to his ways of constantly picking up new court favourites and setting too capable or prominent ministers to sidelines.
And since Choristers’ Bridge was a mess that produced individuals like Izvolsky, Hartwig or Bezobrazov and gave them leeway to plot their own little schemes (often working against one another or at least against the official wishes of Petrorad!) that affected the Empire as a whole, the way Russia started the deathride of Romanovs would seem almost tragicomical if one could disregard the appalling human suffering it brought about.

It seems that we are talking about more or less the same thing. Russian foreign policy was "confused"for most of the XIX - early XX with the only (arguable) "break" being a short reign of Alexander III with his famous sentence "when the Russian Emperor is busy fishing, Europe can wait" :)

The obsession with the Balkans was something like a hereditary disease which lost whatever little sense it initially had by the time of Nicholas I but kept going on nonetheless. By the time of Nicholas II this was a pure idiocy and this defined the resulting "logic" of diplomatic and eventually military actions. Why do you need an ally who contributes nothing and who makes you a hostage of its own irresponsible actions? Why do you need to get into confrontation with a big neighbor over the issue which has nothing to do with your national interests? Why do you suddenly start objecting to something that was more or less agreed upon within the last 3 decades (which was Austrian argument) especially if what A-H wanted was just a continuation of its foolish expansionist policy with a good potential for creating new problems within a short future?
To think about it, assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was against Russian interests: his idea of a Tripple Monarchy, if implemented, was going to create a whole bunch of the new problems for A-H (almost definitely, the Hungarians would be unhappy) and he was advocating a cautious approach toward Serbia so assassination was against Serbian interests as well. So why keep supporting the suicidal fools?
 
The easiest way I think for Russia to stay out is for Nicky to decide that the Serbian Government was directly involved in the assassination. He could convince himself there was no way it could be pulled off without the Serbian Government knowing about it and he didn't want a bad precedent being set where by an heir apparent to a throne is assassinated and the government behind it gets away with it because he doesn't want his son murdered by government backed revolutionaries and he gives that as a reason.

It would not be too difficult for him to make such a decision if he had been capable of some logical thinking. His grandfather had been assassinated and so was his uncle, not to mention numerous lesser figures (more than 17,000 people had been killed or wounded in terror attacks in 1897-1917) so the Imperial Russia should be the last country in Europe to condone such actions. Perhaps by expressing a complete sympathy with A-H (and willingness to help forcing Serbia to comply with Austrian demands) he would be even able to get some kind of an extradition agreement: numerous Russian revolutionaries of all ilks had been hiding in A-H and Germany.
 
On the idea that "public opinion" forced the Tsar to go to war: Some of his advisers at the time did warn that there would be a revolution if the Tsar decided against war, and Brusilov later argued that there would indeed have been a revolution in 1914 instead of 1917 in that event. Orlando Figes in A People's Tragedy notes that this seems overstated:

"...Sazonov recommended a general mobilization, realizing that a German declaration of war against Russia was now imminent (it came on 1 August). He warned the Tsar that 'unless he yielded to the popular demand for war and unsheathed the sword in Serbia's behalf, he would run the risk of a revolution and perhaps the loss of his throne'. Nicholas went pale. 'Just think of the responsibility you're advising me to assume!' he said to Sazonov. But the force of his Ministers argument was incontrovertible and, reluctantly, the Tsar called for the general mobilization on 31 July.

"Brusilov later claimed that the Tsar had been forced to go to war by the strength of his own people's patriotic fervour: 'Had he not done so, public resentment would have turned on him with such ferocity that he would have been tumbled from his throne, and the Revolution, with the support of the whole intelligentsia, would have taken place in 1914 instead of 1917.' This is undoubtedly an overstatement of the case. The middle-class patriots who assembled in front of the Winter Palace to greet the Tsar's declaration of war on Sunday 2 August — clerks, officials, high-school students and housewives — were hardly the people to start a revolution. Many of them, according to foreign observers, had been ordered to turn out by their employers or masters. But on that sunny afternoon, as Nicholas stood on the balcony of his Winter Palace and surveyed in the square below him the vast flag-waving and cheering crowds, who then, as one, knelt down before him and sang the national anthem, the thought must have crossed his mind that the war had at last united his subjects with him and that perhaps, after all, there was some reason for hope. 'You see,' he told his children's tutor shortly after in a state of great emotion, 'there will now be a national movement in Russia like that which took place in the great war of 1812.'" https://intranet.cesc.vic.edu.au/StudentPublic/VCE REVS/A People's Tragedy Orlando Figes.pdf

The upper- and middle-class patriots would grumble if the Tsar would not fight--but start a revolution? Hardly, especially since they were well aware that their own property (and lives!) would be in mortal danger once the revolution turned to the left, as it inevitably would...

