WI: Robert E. Lee Captured At Gettysburg

Greenville

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What if General Robert E. Lee's forces were surrounded and captured at the Battle of Gettysburg as hoped for by the Union?
 
The Confedracy is screwed, the door to Richmond is wide open.The forces left defending Richmond aren't enough.
Robert E Lee's reputation will take a serious hit, with people saying he never should have been anywhere near Gettysburg.
 
Agreed, there are not nearly enough troops near Richmond to defend it against Meade once he moves against it and the best generals in the CSA have been captured. There are no reinforcements to speak of outside of armies already engaged. The only way to get enough troops to defend Richmond is basically abandon the rest of the CSA , which is much worse yet than abandoning Richmond.
 
The Southern Rebellion is dead in the water.

The combination of the capture of the Army of Northern Virginia and the the seizure of Vicksburg/reconquest of the Mississippi River in quick succession would hit morale across the rebellious territories hard. Even assuming the leadership in Richmond intends to fight, there's no way they'll be able to convince Lousianna or Mississippi to send up their reserves when General Grant is close by and could strike at any moment. Hell, the entire Deep South is likely to hold onto what garrison troops they have for dear life, meaning the rebel leadership is going to have to flee to where they are if they want to be protected... which leaves Virginia and all its industrial capacity undefended and a clear route into North Carolina, who has strong Unionist sentiments and could easily defect (especially if they're offered fairly lenient terms for reunion by the Federal government... which at the time of Gettysburg was still a viable option).

Assuming the Emancipation Proclaimation is still issued, you might just see a rush by state governments to get out of the "state of rebellion" to avoid the enforced emancipation since there's no longer a large standing military force to give the rebellion any chance of success. In the long run, of course, that's going to make emancipation more problematic, especially if the upper south is given lenient terms to repatriate in order to end the rebellion more quickly (Lincoln, the Republicans, and even most of the Northern population valuing the sanctity of the Union, republic, and Consitutionial law more than black liberation in any reguard). In all likelyhood, Emancipation won't be attached to the Civil War, and it would be better remembered for how the young Republic proved it could sustain itself, proving the viability off Constiutional law and democratic self-governance (In an era where republicanism looked like it was on its way out... see the failure of the Springtime of Nations), securing the hope of liberty when it looked like it might be snuffed out for rule by "aristocrats" (The Southern planters would still get the shaft... but more for how they resembled European nobles)
 
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The Southern Rebellion is dead in the water.

The combination of the capture of the Army of Northern Virginia and the the seizure of Vicksburg/reconquest of the Mississippi River in quick succession would hit morale across the rebellious territories hard. Even assuming the leadership in Richmond intends to fight, there's no way they'll be able to convince Lousianna or Mississippi to send up their reserves when General Grant is close by and could strike at any moment. Hell, the entire Deep South is likely to hold onto what garrison troops they have for dear life, meaning the rebel leadership is going to have to flee to where they are if they want to be protected... which leaves Virginia and all its industrial capacity undefended and a clear route into North Carolina, who has strong Unionist sentiments and could easily defect (especially if they're offered fairly lenient terms for reunion by the Federal government... which at the time of Gettysburg was still a viable option).

Assuming the Emancipation Proclaimation is still issued, you might just see a rush by state governments to get out of the "state of rebellion" to avoid the enforced emancipation since there's no longer a large standing military force to give the rebellion any chance of success. In the long run, of course, that's going to make emancipation more problematic, especially if the upper south is given lenient terms to repatriate in order to end the rebellion more quickly (Lincoln, the Republicans, and even most of the Northern population valuing the sanctity of the Union, republic, and Consitutionial law more than black liberation in any reguard). In all likelyhood, Emancipation won't be attached to the Civil War, and it would be better remembered for how the young Republic proved it could sustain itself, proving the viability off Constiutional law and democratic self-governance (In an era where republicanism looked like it was on its way out... see the failure of the Springtime of Nations), securing the hope of liberty when it looked like it might be snuffed out for rule by "aristocrats" (The Southern planters would still get the shaft... but more for how they resembled European nobles)


