WI Russia completes it's Great Program and the Great War is delayed until 1917

In OTL, very strong German fears existed with such an outcome. Moltke the Younger felt intense pressure to welcome a conflict sooner than later during his tenure because of Russia's Great Program and French increases in mobilization potential. If the July 1914 crisis had passed with no conflict and no significant loss of face to AH or Germany (that's a tall order), and no more major squabbles appear until 1917, would German strategy still be rested on Schlieffen's approach, or would it have to change and in what ways? I found some references to possible results of Russia's Great Program in Norman Stone's excellent history of the eastern front, but not sure what the effects would have been on German strategy given such a scenario. Germany was losing prestige in Europe in OTL and smaller nations, like Romania, started looking towards the Entente for their future interests. I suspect that would continue after the July 1914 crisis. In addition, could the Junkers continue the policy of limiting conscription to only half the available population, or could the navy continue with getting huge funding under the weight of Russia completing it's Great Program? What were the potential results of the Great Program for Russia?
 

mowque

Banned
Welcome!

You can put this on our actual Alt History forums.....Chat is for non-History stuff. Good WI though.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Might be a first. :)

Thread moved from Chat to post 1900.

Cool, never thought we could reverse the traffic. :D
 
The Great Program won't fix several of the fundamental defects in the Tsarist military system, namely the waste of money on the useless fortifications seen in the pre-war era, the failure of Russian arms to find any reasonable or workable means of combined-arms co-ordination through the war, nor will it handle the problems of command and co-ordination of singular armies in individual battles. The Great Program might let Tsarism survive a long war, but it will still lead to an overall failure of Russian arms in that war as it did not handle the fundamental failures in the Russian system, not all of which would be even potentially visible without a major war to expose them.
 
I guess the likelihood of war will reduce with the power the Germans attribute to Russia. If the Germans think that Russia is to strong, they'd change their policy - and by the way, Russia being this strong might lead to the British changing their perception of the greatest threat on the continent as well (although not to the point of an alliance with Germany).

Considering military tactics, a France-first strategy is still sensible with a stronger Russia, methinks.
 
I think 1917 is the point at which the Germans had predicted they can't win against the French fast enough to turn around and defeat the Russians, and so they won't allow themselves to be drawn into a war.
 
I think 1917 is the point at which the Germans had predicted they can't win against the French fast enough to turn around and defeat the Russians, and so they won't allow themselves to be drawn into a war.

Indeed, this is the chief reason why we see the war council in 1912 deciding that a war would need to happen as soon as possible if Germany was to get her hegemonic ambitions.
 
I think Germany still does a France first strategy in 1917. German feared that a defence in the west but attack in the east strategy would take forever and that in a long war her manufacturing economy would suffer worse than France or Russia's and that time would be on her enemies side.

Its only worse in 1917. Russia is that much stronger. Germany if faced with war would still try for a knockout blow in the west even if that meant retreating to the Vistula fortress line in the east from the get go. However since the Germans know this is much more riskier now, look for them to be much more cautious diplomatically (I agree with the above posts).

Russia is not going to launch an unprovoked war (as long as the Czar is around, he isn't going to attack his monarchy buddies unless forced to). The German army's reputation is just to stout for anybody to just attack that country without being forced into it. As long as the Germans don't do anything stupid they can keep the peace.

A likely war situation in 1917 is that there is usual unrest in Turkish Armenia or Kurdestan and Russia feels its a good time to take another slice of Turkey and intervenes. Now Germany has to decide if she defends Turkey to defend her interests in the country. A risky proposition indeed. Perhaps Britain, worried about a victorious and strong Russia taking and keeping Istanbul whispers to Germany let Russia take just Armenia and we will go ahead and finally do the split of the Portugese colonies. Germany, fearing war with Russia is glad to take the English deal.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
In OTL, very strong German fears existed with such an outcome. Moltke the Younger felt intense pressure to welcome a conflict sooner than later during his tenure because of Russia's Great Program and French increases in mobilization potential. If the July 1914 crisis had passed with no conflict and no significant loss of face to AH or Germany (that's a tall order), and no more major squabbles appear until 1917, would German strategy still be rested on Schlieffen's approach, or would it have to change and in what ways? I found some references to possible results of Russia's Great Program in Norman Stone's excellent history of the eastern front, but not sure what the effects would have been on German strategy given such a scenario. Germany was losing prestige in Europe in OTL and smaller nations, like Romania, started looking towards the Entente for their future interests. I suspect that would continue after the July 1914 crisis. In addition, could the Junkers continue the policy of limiting conscription to only half the available population, or could the navy continue with getting huge funding under the weight of Russia completing it's Great Program? What were the potential results of the Great Program for Russia?

