WI Remilitarisation of the Rhineland is prevented

Let's say an overly aggressive overly Germanphobic French commander marches his unit across the German border and the Germans reserve march back what happens then?
 
The Germans are shown for the scaredy-cats they were at that point. Hitler might get couped from power.
Outside that, probably some harsh words to France and to Germany, but nothing more.
 
Let's say an overly aggressive overly Germanphobic French commander marches his unit across the German border and the Germans reserve march back what happens then?

That's two WIs.

If the French had crossed the border is there any guarantee that the Germans really would have marched back w/o a fight? I'd have thought the latter was a better bet for Hitler, politically, as it would rally Germans around him. Just running away wouldn't.
 
That's two WIs.

If the French had crossed the border is there any guarantee that the Germans really would have marched back w/o a fight? I'd have thought the latter was a better bet for Hitler, politically, as it would rally Germans around him. Just running away wouldn't.
From what I heard, the German troops into the Rhineland were under orders to retreat if they saw a single French uniform.
Hell, some soldiers retreated because they saw a Gendarme, ie a French (military) policeman.
 
From what I heard, the German troops into the Rhineland were under orders to retreat if they saw a single French uniform.
....

That is correct. When planning the operation Hitler specified a immediate withdrawal were the border guards to report French soldiers crossing. Or Belgians as it was assumed they would support the French as they had in 1923-24. Shiers 'Rise and Fall of the Third Reich has a passage on this, as do many subsequent historians.
 
I think @David T's bit on this needs more attention. Granted, that goes for most of his stuff, but here especially.

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/soc.history.what-if/qtvUxyKQ6hI/tVfsLI6cbMUJ

A quick summary, though: the Germans did, in fact, intend to resist in the event that the French moved into the Rhineland. Hitler's statements to the contrary are a combination of humble-bragging and exaggeration of what he actually said. The French would have to mobilize their army in order to effectively counter the German move, especially since their planners overestimated German troop numbers and quality, and the time delay would increase their political isolation. That said, the German forces would not have been completely incapable of serious resistance, so there would have been a real cost to the operation, and from the French perspective it would have been smarter to invade in response to the reinstatement of German conscription the year before.

Lastly, he thinks it unlikely Hitler would have been toppled by such an outcome. Rather, it may have strengthened his hand as resisting an invading army. And also, if this move failed, he could "remilitarize" the Rhineland simply by incorporating the local police into the Wehrmacht, and then adding additional troops later.

Even without that, I'm automatically distrustful of accounts of German generals bringing the knives out the moment Hitler made a mistake, for the same reason that I think the number of assassination attempts he survived is at least somewhat inflated.
 
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Let me recycle an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:

***

James Thomas Emmerson, in his book _The Rhineland Crisis: 7 March 1936_
concluded that Hitler would have resisted the French. Yes, he
acknowledges, several times Hitler was to say subsequently that had the
French marched in, he would have had to beat an ignominious retreat, but
he usually said that to boast about his "nerves of steel", show how much
more daring and wise he was than his diplomats and generals, etc.
(Actually, the generals didn't put up any real opposition. Fritsch said
he agreed that remilitarization of the Rhineland was a necessity, but
evidently had some reservations--he agreed to it only after Hitler assured
him the operation would not result in hostilities. Blomberg had no
objections at all. As for the diplomats, Foreign Minister Neurath
probably expressed personal reservations, but did not challenge the
Fuhrer. Neither Hitler nor Neurath nor the generals thought that France
would act so long as it was clear that the action was not a preparation
for an attack on France--for this reason the number of troops
participating in the remilitarization was limited.) The actual military
orders, Emmerson claims, show that resistance was intended. Moreover,
Hitler's statement to Schuschnigg in 1938, often used to bolster the
theory that Hitler wouldn't resist, actually was that Germany "would
withdraw perhaps 60 kilometers but would still hold the French."