The EP went into effect on Jan 1st, 1863 by Gettysburg it was too late to go back. Lincoln said several times that after it went into effect he could not go back on it as he already pledged his word. After Lee's capture Lincoln is in a position both militarily and politically where he doesn't have to give up a thing. There is literally almost nothing between Meade and Richmond. Grant will take Vicksburg at the same time and Confederate Army morale would be very low. I think Bragg's men might give up even before Grant arrives because the cause would be clearly hopeless after the fall of both Vicksburg and Richmond.
 
The EP went into effect on Jan 1st, 1863 by Gettysburg it was too late to go back. Lincoln said several times that after it went into effect he could not go back on it as he already pledged his word. After Lee's capture Lincoln is in a position both militarily and politically where he doesn't have to give up a thing. There is literally almost nothing between Meade and Richmond. Grant will take Vicksburg at the same time and Confederate Army morale would be very low. I think Bragg's men might give up even before Grant arrives because the cause would be clearly hopeless after the fall of both Vicksburg and Richmond.

I mentioned the morale issue in terms of the "Confederates" as a whole (and as for the rebel government in Richmond, yah they're screwed. I woulden't argue against that in any circumstances). The problem Lincoln faces is, while the rebel army is gone, the situation in the Dee[ Southern states is still viable enough and Lee captured in a "martyer" enough of a situation that the state governments there could still reasonably threaten to shift to gurellia warfare. We've yet to see the March to the Sea, and the Army of Northern Virginia was worn down not through attrition on its own soil, but swallowed in a sack while invading enemy territory. In such a case, resistance hasen't been proven to be a futile effort; the Deep South could very well conclude that it was trying to bring the war to the North and focusing on a conventional military campaign in Virginia that was the mistake.

Assuming that threat still existed, and the Upper South was willing to peacefully rejoin the Union (saving what could be an extended, violent occupation of what Lincoln wanted to see as his fellow countrymen, leading to greater resentment and death on both sides and a potential long-term split of the nation into areas under civilian and military law as unrepentant rebels: who could say they offered peace and reunion with honor and their Constitutional rights intact, but the Radical Republican tyrants offered only war to the death over the issue of black franchise). Imagine the political backlash even in the North when people learn their sons are going to be dying and fighting for potentially years more when peace and reconciliation was so close at hand.

The Democrats are going to be making political hay over the issue, and there's going to be a lot of Republicans putting pressure on the administration to do at least some backpeddling if they don't want to get voted out by moderate "Reconsiliation" candidates.
 
I mentioned the morale issue in terms of the "Confederates" as a whole (and as for the rebel government in Richmond, yah they're screwed. I woulden't argue against that in any circumstances). The problem Lincoln faces is, while the rebel army is gone, the situation in the Dee[ Southern states is still viable enough and Lee captured in a "martyer" enough of a situation that the state governments there could still reasonably threaten to shift to gurellia warfare. We've yet to see the March to the Sea, and the Army of Northern Virginia was worn down not through attrition on its own soil, but swallowed in a sack while invading enemy territory. In such a case, resistance hasen't been proven to be a futile effort; the Deep South could very well conclude that it was trying to bring the war to the North and focusing on a conventional military campaign in Virginia that was the mistake.

Assuming that threat still existed, and the Upper South was willing to peacefully rejoin the Union (saving what could be an extended, violent occupation of what Lincoln wanted to see as his fellow countrymen, leading to greater resentment and death on both sides and a potential long-term split of the nation into areas under civilian and military law as unrepentant rebels: who could say they offered peace and reunion with honor and their Constitutional rights intact, but the Radical Republican tyrants offered only war to the death over the issue of black franchise). Imagine the political backlash even in the North when people learn their sons are going to be dying and fighting for potentially years more when peace and reconciliation was so close at hand.