Welcome to the board.

The exact POD is always important for a complete analysis, and depending on the POD, often things can go both ways.

You listed no loss of face for A-H and Germany, which to me, means they "won" the Serbia issue. A-H had many ethnic issues, and they have now eliminated one of many problems. With Serbian (read Southern Slav) ambitions crushed, now A-H can deal with Hungary 1917 issue.

As an aside, to give you an example of why the POD matters, look at some of the possible immediate effects:

1) Maybe Bulgaria is larger after getting the Southern Part of Serbia.
2) Serbia may have agreed to all the demands, and A-H has a police force in Serbia. Any Serbian politician who gets out of line is simply arrest by A-H and sent to jail for 20 years.
3) Did Russia lose face after having to back down in its support of Serbia? Or did the Russians find a face saving way from day 1. Losing face in Serbia could easily cause a very, very nasty political crisis in Russia.
4) Maybe Serbia had to give all its heavy weapons to A-H as terms of peace.
5) etc, etc.

Now to what i think you want to know.

Before 1905, Germany had a different plans. So likely at some point before 1920, a different plan is adopted. Most likely is to defend against France, and go against Russia. My guess is that Germany will build a line of heavy fortifications in the 1916 to 1920 are in A-L. A huge amount will depend on who is the next GHQ leader.

France's 3 year conscription was a temporary measure, so France's 1920 active army will be smaller than the 1914 active army.

Germany could have afforded a larger Army, at least two full more armies, maybe more. A scared public may support a much larger army. Two-thirds of the budget was not defense, and France was closer to 1/3. Germany could afford to double the Army's budget, if the public wanted to do it. There were plans to add more trucks to the Army, so perhaps Germany chose more equipment over more men. Germany might have developed motorized infantry, or even armored units give a decade or so. It would be a gradual evolution.

The Junkers had already allowed non-Junker officers in support units. To expand they will have to do this even more. My guess is the Junkers support a better army (motorized, tanks, airplanes) and the population support a larger army (more reserve corp). A lot depends on how the politics play out, and the SPD will want changes in sufferance rules for more military spending or any other kaiser lead program.

Navy funding could go either way. My guess is that it stays at about 2-3 new capital ships per year, so Germany has a much more powerful navy as the pre-dreadnoughts are replaced or moved to support roles.

A-H spent the least on their military, and was also do a modernization program. A-H will have a better equipped army in 1918 than 1914. For example the artillery pieces from the 1880's will be replace by modern guns.

There is also the 50 year expiration of the dual monarchy in 1917. A-H might be destroyed as a single country, or it might come out much stronger.
 
Thank you for the responses; I like a lot of the thoughts I'm reading. It seems a delay to the start of the war by a few years opens many paths, in particular for Germany. Far from being only a threat to their existence, the increase in Russian strength could also be an opportunity to play on the fears of Britain and possibly open low level discussions on colonies and maybe naval issues. In addition, a change in military posture towards France might aid in these discussions. However, I don't see Britain turning it's back on the Entente unless the increase in Russian strength emboldens the czarist regime to seek adventures outside Europe, like Turkey, or another war with Japan, a British ally. That would be a most interesting showdown, but Russia would need to feel secure in the west before attempting such an adventure.

Perhaps the inevitable reaction of German war planning towards a focus on the east with a healthy increase in conscription causes Russian generals to fall into line and advocate war now rather than later (just like Moltke felt) given the decline in French military strength that was mentioned above. I see two likely outcomes with either Russia getting into a crisis involving A-H, like in OTL, or secret negotiations with Germany on a new order for Europe and spheres of influence. Given the liklihood of Franz Joseph's death coinciding with the Hungarian issue, I like the latter outcome. Imagine Germany and Russia agreeing to a future Europe without A-H? It doesn't seem too farfetched given history and it seems the only way for the peaceful emergence of a GrossD'land, which would require Russian consent. A-H would be in a state of internal turmoil and Russia would declare their right to protect Slavs in Galacia and Bukhovina and threaten to invade, while Germany gives the Austrians a private ultimatum that unless they allow Hungarian independence, then no help except arms to fight Russia.

