I was speaking in terms of your claims to the thoughts/attitudes/ect. of the broader Russian population. People don't like admitting (even to themselves) that strongly held pricipals, decisions they made in great passion, great sacrifices, broad and long standing cultural beliefs ect. are wrong, especially when the environment around them is saturated with information trying to enforce those beliefs, you're surronded by comrades you don't want to let down, ect.
You vastly overestimate the amount and objectivity of the information available to the average Ivan (Or Franz, or Pierre, or Tom for that matter). They don't have perfect information on the entirety of the war effort; or even general information of everywhere that isen't being filtered heavily through censorship and pro-Us spin, included casulity figures highly slanted in one's own direction. Given the particularly hard censorship, low density of press, and broad illerteracy among the Russian peasentry and the sheer geographic spread of the fronts they were fighting on, this was even more accute for them. As far as most people are concerned, maybe the Teutronic nations are pushing hard but they're paying DEARLY in blood for every step (The big French spin during the early years of the war, with all the papers and offical figures reporting the Germans were running through their manpower pool much faster than the Entente was.) and if Russians have any idea of what's going on in the West its going to be what they're getting from their allies and so will beleive the enemy is getting ground down. There's still plenty of plausability to opptomistic claims/What People Want to Hear in 1915, especially given the food and transport infastructure system that REALLY produced the major urban unrest in Russia hasen't happened yet and worse conditions on the front won't affect that. To draw some words from Sheman, a hostile population needs to feel the "hard hand of war" before they start wanting peace, and the army won't walk off as long as they beleive the conflict is going on and their homeland is in danger, which nations making bold advances and stating intentin to carve off "pounds of flesh" would certainly create. As for the Russo-Japanese War, the fact the budget was being strained to the limit and the fact the navy was at the bottom of the sea, while the Army was a force who's bayonets were set to picket the throne rather than being poised to overthrow it, made the advantages of giving up on a few highly peripheral interests worth it for insuring the survival of the government/state Remember, Nicholas's promises about reform went out the window once he felt he had the power to re-enforce his Aboslutism.
Again, iavailablity of information. Also, there's the assumption that the generals will keep trying to throw them into suicidal charges against an advancing enemy (And these would be a failure constantly; a dubiosu statement at best given that advantages being on the strategic defensive with counter attacks had over strategic offensive, particularly when within your own territory and with WW I technology). Your statements require the the Russian brass to have misplaced their brains en-mass (And before you cite French obsession with the Cult of the Offensive on the German presence on their front, let me remind you the French army had a strong economic motivation to get the Germans off their main industrial resource centers)
Incorrect. Governments are only valid as long as they retain dominance over the application of force in their juristiction. Nicholas and Kerensky fell when the people with guns turned them away from the crowds and towards the government, partially because they had to give their usurpers guns in order to point them at the crowd (Kerensky fell victim to that one)