The Democrats are going to be making political hay over the issue, and there's going to be a lot of Republicans putting pressure on the administration to do at least some backpeddling if they don't want to get voted out by moderate "Reconsiliation" candidates.


It wouldn't happen. The South just ran into a buzz-saw and got its clock cleaned. Morale would be low and guerilla war is vastly overrated. Expect Union casualties to drop 80%+ (Probably considerably more) virtually overnight. With no support from abroad, with Virginia overrun and their main armies defeated I doubt very much the South would put up much more of a fight than in 1865. With the ANV gone there is nothing to prevent Meade from taking Richmond and then simply march his army straight south to Georgia and then turning west. Since the money was in the east it makes it even more devastating than the loss of the west was in 1864. Basically 1865 would happen a year and a half early.

The biggest problem with your scenario is that the masters can't prevent their slaves from running off if they are playing guerilla in the woods. Slavery can not last long without police power defending it and once the South is overrun by armies the South would have no police power left . If they run off to play guerilla the slave owners lose their slaves, if they don't they will have to pay the ex-slaves but at least they can get the ex-slaves to pick their cotton for them.
 
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edgeworthy pointed it out upthread.

Peter G. Tsouras's Gettysburg: An Alternate History ended with exactly this scenario.

(I can't remember if it is explicitly stated in the text that the war ends earlier than in OTL, but it is strongly hinted that the war ends a lot earlier than OTL, for the same reasons posters have outlined in this thread)
 
What if General Robert E. Lee's forces were surrounded and captured at the Battle of Gettysburg as hoped for by the Union?

How could this happen?

At Gettysburg, the Confederates surrounded the Union forces, attacking from the west, north, and northeast. Supposing Meade launched a grand counterattack after defeating Pickett's charge; the effect would be to drive the Confederates off the the field, not surround them.

There was a chance to destroy the AoNV, but it was after the battle, when high water prevented the retreating Confederates from crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. Meade had pursued, but cautiously; and worried that Lee's dug-in position along the river was too strong to attack. He spent two days in reconnaissance; but Lee crossed the river in the night after the second day.

If Meade had pressed the attack, there is a good chance that the AoNV would collapse, with most being captured, including probably Lee.

Effects: the war is over within six months. The twin castastrophes of Vicksburg in the west and Gettysburg/Williamsport will be severely demoralizing. The CSA can scrape together some kind of army in the east, but only by stripping troops from every back area, and it won't be a large or strong army. Meade will be pressed to march on Richmond... But the Army of the Potomac will be exhausted, having suffered over 30,000 casualties.

Nonetheless, Richmond will fall by October.

Meanwhile, Rosecrans will drive Bragg out of Tennessee. Bragg was able to counterattack, but that was with reinforcements including Longstreet's corps from Virginia. That isn't happening; Bragg also got troops from the Gulf Coast which are going to Virginia instead. Bragg will withdraw into Georgia.

Grant would probably lead his Army of the Tennessee to Mobile, then move into Georgia, to combine with Rosecrans against Bragg. With Meade coming south from Virginia, Confederate resistance would dissolve. Davis would be captured, probably in South Carolina or Georgia. The remaining rebel commands would give up.

The war ends in December or January.
 
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There was a chance to destroy the AoNV, but it was after the battle, when high water prevented the retreating Confederates from crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. Meade had pursued, but cautiously; and worried that Lee's dug-in position along the river was too strong to attack. He spent two days in reconnaissance; but Lee crossed the river in the night after the second day.

If Meade had pressed the attack, there is a good chance that the AoNV would collapse, with most being captured, including probably Lee.
While I would agree with the majority of your post, I find several old myths repeated here.

1. Meade's pursuit was not cautious but fairly aggressive and well-conceived. Meade's orders to screen Washington constrained him to a less direct route to the Potomac than the one Lee took. Not to mention logistical factors that hampered Meade.