Then the Austrians try to implement Hungarian independence, which causes all hell to break loose, a la 1989 Eastern Europe, and German and Russian armies move in to officially help keep the peace because of the power vacuum caused by the disintegration of the A-H army into ethnic groupings, but they merely occupy pre-designated zones of control, a la 1939 Poland. Within a year the Austrians request Anschluss (Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia), Galicia and Bukhovina are annexed by Russia, Croatia becomes a kingdom with a Hohenzollern king, and a smaller Hungary is laid impotent or gets involved in a struggle among the Balkan successors of the Empire and possibly Romania too. Then France is isolated as Bismark intended and the deutsche mark descends upon Europe as the currency of choice (like in Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War).

But how long would Britain put up with a Russo-German division of Eastern Europe? What options does a possible alliance with France offer compared to a rapproachment with GrossD'land? I think they keep their empire intact much longer into the twentieth century by cooperating peacefully in a German-dominated Europe, economically speaking, rather than chasing chimeras of glory in Flanders and bankrupting themselves out of an empire so the French can keep screwing with everyone on the planet (IMHO, its unfortunate for the world that's what the British people got for all their goverment's troubles of getting into bed with the wrong side in 1914. Today there's little to show for such heroic efforts).
 
If you want a stronger Russian military reform, would they have to lose the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War? Because they keep winning wars against their opponents (Japan being the exception because Russia lost to them), military advisors don't feel the need to reform their army.
 
I'm not sure the Germans would cooperate with Russia in splitting up A-H. They would already fear being overrun by the 'Slavic hordes', why would they cooperate in dividing their only major ally with, in their view, their biggest enemy? The Germans want to rule Europe, and they know that due to Russia's sheer size any attempt at a co-dominium would end with Russia as the dominant partner.

That's not even counting what the rest of Europe might say to the breaking up of one of the Great Powers, if a weak one. Such a massive change in the balance of power would cause a massive diplomatic crisis, and it's more likely than not that a war breaks out over one or several of the many issues that will arise out of this.

The historic British policy has always been to prevent Europe from uniting under one hegemon. They would certainly side with the French, and very likely the Italians, in a scenario like this, as well as building up their ties with Japan. A united Europe is one that can dominate Britain, and that's something the British won't allow without a major war.
 
as others have said the German general staff (or whoever controlled policy) thought that 1917 was the absolute latest they could go to war with Russia and realistically stand a chance of winning. Past that and any war would only result in defeat.

Hence this thinking is a big reason why the Germans were willing to support the Austrians in regards to the assassination of archduke Francis Ferdinand.

If you can change the circumstances so that the assassination doesn't happen and that any war gets delayed past 1917 then you might be able to outright butterfly ww1 all together.

Germany will not feel confidant in starting any trouble that might drag it into a war it can't win.

And Austria might have a leader that can do soiemthing to stablize the situation. (note however that from what I've read FF was a reactionary that actually wanted to restore the old solitary German privilege so that the empire would become a purely German run state again instead of a jointly German-Magyar run one.)
 
If German synthetics can develop to bring rubber, coal gasoline, and others things to bear in the next 3-5 years they *might* be able to survive a longer war. And given that much of the best of German youth would be around a number of things might be plausible. Russia will still have difficulty making it out of such a prolonged war intact but I think that if the events leading to war are changed then the outcome will possibly change too. If France is held to a war by itself with Italy given a better deal and the UK stalling for time,maybe Germany can win the offensive. Also the Germans were toying with the idea of adopting a Mondragon rifle in 1914, so I wonder how they might do with MP18s and semi-auto battle rifles the day the war starts if everyone else is using bolt-action rifles. Aircraft and Zepplins will also be more advanced an German subs may also be more plentiful.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
If German synthetics can develop to bring rubber, coal gasoline, and others things to bear in the next 3-5 years they *might* be able to survive a longer war. And given that much of the best of German youth would be around a number of things might be plausible. Russia will still have difficulty making it out of such a prolonged war intact but I think that if the events leading to war are changed then the outcome will possibly change too. If France is held to a war by itself with Italy given a better deal and the UK stalling for time,maybe Germany can win the offensive. Also the Germans were toying with the idea of adopting a Mondragon rifle in 1914, so I wonder how they might do with MP18s and semi-auto battle rifles the day the war starts if everyone else is using bolt-action rifles. Aircraft and Zepplins will also be more advanced an German subs may also be more plentiful.