The "grumbling" already led Alexander II into the wasteful war of 1877/78 and the byproduct was a "grumbling" against government who managed to screw up both war and peace.

As for Brusilov, while being one of the most talented commanders of WWI, he was not necessarily is most honest and reliable source: it is quite clear from his memoirs that he had a huge personal grudge 1st against Nicholas and then against Kerensky.
 
"A telegraph from Crackenthorpe to Grey, dispatched just after midday on 25 July, confirms that at this point the Serbs were even willing to accept the notorious points 5 and 6 calling for a mixed commission of enquiry, 'provided that the appointment of such commission can be proved to be in accordance with international usage'. It may have been the reassurance from the Russians that stiffened the backs of the Serbs."
From page 461-462 in The Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark

I read Sleepwalkers. It's not a very good book IMO.

The telegraph from Crackenthorpe to Grey says this:
"The [Serbian] Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible...The Serbian government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply."

Which draws a very big question mark over Clark's interpretation.

Though that's only one of his problems. I'm not sure how a communication of the British Foreign Ministry is supposed to conclusively "confirm" anything about the inner workings of another state's government. Or how the Russian messages to Serbia - which included such suggestions as "if Austria invades, you probably shouldn't even fight back" - were supposed to stiffen anyone's back.

But that's a separate topic all on its own. Like I said, I think Decisions provides a pretty thorough debunking of the narrative later embraced by Clark.
 
While A-H wanted an excuse to squash Serbia, they were not going to go to war with Russia by themselves. If Wilhelm II does not give A-H the blank check and Russia does not basically do the same for Serbia then both A-H and Serbia are going to hash this out on their own, with or without fighting.
 
"The [Serbian] Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible...The Serbian government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply."
Where did you find this?
 
Orlando Figes in A People's Tragedy notes that this seems overstated:

"...Sazonov recommended a general mobilization, realizing that a German declaration of war against Russia was now imminent (it came on 1 August). He warned the Tsar that 'unless he yielded to the popular demand for war and unsheathed the sword in Serbia's behalf, he would run the risk of a revolution and perhaps the loss of his throne'. Nicholas went pale. 'Just think of the responsibility you're advising me to assume!' he said to Sazonov. But the force of his Ministers argument was incontrovertible and, reluctantly, the Tsar called for the general mobilization on 31 July.

"...As in his earlier book, McMeekin sees Russia as one of the states carrying a high level of responsibility due to its early and (initially) secret mobilization on July 24. This secret (partial) mobilization had been ordered even before formal receipt of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, and was only to be announced in case of an Austrian declaration of war or the outbreak of military operations. This order for partial mobilization was confirmed by the Russian council of ministers on July 25, where also (and more important) the “Period Preparatory to War” was (again secretly) announced in all of European Russia. It is only during the “Willy-Nicky” correspondence on July 30 that Czar Nicholas inadvertently admitted that “the military measures which have now come into force were decided five days ago” (p. 283). This admission makes Kaiser Wilhelm’s reaction that “the Czar has secretly mobilized behind my back” and his support for German mobilization definitely understandable. Still, only when this information was confirmed by the actual Russian mobilization placards was the German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg convinced. Mobilization was initiated with the proclamation of the “Kriegsgefahrzustand” on July 31 followed by the German mobilization on August 1."

As for the actual public opinion argument: the middle class was not going to riot in itself. But passive support to actual terrorist revolutionaries and apathetic view towards the Romanov regime was nearly as bad, as the modernizing Russia desperately needed this strata and their expertise. Most of elementary teachers supporting revolution is not a good recipe for societal stability.
 
To think about it, assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was against Russian interests: his idea of a Tripple Monarchy, if implemented, was going to create a whole bunch of the new problems for A-H (almost definitely, the Hungarians would be unhappy) and he was advocating a cautious approach toward Serbia so assassination was against Serbian interests as well. So why keep supporting the suicidal fools?

You realize that the Black Hand wasn't the Serbian Government ?
 
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