2. The idea that the Army of the Potomac could destroy the Army of Northern Virginia at Williamsport is simply false. Lee had had time to entrench, very heavily. Meade called a council of war, and many of his generals opposed an attack under those circumstances.
In fact, most of the criticism came from politicians and rear-echelon soldiers. Confederate General John B. Gordon also defended Meade's decision. Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1st Corps Artillery Chief, who examined Lee's position after his withdrawal, thought Meade made the right call. Brig. Gen Henry Hunt agreed with Wainwright's assessment. A. A. Humphreys, Meade's new chief of staff, thirty-year veteran of the Topographical Corps, also believed Meade acted correctly in taking his time to prepare an assault on Lee's formidable lines.
 
While I would agree with the majority of your post, I find several old myths repeated here.

1. Meade's pursuit was not cautious but fairly aggressive and well-conceived. Meade's orders to screen Washington constrained him to a less direct route to the Potomac than the one Lee took. Not to mention logistical factors that hampered Meade.

2. The idea that the Army of the Potomac could destroy the Army of Northern Virginia at Williamsport is simply false. Lee had had time to entrench, very heavily. Meade called a council of war, and many of his generals opposed an attack under those circumstances.
In fact, most of the criticism came from politicians and rear-echelon soldiers. Confederate General John B. Gordon also defended Meade's decision. Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1st Corps Artillery Chief, who examined Lee's position after his withdrawal, thought Meade made the right call. Brig. Gen Henry Hunt agreed with Wainwright's assessment. A. A. Humphreys, Meade's new chief of staff, thirty-year veteran of the Topographical Corps, also believed Meade acted correctly in taking his time to prepare an assault on Lee's formidable lines.


What troops were there at Washington itself?

With the Capital no longer in danger, would it have been possible for these forces to move up the Potomac and get there before Lee did, so that he arrived at Williamsport to find Union forces on the opposite bank?
 
What troops were there at Washington itself?

With the Capital no longer in danger, would it have been possible for these forces to move up the Potomac and get there before Lee did, so that he arrived at Williamsport to find Union forces on the opposite bank?
Based on the report of Brigadier General J.G. Barnard on March 31, 1863, the garrison "of the forts constituting the Defenses of Washington" was 10,305 artillerymen and 16,420 Infantry for a total of "full garrisons for all the forts" as 26,725 men.
He also included a statement an interesting statement:
It will be seen, therefore, that a force of this magnitude would not furnish a satisfactory defense against a powerful and prolonged attack.It would be necessary to sustain it by arming all the able-bodied men in the District, and putting them upon the lines and in garrisons in the northern forts, and even then the defense would be weak.
The report shows that the Washington Defenses were felt to be undermanned than overstrength. The report also stated that 25,000 infantrymen and 9,000 artillerymen were required the defense. Hence, there would be no way to convince Halleck and Lincoln to send troops to Williamsport in order to block Lee.

The insecurity about Washington is greatly demonstrated by orders and restrictions that must followed by the Army of the Potomac commanders. The Army of the Potomac must always be between Washington and the Army of Northern Virginia. The only way for Meade to do so was by marching down the spine of the South Mountain range which added the distance and thus fatigue of the march. However, there was no other route Meade could take without disobeying orders.
 
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there would be no way to convince Halleck and Lincoln to send troops to Williamsport in order to block Lee.

The insecurity about Washington is greatly demonstrated by orders and restrictions that must followed by the Army of the Potomac commanders. The Army of the Potomac must always be between Washington and the Army of Northern Virginia. The only way for Meade to do so was by marching down the spine of the South Mountain range which added the distance and thus fatigue of the march. However, there was no other route Meade could take without disobeying orders.

Pity.

I admire Lee, but his escape after Gettysburg was a tragedy for North and South alike.
 
Pity.