The Germans loved to plan, even if the plans were often overly complex. If Germany concludes a longer war is inevitable if their is a war, then prewar stocks of key raw materials are possible. Along with as others mention, a different foreign policy.

If Russia and France look sure to win, the UK will have a lot different policy too, and will even intervene in Germany's favor. Even early in the war, people warned that if Germany was dismantled as a Great Power, then Russia would dominate Europe. The British strategic planners understood how dangerous an Russian occupation/annexation of large parts of A-H or Germany could be. The UK was terrified of the Russians having direct access to the Med. If the Entente wins decisively, the various Slavic states are Russian client states and Russia may well have a major naval base in the Mediterranean.

In short, WW1 fought 5 years later may look nothing like our WW1, and will likely have a different lineup.


as others have said the German general staff (or whoever controlled policy) thought that 1917 was the absolute latest they could go to war with Russia and realistically stand a chance of winning. Past that and any war would only result in defeat.

....

And Austria might have a leader that can do soiemthing to stablize the situation. (note however that from what I've read FF was a reactionary that actually wanted to restore the old solitary German privilege so that the empire would become a purely German run state again instead of a jointly German-Magyar run one.)

It is true the GHQ believed that, and it is probably true with the forces they had at the time in the budget. But Germany was a rich country that could have afforded an Army at least twice as big, so an arms races is quite possible. Predicting the votes of the Parliament is beyond my ability, but they could have easily gone hawkish, and the Junkers could have agreed to a lot more non-Junker officers. The A-H is woefully underequipped compared to the German standards. If the 1917 crisis is resolved in a pro-German manner, there is also the possibility of providing aid to improve the A-H army. If the A-H army was up to German TOE in 1914, the war looks a lot different.

Europe was going through an arms race, where one side passed a defense bill that gave it a clear advantage, then the other side reacts. This pattern is likely to continue, because even the most left wing German political party does not want to replace the Kaiser with the Tsar.

Now, A-H trying to go pure German is possible, but not the most likely option. There were many things being looked at, to me, it is hard to see which choices would have been made. Yes the Hungarians wanted a separate country with huge Slavic minority populations, but in realty, this option would be terrible for Hungary, because Austria would align very closely with Germany, and eventually Hungary is likely dismantled by Russia. Also, the top 5% that controlled the country interest are not aligned with the lower class Hungarians. And the main "German privilege" was having the Army using only German as its language, and this change made a lot of sense. Now given a long enough time frame, the minority population of A-H may start to think of themselves as German, but it does not have to be that way.

A-H in 1917 could easily lead to war. The problem for Russia intervening, is that its national interests don't necessarily align with Britain or France. Britain does not want Russia near the Med and probably wants independent states outside of Russia sphere. France will want to weaken Germany, but even in this time frame, it would understand that a defacto merger of Germany and A-H into one state would harm its interests, and IMO, stripping Austria of minority populations can only lead this way. Once the German interest is separate from the Southern Slavic issues, then German and Russia being allies again is possible. Russia would give lip service to helping the Poles, but the Tsar did not want an independent Poland. Anytime in the previous 90 years, the Tsar could have setup the Triple crown of Russia, Poland and Finland, but they did not.
 
It is true the GHQ believed that, and it is probably true with the forces they had at the time in the budget. But Germany was a rich country that could have afforded an Army at least twice as big, so an arms races is quite possible. Predicting the votes of the Parliament is beyond my ability, but they could have easily gone hawkish, and the Junkers could have agreed to a lot more non-Junker officers.

