(I found this in a Scottish newspaper online. "Braveheart" doesn't give me enough background to understand any of this, but others here might be able to discuss it.
--Alois)
If Bruce had died at Dumfries, there would be no Scotland
Ted Cowan
MOST of Scotland must have believed that the wrong man was left bleeding to death at the altar of the church of the Grey Friars in Dumfries, when Robert Bruce dispatched John Comyn in February 1306. The victim was known as the Red Comyn long before he met his sanguinary end. His family, unlike the vacillating Bruces, had been associated with the Patriotic Party since the mid-13th century, defending Scottish interests against hostile English ambition.
It is noteworthy that the first military attacks in the Wars of Independence were initiated by the Scots, at Easter 1296, when the Red Comyn, in league with his relative the Earl of Buchan, attacked Carlisle Castle, defended, on behalf of Edward I, by Robert Bruce and his son - the future king. Bruce and Comyn, as joint Guardians in 1298, had an acrimonious relationship, degenerating on occasion to fisticuffs. Comyn remained in office for two years after Bruce resigned in a huff; he was the last to hold out against Edward I, in 1304.
If Bruce had died at Dumfries there would have been no arachnaphilia, no Bannockburn, no Arbroath Declaration and, arguably, pretty soon, no Scotland.
John Comyn was the nephew of John Balliol - King John since 1292 - illegally deposed by Edward I in 1296. Following the English conquest of Scotland, William Wallace spearheaded the resistance, but he always claimed to be acting ‘in the name of the lord John by God’s grace illustrious king of Scotland, by the consent of the community of the realm’.
Like Bruce, Comyn regarded the victor at Stirling Bridge as an upstart who offended his aristocratic sensibilities, and it is completely believable that both noblemen treacherously contributed to Wallace’s defeat at Falkirk.
The first loyalty of aristocrats was the preservation of family interests, rights, privileges, and not least, estates, including those that might be held in England or France; they were trapped by their pedigrees and pasts, unfree to act in some irresponsible adventure for national liberation. Their assumptions told them that Wallace would eventually be destroyed by hubris and corruption, and both were probably relieved when he was no more.
Comyn would have had to take on some of the late Robert’s allies, such as the Douglases, Murrays and Stewarts, as well as the Bruces themselves, but it is unlikely that he planned a Comynist regime. He would have been intent upon the restoration of his uncle, in exile in France, an outcome for which he had already striven. Although excommunicated for defiling the sanctuary, he would have proved much less divisive than Bruce, who plunged Scotland into a civil war as well as revolting against the mighty Plantagenet. Nor would he have been regarded, as was Bruce, as a usurper of Balliol’s kingship. Comyns and Balliols together represented an extremely powerful alliance, controlling a great swathe of Scotland from Galloway to Buchan. Any opposition would have been swiftly crushed and those clerics who were concerned about the independence of the Scottish Church would soon have rallied round.
It is conceivable that when Edward I died in 1307, his successor, Edward II, would have accepted the restoration of Balliol, as the individual who enjoyed the most unanimous support in the country, as well as having some sort of a track record of cooperation with the English.
However, Balliol, as king, had not been quite the "Toom Tabard", or empty coat of legend. He had tasted the ambrosia of power. In two years, he convened four parliaments, a record for medieval Scotland. The alliance with France had been strengthened and he would have secured guarantees from King Edward that there would be no more unreasonable demands, such as appeals to English courts, or Scottish service in England’s wars.
When Balliol died in 1313, he would be succeeded by his son Edward, doubtless by then married off to some suitable English heiress close to the throne. Possibly, since he lived until 1363, King Edward of Scotland may have eventually wed Joanna, Edward II’s daughter, as part of negotiations leading to a union between the two countries; a not dissimilar scenario was historically debated by David II.
The Comyns would have achieved an aristocratic coup in 1306, which would have been as retrograde and disastrous as a Jacobite victory 400 years later. Historically Bruce was forced, in the Declaration of Arbroath, to signal the constitutional monarchy, freedom and independence in the creation of a national loyalty which far transcended the duty to family and kin, thus fostering a nation and assumptions which have continued to motivate Scots ever since. The Comyn touch may not have proved so sensitive or so inspirational.
