So no where near as serious as some of the other great sieges of WW2 which endured despite people dying of starvation in the streets!
K? What does that have to do with not having enough ammo and fuel for defenses to be able to endure a major invasion?
The Axis lost air superiority over Malta just ten days after the Hercules plan was agreed.
The invasion was never happening, it was starvation and surrender after failed summer convoys or nothing.
Oh you mean when the Axis diverted air power to support the Battle of Gazala, Tobruk, and invasion of Egypt IOTL?
I have made this point on other forums and I will just say again that I do not think an Axis capture of Malta in 1942 is quite the disaster for the Allies that it is generally made out to be (including a couple of rather poor AH books that make it the game changer that allows the great Rommel to capture Egypt):
- In 1942 the British expended a lot of forces keeping Malta in the game. PEDESTAL alone saw one carrier and two cruisers sunk with another carrier earning an extended vacation in Virginia. No Malta to sustain and all of those forces devoted to supplying Malta get to cause trouble elsewhere.
- A successful Axis invasion of Malta will be a casualty filled slugfest. Axis forces will take heavy casualties and their prize will likely be a pile of rubble once all is said and done.
- Capturing Malta will not help the Axis take Egypt contrary to popular belief, particularly if they wait until June. The further they go into Egypt the longer their supply lines get, the shorter Allied supply lines get, El Alamein is still chokepoint, and Allied numerical and material superiority which starts coming into play in 1942 will still be a thing.
Just a few thoughts. I was just fooling around on Amazon yesterday and I found a AH book that has the Axis taking Malta in 42 and then Rommel taking Egypt and after that going on to move up into the Soviet Union or something like that.
No one here said the loss of Malta would be a game changer or allow Rommel's replace to take Egypt, rather that going after Malta would happen in lieu of launching Gazala and invading Egypt. Without Rommel it is hard to see anyone even try Gazala or that Hitler would reinforce that theater like he did IOTL without his media darling getting all the headlines.
If Malta is taken taken then it reduces most of the pressure on Axis logistics to North Africa, which is a huge help and reduces a major source of bleeding of forces to constantly have to suppress the island.
Where do you think the British would use their August and on naval forces that would have otherwise been either lost or tied up with Malta?
I don't think anyone disputes that invading Malta in 1942 would be bloody for the Axis, just that the juice would be worth the squeeze and cause serious issues for the Allies from then on, as the Malta outpost in the Axis backyard was a vital staging point for all sorts of operations, including providing air cover for the invasion of Sicily; without Malta it is debatable if Sicily would have even been invaded.
I don't see Malta getting any different of a treatment if Rommel is captured (as per the OP) and honestly the only thing I can think of as anyway meaningfully different in the war is that maybe the Allies have an easier time during Overlord with an even less well prepared Atlantic Wall to run into (provided the person who fills in for Rommel in this role isn't actually a hell of a lot better at organising something like that.)
Rommel was overrated in terms of his abilities above corps level operations, so I doubt we see much Atlantic Wall differences...which was generally pretty negligible as it was IOTL, since it basically folded like a wet paper bag when attacked and seems to have been a massive waste of resources. Outside of Omaha IIRC the Germans lost more men defending the Normandy beaches than the Allies lost landing and they were inland in a matter of hours. The real problem was when they tried to push inland and there wasn't much that Rommel did there that anyone else couldn't have and he was out of action 5 or 6 weeks into the campaign and not even present when it mattered on the first day.
en.wikipedia.org