No, this was part of their calculations. The Germans recognised that if they increased the size of their army, their enemies could do the same, and that after 1917, the Russians would have the advantage in doing so. Their analysis was based on the balance of industry and infrastructure, as much as their immediate military strength.

You also had the rise of the Socialists as a force in German politics, which would only be accelerated by attempts to increase the size of the army.
 
Bismarck when he was in charge was worried bringing in Austria into Germany would change the political makeup of German (at Prussia's expense) since Prussia would now be a smaller part of the bigger pie. It was better just to ally and protect Austria and ensure the predominace of Germans in that country vs actually annexing the German part. I don't see a German /Russian agreement to take down A-H.

Now this no war until 1917 TL assumes the German put limits on how much they are willing to back Austria over stuff that happens far away from any Germans.

Tirpitz in his memoirs (a free Nook download) states that Austria should have just accepted the parts of the ultimatum that Serbia was willing to agree on and take the remaining points to international conference.

He thought an agreement with the English over the Portugese colonies was just around the corner and great things were just ahead for a Germany at peace (and his big navy would preserve that peace) and any war with Russia was just crazy talk (and the military mission in Istanbul should be withdrawn, what possible good was going to come from that).

He is correct. Germany had a lead in high tech stuff like chemicals and electronics, some of her colonies were just becoming profitable, diamonds had been discovered in Southwest Africa, more colonial areas could be secured (i.e Portugese colonies). Within 10 years you might see regular Zepplin service to those colonies from Germany. The Czar was never going to launch a war of aggression against the other Monarchies.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
No, this was part of their calculations. The Germans recognised that if they increased the size of their army, their enemies could do the same, and that after 1917, the Russians would have the advantage in doing so. Their analysis was based on the balance of industry and infrastructure, as much as their immediate military strength.

You also had the rise of the Socialists as a force in German politics, which would only be accelerated by attempts to increase the size of the army.

I have looked at the GDP and population numbers, and I don't think it was as hopeless as the GHQ made it to be. There were clearly the men power both in Germany and A-H for a much larger army, and the funds to equip it. Even after this is done, their is a large enough economy to support a Navy the size of the UK's in 1914.

I was giving what was possible, and it was possible.

France was already at 3 years conscription. If Germany goes to 3 year conscription, i really doubt France would have gone to a 4.5 year conscription. It is proper to look at other sides reacting, but it is wrong to assume they will always match.

Now, this is more how I feel it will play out if the German population really believes that any war with Russia is an automatic loss.

1) The Germans will go to 3 year conscription, and the extra 4 armies will be placed on the eastern front.

2) Hungarian leadership will be terrified of Russia, and will make a reasonable compromise with Austria. Austria military will also become much, much stronger.

3) Germany will adopt a less aggressive foreign policy.

4) Assuming Britain also view the situation that Russia will be able to easily conquer Germany will move away from France and Russia towards Germany to maintain the balance of power. IOTL, they were not that far apart on naval levels, it was under 10% difference on the fleet size of Germany compared to the UK. Germany will be afraid, and will agree to Britain terms, the deal will have face saving components for each side.

5) France will now have to decided if to add another 1.5 years of conscription. There is a huge political cost to pay. Maybe they pay the cost, maybe the try to find ways to limit the arms race.

6) It is not clear to me that the Tsar would be able to maintain internal stability in this scenario.

7) If WW1 comes, it will be long an bloodly.

The key thing is the belief. Very few Germans wanted to replace the Kaiser with the Tsar, and this is exactly what being unable to win against Russia means. Less than 1/3 of the budget went to defense, there are huge resources available for better/larger military. In the 1930's and 1940's, the USA was antiwar, and had a small military budget. Once France falls, and the USA's population is scared, FDR gets massive funding and an unheard of peace time conscription. IF, and this is a big IF, the belief is Germany automatically lose to Russia in any war, the army will get whatever it wants.

A lot of WW1 was that Britain was playing the balance of power game, and became more French leaning as Germany became stronger. If Britain had entered on the CP side, the war would have been over in 18 months or less. WW1 looked a lot like it did, because the UK had a policy that was designed to make any war in Europe a very close call, and this has the side effect of making the war very bloody.
 
If German synthetics can develop to bring rubber, coal gasoline, and others things to bear in the next 3-5 years they *might* be able to survive a longer war. And given that much of the best of German youth would be around a number of things might be plausible.