--Alois)
If Bruce had died at Dumfries, there would be no Scotland
Ted Cowan
MOST of Scotland must have believed that the wrong man was left bleeding to death at the altar of the church of the Grey Friars in Dumfries, when Robert Bruce dispatched John Comyn in February 1306. The victim was known as the Red Comyn long before he met his sanguinary end. His family, unlike the vacillating Bruces, had been associated with the Patriotic Party since the mid-13th century, defending Scottish interests against hostile English ambition.
It is noteworthy that the first military attacks in the Wars of Independence were initiated by the Scots, at Easter 1296, when the Red Comyn, in league with his relative the Earl of Buchan, attacked Carlisle Castle, defended, on behalf of Edward I, by Robert Bruce and his son - the future king. Bruce and Comyn, as joint Guardians in 1298, had an acrimonious relationship, degenerating on occasion to fisticuffs. Comyn remained in office for two years after Bruce resigned in a huff; he was the last to hold out against Edward I, in 1304.
If Bruce had died at Dumfries there would have been no arachnaphilia, no Bannockburn, no Arbroath Declaration and, arguably, pretty soon, no Scotland.
John Comyn was the nephew of John Balliol - King John since 1292 - illegally deposed by Edward I in 1296. Following the English conquest of Scotland, William Wallace spearheaded the resistance, but he always claimed to be acting ‘in the name of the lord John by God’s grace illustrious king of Scotland, by the consent of the community of the realm’.
Like Bruce, Comyn regarded the victor at Stirling Bridge as an upstart who offended his aristocratic sensibilities, and it is completely believable that both noblemen treacherously contributed to Wallace’s defeat at Falkirk.
The first loyalty of aristocrats was the preservation of family interests, rights, privileges, and not least, estates, including those that might be held in England or France; they were trapped by their pedigrees and pasts, unfree to act in some irresponsible adventure for national liberation. Their assumptions told them that Wallace would eventually be destroyed by hubris and corruption, and both were probably relieved when he was no more.
Comyn would have had to take on some of the late Robert’s allies, such as the Douglases, Murrays and Stewarts, as well as the Bruces themselves, but it is unlikely that he planned a Comynist regime. He would have been intent upon the restoration of his uncle, in exile in France, an outcome for which he had already striven. Although excommunicated for defiling the sanctuary, he would have proved much less divisive than Bruce, who plunged Scotland into a civil war as well as revolting against the mighty Plantagenet. Nor would he have been regarded, as was Bruce, as a usurper of Balliol’s kingship. Comyns and Balliols together represented an extremely powerful alliance, controlling a great swathe of Scotland from Galloway to Buchan. Any opposition would have been swiftly crushed and those clerics who were concerned about the independence of the Scottish Church would soon have rallied round.
It is conceivable that when Edward I died in 1307, his successor, Edward II, would have accepted the restoration of Balliol, as the individual who enjoyed the most unanimous support in the country, as well as having some sort of a track record of cooperation with the English.
However, Balliol, as king, had not been quite the "Toom Tabard", or empty coat of legend. He had tasted the ambrosia of power. In two years, he convened four parliaments, a record for medieval Scotland. The alliance with France had been strengthened and he would have secured guarantees from King Edward that there would be no more unreasonable demands, such as appeals to English courts, or Scottish service in England’s wars.
When Balliol died in 1313, he would be succeeded by his son Edward, doubtless by then married off to some suitable English heiress close to the throne. Possibly, since he lived until 1363, King Edward of Scotland may have eventually wed Joanna, Edward II’s daughter, as part of negotiations leading to a union between the two countries; a not dissimilar scenario was historically debated by David II.
The Comyns would have achieved an aristocratic coup in 1306, which would have been as retrograde and disastrous as a Jacobite victory 400 years later. Historically Bruce was forced, in the Declaration of Arbroath, to signal the constitutional monarchy, freedom and independence in the creation of a national loyalty which far transcended the duty to family and kin, thus fostering a nation and assumptions which have continued to motivate Scots ever since. The Comyn touch may not have proved so sensitive or so inspirational.