I admire Lee, but his escape after Gettysburg was a tragedy for North and South alike.
True. There were, however, opportunities to cut Lee off from the Potomac.

I thought of two POD(s) that could help Meade trap Lee north of the Potomac.

1. IOTL Pleasonton was acting as the Cavalry Corps commander and Meade's Chief of Staff. Meade could possibly use this as an excuse to relieve Pleasonton from his role as Cavalry Corps commander and replace him with John Buford.

Firstly, Pleasonton failed to see the opportunity to barricade Jack's Mountain passes, both of which were narrow and have steep sides. Federal cavalry, supported by artillery, could have bottled up Lee's army there. Lee would have had two options.

a) Fight through the Federal blocking force
b) Taking a longer retreat route, probably the Cashtown pass

Either way, Lee would be delayed and provide Meade more time to get closer to the banks of the Potomac before Lee. I doubt Buford would miss such an opportunity to do so.

Secondly, Pleasonton moved an entire Union cavalry division (Gregg's) to a location where it would be of no discernible use to the immediate pursuit.

Finally, Pleasonton totally failed to coordinate the Federal cavalry at all. Buford's and Kilpatrick's efforts to interdict Lee were uncoordinated and disjointed. Had Pleasonton concentrated his cavalry to delay Lee, we may see Meade on Williamsport first.

2. IOTL There were a few opportunities to interdict wagons carrying tons of critical ammuntion supplies to Lee. Some 4,500 men from the Department of West Virginia, commanded by Brig. Gen. Benjamin F. Kelley, were marching east with that intention in mind.

However, Kelley received contradictory orders. Although Halleck ordered him to attack Lee's wagons on July 5, new orders on July 9 instructed him to march to 'help Meade win a victory' and 'A battle is not far off.' Kelley decided to march to join the Army of the Potomac rather than accomplish the task of disrupting the wagons.

With the two PODs combined, I think Meade has a solid chance of destroying the Army of Northern Virginia north the Potomac.
 
Perhaps a more interesting possibility is that something goes wrong, and the rebel army escapes, but Lee (perhaps with Longstreet) is with the rearguard, and gets captured or killed by Union troops. We have the army of northern Virginia still in the field, but decapitated.
 
It wouldn't happen. The South just ran into a buzz-saw and got its clock cleaned. Morale would be low and guerilla war is vastly overrated. Expect Union casualties to drop 80%+ (Probably considerably more) virtually overnight. With no support from abroad, with Virginia overrun and their main armies defeated I doubt very much the South would put up much more of a fight than in 1865. With the ANV gone there is nothing to prevent Meade from taking Richmond and then simply march his army straight south to Georgia and then turning west. Since the money was in the east it makes it even more devastating than the loss of the west was in 1864. Basically 1865 would happen a year and a half early.

Inclined to agree. On paper there is still the Army of Tennessee, but with Lee's surrender, only days after Pemberton's, I can see it melting away as soldiers just take off for home w/o waiting on the formalities of surrender. Bragg could find himself a general without an army. I wonder if his farewell message to his troops would be as ungracious as Kirby Smith's was OTL.


The biggest problem with your scenario is that the masters can't prevent their slaves from running off if they are playing guerilla in the woods. Slavery can not last long without police power defending it and once the South is overrun by armies the South would have no police power left . If they run off to play guerilla the slave owners lose their slaves, if they don't they will have to pay the ex-slaves but at least they can get the ex-slaves to pick their cotton for them.

Any thoughts on longer term consequences?

Both sides have suffered far fewer casualties (only half as many?) than OTL, and the South in particular isn't ruined as thoroughly as it was by 1865. Far less of its infrastructure will have been destroyed. Could affect the economy is some ways.

One butterfly. With the ACW ending in 1863, does Maximilian still go to Mexico in the face of US opposition? If not, then he's probably still around in 1870 as a possible candidate for the Spanish throne. This could have interesting effects on European history.
 
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