Nope.

1. Coal gasoline
Wiki said:
Since the invention of the original process by Franz Fischer and Hans Tropsch, working at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in the 1920s, many refinements and adjustments have been made. The term "Fischer-Tropsch" now applies to a wide variety of similar processes (Fischer-Tropsch synthesis or Fischer-Tropsch chemistry). Fischer and Tropsch filed a number of patents, e.g., US patent no. 1,746,464, applied 1926, published 1930.[8] It was commercialized in Germany in 1936. Being petroleum-poor but coal-rich, Germany used the FT-process during World War II to produce ersatz (German: substitute) fuels. F-T production accounted for an estimated 9% of German war production of fuels and 25% of the automobile fuel.[9]
FT was only invented in the 20s, wasn't ready for industrial scale until the 30s. No way is it possible in the 10s.

So, no liquid fuels.


2. synthetic rubber.
Hmm... This one may actually be doable, much to my amazement.
The Russian scientist Sergei Vasiljevich Lebedev created the first rubber polymer synthesized from butadiene in 1910. This form of synthetic rubber provided the basis for the first large-scale commercial production, which occurred during World War I as a result of shortages of natural rubber. This early form of synthetic rubber was again replaced with natural rubber after the war ended, but investigations of synthetic rubber continued. Russian American Ivan Ostromislensky did significant early research on synthetic rubber and a couple of monomers in the earlier 1900s.
I doubt you'd manage to get the volume you'd need, but maybe it's possible.

Chemistry is making huge strides - but it's not up to most of the things you want. Note that nylon, the first purely synthetic fiber wasn't invented until 1935.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
If German synthetics can develop to bring rubber, coal gasoline, and others things to bear in the next 3-5 years they *might* be able to survive a longer war. And given that much of the best of German youth would be around a number of things might be plausible. Russia will still have difficulty making it out of such a prolonged war intact but I think that if the events leading to war are changed then the outcome will possibly change too. If France is held to a war by itself with Italy given a better deal and the UK stalling for time,maybe Germany can win the offensive. Also the Germans were toying with the idea of adopting a Mondragon rifle in 1914, so I wonder how they might do with MP18s and semi-auto battle rifles the day the war starts if everyone else is using bolt-action rifles. Aircraft and Zepplins will also be more advanced an German subs may also be more plentiful.


You would need to check figures, but I think the Galicia (A-H) was around 10% of world oil supply, and Romania was another 10%. The great oil fields of Texas, Saudis were decades in the future. You would also want to look at the oil fields of Northern Iraq. Some good diplomatic work can fix this for Germany. Also the POD is "success" in Serbia, so if forward thinking, some extra territorial rights to move oil trains through Serbia from the Ottomans could work. Also, Heavy fortifications in Galicia (A-H) make a lot of sense. As does really good Romanian relations, but Romania is hard to keep happy if Hungary is happy.

Personally if I was in charge, once oil becomes critical to the German war Plan, holding the A-H oil fields becomes the number one strategic priority.

As to rubber, why not just do a multi-year strategic stockpile? Evidently, the steel industry had stockpiled enough trace metals for steel production for the entire war. Note, it was the industry that was forward thinking, not the government. So the need to plan ahead was clear, but the attitudes need to change in GHQ.

For some reason, a multi-year war was consider possible, even by 1905, but I have not found evidence of serious planning for it by the Germans. The whole Belgium plan was built on needing to win quickly to avoid a short war, but it was always considered a risky plan that could fail, and there appears to me to be no good backup plan. Food is a striking example. Germany had the train schedules down to the minute, but it was winter of 1915 before they did food rationing. IMO, food rationing should have been trigger automatically by the mobilization, and it should have taken effect within a few weeks of July 28. I see no evidence the ammo issues in a long-term war was considered. The first plant is built in 1913, so if this was pushed as a national priority, the nitrogen issue would have never even existed in the war. If Germany knew how to build one plant, it could have also built 3.

IMO, as a guess, if Germany gets to the 1917-1920 time frame, and it concludes the war has to be a long war, it will setup the resource/planning structure, and address these issues systematically. And my guess, and $4 will get you a nice cup of coffee. ;)
 
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