An important fact to remember is that the French army in 1936 had no
strike force capable of marching as far as Mainz, let alone occupying the
entire Rhineland. Nor did it possess a single unit which could be made
instantly combat-ready. To resist militarily, the French required
mobilization, which would take time--and during that time, it would no
doubt be evident how totally isolated the French would be in favoring
force. Moreover, the French army believed that the Rhineland had really
been militarized for a long time--they counted, besides the newly
introduced troops, 30,000 members of the labor service and 30,000 members
of the Landespolizei and other police organizations as combat forces.
They also counted over 200,000 "auxiliaries"--all Germans in the
Rhineland who belonged to such organizations as the SA, SS, and NSKK
(motorized corps of the SA). These, the French believed, would put up a
stiff resistance in familiar terrain, certainly for as long as would be
required for Blomberg to bring in his reinforcements.

Gamelin believed that he could establish a foothold on German soil, but
that his advance would be halted rapidly, both by supply problems and by
the enemy--he counted not only over a million Germans already under arms
but millions of members of pre- and para-military formations, disciplined,
partially trained, and capable of being integrated into fighting units
with reasonable speed. They might only be cannon fodder in the short run,
but eventually the weight of Germany's larger population would tell,
especially since France had no equivalent pool of semi-skilled manpower.

Although it is clear in retrospect that the French overestimated German
military strength, that doesn't mean that an occupation of the Rhineland
would have been a walkover. Hitler was not bluffing. The Aachen, Trier,
and Saarbrucken battalions were under orders, not to flee, but to pull
back into previously prepared positions, where their job was to "halt the
enemy advance" for as long as possible before pulling back again to
designated defensive areas. J.A.S. Grenville, in _A History of the World
in the Twentieth Century_ (1994), comes to the same conclusion: "It is a
myth that all that was required to humiliate Hitler was a French show of
strength...German troops were to withdraw as far as the Ruhr and there to
stay and fight. But in view of earlier French political and military
decisions it was obvious that the only French counter-moves would be
diplomatic." (p. 224) Hitler knew that France had not marched in March-
April 1935 during the conscription crisis--and the Reich was considerably
stronger eleven months later.

It is far from clear to me that if the French had marched into the
Rhineland, this would have brought down the Hitler government--it might
have had the opposite effect of unifying Germans around him against the
invader (particularly if they saw that Britain and other nations were
critical of the French move). The French, in any event, had unpleasant
memories of their occupations of the Rhineland during the 1920's, and put
their trust in the Maginot Line they were building.

BTW, there was one way for Germany to remilitarize the Rhineland which
wouldn't even have involved the slight risk Hitler actually incurred.
Hitler could simply have proclaimed that the 14,000 Landespolizei in the
Rhineland were hereby incorporated into the Wehrmacht! France was most
unlikely to have intervened to stop a "militarization" that did not
immediately increase by even one the number of armed German forces in the
Rhineland. Yet once the principle of remilitarization was established,
Germany could then gradually add to their number.

I don't know why Hitler didn't choose this low-risk approach to
remilitarization. Probably it was (as suggested by Emmerson) because he
wanted a _dramatic_ proof to the Germans that their "slavery" had ended--
troops marching across the bridges, aircraft over the Cologne Cathedral,
etc.

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/qtvUxyKQ6hI/tVfsLI6cbMUJ
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Lastly, he thinks it unlikely Hitler would have been toppled by such an outcome. Rather, it may have strengthened his hand as resisting an invading army.
Agreed; indeed, the patriotism card would work well for Hitler in this TL.

Also, here's another question--does France go for Berlin after it moves into the Rhineland, or does it keep its troops in the Rhineland and prevent them from moving further eastward?
 
Agreed; indeed, the patriotism card would work well for Hitler in this TL.

Also, here's another question--does France go for Berlin after it moves into the Rhineland, or does it keep its troops in the Rhineland and prevent them from moving further eastward?

Given the costs, they'd probably want whatever offered the quickest possible resolution to the whole mess. That's ignoring how unlikely it is that we even get that far, as David showed with his full post.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Given the costs, they'd probably want whatever offered the quickest possible resolution to the whole mess. That's ignoring how unlikely it is that we even get that far, as David showed with his full post.
Please keep in mind that it might be possible for France to get Polish help in its attack on Germany, though.
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
Please keep in mind that it might be possible for France to get Polish help in its attack on Germany, though.
Poland has a rather unfriendly neighbor to the East, and would have to leave most of its army in the East to defend against that neighbor.
 
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